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Chapter 8

The Ambivalences of Nordicity

Introduction

'The Nordic Model' or 'The Scandinavian Welfare State' are famous icons often used to portray the success of labour and social democratic movements in the North, drawing on the wrecks of the nineteenth century Nordic nationalist project. The narratives about the Nordic project cross-cut political, socio-economic, and cultural fields to an extent, where it almost became an unquestionable myth. However, processes of globalization, European Union integration, difficulties in having strangers involved in recreating Nordic nationalism, and contemporary national projects for independence in the Faroes and Greenland increasingly deconstruct the myth in practice. The ambivalences of Nordic nation-building, on the grounds of territorial bonding, come up to the surface. This chapter discuss central figurations of Nordic political culture, their origins and consequences. The Nordic Atlantic regions have their specific paths, where Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland (the West Nordic countries) have often been ignored. In some aspects they may be exemptions to Scandinavian tracks, but these tracks are first and foremost divided West versus East in the traces of the former Danish versus Swedish realm. Therefore, Nordic Atlantic peripheries, object to Danish colonialism, experience their specific ambivalences of Nordicity.

A very central organising idea of the project has been the idea of the people, bonding and bonded by the nationalism of the common production of wealth and welfare. Welfare nationalism has been a way of coping with social and physical distances, producing societies of redistribution among those included in the nations, culturally defined. This was clearly defined in after Second World War Social Democratic programs, anticipating people coming together in hopeful national communities. There were interesting similarities between the programs of the British and Norwegian Labour Parties and the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats, as they were in fact inspiring each other (Olesen 1998). These were national projects with broad appeals. Greenland was to become one of the very few countries in the world to experience a clear-cut implementation of a Social Democratic Program by the colonial power (Adolphsen and Greiffenberg 1999). The after war histories of Iceland and the Faroes followed different tracks and were deeply concerned with

national identity and the heritage from and relation to Danish nationalism and colonialism. People in Iceland and the Faroes performed their specific variant of welfare nationalism, but this was less an implementation of a Social Democratic welfare state program. The commonality of the various paths suggests that welfare projects have historical roots prior to twentieth century Social Democratic policies. The project also to have been based in more discrete and contingent relations, prior to the formation of political programs of the welfare state (Knudsen 2000a). Among other aspects, Nordicity has traces back to the specific forms of protestant reformation, absolutism and pietism in the relation between state and church in the Danish Kingdom, to be addressed later in this chapter.

Across these apparent continuities, there are crucial ambivalences in the production of nations and welfare in the Nordic Atlantic and they have common Nordic references, although the 'Nordic' is only a rather tacit 'background' to the various nationalisms, but this only makes the use of the common denominator the more powerful. The ambivalences are associated with the specific form of Nordic nationalism that combines national definitions of each people as a bonding community (*Gemeinschaft*, Østergaard 1991) with an idea of a common ancestry in the trans-national Nordic world.

This ambivalence of Nordicity is found in the bonding Nordic and national community and the use of this for socio-economic redistribution. With increasing flows of people and capital across borders, the implicit use of territoriality to bond, is challenged. This raises an explicit agenda of who are included in the 'we' and who are excluded from the 'we'. Who identify with who, and who will contribute to associate to the benefit of who etc.? It is ambivalence between solidarity among 'us' and solidarity with 'them'. Solidarity in consequence is about socio-economic redistribution in what can be called an 'associational economy' characterized by profound social or even better societal (*Gesellschaftliche*) innovations. Alongside these political economies of redistribution, there is the question of recognition of who should benefit. Here, social distinctions are made according to bonding communities (*Gemeinschaften*) of the Nordic nations or people, as defined by means of cultural similarities. So while the redistribution side seem to coin an inclusive societal model, this is not the whole story when it comes to recognizing those included according to cultural identity, since the people included is exactly claimed to be more or less identical with each other. By way of a number of historical and contemporary examples, this chapter set of to understand how this ambivalence between recognition and redistribution has worked and work.

While one would ideally expect direct resemblance between cultural recognition of nationhood and socio-economic redistribution by territorial states, this is not the case in practice. First, the ambivalence comes to the surface in the relation between nationality and Nordicity. The nineteenth century Nordic nationalist project failed, leaving the Nordic project back to tracks of rather silent, 'low politics' or cultural cooperation. To a high degree a form of transnationalism, supported by rather weak institutionalized organizations and ties, but also by NGOs, first and foremost the Nordic Associations (*Foreningen Norden*). This means that a certain form of sub-political cultural process of mutual recognition and networking among sister people is performed, while these forms of recognition is in fact not supported by any apparent form of Nordic political economy of redistribution. Nordicity remains a question of identity and networks of the selected.

Secondly, the ambivalence is found between the Nordic and the European Union project. With Denmark's EU-membership since 1973 and Sweden's and Finland's since 1996, alongside with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Nordic project did not only become more backstage. In finding a role in relation to the European Union (and to Russia), it also changed its orientation and turned much energy into cooperation around the Baltic Sea and especially with the three new independent so-called Baltic states. This meant in effect a sharper distinction between dominant European Union Norden, with the three Baltic states associated, vis-a-vis the four Nordic Atlantic

countries, defending their maritime resources. The community of the Nordic people is therefore challenged by the much stronger, territorial and almost statist, forms of redistribution performed by the European Union, driven by innovation and regulation, rather than by identity formation and reciprocity.

Finally, the ambivalence is especially apparent between nation-statehood and the home-ruled nations of the Faroes and Greenland, where Nordic cooperation in creative ways have given the Faroes and Greenland (alongside with the Åland islands) certain, recognized, roles to play. Meanwhile the Faroes and Greenland remain subordinate parts of the Danish Realm, the Kingdom of Denmark, and it is with Denmark redistribution takes place. Politics of recognition and redistribution does go alongside each other in ambivalent ways, let alone the questions of immigrants.

The relation between recognition and redistribution address central issues in the production of Nordic Atlantic societies. This is less about physical but more about social and cultural distances. The ambivalence is between coping with social distance (welfare and inequality by means of redistribution) and coping with cultural distance (identifying us and the other by means of recognition). This chapter base its analysis in first a conceptual discussion of how boundaries of national communities are produced. With reference to contributions across (and especially Marianne Gullestad's inspiring) anthropology and cultural history this leads to the central understandings and practices of Nordic identifications with the notions of 'egalitarian individualism' and 'imagined sameness', which are suggested to have been historical produced with the help of Protestantism and the integration of state and church. This is all in all an argument about the procedures of recognition, characteristic to how it is defined who is belonging to Nordic communities of various sorts, with emphasis on the Western Nordic, the former Danish empire.

The second part of the chapter then sets out with a number of examples of the socio-economics of Nordic Atlantic projects and the forms of redistribution involved, most strikingly with the case of the home-rule government owned global fish firm Royal Greenland. This then leads to an analysis of the various nationalisms performed in the Nordic Atlantic area. Historical examples are drawn from Norwegian, Icelandic, Greenlandic and Faroese history to analyse how the discrepancies of recognition and redistribution work. Of special interest are the relations between the state of Denmark and the home-rule governments of Greenland and the Faroes.

In the end I finally address Nordism as such as a form of postcolonial ideological practice reminiscent of the engagement of the Danish poet, politician and priest Grundtvig for a special mission of the Nordic peoples. As a consequence of the analysis of the ambivalence of Nordicity, the coping approach with innovation, networking and formation of identity is critically reconsidered.

Nationalism and boundary making, Cultural practices and social interaction

To frame some important conceptual clarifications, let us here again [for the third and last time] reflect on Bauman's phrase, putting Fredrik Barth's (1969) social anthropology of boundaries to the edge: '...the ostensibly shared 'communal' identities are after-effects or by-products of forever unfinished (and all the more feverish and ferocious for that reason) boundary drawing' (Bauman 2001: 17). It is of particular relevance for this study of 'Nordic after-effects' to address the theoretical and methodological implications of Bauman's claim.

Fredrik Barth's approach was always to highlight the social interactions that produce boundaries and cultures. He pointed to the problems in thinking of boundaries as hermetic. They 'persist despite a flow a personnel across them', and second '...ethnic distinctions do not depend on an

absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built' (Barth 1969: 9-10). Barth's remarkable critique of cultural essentialism (before this term was used) was based in detailed ethnographic studies, especially at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, by using a Goffmannian micro-sociological approach. He saw how sharing of culture was taken for granted, but suggested to see this '...as an implication or result, rather than a primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization' (Barth 1969: 11). Thereby the very concrete process of making bonds and boundaries in practice comes in to the centre of focus.

Contemporary constructivist approaches to Norwegian nationalism has shown how nationalism drew on cultural imaginations of an authentic village culture that was no longer practiced. The image and idea was produced by Norwegian intellectuals in the colonial capital Copenhagen. Complimentary to Bauman's at-the-edge formulation, the Danish historian Uffe Østergård argues that '... cultural nationalism does not catch people [*fænger*], until the cultural basis it appeals to, no longer is a matter of course' (Østergård 1994: 20, my translation from Danish). The making of boundaries, binding the memory of a village culture, is unfinished and indeed therefore becomes feverish.

But does this mean, following Barth and Bauman, that it is only the organization of social practices, innovations and networks (cp. chapter 1), that matters in coping with distances? Do the practices of formation of identity and making sense not matter to 'how people's mundane practices of coping with distances constitute various kinds of societies' (chapter 1). Bauman's strong sentences, may in practice show up to be too functionalist, as also this one: 'the sameness evaporates once the communication between its insiders and the world outside becomes more intense and carries more weight than the mutual exchanges of the insiders' (Bauman 2001: 13, and see chapter 1). This sentence is so functionalist, that it also contradicts Barth's points, quoted above (Barth 1969). Interaction does not necessary make pre-interaction sameness disappear. However, the fundamental problem is that sameness is not a 'clean' theoretical concept; it is implicit in some everyday life practices, at least in Norway as shown in a number of studies by the Norwegian Social Anthropologist Marianne Gullestad (1992, 2001, 2002). The problem now to be addressed could also be phrased in relation to 'boundary quote' from Bauman (above): How are after-effects enacted?

Gullestad relates directly to Fredrik Barth:

Theoretically, I think, in spite of Fredrik Barth's claim of the opposite [ref. to Barth 1969], it is not possible to understand ethnical boundaries without also taking into consideration cultural categories and practices. There is a more complex relation between the ethnical boundary and "the cultural stuff that it encloses" [ref. to Barth 1969: 15]. In addition to Barth's weight on the individual's understanding of own identity, it is also important to focus on the power in being able to categorise and term [or signify, from Norwegian '*betegne*'] others (Gullestad 2002: 80-81, my translation from Norwegian).

Marianne Gullestad has provided many interesting studies of everyday national identity, to be discussed in the next section. For the moment we dwell with her more or less Foucauldian point on the power of categorizing others. Her point is a necessary addition to Barth and Bauman, as she stresses the power of making sense of mundane everyday life practices. Therefore, a communitarian obsession with a community 'we' is rather the problem than the solution to a non-xenophobic analysis. As pointed out in the introduction to chapter 7, this problem is not only in communitarian discourses, but lies implicit in the phenomenology (Ingold, Heidegger) of dwelling.

This rooted and Heideggerian phenomenon of ‘the we’, which is ‘worlded’ rather than global, seems to open up political space for the new communities, including the ‘new social movements’. In its departure from the subject-object assumptions of the abstract “I”, it opens up space as well for ecological thought. But the Heideggerian anti-discursive world of shared meanings, background practices and building, dwelling and thinking is at the same time and proximally the world of racism and ethnic hate. (Lash and Urry 1994: 315)

The problem seems to lie in the connotations dwelling give to a sort of privileged localised authentic environment. Mobilising this into aircapes or migrant routes does not prevent the fundamental problem. Therefore it is in fact not the territorial localisation of ‘we’ in itself that is problematic. The problem rather is to remember to change the essentialist ‘is’ (before ‘at the same time’ in the quote) into ‘is *made / translated into...*’. Otherwise we do not reveal and investigate the rather active human practice of transforming people associated with a project into the idea that this project is then only for them to identify with and/or benefit from. All collective projects are *not* doomed to become exclusive. It is not territoriality per se but the essentialist and exclusive use of territories that is problematic.

Boundary in this way have other, and more discursive, dimensions, than Barth thought of, but in a sense his approach can be translated into a Foucauldian perspective, so to say, studying the enactment of states ‘from below’. The social processes of making peoples’ ‘we’ references and belongings into boundary-objects for discrimination is namely central processes in the ‘...’governmentalization’ of societies, that is, the specific way human practices became objects of knowledge, regulation, and discipline.’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 4). This process is itself made by actors; power does not exist independently from the practices exercising it. Therefore we need to study how people make boundaries into power, or better use boundaries to exercise power, to categorise and transform forms of ‘we’ and ‘them’, ‘us’ and ‘the others’.

Having considered the conceptual focus on how people make and reconstruct states and national identities and make use of them in their practices, the methodological question of what history can explain is on the agenda. Nomothetic social sciences have the habit of ‘using’ the past to explain how specific present phenomena came into being and possibly generalize this finding. In contrast, hermeneutic historians take their point of departure in the past to understand why certain possible events and changes occurred, while other did not, and thus with little ambition of theoretical synthesis (Ingesman 2000: 68). The risk of the first, nomothetic, position is historicism, namely to ‘use’ the past as a form of historical determinism or necessity. The limit of the second position is that the focus of understanding a specific context does not allow for theoretical conclusions. This may contradict an inclination to comparison of contexts, to question the limits of contexts and to point to the porosity of contexts in a globalizing world. Nevertheless, the non-historicist historian - and non-geographically-determinist geographical - approach has the advantage of always asking what was the specific, practices, events, translations, ‘conditions’ etc. that made the difference between several latent possibilities. It also has the advantage of approaching the world and societies as thereby changeable. It reminds us that societies are made, changed and remade, and it directs our intention away from functionalist explanations and moves us into hermeneutic investigations of how, as here, people cope with distances. Whether peoples’ coping produce societies or not should remain open. If societies are constructed, we are interested in what kinds of societies are produced and look for answers to this in investigating how people have coped with various forms for distance. Here, past practices will never suffice to explain the present. If past practices affect present societies we need to show how. Therefore the following sections do investigate how present Nordic Atlantic societies are practiced, what were the historical possibilities that people made into

these practices, and how do people make use of the past. In other words: how do people enact the ‘after-effects’ of the ‘Nordic’?

Egalitarian individualism: The freedom of sameness.

Are there central figurations of meanings used in Nordic nationalism to categorise ‘we’ or ‘us’? Marianne Gullestad has presented interesting anthropological works on the meanings of equality and freedom in Scandinavia or Northern Europe, based in field work in contemporary Norway. Based on her findings she has suggested the term ‘egalitarian individualism’ (Gullestad 1992) to frame how equality and freedom is understood. Gullestad’s provocative point is that equality in the Nordic sense is not the Anglo-American liberal ‘equal opportunities’ but goes further. The Norwegian word *likhet* (and Danish *lighed*) for equality rather mean ‘alikehood’ or ‘sameness’, while difference (that is a consequence of equal opportunity) is easily perceived as hierarchy and injustice. The ‘historical explanation’ often used by people at large, is that the Nordic countries (apart from most of Denmark and parts of Sweden) did not have feudal master-servant relations. The rural social structures in the Nordic peripheries were formed via scattered farms or village communities, thereby not paving the way for strong hierarchical social relations. This is then also used to explain why for example Norwegian terms of ‘closeness’ (or proximity) and community are deeply connected to ideas of equality as sameness (Gullestad 1992: 194). If these findings are true, they make us understand why some Norwegians seek to avoid direct encounters with immigrants. ‘From the point of view of the new immigrants, the Norwegian practice of avoiding situations where equality as sameness cannot easily be established is an obstacle for social contact and integration’ (Gullestad 1992: 195). In other words: Immigrants experience that Norwegians keep at a distance, because sameness and proximity goes hand in hand in Norwegian cultural practices.

Gullestad’s analysis is provocative, but to the extent it is valid, it can explain how sameness is used to draw boundaries, in continuation of Barth’s approach in the last section. This is not happening in a functionalist way, but because of the content of the cultural practice. It is because Norwegian cultural practices connect sameness, proximity and also community in a way, that they may work as translations of each other that boundaries become the consequence. It is not an unintended consequence. Symbolic fencing is used as a strategy. People cope with cultural distance by means of distancing, but it is a strategy producing new problems. ‘The symbolic fences imparted via distancing are solutions which form new dilemmas in a continuous process’ (Gullestad 1992: 196). But sameness remains the meaning cultural practices ascribe to being egalitarian and to national identity.

The other side of Gullestad’s analysis is to point at individualism, based on the understanding of freedom as independence. Again ‘roots’ in the experiences of living in remote farms can be imagined, but these past practices are of course only forming the present to the extent that people refer to them as giving meaning to their practices. But it is a very central part of Nordic cultural practices to have the objective of ‘getting one’s own place’ to live, often materialised in the one-family house.

In his study of ‘the Culturality of the Nordic Welfare State’, the Swedish [historian] Lars Trädgårdh (1997) point out that behind the Nordic idea of *Gemeinschaft* is a notion of a ‘*Gesellschaft* of individuals’ that he sees as a generalization of the local peasant assemblies, he has studied in Sweden and Finland. Therefore he argues that the isolation and loneliness of individuals (often associated with Swedishness) is not a consequence of the welfare state but rather a kind of pre-welfare-state national identity. It can be argued that his argument is too historicist, and further

more that it at least is more valid in Sweden (and Finland), than in the Western parts of Norden (the Danish colonial realm).

Some of Marianne Gullestad's later works concentrate on the 'sameness' dimension, also concentrating the argument on Norway, suggesting that an 'imagined sameness' is used to provide distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. 'As a concept and a set of practices imagined sameness is not merely associated with the word *likhet*, but also with a large number of other linguistic expressions. Some examples of such expressions are "to fit with each other", "to suit each other", "to get on well together and to hold common opinions".' (Gullestad 2001: 38, italics by me). Gullestad has consciously used her analysis politically in works critically addressing Norwegian everyday coping with immigrants (2002). She studies the transformations of the wordings of 'an immigrant' and 'a Norwegian' via a sequence of diverse case studies. In one of these, she analyses a telephone conversation between an immigrant, born in India, and a professor in linguistics, based on the professor's narrative (Gullestad 2002: 88-93): The immigrant wanted to know for how long she will persist to be an immigrant, since she had obtained Norwegian citizenship, but as an expert in linguistics the professor could only answer her that she will remain an immigrant for her 'whole life'. Studying a number of dictionaries did not give the professor the possibility of another answer. Gullestad shows how the word 'immigrant' nowadays only gets its connotations in opposition to 'Norwegian' and thus locks the immigrant, like the Indian women deeply unsatisfied with the answer she got, into an 'eternal present', where she can never leave her past immigration (Gullestad 2002: 91). The key to understanding the situation of the minorities is thus for her to analyse the construction of the majority of Norwegians, since it is with the performance of the governing practices of the majority, that minorities are defined. This way, we see (with inspirations from both Barth and Foucault) how societies are made through governmentalizing practices, that draw lines between here and there, and connect them with boundaries between past and present, as we saw above.

This way of studying also has consequences for the performance of research practices. Interestingly, another case in Gullestad's work is the Norwegian community research tradition and the ways the perspective of this tradition is used in the biography of a non-academic Northern Norwegian man (2002: 262-269) leading her to a sharp analytical and political critique of Ottar Brox' defence of local people protecting their own interests as opposed to immigrants. The defence of local for example fishing communities of people 'belonging' to the place easily go hand in hand with defences of national identity. Brox' position in community research and in politics has been influential in Norway (see also Johnsen 2002). Although there is also much ambivalence, analytically and politically, in research, I will argue that Gullestad's attack on the 'from below' community studies tradition do not hide all kinds of 'from below' studies, as they are not all of them 'the same'.

Interestingly, Gullestad took off with a concept 'egalitarian individualism' to explain Nordic cultural practices, and found a concept of equality as sameness. Ten years later, confronted with the debate about migration, she developed the same analysis into the concept of 'imagined sameness', with less stress on the 'liberty' of individualism. The freedom of sameness is ironic, it seems. Clearly it is involved in processes of governmentalization. The freedom of sameness has become a form of governmentality, whereby people rule and accepts to be ruled. 'Sameness' and 'egalitarian individualism' has become a powerful imagination. The next section explores how this may have been installed historically

Localising Protestantism

The Nordic countries have a common religious history, making them apart from most other European countries. With Finland as a partial exemption, they are all countries where Lutheran Protestantism played a crucial role in the formation of states and societies. Lutheran Protestantism was introduced from above, when religion was nationalized through state-led reformations in the 16th century. But this in turn also provoked pietism and a number from below religious revivalisms (Stråth and Sørensen 1997: 10), but many of these reactions were reintegrated in the state-led churches, in interesting ways superseding distinctions between from-above and from-below (Stenius 1997: 163).

The statist introduction of Protestantism was especially the case in the Kingdom of Denmark including Norway, the Faroes and Iceland. To take one specific example, in Iceland reformation can from above and from outside, only gradually taking root in a society, where Christianity were performed vis-à-vis other beliefs and Icelanders continually have been ambivalent toward religion (Hastrup 1990: 26, 130-131). Reformation meant the gradual installation of certain forms of governmentality, such as in marriage systems and the like. Certain standards were set by the Danish king as to what should be conceived as part of society, thus defining the abnormal, such as witches, as non-societal (Hastrup 1990: 226).

As pointed out in chapter 7, the reformation meant the unification of the administration of the state and the church in one territorial system. Meanwhile the reaction to the 'from above' Lutheran state-church can from two moves: First of all from pietism, first enacted at the Danish court in the early 18th century but gradually becoming part of various popular revival congregations, not at least in the peripheries of the Kingdom and in the mission in Greenland, whether following Hans Egede or the Hernnhut mission. Pietism sought for a real, 'authentic', Christianity for selected people. Thus for pietism, Christianity is not for everyone. The revivalism caused conflicts with a state apparatus increasingly influenced by Enlightenment, but the state administration was generally not keen in too much intervention in religious matters, since Enlightenment was also a move in opposition to strong state-church relation (Ingesman, 2000: 83-84). Ironically, this in turn meant that pietism and a number of religious revivalisms came to influence governmentalities of many people in the Nordic Atlantic, under the umbrella of the enlightened state. However, the less religious Icelanders represent an interesting exemption to the rule in contrast especially to the central role of various forms of Christianity in the Faroes. Iceland did not experience any major religious revivalism in the 19th century. In turn there was a national revival, that among other things also led to some free churches around 1900 formed in explicit opposition to the dominance of the Danish state's 'people's church' (Pétursson 2001).

The cultural historian Nina Witoszek has suggested an interesting perspective on the peculiar Scandinavian Enlightenment. She suggests that the Enlightenment is the '*founding tradition of Scandinavian cultures*', much stronger than romanticism, and that the strength of Scandinavian Enlightenment is due to 'the powerful, modifying presence of Christianity' (Witoszek 1997: 73). The compromise, however ironic it may be, is between rational pragmatic, liberal, agendas and a strong religious, Christian, ethos. Much of these ideas have been explained by the Swedish author Per Olov Enquist in his historical novels *Livlægens besøg* about Struense, the personification of Enlightenment in Denmark, and *Lewis rejse* about the revivalist movements, obviously paving the way for the welfare states. The Pentecostal Movement in many parts of the Nordic countries, the Hernnhut mission in Greenland until 1900, the Plymouth Brethren community in Klaksvík (locally called the "Baptists", see chapter 7), the Lastaedian congregation in much of Northern Scandinavia including Storfjord municipality, the *Indre Mission* evangelical wing of churches in Norway, Denmark and the Faoes, but also the many Grundtvigianists especially in Denmark are examples of these effective movements. They were and are not in opposition to rationality, but install a certain form of thinking about society and people, where there is a certain proximity between each individual and God.

To obtain proximity, much organised activity is performed, including voluntary poor relief work. Moral is central, European decadence the enemy. The central figure is the selected but isolated people coping through hard work and committed effort. Importantly, the activities organised is to a high degree civic *Bildung* (non-formal education), and the central actor per se is the peasant, independent, free-holder. The peasant constructed flee from the Romantic stereotypes into the image of the rationalist, educated, peasant (Witoszek 1997: 82-86). In short: a citizen, a society producer.

Witoszek argue that there is a historical continuity in Norwegian political culture, anticipating not only Social Democracies and nationalism but also constitutional democracy: 'There was an indigenous, individualist, egalitarian ethos which both prepared and supported the 1814 constitution and which ensured its further operability' (Witoszek 1997: 87). The same argument could be developed for the history of thing places in Iceland (Thingvellir) and the Faroes (Tinganes), exhibiting a tradition of combination of political and religious culture. For example, it is said that Icelanders decided to become Christian in the year 1000, during the annual thing at Thingvellir. However, the similarity of such explanations and narratives with nationalist ideology itself may cause reflections, reinstalling critique of historicism and of cultural essentialism. Where was this 'indigenous, individualist, egalitarian ethos' that Witoszek found and that reminds Gullestad's points? Where is this inherent Protestantism localised? In the case of Iceland as mentioned above, 'national revivalism functionally replaced religious revivalism' (Thorkildsen 1997: 144), meaning that nationalism itself became the enactor.

Gullestad has another answer for Norway: A particular form of secularized pietism is localised in everyday practices, and she use her fieldwork among young mothers in Bergen as evidence to a form of embedded moral. Thereby she presents concrete examples of how the striking similarities between pietist lay organized church life and the notion of equality as sameness is actually lived. Although the documentation is only sketchy, as she points out, the correspondence between pietist revivalism and her 'equality of sameness' cannot be a coincidence. 'The lay organized church is by definition egalitarian, stressing the community of brothers as against the hierarchy of the clergy. Pietist revival is further characterized by a strong dividing line between "us" (the converted) and "them" (the non-converted)...' (Gullestad 1992: 219). Only we should show how the ideas are circulated through education, prayers, nationalism, and thus not only lived everyday life, but also a matter of governmentality. Consequently, to see this only as continuity of everyday life practices paving fertile grounds for certain political arrangements from above would miss the point. Governmentalization is with us the whole way; 'from above' and 'from below' come together.

To give another example, teachers and priest are central 'governmentalizers' and play significant roles in nation-building. In Greenland the catechists, combined preachers and teachers, were trained by Danish and German missionaries as early as in the 18th century. A catechist seminary was established in Nuuk in 1845 (Tuesen 1988, 1995), and catechists became an important part of the local Greenlandic elite, having a close contact with Danish colonial rule and developing the tradition of missionaries. The establishment of a unified Greenlandic church and school system already in the beginning of the 20th century became crucial to the development of the idea of Greenlandic nation and the cultural values ascribed to this. But this importance is only due to the everyday practices of, among others, catechists.

National and religious identities are simultaneously lived and construed, practiced and imagined, incorporated and narrated, performed and governmentalized. There is a number of similarities of how church and state developed since the Reformation in the Nordic countries, but there is also differences: First of all between the Danish and the Swedish realm. Reformation was implemented much faster in Denmark-Norway, the Faroes and Iceland than in the Swedish realm. The church and not to forget its property became a part of the state, or better, of the further building of the state (Thorkildsen 1997: 139). Furthermore, pietism was suppressed in Sweden, while it was encouraged by the Danish king. There is thus one distinction between the Western Nordic 'Low church' and the Eastern Nordic 'High

church' (Thorkildsen 1997: 141). On the other side, the Western Nordic church is not one tradition. I have already mentioned the less importance of strict religion in Iceland. Greenland represent another case, where there was no Reformation, since no Christians were settled in Greenland at that time, while here Danish pietism and German Hernnhut mission became crucial part of the colonial shaping of the country. The Faroes have many revivalisms and is still today a rather religious society. Norway in the 19th century saw a split between nationalist and revivalist movements (Thorkildsen 1997: 149).

However, across these different histories, that do also have further local and regional varieties, there is a common localisation of Protestantism as organizer of territorial administration of state and church. Furthermore, there is a certain form of associative organization of people, an 'egalitarian individualism' (Gullestad 1992) for those included, paving the way for a certain form of citizenship, where every citizen has a direct *Gesellschaft* relation to God and State (see Stråth and Sørensen 1997: 12), while this relation is on the other hand conditioned on being part of the people as *Gemeinschaft*, construed through imagined sameness. Trädgårdh suggested that 'behind the *Gemeinschaft* of the so-called 'homes of the people' one finds a *Gesellschaft* of atomized, autonomous individuals' (1997: 253). This may be more or less true for his Sweden, but I am afraid for the Nordic Atlantic this is upside down. Sweden may represent a certain form of enlightenment of a Swedish democratic patriotism. However, even this position vis-à-vis the dark sides of German romanticism, is also a national cultural project of the Swedish people (Witoszek and Trädgårdh 2002: 8), that has its exclusive features. But this is not the place for further analysis of Sweden (see Pred 2000 on racism in Sweden).

In the case of the Nordic Atlantic area, stronger after-effects of pietism frame an understanding of societies as not for anybody, but only for those selected: People first, individuality second. Therefore it is no coincidence that the resistance to the EU in the Nordic countries have often been in the wording of the 'Nordic *Gemenskap* / *Fælleskab* (*Gemeinschaft*)' as opposed to the alienation of the EU *Gesellschaft* (Trädgårdh 2002: 94-95). Nordic Atlantic communities (*Gemeinschaften*), nationally but also locally and transnationally, have been defined with the help of boundary making, marking who belong to the selected people and who does not. The claim here is then that the after-effects of this boundary making are alive in the practicing of imagined sameness. Boundaries came with the political culture of statist reformation and pietism, where the state not only took over the property of the church – but also the project of the church (Ingesman, 2000: 82). These complex and ambivalent processes paved the way for the specific Nordic Atlantic compromise or even synthesis of Enlightenment and Christianity. The Nordic Atlantic nationalist and state-building projects cannot be understood without the forms of cultural understanding of the 'governed people' implied. The church had become an instrument in the exercise of state power, performing registration of people, censuses etc. (Knudsen, 2000: 42-44).

This was not only a project 'from above'. It was, and is, a story of governmentalization, cross-cutting the distinction above-below. State regulation and redistribution is embedded in local practices. As shown in chapter 7, this is evident in the case of the redistributive associations of welfare municipalities. Of course, it can be hard to generalise the practices translating these principles over time. However, it is striking to what extent these translations in spite of other distinctions seem to have been generalized in the associative practices of people, where redistributive efforts are only valid for the selected people, that is those recognized under the category of 'imagined sameness'. However, with the increase of mobile networks and flows boundaries are challenged, but by this reason not necessarily dismantled. To the contrary, remembering Barth's qualifications, boundaries were never hermetic, but rather implications or results of interactions across them. Therefore it is interesting to look further into the political transformations that come along with contemporary socio-economic innovations, involving many cross-boundary relations

The socio-economics of Nordic Atlantic projects

Socio-economic development is one of the fields, where the associative practices in the Nordic countries have been found to be crucial. The term ‘associational economy’ (Cooke and Morgan 1998) has been coined to explain how certain regions, in spite of comparable low investments in Research and Development, have performed with some success. The success is ascribed to certain forms of collaboration, shared understanding, organized public life, state-facilitators, dense networks or certain political or religious projects. The Norwegian economic geographer Bjørn Asheim suggest to find the historical and social background to the coordinated market economy in Norway in ‘egalitarian social structures’, ‘protestant work and consumption ethic as well as being concerned with the value of social justice and solidarity’ (Asheim 2003: 177). He sees these aspects of the economy alongside with concepts of the ‘configuration of development’ and of social capital (see the discussion in chapter 1), that make society more than a frame but a part of the business itself: ‘This organising form of bringing the society inside the firm through learning organizations based on broad participation, and supported by labour market legislation as well as a strong tradition of co-operation between the labour market organisations, is in many aspects the opposite way of achieving a fusion of the economy with the rest of society than the industrial district model...’ (Asheim 2003: 187). In contrast to the rather localised embeddedness of industrial districts, this Nordic type of broader societal forms of business development is built by certain ‘development coalitions’ including public authorities. There are however few studies in economic geography that show how such processes work in concrete.

Chapter 7 referred to a number of studies of especially two contrasting Nordic Atlantic localities, Klaksvík in the Faroes and Storfjord Municipality in Northern Norway. In both of these cases, religious associations including the Plymouth Brethren community in Klaksvík and the Lastaedian congregation in Storfjord play crucial roles, performing scandals and conflicts as much as homogeneity, since none of these revivalist groups have a clear hegemony. Nevertheless, chapter 7 concluded that (also these) municipalities were capable of territorial translation of social relations into a common language. However, this was increasingly more the case because of the territorial bridging of different stake-holders than of the territorially bonded community. The point is that the persistence of religious revivals is not the decisive factor. The decisive factor is the territorial organization of an associative society, municipal and national, where people participate in governing themselves as a people. As pointed out by Asheim (referring to Woolcock, as I also did in chapter 1), there is a rather generalised form of social capital building an associative society. This may explain how also Icelandic, Greenlandic and Faroese economies have coped, in spite of nepotism, overinvestment in fisheries, underdeveloped national systems of innovation and outward flows of capital (cp. Jonsson 1995). The point is that although we do not find any strong state in Iceland, and we find no Faroese or Greenlandic state, various forms of territorial bridging associative redistribution is performed.

The hegemonic, postcolonial, fish firm Royal Greenland is an interesting and in many ways extreme case of the ambivalences involved. My study of this is based in a one month field work in four localities in Greenland in 1996 (in the municipal centres Uummannaq and Ilulissat (revisited 2001), in the small village Ikerasak in the district of Uummannaq, and in the capital Nuuk, including the Royal Greenland head office). Further deregulation and privatization has been under way after my field work.

Royal Greenland is a vertically organized shrimp and fish company responsible for most of Greenland’s exports. The company runs several trawlers in Greenlandic and foreign waters, as well as fish processing plants in a number of Greenlandic towns (municipal centres), and in Denmark. In 1996, Royal Greenland also bought a large processing plant for ready prepared products in Wilhelmshaven in Germany, ran parts of a trawler company in Seattle and formed joint ventures with the Northwest Russian fish company Sevryba. While building on the colonial heritage of the Royal Greenland Trade

(the monopoly trade company), the firm had the objective of becoming a major player in global fish and shrimp trade, itself one of the major coldwater shrimp/prawn (*Pandulus borealis*) producers of the world. In 1996 Royal Greenland informed me that the majority of their occupied staff was outside of Greenland and main profits were gained in the overseas division, while these engagements were clearly also fragile, due to the fluctuations in the global fish and especially shrimp market. Meanwhile Royal Greenland also had a number of plants running in Greenland, subsidized by the Home Rule Government, following a principle of 'societal tasks'. Since 1996 an increasing number of these plants have been reorganised into subsidized systems outside of Royal Greenland, whereas other profitable plants in smaller villages (especially in Uummannaq and Upernavik district Greenlandic halibut fishing) have been merged with a number of newly emerged private fish firms (investigated 2001, see Bærenholdt 2002 and chapter 5).

The globalization strategy of Royal Greenland was in no way generally popular. Several Greenlandic interview persons asked why the foreign activities could not be 'done by ourselves'. Furthermore there is a strong public and political awareness around Royal Greenland, with influential Greenlandic politicians involved in the management and the board of the firm, alongside with Danish business men and former politicians.

Royal Greenland decisions are constantly on the political and public agenda. Meanwhile, fish industry is not at all considered giving status among many Greenlanders. Work on the floor in fish processing tends to be the last alternative, and most of the management staff is Danish. Thus, Royal Greenland, as other fish firms in the Nordic Atlantic, demand immigrant workers (see chapter 5). On the one side Royal Greenland is blamed for not creating enough jobs, on the other side these jobs do not meet the expectations of many job seekers. Further modernization, leading to better jobs, is an expensive possibility, but business rationality would lead to the move of more jobs from on-shore processing to mobile ships with processing on-board.

The example illustrates the ambivalences of the project of making Royal Greenland a 'social democratic' service and facility for societal development, in continuity of the 1960s Danish modernization plans for Greenland. Taking into consideration the Danish subsidies and the use of these funds not only for welfare service provision but also for business subsidies, the nationalist agendas for increased Greenlandic self-government, questions the rationality of continuing the subsidizing. Interesting in both the Faroes and Greenland, the more or less leftist nationalist political parties and movements are also those increasingly thinking by way of neo-liberal economics, pointing to Iceland as a model. The project of making Royal Greenland an independent private company is part of this discourse, supported by numerous economic reports. The premise of this form of nationalist liberalism is to 'cut one's coat according to one's cloth' (*at sætte tæring efter næring*, in Danish).

However, this is an ambivalent project since it refers to a collective national actor performing the economy. On the one side we have increasing trans-national flows and engagements, on the other these are supposed to be useful for the bounded associative we, transgressed by flows and engagements. This form of politics is a kind of neo-mercantilism, where political actors seek to produce national or regional 'closures'. In his critical study of regional devolution in Britain, the British geographer Ray Hudson explain how 'Social and political actors often seek to increase the extent of regional closure and represent regions as closed, continuous and internally homogeneous and, as such, legitimate subjects seeking to shape policy. Consequently, while many of the social relations that help constitute regions traverse their immanent boundaries and enrol extra-regional actors in the process of regionalisation, these trans-boundary relationships may, in some cases, produce what may be termed "closure"' (Hudson, forthcoming). It seems obvious that the case of Greenlandic national economic strategies for independence is also such a case. This may lead to the neglect of questions of internal equity, since the installation of certain form of 'neo-liberal governmentality' alongside with devolution (Hudson, forthcoming) may build on non-realistic prospects. The emerging ambivalence is about an

associational construction of a 'we', defined by imagined sameness, while dismantling the forms of redistribution inherent in the historical construction of sameness, the result being recognition without or with only weak redistribution.

The potential fire of these processes is obvious, when the association has been built on colonial relations, which makes impossible for the colonized people to conceive of the colonizer's subsidy as a form of regional policy. At least it would require Denmark's recognition of the independent nationhood of Greenlanders and Faroese, followed by the mutual acceptance of conceiving of the subsidy as a compensation for past damage and pain. We will come back to this point in more detail in the later section on the indistinctive zones of home-rules, while we will first address the context for this point in the broader field of Danish colonialism and Nordic Atlantic nationalisms.

Nationalism and the Nordic Atlantic Nation-states

The history of Danish dominance in the Nordic Atlantic since the 1380 merge with Norway, including Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland, pops up again and again. For good reasons nationalism as the project of self-determination is persistently on the agenda, since we are still globally in the 21st century in a colonial present (Gregory 2004a). Meanwhile, many social sciences have not only neglected colonialism, but also the much connected phenomena of nation and nationalism; more central to modernity than often acknowledged. The formation of nations has to be seen in connection with modernity, whether as the origin of modernity, an invention of modernity, a passage to modernity or a counterweight to modernity (Árnason 1996). Social sciences have taken for granted, all too un-reflected, an identity between 'nation-state' and 'society' that should have been its key-concept. 'It often turns out that the 'society' which lies at the heart of sociology's own self-definition is created in the image of the nation-state' (Billig 1995: 53).

More contextual sensitivity to the concrete geographies and histories of societies cast light on the many ambivalent faces of nationalism, also inside the social sciences. It is for example obvious that nationalism is not only connected to colonialism, whether in the form of nationalism of the colonizer or of the colonized, but also to discourses of liberalism, both as economics and political philosophy. For example, classical political discourse about the liberal community of sovereign individuals is said to go hand in hand with the birth of the idea of England as a nation (see Árnason 1996: 56-57). Meanwhile it is thought provoking that the most classical images about nation-state with a 'partial' fit in trinity of nation, state and territory are exactly the old colonial states along the North Atlantic Rim, namely Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, England/Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, add to this later unified and more or less federal state constructions of Germany, Italy, Canada and the US. But the 'fit' is exactly only partial, otherwise we would forget the crucial 'exemptions' such as the Basque, the Breton, Ireland including the six Northern counties, Wales, Scotland, Quebec, the Inuit in Northern Quebec (Nunavik) and Labrador (New Found Land), Nunavut, Greenland, the Faroes, the Sami, the immigrants etc. The world is far from 'perfect'; it is rather the exemption that is the rule. In other words: The rule of power does not follow the rules.

Contemporary research on nationalism has contributed significantly to our understanding of the historical constructedness of nations and nationalism, where it is not possible to think of nations without states and projects of state formation are seen as *a priori* to nationalism and nation-building (Billig 1995: 19ff). Often the definition of nation-state is confused with the definition of a territorial state per se. Thereby social science oversee that it is historically possible to have the use of state power that is *not* legitimized by reference to a specific people as an 'imagined community' (Andersson 1991) or by way of a certain 'imagined sameness' in the case of Norway (Gullestad 2001, 2002). *Social sciences* [and social scientists such as Giddens] tend to forget the cultural side,

the formation of identification and othering, that were historically constitutive - not for the European absolutist territorial state but - for the democratic state-building projects of the 19th and 20th century capitalism and normative modernity (Bærenholdt 1998).

However, there has been an increasing awareness of the nationalist resurgence coming along with globalization. Manuel Castells points at a number of contemporary cases of nationalisms that are not bound to state projects. He also sees states as vanishing. In his view 'the incongruence between social theory and contemporary practice comes from the fact that nationalism, and nations, have a life of their own, independent from statehood, albeit embedded in cultural constructs and political projects' (Castells 1997: 29). Although Castells tends to misread Benedict Andersson, since Andersson does also see nationalism and nations as more than 'demystifying ideologies', his point is that nationalism is a historical construction and social practice that does exist as a shared experience. He stress four points about contemporary (as opposed to the many studies of past) nationalism: First nations are 'entities independent from the state', second nations 'are not historically limited to the modern nation-state as constituted in Europe in the two hundred years following the French Revolution'. Thirdly, 'nationalism is not necessarily an elite phenomenon' and fourthly 'contemporary nationalism is more reactive than proactive, it tends to be more cultural than political' (Castells 1997: 30-31). Castells' emphasis is interesting and relevant to the Nordic Atlantic cases. His own (wife's) Russian case and his (personal) own Catalan case, lead him to define nations as '*cultural communes constructed in people's minds and collective memory by the sharing of history and political projects*' (Castells, 1997: 51). This is a definition opening for the recognition of non-territorially defined nations, for example defined by their language, that are more than the bonds of ethnicity because of the claims of cultural autonomy and recognition. Unsurprisingly, Castells sees nationalism as a social movement, but he does not address the ambivalence of such movement, for example the suppression of other languages than Catalan in Catalonia.

While we must recognize, with Castells, the practical, shared experience of welfare nationalism in the Nordic countries, we must also comprehend the conflicts associated with nationalism, especially when arising in the legacy of colonial administration and of cultural othering. While Castells does recognize, in a rather pessimistic way, the trend of cultural communes forming only resistance identities, and not project identities, he does not address the orientalist problem that colonizer and the colonized (nor does he do that on the, eg. Caucasian, colonial margins of Russia) also share experiences in ambivalent ways, as they tend to depend on each other in various ways. First, obviously the colonized define their project as resistance to the colonizer. Second, however doing that the colonized tend to speak in the 'language', the approach to nationalism etc. of the colonizer. Third, in ambivalent ways the two cannot forget the identification with the other, how they nourished each other in asymmetric, paternalist forms, and how their own identity more or less belong to the definition in relation to the other. It is thus not only George Bush and Osama Bin Laden that depend on each others as their shadows (cp. Diken and Laustsen 2004). Finally the nourishing 'symbiosis' between the nationalisms of the colonizer and the colonized is often conditioned, but not determined, by socio-economic connections and dependencies (Hroch 1985), as we saw in the case of Greenland above. We will now discuss these ideas shortly in relation to Norwegian and especially Icelandic nationalisms, while Faroese and Greenlandic nationalisms and home-rules will be investigated in the next section.

Most nationalisms are defined in opposition to a colonial power, go along with the exercise of colonial or, and often in combination as in the case of Denmark, as reaction to the collapse of a colonial empire. As mentioned earlier, Norway became independent from Denmark and formed a democratic constitution as early as in 1814, while Norway, however, became part of an asymmetric union with Sweden, until its full independence in 1905, importing a Danish Prince to become King

of Norway. Much of this series of event is embedded in 19th century European geopolitics. When Denmark was forced to surrender Norway in 1814 on one side this was less as a result of nationalism but rather a consequence of the geopolitical weakening of the state of Denmark following the Napoleonic Wars. Wider Norwegian nationalist movements became a later product of popular mobilisation in opposition to the asymmetrical personal union with Sweden.

On the other side we should not confuse the causes of the surrender with the course set for projects afterwards. In his interesting comparative study of 'oppressed nations', Miroslav Hroch point to the existence of certain form of '*Landespatriotismus*' performed in the bureaucracy, partly merging with the upcoming commercial bourgeoisie. 'The victory of this patriotism in Norway was not simply associated with a favourable constellation of international politics, but resulted first and foremost from the distinctive social composition of the group which upheld it' (Hroch 1985: 41-42). Hroch's class analysis stresses the essential roles of elites. Nationalism's imagination of ancestry should not be confused with, neither the actual practical (even functional) mobilisation of people in the periphery by elites, nor with the conditions actualizing the national project. We should remind ourselves not to confuse the historical analysis of nationalisms, conditions and the social forces forming the political project, with the historical imaginations performed in nationalist practices of the political projects, although there can be connections we cannot escape. But orders and connections between historical possibilities, social forces and nationalist imagination are not given in advance by any universal scheme or manuscript. Icelandic nationalism is one specific, contextual, case.

Icelandic nationalism draws on the legal tradition of the *Althingi*, the nationalist movement was influential in the 19th century, forcing Denmark to give the *Althingi* legal powers in 1874, home-rule in 1904 and an independent state in person union with Denmark in 1918. Compared to Ernst Gellner's (1988) theory of nationalism as connected with and functional to industrialism, Icelandic nationalism is much too early, even compared to the industrialization of Denmark. The early Icelandic national project was rather propelled by an early and long, European humanist, interest for the early Icelandic history and literature (the sagas) already from the 17th century. At the same time as Norwegian intellectuals started to meet in the Norwegian Society in Copenhagen, the Icelandic learned society was founded in Copenhagen in 1779, followed by the Icelandic Literature Society in 1816, thus paving the way for connections between country, people, language and history forming a nation (Wåhlin 1994: 38). Of course these projects of connection were conditioned by the actual performance of trade and travelling between Denmark and Iceland, and inside Iceland. While Icelandic nationalism was somewhat sceptical to the trade operations of the trade monopoly (see chapter 3), it was also conditioned by these operations.

Parallel to this, the *Althingi* tradition meant that many officials and all bishops and vicars after the Reformation were Icelanders, recruited from the peasant land owners and highly educated already in the 18th century. The 19th century national project could then be seen as the attempt of avoiding to be part of the Danish territorial democracy (as Denmark had also tried in Schleswig with little success). Finally Icelanders' culture and language were surprisingly homogenous, and affected by Enlightenment and liberalism, prior to the nationalist project (Karlsson and Debes 1987: 17-23). The Icelandic Historian Gunnar Karlsson thus points to a number of characteristics that support the idea that Iceland was more or less a nation 'of collective memory by the sharing of history' (Castells 1997: 51, see above) at an early stage. It is worth mentioning, that the distant location of Iceland far from the colonial centre facilitated this project, but also that the project implied that Icelanders for generations had coped with immense and troublesome distances within Iceland, including travelling to the *Althingi* encounters at Thingvellir. These trips were performed to an extent that it is meaningful to talk about shared Icelandic cultural and political practices, supported by the (still) well preserved memory of the 9th century migration from Norway to Iceland.

However this analysis is, we must admit, also influenced by the history writing of Icelandic nationalism itself. The presence of heritage alongside with the tradition of a specific form of governmentality, independently from foreign Norwegian and Danish rule, are among the features explaining the early Icelandic nationalism.

But the colonial power was also part of the national project. First there was a colonial historical interest in the traces of Norse history in the Icelandic sagas and language, said to represent authentic Nordic heritage as such, meaning that the contrasting nations of Denmark and Iceland also defined certain denominators. Second Danish officials and merchants present in Iceland did their paternalist attempts of civilizing the Icelanders by education in dance, music, gymnastics and housekeeping, as in the case of Eyraðakki. However the picture is complex, as landless Icelandic workers could have better relations to the Danish trade station than to Icelandic land-owners (Magnússon 1991: 179-180). Meanwhile, across these complexities, Icelandic historical geography and ethnography represent a remarkable separate continuity, the plausibility of which is hard to question (Hastrup 1990: 306). Only we need to acknowledge the degree to which both past and present literary and research discourse contribute to construct this, in this sense ironic if not self-fulfilling vision of, continuity.

While there are differences in the socio-economics of Norway and Iceland, there are similarities in their national projects. It is interesting that Hroch in his comparative analysis of the production of oppressed nation-states in Europe attribute certain exceptional characteristics to the formation of the Norwegian nation-state that could also have been attributed to the Icelandic nation-state, if this had been included in his analysis.¹ It is not only that both states gained their independence in the context of a defeated/occupied colonial power (Denmark), that Hroch call the 'ruling power'. This is not internationally exceptional, the exceptional finding is quite another, internal:

The Norwegian nation is the only one of our oppressed nations whose national movement ran its course under conditions covered by the Western European conception of the development of a "state-nation": here political and ethnic unity were largely identical, and the oppressed nation displayed roughly the same organic social structure as the ruling nation. This is why the group which pioneered the revival of the Norwegian nation differed so considerably in its social composition from those of other oppressed nations. The bourgeoisie and the topmost strata of the intelligentsia, who were attached to the bourgeoisie, had the foremost place in the movement, whereas in the other cases those groups were to be found predominantly within the ruling nation (Hroch 1985: 39).

The existence of an internal elite is remarkable to Hroch, while he does put less emphasis on how the elite was first educated and developed its program in the colonial capital of Copenhagen. Although the formative role of the Norwegian and Icelandic intellectual societies founded in Copenhagen is debatable, the existence of national, liberal elites obviously became crucial to the long process of state-nation formation in Norway and Iceland in the 19th and early 20th century. Then one can miss an analysis of the consequence of the absence of feudal relations in Norway (as well as in Iceland) in Hroch's analysis. There was only a weak aristocracy in Norway and none in Iceland, and this fact obviously made a smother way for the free-holding peasants, in combination with merchants and officials would Hroch stress. And this way we have given an explanation by way of social composition to the peculiar Nordic enlightenment tradition, analysed by Witoszek (1997, see above). However this also means that the Nordic countries never experienced thorough

¹ Hroch's (1985) comparative analysis include Norway, Bohemia, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia as well as the Flemish movement and the Danish minority movement in Schleswig.

bourgeois revolutions setting new stages for universal citizenship. It is because of these apparent continuities, that one easily gives historical explanations of the ambivalences of Nordicity.

In spite of the 'historical weight' of these so-called 'internal' explanations, the most important historical fact is that the Norwegian and Iceland nationalisms emerged alongside with the nationalism of the Danish losing colonizer. In consequence, nationalism developed in more connected ways than a comparative study of countries tends to see, since a comparative study, like Hroch's, concentrate on territorial units rather than on connections across these units. This will become more evident in the next section on the later nationalisms of the Faroes and Greenland.

Nations without states - The indistinctive zones of home-rules

Faroese nationalism differs from Icelandic in several ways. A nationalist movement did not come up before around the meetings of Faroese students in the 1870s in Copenhagen, and the founding of a Faroese nationalist movement in the Faroes in 1889. The Faroese people have never agreed upon the national question, as in the case of Iceland. The nationalist leader Jóannes Patursson had negotiated a home-rule arrangement with Denmark, but lost his mandate in 1906 since Faroese opponents of home-rule gave the impression that more independence would mean increasing taxes (Wåhlin 1989, Rerup 1989). The question of welfare redistribution together with Denmark versus nationalist recognition remained disputed throughout the 20th century, meaning that the national question remained to be the major distinction in Faroese politics. While the nationhood of the Faroese has never really been recognized by Denmark, there has never been any doubt about Faroese identity among the Faroese (Karlsson and Debes 1987: 25, Wåhlin 1994: 44). In spite of lack of continuity in the written language, Faroese language has been continually practiced since the Middle Age. The Faroese were early well educated, literate people. School teachers have been educated in the Faroes since 1870 and the Danish (more or less Nordic) tradition of folk high schools has also influenced the Faroes. Alongside especially Icelandic inspirations, 19th century high school tradition and Grundtvigianism in Denmark inspired the formation of Faroese nationalism. The 19th century national movement emerged on the basis of a cultural program with special emphasis of recognition and preservation of Faroese language, propelling the construction of a new Faroese written language by the V.U. Hammershaimb (1819-1909). This project was strongly supported by the people around N.F.S. Grundtvig; Hammershaimb participated in the meetings of Grundtvig's 'Scandinavian Society' (see next section). Based on the promotion of a common Nordic/Scandinavian cultural and language heritage, the 'Scandinavian society' supported the right to independence for any Nordic people (Wåhlin 1994: 46-47). It is clear from this that the national project was one based in ideas of common culture, rather than a project about political rights.

The Faroese nationalist leader Jóannes Patursson's political nationalism stood on the shoulders of this cultural national project. Patursson was himself educated in agriculture in Norway and married with an Icelandic woman drawing much of his political inspiration from these two Nordic brother people, including the inspiration from the Icelandic 1904 home-rule (Karlsson and Debes 1987: 29-31). He also used the reference to the Faroese people as one among the other Nordic as part of his political argument for the Faroes' independence. In the interwar period Nordic identity was promoted as an alternative to Danish dominance (Wåhlin 1994: 49-50), thereby continuing the Grundtvigian tradition. It goes without saying, that the development of Faroese nationalism came along with increased mobilities both inside the Faroes and between the Faroes and other countries, as it is for example obvious in the contacts and networks around Jóannes Patursson.

Following the ‘peaceful’ British occupation during the Second World War and the subsequent referendum majority for independence dramatically rejected by the Danish Government (Harhoff 1993), the Home-Rule for the Faroes from 1948 delegated a number of responsibilities from Denmark to the Faroes in what have been compared to a system comparable a ‘highly developed municipal self-government’. The Home-Rule law recognise the Faroese language and flag, but it does not recognize any Faroese nation. Faroese people are Danish citizens living on the Faroes, and the Faroes is conceived as ‘self-governed “people-society” within the Danish Realm’ (Karlsson and Debes 1987: 34, Harhoff 1993: 76). It is remarkable that the Icelandic solution (personal union with Denmark since 1918) was considered both among nationalists in the Faroes and in the notes to the Danish government by the Danish expert in international law Alf Ross (Harhoff 1993: 73). Obviously Denmark was not willing to grant the Faroes such a solution after the Second World War.

Even more remarkably, the Greenland home-rule law from 1978 is more or less based on the principles of the law on Home-rule of the Faroes, in spite of significant cultural, political, historical and infrastructural differences (Harhoff 1993: 489). There are divergences between the two Home-Rule laws, especially regarding raw materials (Harhoff 1993). But this does not disturb the overall impression that the asymmetric delegation of power from Denmark to the Faroes/Greenland corresponds to the political interest of the Danish state, no withstanding that there were also political interests in Greenland and especially in the Faroes in favour of not too far reaching independence.

Greenlandic nationalism arose much later than the other Nordic Atlantic nationalisms, although one can argue that a certain project of educating the Greenlanders was already at stake in the 19th century (Tuesen 1988, 1995), where Greenlandic language was in fact secured in education in Greenland before the Faroes. However, explicit political nationalism did not emerge before the 1960s, again among students in Denmark. This happened after the formal decolonization of Greenland with the Danish 1953 constitution that changed the colony of Greenland into a county of Denmark. Profound claims for self-government or independence were a reaction to Greenland’s membership of the EU from 1973, as a county of Denmark, since the majority vote in Greenland had been clearly against EU membership. **[cross-check all the historical information in this chapter with chapter 3]** Before the EU membership one of the major requirements had been abolition of the so-called ‘birthplace criteria’ (*fødestedskriteriet*), mobilizing the Council of Young Greenlanders in Denmark in 1964 (Karlsson and Debes 187: 37). In spite of Greenland being a Danish county this criteria meant a discrimination of people born in Greenland, as they have lower wages and other rights. People born in Greenland was not attributed the free travels, that was part of the contracts with the people ‘called for’ from outside Greenland (from Denmark). Although this criteria was later, at least formally, abolished by the Home Rule Government it draws our attention to the specific social mechanisms at work in the asymmetric, postcolonial, relations between the state of Denmark on the one side and the Faroes and Greenland on the other side. We will now analyse the mechanisms at work in these ambivalent relations and in what sense they can be seen as ambivalences of Nordicity.

Faroese and Greenlandic people are granted a partial self-government, based on the delegation of power from the state of Denmark to the each of the two Home-Rule Governments. Although this delegation *de jure* can be withdrawn, this is generally not considered to be the case *de facto*. Nevertheless, this asymmetric relation expresses that Danish sovereignty over the Faroes and Greenland cannot be questioned. So while the Danish state, in an apparently enlightened way, ‘gives’ home rule to the thereby culturally recognised Faroese and Greenlandic peoples, this is a not

political recognition.² Although Denmark has given the Home Rule Governments (and especially Greenland) rights to participate in international relations, there have also been very many cases of evidence of Danish sovereignty, ranging from secret agreements with the US on the Thule Air base to the recent false reports to the UN on the (lack of) political aspirations for self-government in the Faroes and Greenland. Obviously, Denmark especially in its international relations, following the long historical break-down of the Danish empire, is interested in maintaining sovereignty over the Faroes and especially over Greenland, because of the role of these territories in matters of security, research and environmental protection with a global scope (Harhoff 1993: 488).

Politically Greenlanders and Faroese are citizens of Denmark, and as such the two Home Rule Governments are involved in redistributive mechanisms, allocating block grants of around one billion DKK to the Faroes and around three billion DKK to Greenland a year. While these subsidies are socio-economically very important, this is exactly why Faroese and Greenlandic nationalists perceive them with the shame, that in the Anglo-American liberal world is worded in the term of 'being on welfare', which is quite another meaning than normally associated with welfare inside Scandinavia. In other words, this is a redistributive mechanism among people that do not feel recognized with equal rights. It is redistribution without recognition, and from the protagonists for further self-government or independence for the Faroes and Greenland the response is to prefer recognition rather than redistribution. However the ambivalence is also with the Home Rule Government, since there is also always the wondering among some Greenlandic politicians of how large compensation could be gained.

The mechanism seems to work consequently. For example in the case of the forced reallocation of the inhabitants of the place (shortly before the abolition of Greenland's formal colonial status in 1953), where the Thule Air Base was subsequently constructed, to this day (of writing March 2005) no Danish prime minister have accepted to give an excuse to the relocated. In stead, the state of Denmark has given a new air port. Redistributive compensation, but no recognition of right, seems to be the consequent exercising of power. The position is logical, since the secret agreement with the US on the Thule Air Base in no way gave Denmark rights in response to the user rights allocated to the use. Instead Denmark apparently achieved a reduction in the amount of required military resources provided by Denmark to NATO (*Grønland under den kolde krig* 1997), that is a redistributive compensation. Hence it is no surprise that one Greenlandic speculation became how much compensation from the US could be gained, and if this would potentially be enough to secure economic independence from Denmark. Consequently the 2004 agreement on new military installations at the Thule Air Base as part of the US defence against missile attacks included new possibilities for trade and student exchange for Greenland in the US. That is redistribution and the opening of new connections, not recognition of political rights. Nationalism in the shadow of deeply asymmetrical relations, that is colonialism, takes ambivalent forms.

The after war Social Democratic project for the modernization of Greenland led to import of Danish teachers and officials at a level, never experienced before. Danish was increasingly introduced as the educational language, Greenlandic school pupils in 6th class stayed for a long period in Denmark, and at the most extreme a selected group of Greenlandic youngsters were taken from the families and moved to Denmark to be educated into a new modern elite, the personal consequences of which were immense (Bryld 1998). It is therefore no surprise that the 1960s and 1970s Greenlandic radical politics and the 1980s and early 1990s Home Rule Government practices were to a large degree to respond to Danification with Greenlandization. Unfortunately, these

² Recognition of Faroese and Greenlanders as distinct peoples has been a major issue in the projects for further self-government in both countries. According to 'Grønlands Radioavis' (Greenland broadcasting in Denmark Radio in Danish) on 15 March 2005 the Danish Foreign Ministry presented a note recognising Greenlanders as a people to the joint Greenlandic-Danish self-government committee.

responds pursuing recognition and indigenous rights did not always make the educational progress and international orientation of Greenlanders easier (Bærenholdt 1999). Indeed, the Home Rule government and the political elite have succeeded in placing Greenland centrally on a number of international agendas, especially in indigenous affairs (see chapter 9).

In other words, cultural identifications are widely recognised and even celebrated. Greenlandic nationalism have given a portrait of the Greenlandic, indigenous, way of life as that of subsistence life style, where the role of the hunter is not unlike the role of the peasant in the other Nordic nationalisms. These cultural manifestations and projects are not only heavily influenced by the colonial discourse on how to preserve the authentic Greenlander (see chapter 5), but also by the cultural nationalism of Danish Grundtvigianism, translating 'Dane' to 'Greenlander', as also performed through the pietist impact. One, positive and supportive, interpretation would here to be talk about cultural nationalism of a *Gemeinschaft* project as suggested by Otto Bauer in the context of the Austrian-Hungarian empire (Østergaard 1991) or by Manuel Castells (1997, see above) more recently. Another, negative and critical, interpretation would be to analyse the allocation of specific identifications (and subsidies) as a project of performing 'zones of indistinction' (Agamben 2003, Bolt 2003, Diken and Laustsen 2004, Bauman 2004). In this second, maybe more realistic, interpretation those enclosed in a territory often see this as an escape, while it is still the power of sovereign to decide the terms of inclusion and exclusion, exactly by the use of territorial power. This is most powerfully performed by the right of the sovereign to suspend laws. Not that this is actually done, but just the possibility – even only *de jure* – has its powerful consequences. Denmark recognises Greenlandic and Faroe people as cultural communities, but politically in the end they are only fully recognised as citizens of the Danish Realm. To make this very clear, if Denmark can *de facto* not suspend Home Rule Governments, it can stop subsidizing these Governments and stop supporting Greenlanders and Faroese people in Denmark.

The realism of this second, possible, interpretation became clear in the negotiations between the Danish and the Faroese government on the Faroese claims for further independence (Nyborg-Jørgensen 2004). The Danish government, headed by the Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, suggested the Danish subsidies abolished quickly in the case of further Faroese independence, and this position gained much tacit support among Danes broadly, taken for granted 'that if you want to be independent, then you must also make your own way of living', almost like a strict parent talking to a child. The logic of the position is all too obvious. This is also the case with the calculations presented by the Danish government over the further Danish costs in financing welfare and education for Faroese people staying in Denmark. Meanwhile, these positions were, again like a parent to a child, followed by much political discourse, both in negotiation and in the Danish parliament, about the strength of 'historical bonds' between Denmark and the Faroes, that make Danes regret any Faroese disregard of this (Nyborg 2004). This is an argument about relations between Danish and Faroese (culturally defined) people, supported, of course, by the very many family, commercial and professional connections. Taking into consideration the chronic divide in the Faroese population on the national question, few routes of escape were possible for the Faroese delegation, and the political constellation behind broke down in the years following, leaving the most consequent politically nationalist Republican party out. This analysis is not meant to be in support for either of the political positions or forms of nationalism performed.

It is the structure of the argument that is interesting. The Danish political establishment sentimentally talks about historical bonds between people, without expressing any considerations about other (geopolitical, commercial, symbolic) interests in keeping the Faroes in the Realm. The same argument would easily go for the Greenlanders, but possible only stronger, since the Greenlanders represent both an immense land symbolically compensating the national loses of Denmark in 1864 (see Hvalsum 1999) and an indigenous people, Danes and Danish educational

material take much care for, in ways more obviously paternalist than in the case of the Faroes. If anyone question this taken care, there is the redistributive block grant to remind.

In this sense, the ambivalence of Danish Nordicity is about a certain form of solidarity that could be called 'colonial modernity' performing exclusion by way of inclusion. In his analysis of the new distanciations produced in the aftermath of September 11th 2001, Derek Gregory shows how 'colonial modernity is intrinsically *territorializing*' (2004b: 205) by the complex use of distinctions and connections. Capital movement may deterritorialize and support migrant processes, but these processes go along with political territorial power exercised in feverish attempts of control (Diken and Laustsen 2004). We have seen the socio-economics of the globalization strategies of Royal Greenland and many other actors in the Nordic Atlantic. But we also see the consistent political projects of reproducing and defending the cultural sameness of Faroese and Greenlandic people that is also pleaded by Danish nationalism.

The Home Rules of the Faroes and Greenland are in one way nations without states, but they are only cultural nations recognized as certain kinds of zones of cultural sameness within the territorial state of Denmark. Thereby it is form of recognition that is conditioned on the tacit acceptance of an asymmetric, if not paternalist, relation. Some would say that the acceptance is made tacit by the redistributive block grant, which effectively makes silent the possible Danish interests other than being recognized as a generous and enlightened people taking 'responsibility' for the Faroese and Greenlandic people, thus included by way of their exclusion.

Nordism, a tacit project?

The idea of the existence of Nordic community is debated, and apart from the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council (see chapter 9) there are few strong and extrovert markers of Nordicity. However, the silent reference to a form of community between the Nordic countries, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, accompanied by Greenland, the Faroes and Åland, is widely used inside the Nordic countries. Internationally, the notion of Scandinavia is used more often, but the problem with this that is actually only refers to Norway, Sweden and Denmark (the Scandinavian languages), if not only to Norway and Sweden (the Scandinavian peninsula), and the word originally come from the southernmost region of Sweden (earlier Eastern Denmark) Scandia.

However, the idea of Norden originally was supported by 17th and 18th century collections of the medieval Icelandic manuscripts, taken to colonial capital Copenhagen, but most of them have been giving back to Iceland (exhibited in the Árna Manússonar Museum in Reykjavík). The manuscripts represent not only a very central heritage for Iceland but for all of the Nordic countries (except Finland), and they were heavily used during the 19th century collapse of the Danish empire to construct national romantic narratives often expressed by Viking symbols, and interestingly, perceiving immigrating Icelanders as the authentic Nordic people.

Alongside this Nordic cultural project, there was also a Nordic political project, normally called the Scandinavian movement. It emerged in parallel to the (more successful) projects of unification of Germany and Italy, but finally collapsed with Danish loss of Schlesvig in 1864. Again there were also external geopolitical interests in maintaining a divided control of the Baltic Sea entrance (Østergaard 1994). The Scandinavian political projects was thus super seeded by the persistent Nordic project of cultural cooperation performed in civil networks and associations (especially the Nordic Associations founded 1919), and later by way of a number transnational organizations. While some of these forms of cooperation in the Nordic Atlantic area will be discussed in more

detail in chapter 9, we will now concentrate on the central cultural meanings of the Nordic cultural project.

The Danish priest, poet and politician N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872) was one of the central intellectuals in 19th century Denmark, although less internationally known than Søren Kierkegaard. Grundtvig is normally regarded as the founder of Nordic folk high schools, and he was also one of the central makers of the Nordic cultural project. In his study of 'Grundtvig and Norden' from 1942 the Danish literary historian Gustav Albeck followed the successive formation of Grundtvig's idea about Norden as a 'spiritual unit' with a certain role to perform in his unified narrative of Christendom and Nordic history. He anticipated a Nordic mission to become the sixth of the seven selected people to carry Christendom, according to the Revelation of St. John the Divine. This sixth people, 'Philadelphia', would take over responsibilities with the mature civilisation of humanity (Albeck 1942: 35, 58). Much of these ideas were spelled out in Grundtvig's frustration of the loss of Norway in 1814 (the remains of the medieval 'Nordic Union') while he later came to terms with this situation by acknowledging that Denmark is 'the country of rebirth', 'history's Palestine' and 'the heart of Norden' (quoted in Albeck 1942: 49, translated from Danish). Throughout his writings, Grundtvig persistently saw World history along side with the succession of the selected main people, all of which were sea faring people, among which 'High Norden' was supposed to be a gift to humanity (Albeck 1942: 63, 102). It is obvious that Grundtvig's project was cultural-spiritual rather than political. He thus clearly took another road than the so-called 'National-Liberals' and 'Student-Scandinavianism' in the 1840s. While these political movements were more firmly connected to European thinking of nationalism and liberalism, Grundtvig became much less interested in the political projects of state making.

Although there is no reason to overestimate the influence of a single person, there are few ideological references used by so many people, in respect of other orientations, as the ideas of N.F.S. Grundtvig. This is first and foremost true in Denmark, but there are traces in the Nordic Atlantic too. His ideas about popular and lay knowledge, though always ambivalent to more intellectual scholarship, and ideas about values of freedom, mental broadness and tolerance is often associated with Danish national feeling, but interestingly these ideas built on a

'...unspoken precondition (was)[of] the ethnic homogeneity of the population. The same is the case when it comes to the development of the welfare state during the 20th century. It is a state/nation regarding itself as liberal and tolerant and placing high value on social equality and social cohesion promoted through a well-developed welfare system. It has nurtured a long-standing interest in global humanitarian issues, in that way building an image of external as well as internal solidarity. This solidarity is the foundation stone of the welfare state, but what has largely been unrecognised is the degree to which it has been based on a cultural concurrence of equality and likeness' (Koefoed and Simonsen 2005)

While this analysis addresses the various nationalisms of Denmark it does also implicitly suggest what would be the Danish expectations of how other nations, eg., the Nordic Atlantic, perform, as also suggested by Marianne Gullestad's term 'imagined sameness' for Norway.

The NGOs the Nordic Associations (one per country), founded in 1919, came to define the backbone of cultural Nordicity as the cooperative spirit based on common cultural identities, complementary to national identities (Janfelt 2000). This is quite easy through the shared heritage of the national projects of Norway (the way North), Iceland and the Faroes, while it is more complicated in the case of Greenland (see chapter 9). The Grundtvigian wording of this complementary role of the various identities would be 'Multifarious, though fundamentally the same' ('*Mangfoldig, dog ens i grunden*', Janfelt 2000: 31).

The fundamental sameness, Grundtvig anticipated across Nordic people was rooted in the imagination of a selected Nordic people, given a historical mission in the development of Christendom. One cannot help to link this 19th century thinking with the self-sufficient statements of many Nordic politicians of the very early 21st century (see Simonsen 2004 for her analysis of the Danish Prime Minister's 2003 New Year speech). This is not to explain by way of historical determinism, it is only to put the contemporary in perspective. Furthermore, there is a tacit role of the Lutheran church throughout the Nordic (here Atlantic) countries in two ways: First as also argued in chapter 7, the church since the reformation became part of the power apparatus of the state, including the municipal, local, authorities. This organizational merge promoted the early introduction of obligatory primary education in the Nordic countries. Second, Lutheran churches claimed responsibility for people as such, pursuing identity and sameness between people that is increasingly becoming ambiguous with globalization (Lodberg 2000). Had these identifications only been part of the preaching within the limited spheres of the church, this would not have been so problematic. But this is otherwise when the ideological preaching of 'imagined sameness' became part of the political culture in, at least, Denmark and the Nordic Atlantic countries of its former empire. I have thus argued, especially for the postcolonial relations between Denmark and the Faroes, respectively Denmark and Greenland, that Nordism may represent a form of postcolonial ideological practice reminiscent of the engagement of the Danish poet, politician and priest Grundtvig for a special mission for the Nordic peoples. Nordic peoples were anticipated to be alike, but the Danish people more alike (!), that is on higher ground, than the other. Nordic nations were recognized because of their sameness, however with Danes as the prime people. As such Nordicity supports the idea of nationhood, as long as nations share a common heritage. When Denmark then is assigned a special role, this is not in contradiction to the postcolonialism of Nordism, but a part of its ambivalence; postcolonial heritage.

Nordism is a Janus face. It is international and humanitarian for extrovert use, but the use of the principle of sameness defines the limits of introvert tolerance. Redistribution in the form of social innovations and welfare regulations address those recognised as citizens, and because of the, in principal, territorially universal welfare systems, recognition is more or less translated into the right of welfare. It is for example the case in Norway that 'Because the welfare system includes all who reside at Norwegian territory, the immigration rules exclude the majority of potential immigrants' (Lotherington and Fjørtoft forthcoming). Social distance is met by various forms of redistribution, conditioned by territorial citizenship which is based on cultural 'proximity'. Redistribution is conditioned on recognition, why recognition is limited.

This chapter has stressed a number of – rather tacit - restrictive mechanisms of Nordicity. People included as such, or only partially, take part in a system of governmentality, where cultural distance is used to demarcate. Nordism cope with cultural distance by distancing practices that define the recognised in terms of sameness. Furthermore sameness is translated into, and practiced by way of, proximity. Cultural distance is used to celebrate the mission of the selected Nordic peoples as opposed to other people. These crude characteristics of the backside of Nordicity is increasingly revealed when the welfare state systems are challenged by immigration, but the historical background goes further back to the institutionalized merge of state and church, whereby, the later nation-, states in principle took over the missionary care for the people thereby recognized as citizens.

Now there are differences among the Nordic nation-states, and this chapter has concentrated on the Nordic Atlantic area of the former Danish empire. In these areas, historically, coping practices have been more or less connected with various lay pietist movements paving the way for governmentalities of 'from below' popular participation, hand-in-hand with 'from-above' nation-state intervention, in so far as independent nation-states were established in first Norway and then

Iceland. In the cases of the Faroes and Greenland, this is still not a hand-in-hand relation, since the Nordic (Grundtvigian) ideal-model of correspondence between people and state has not been established. However, the ideal-model is also ambivalent, as it is perfectly possible to just recognize cultural identity of the Faroese and Greenlanders as nations among the other Nordic without political recognition, at least as long as the instinctive zones of distancing and territorialization combined is secured by means of redistribution. In this way the shared experience of nations without states (Castells' vision) is vital, involved as it is in complex patterns of asymmetric othering. The nationalist projects for further self-government and independence, supported by some but not all Faroese and Greenlanders, non surprisingly respond to their distancing by claims of recognition rather than redistribution by way of, what could be called, 'postcolonial gifts'.

Admittedly, this is a dystopian analysis, and in line with the ambivalence of Nordicity, another interpretation is also, most perfectly simultaneously, possible. Nordic modernity, colonial modernity included, also has a front side. Almost representing the utopian dream of many globally, the Nordic/Scandinavian model as all other utopian projects of modernity is a territorialized vision of the good, clearly territorially bonded, society (Bauman 2004). It is the very same vision of a society that do also perform the dystopian vision of egalitarian individualism where people are brought together in their goal of sharing wealth but only among the selected, the converted, the real people.

Though the recognition of people has been discussed as positive, this is in fact more complicated. Recognition of people as a collective identification with one another does in fact not mean acknowledgement of the other. Acknowledgement is a weaker concept alternative to recognition, because it does not presuppose certain identifications, does not suggest specific bonds and boundaries to be used for exclusion and definition by us by way of contrast with the other. Acknowledgement should be beyond the bonds of 'tolerance' and 'reciprocity', implicit in the notion of recognition. With reference to Levinas and Derrida, Clive Barnett suggests an ethics where '...responsibility would be understood as being formed in a mode of responsiveness to claims for *acknowledgement* (of pain, or suffering, distress, etc.) rather than mere *recognition* (as the same as you, or as wholly different from you)' (Barnett 2005: 19). Such an idea, reminiscent of the mundane and non-strategic practices of coping could be the other, utopian, version of Nordicity.

However, the remaining problem is the socio-economics of (re)production and (re)distribution of wealth and welfare. This is what the solidarity - the shared practices - of nationalism is more often than not about. Redistribution is the reason for making bonds and boundaries, and in practice the concept of recognition is more about rights to get pieces of the cake than anything else. All too often totalitarian regimes keep in power as long as they only provide victories, wealth and welfare (as for example the case of *National Socialism*); when they cannot any more, openness and democracy may become an issue. Totalitarian regimes do not know of ambivalence between recognition and redistribution, they are two words for the same; the solidarity of the supporting people. This can also be put in other words: Totalitarian regimes cope by means of 'a perfect fit' between innovation, networking and formation identity, not unlike 'Nordic lay modernist' ideas of coping, embeddedness and empowerment.

The ambivalence of Nordicity is thereby also a form of ambivalence with the concept of coping as defined in the three dimensions: innovation, networking and formation of identity (see chapter 1). The modernist idea of fit between socio-economic and socio-political innovation, cross-cutting networking and the making sense of all this by means of identification becomes dystopian when the fit is territorially bonded around 'us' in contrast to 'other'. To overcome dichotomies between us and other, territoriality and mobility, bonding and bridging, inclusion and exclusion the modernist answer is zones of indistinction where some are 'more alike' than others. In other words: The all too easy response is to include people in the networks to perform the restricted roles in the celebration

of Nordicity. This may be less harmful to the Nordic fans in Scotland, the three Baltic States and Northern Russia, than to those already included.

It is worth remembering that the dystopia outlined was not at all a strategic purpose of Nordic policies. It is rather the unintended consequences of the utopia of the welfare state. Furthermore, there are international aspects of the Nordic engagement no less ambivalent than the 'domestic affairs' discussed in this chapter. Highly profiled Nordic involvement in the UN, humanitarian work and development aid goes along with military invasions, rerouting of refugees etc. The Nordic states, home-rules and populations are often some of the most generous in helping those suffering. For example the collection of money to far away victims of war, hazards and poverty is always reaching imposing levels among Greenlanders, while their politicians try to win more advantages from the US in compensation for new military installations (to protect the US against attacks from 'evil states') in Thule. This is the Janus face of Nordicity, if not of coping and human/social life in general. We acknowledge others, while we also seek to protect...yes who? Should/could we (or each of us) acknowledge ourselves as others, or the same as the others?

One vision is that of the common global fate of people on earth; our sustainable future envisioned by the gaze from a de-territorialized space ship of the earth as other. Coping practices across territorial boundaries and social bonds emerge with various forms of trans-nationalism and cross-border cooperation, to be further investigated in the Nordic Atlantic – and Arctic – context in the next and last chapter. However let us not forget, as stressed by Fredrik Barth, that all boundaries are rather sustained than dismantled by their perforation.

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