http://hdl.handle.net/2330/2 Search the Channel search http://bora.nhh.no:8080/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/2330/1682 Title: Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption <br/> <br/>Authors: Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg <br/> <br/>Abstract: This paper examines the use of market-share thresholds (safe harbors) in evaluating whether a given vertical practice should be challenged. Such thresholds are typically found in vertical restraints guidelines (e.g., the 2000 Guidelines for the European Commission and the 1985 Guidelines for the U.S. Department of Justice). We consider a model of resale price maintenance (RPM) in which firms employ RPM to dampen downstream price competition. In this model, we find that restrictions on the use of RPM by a dominant firm can be welfare improving, but restrictions on the extent of the market that can be covered by RPM (i.e., the pervasiveness of the practice among firms in the industry) may lead to lower welfare and higher consumer prices than under a laissez-faire policy. Our results thus call into question the indiscriminate use of market-share thresholds in vertical cases. Tue, 29 May 2007 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2330/1681 Title: Making sense of market delineation with the aggregate diversion ratio <br/> <br/>Authors: Daljord, Øystein Børnes; Sørgard, Lars; Thomassen, Øyvind <br/> <br/>Abstract: The US Merger Guidelines leave it an open question if the SSNIP test requires an increase in one, some or all prices in the candidate market. We argue that the characteristics of the candidate market in question should be decisive for how to perform the SSNIP test. If there are asymmetries between products, increasing one price might be a better procedure in order to identify competitive constraints. Katz & Shapiro (2003) derived a one-price criterion in terms of the aggregate diversion ratio which is applicable for asymmetric candidate markets. Unfortunately, the derivation is incorrect. We derive a corrected criterion. Sun, 29 Jul 2007 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2330/1680 Title: International income inequality : measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food <br/> <br/>Authors: Almås, Ingvild <br/> <br/>Abstract: Price-adjusted data on national incomes applied in cross-country compar- isons are measured with bias. By studying micro data, this paper ¯nds that the bias is systematic: the poorer a country is, the more its income tends to be overestimated. Consequently, international income inequalities are under- estimated. The bias in the macro price variables (PPPs), is caused by factors ana- logues to those creating bias in consumer price index numbers (CPIs). Ex- ploiting this fact, the PPP bias is measured by estimating Engel curves for food, a method already established to measure CPI bias. Thu, 28 Jun 2007 22:58:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2330/1678 Title: Job losses and child outcomes <br/> <br/>Authors: Bratberg, Espen; Nilsen, Øivind Anti; Vaage, Kjell <br/> <br/>Abstract: Based on matched employer-employee data from Norway, we analyze the effects of worker displacement in 1986-1987 on their children’s earnings in 1999-2001. Using displacement of fathers to indicate an exogenous earnings shock we seek to identify whether family resources have a direct effect on children’s economic outcome. As in previous Scandinavian studies, we find the intergenerational earnings mobility to be fairly high compared to the U.S. and the U.K. Displacement appears to have a negative effect on earnings and employment of those affected, while we find no significant effects on offspring. Tue, 29 May 2007 22:58:59 GMT