

New Directions in Peace and Conflict Research

**Non-violent Strategies for Confronting Global Terrorism
and for Promoting Peaceful Social Change**

A CPS research conference, University of Tromsø, Norway, 7th-9th September 2005

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**New directions in Peace and Conflict Research:
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Terrorism and for Promoting Peaceful Social
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From September 7th-9th, 2005, the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS) at the University of Tromsø hosted a research conference entitled: “New Directions in Peace and Conflict Research. Non-violent Strategies for Confronting Global Terrorism and for Promoting Peaceful Social Change”.

The conference theme was the nature and political potential of non-violence. The Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø considers this issue a central concern in its activities and an important matter in Peace Studies generally. The conference aimed to explore the possibilities of non-violence in the context of two key contemporary themes of global conflict: 1) Terrorism and its variety of responses and 2) Social resistance and political activism.

The principal aims of the conference were to illuminate the research dimensions of these specific themes and more generally to examine the character and purpose of Peace Studies both as multidisciplinary and as a catalyst for non-violent social change.

The Conference presented the following keynote speakers:

- Anat Biletzki, Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tel Aviv, Israel
- David Barash, Professor of Psychology & Zoology at the University of Washington, Seattle
- Geir Lundestad, Secretary of the Nobel Peace Committee and Director of the Nobel Peace Institute

Other invited contributors to the conference were:

- Gavriel Salomon, Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel
- Kari Karamé, Researcher at NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)
- Ram Roy Bhaskar, Professor at the Centre for Critical Realism, London and University of Örebro, Sweden.
- Rob Walker, Professor at Keele University, UK and the University of Victoria Canada

There were seven additional guest contributions.

The programme for the conference is presented in the table on page iii

Time	Wednesday 07.09	Time	Thursday 08.09	Time	Friday 09.09
Morning Session I 09:00 – 09:30	Arrival Registration	Morning Session I 09:00 – 10:20	Featured Lecture: David Barash, University of Washington “Redirected Aggression”	Morning Session I 09:00 – 10:20	Featured Lecture: Roy Bhaskar “The Roots and Rationale of Non-violence”
09:30-09:40	<i>Opening Remarks:</i> Ole D. Mjøs Chairman of the CPS board	Break		Break	
09:40 – 10:40	<i>Special Keynote Address:</i> Geir Lundestad, Secretary and Director of the Nobel Peace Institute “The History and Accomplishments of the Nobel Peace Prize: An Agent for International Change?”	10:40 – 12:00	Featured Lecture: Anat Biletzki,, Tel Aviv University “The Language of Terrorism”	10:40 – 12:00	Featured Lecture: Gavriel Salomon, University of Haifa “Research on Peace Education: Interesting Findings & Challenging Questions”
Break		Lunch	New cafeteria in the Theoretical Subjects Building.	Lunch	The Main Café at the Theoretical Subjects Building Map: no. 27, house 1
11:00 – 12:20	<i>Featured Lecture:</i> Rob Walker, University of Keele “Confronting Terror/Confronting Exceptionalism.”	Afternoon session II 13:00 – 13:30	<i>Conditions of Violence and Terrorism-</i> Guest Presentations Alberto Valiente Thoresen, University of Tromsø “Peace Studies and the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri”	Afternoon Session II 13:00 – 13:55	<i>Non-violence and Peace-</i> Guest presentations Lori Drummond-Mondal, Elise Kipperberg & Clem van Wyk “Research Imperative: Children are a Resource for Promoting Peaceful Social Change”
Lunch	<i>The main cafeteria in the Theoretical Subjects Building. Map # 27, house 1.</i>	13:30 – 1400	Owen Worth, University of Limerick “Towards a Collective Critique of Unipolarity: the Role of Critical International Theory and Peace Research in the Post-post-cold-war Era”	13:55 – 14:25	Espen Gamlund, University of Oslo “Responding to Wrongdoing: Overcoming Evil with Good”
Afternoon session II 13:20 – 14:20	<i>Being, Knowledge & Peace: An Epistemological Symposium</i> Rob Walker, University of Keele “Authorizing Knowledge, Authorizing Violence: Hobbes, Kant and the Claim to Peace.”	Break		<i>Break</i>	
<i>Break</i>		14:10-15:30	<i>Featured Lecture,</i> Kari Karamé, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Gendering Human Security	14:45 – 15:15	Thor Eriksen “Applied Non-violence Philosophy”
14:30 – 15:30	Roy Bhaskar, Centre for Critical Realism, London “Being, Understanding and Peace. The Contribution of the Philosophy of Meta-reality”	<i>Break</i>		15:15 – 15:45	Concluding Remarks
Break		Afternoon Session III 16:00-16:30	Security – guest presentations Frank Möller, Tampere Peace Research Institute “From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib and Beyond: Images in Security Policy, Images of Security Policy, Images as Security Policy”		
16:00 – 17:30	Roundtable: “Being, Knowing and Peace” Question-and-Answer Session with, Rob Walker, Roy Bhaskar, and Stuart Robinson	16:30 – 17:00	Jason Daverth, Trinity College, Dublin “ Revisiting Transarmament as a Pragmatic Approach to Modern Security”		
17:30 – 17:45	First Day’s Closing remarks				
19:00 – 21:00	Boat trip	19:00	Conference dinner		Departure

This series of CPS Working Papers summarises most of the contributions presented during the conference. The CPS is grateful to the authors in allowing us to publish this collection of essays that touch upon fundamental contemporary issues in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. The CPS also expresses its special thanks to the conference organiser Line N. Sandanger.

Tromsø, November 2005.

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Redirected Aggression

David P. Barash*

Abstract

“Passing the pain along” involves the following pattern: When an individual suffers pain, he most often responds by passing it onto someone else. When possible, that “someone else” is the perpetrator, the original source of the pain. Redirected aggression is not merely the stuff of stories and it is closely allied to revenge, though it is not exactly the same. This essay suggests that it is not ethically acceptable to redirect aggression or to pass along our pain. But then, how should human beings respond to pain? Concretely, what will provide order, security and personal satisfaction, as well as minimizing “subordination stress,” without simply passing along the pain of the victimized and without creating new victims? The world’s great ethical systems have long struggled to define an acceptable defense of victims that preserves personal and collective security, without falling into excess. The general conclusion is that redirected aggression – and thus, to some extent, violence generally – is not inevitable.

For as long as there have been human beings on Earth – stretching back to our animal inheritance, in fact – we have been bedeviled by a peculiar need, as insistent as it has been tragic: Making others suffer for the pain we feel, often choosing as our victim someone who wasn’t even the original perpetrator. We might call it passing the pain along, pain that is sometimes physical, sometimes psychological. It is one of the most important dilemmas of human existence. And it has been going on for a very long time.

Consider one of the founding documents of Western literature and civilization, *The Iliad*, which tells of many wrongs and their tragic consequences. Among its many acts of revenge, *The Iliad* deals in particular with the anger of Achilles as he reacts to the pain inflicted on him by Agamemnon, who took his woman Briseis. With Achilles famously sulking in his tent, and the Greeks losing battles to the Trojans, Agamemnon attempts to get the great warrior to fight. He offers to return Briseis, along with an immense dowry. But Achilles is unmoved, declaring at one point, “Not if his gifts outnumbered the sea sands, or all the dust grains in the world could Agamemnon ever appease me.”

What, then, finally moves Achilles to action? It is only when he suffers additional pain - the loss of his friend/lover Patrocles - that Achilles takes action,

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whereupon he responds by inflicting yet more pain, this time on the Trojan hero, Hector. Achilles vows to the dead Patrocles, “I will not give you burial, Patrocles, until I carry back the gear and head of him who killed you, noble friend.”

But that’s not all. Achilles is not to be satisfied with mere revenge (a behavior intimately linked to redirected aggression, as we’ll see). He demands more, swearing that others – *innocents* – shall also suffer for his pain: “Before your funeral pyre I’ll cut the throats of twelve resplendent children of the Trojans.”

Achilles had been wronged, and he “took it out” on innocent victims. Homer was certainly unaware of redirected aggression, as scientists understand it today. He was, however, well versed in human nature, specifically the all too natural tendency of responding to one’s own pain by inflicting yet more on others.

Redirected aggression is closely allied to revenge, but not the same. After all, Hector and Hector alone killed Patrocles; but we are told that before their climactic fight, Achilles was a “veritable demon” to all he met, “killing left and right, without remorse and without pause,” until the river Xanthus was choked with bodies of the Trojan dead.

I call this “passing the pain along,” because it involves the following pattern: When an individual suffers pain, he most often responds by passing it onto someone else. When possible, that “someone else” is the perpetrator, the original source of the pain. But if this cannot be achieved, then another is liable to be victimized, regardless of innocence.

Redirected aggression is not merely the stuff of stories. Art reflects our world, and I argue that the urge to pass along pain lurks behind modern warfare no less than medieval pageantry, leaving its mark in the genocidal wars of the 20th century, as well as those that threaten to overwhelm the 21st. It underlies many of the most prominent, enduring themes of literature, history, anthropology, psychology, and religion. It haunts our criminal courts, our streets, our battlefields, our homes, and our hearts. And modern science, at long last, has begun to explain why. There is nothing new about the phenomenon; there is much new, on the other hand, in our ability to understand it.

Place a rat in a cage with an electrified floor and subject it to repeated shocks. Many signs of stress, and when autopsied: oversized adrenal glands as well as likely stomach ulcers, high blood pressure and other ills.

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Now, repeat the experiment but with a wooden stick in the cage alongside the rat. When shocked, the rat chews on the stick, and as a result, it can endure its experience much longer without burnout. Moreover, at autopsy, its adrenal glands are smaller, stomach ulcers fewer. The rat buffered itself against the stress merely by chewing on the stick, even though it does nothing to get him out of his predicament.

Now, the most revealing part: Put two rats in the electrified cage. Shock them both. They snarl and fight. At autopsy, their adrenal glands are normal, and, moreover, even though they have experienced numerous shocks, they have no ulcers. When animals respond to stress and pain by redirecting their aggression outside themselves, whether biting a stick or another individual, it appears that they are protecting *themselves* from stress. By passing their pain along, such animals minister to their own needs. Although a far cry from being ethically “good,” it is definitely “natural.” Indeed, redirected aggression does not simply derive from irrationality, or human nastiness, but – along with retaliation (immediate pay-back) and revenge (delayed and often exaggerated pay-back) – it is entrenched in the very fabric of the natural world, part of a continuum involving nature’s response to pain.

Biochemically, this response is complicated, involving the neurotransmitter serotonin, which mediates social dominance via aggressiveness. Recently, physiologists have uncovered the hormonal basis for such behavior. Animals – and people – subjected to attack or threat experience “subordination stress,” as a result of which their adrenal hormones go up, along with blood pressure and the probability of developing ulcers. But – and this is crucial – when given the opportunity to “take it out” on someone else, victims show no sign of stress. By passing along their pain, they modulate their own internal distress ... while generating trouble for the next ones down the line. Think of the fellow about whom it is said that he doesn’t *get* ulcers, he *causes* them! Highly dominant individuals (those who do *not* normally experience large amounts of subordination stress), have *lower* levels of serotonin, which, in turn, makes them *less* prone to irritable, unnecessary fighting. More technically, the threshold for fighting is higher when serotonin levels are lower, and dominant individuals enjoy the luxury of having less serotonin. At the same time, low serotonin – characteristic of successful, dominant individuals – is associated with controlled, effective, and relatively rare aggression (rare, because the more dominant you are, the less often you need to assert your dominance).

Put the neurobiologic and stress reduction mechanisms together and we are finally coming to understand the biochemical chain that leads to redirected aggression: To be attacked, injured, or otherwise subjected to pain is to induce subordination stress in the victim. And this, in turn, unbalances his serotonin system, making him or her not only more subordinate but also more likely to redirect aggression toward another. This, in turn, leads us to ask why? Why does subordination stress act on serotonin – or anything else - so as to increase the probability of redirected aggression? What benefit can living things derive from passing their pain onto another, especially if that “other” didn’t cause the distress in the first place? In fact, there is a likely evolutionary reason for its existence.

As to the evolutionary advantage of such a system, it seems clear that individuals who responded to painful situations by striking out at someone else have been more successful than those who sat back and “took it,” because such individuals were less likely to be victimized the next time around. In any social species, including our own, the cost of being victimized includes a loss of reputation; that is, being seen as exploitable. Evolution would therefore reward victims who – even if unable to retaliate against the actual perpetrator – conspicuously “take it out” on someone else, thereby announcing that “I may be down, but I’m not out” or “Don’t get any ideas: I’m not a patsy.”

This is NOT to say that redirected aggression is good – in fact, I think it is very, very bad – but to combat it, we need to confront it, and to confront it, we need to understand not only its ubiquity but also its origins.

At the individual level, let me offer a brief case study: the case of Geronimo, who was to become the most feared and warlike chief of the Apaches. One day in 1858, a squadron of Mexican cavalry ambushed a group of Apaches, in peacetime, while the men were away. The following year, a large force of Apaches, looking for revenge, caught up with a detachment of Mexican soldiers – who may or may not have been those who committed the massacre - and a young man named Geronimo was given command. Why him? Because his mother, wife, and three young children had been among those slaughtered the previous year. Here are Geronimo's own words:

I was no chief and never had been, but because I had been more deeply wronged than others, this honor was conferred upon me. ... In all the battle I thought of my murdered mother, wife and babies - of my father's grave and my vow of vengeance. ... Still covered with the blood of my enemies, still holding my

conquering weapon, still hot with the joy of battle, victory, and vengeance, I was surrounded by the Apache braves and made war chief of all the Apaches. Then I gave orders for scalping the slain. I could not call back my loved ones. I could not bring back the dead Apaches, but I could rejoice in this revenge.

The entire Mexican force, two companies of infantry and two of cavalry, was wiped out. Apache losses were also high, but for Geronimo and his fellows, as for millions of others before and after, it seems to have been worth it.

The process can operate at the level of entire communities as well:

Journalist Lawrence Weschler, writing in *The New York Times*, recounted the appalling outcome of an entire community, the Bosnian town of Banja Luka. Although it used to consist of a majority of Muslims, when Weschler arrived nearly all of them had just been murdered or driven out ("cleansed") by their Serb neighbors:

As I was standing alongside the rubble-strewn parking lot on the site of what had until recently been one of the most splendid ancient mosques west of Istanbul, I asked a passing Serb student by what justification this and all the town's other mosques had been leveled. "Because of what the Ustasha did to us during the Second World War—they leveled our Orthodox churches," he replied without the slightest hesitation. Only the Ustasha were Croats. I somehow felt transported into a Three Stooges movie: Moe wallops Larry, who then feels entirely justified in turning around and smashing Curly.

Not surprisingly, it is consistently "cross-cultural." Among the Yanomamo people of northern South America, it is common to hear statements such as "If my sick mother dies, I will kill some people." According to anthropologist Ruth Benedict, in *Patterns of Culture*, there was a recommended code of conduct among a certain tribe of headhunters:

When a chief's son died, the chief set out in a canoe. He was received in the house of a neighboring chief, and after the formalities he addressed his host, saying, "My prince has died today and you go with him." Then he killed him. In this, according to interpretation, he acted nobly because he had not been downed, but had struck back in return.

What about Iraq?

There are many possible reasons why the Bush Administration chose to attack Iraq, none of them, in my opinion, defensible. What seems clear, however, is that Saddam Hussein was not responsible for September 11, but that in the mind of the American people, the agony of that attack demanded that something be done – preferably something violent – and that someone be held accountable and made to

suffer, preferably someone already known to be nasty, and who also could readily be defeated. Afghanistan's Taliban had been trounced, but the pain of 9/11 demanded more.

The following ditty made its way around the Internet in the US, just prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003: (to the tune of "If You're Happy and You Know it, Clap your Hands")

If you cannot find Osama, bomb Iraq.
If the market's hurt your momma, bomb Iraq.
If the terrorists were Saudi and they've repossessed your Audi,
And you're feeling kind of rowdy ... bomb Iraq!

Thomas Friedman, writing in *The New York Times* in June of 2003, suggested the following:

"The 'real reason' for this war, which was never stated, was that after 9/11 America needed to stick it to someone in the Arab-Muslim world. ... Smashing Saudi Arabia or Syria would have been fine. But we attacked Saddam for one simple reason: because we could, and because he deserved it, and because he was right in the heart of that world."

According to former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, in his recent book, *Disarming Iraq*, "It is clear that the U. S. determination to take on Iraq was not triggered by anything Iraq did, but by the wounds inflicted by al-Qaeda." Whether or not the war in Iraq was justified, it seems clear that its path was facilitated by the eagerness – even, perhaps, the need – of many Americans to redirect their post-9/11 pain. Like the proverbial fish that would not describe its environment as "wet," most of us experience, almost daily, an unspoken, unrecognized tide of redirected aggression. It is the ocean in which we swim.

Here, briefly, are some further examples of the ubiquity as well as the likely depth of redirected aggression. Consider the extent to which the notorious "cycles of domestic violence" may involve victims eventually becoming victimizers, or the extent to which "road rage" may well be generated by someone having "had a bad day," are responding with a "short fuse," "taking out his/her anger" on third parties. Or scapegoating:

We have Old Testament accounts from Leviticus in which the transgressions and sins of the people were placed upon the head of a goat, who was then slaughtered or driven away. Current psychological family theory describes how families often establish a “designated transgressor” who is blamed for any existing dysfunction. At the societal level, African Americans have undoubtedly been the foremost recipients of this dubious honor: In a now-classic study, social psychologists Carl Hovland and Robert Sears found they could predict the number of southern lynchings occurring during any given year between 1882 and 1930, simply by knowing the price of cotton during that year. When cotton went down, the frequency of lynchings went up. The economic and social pain of poor whites was passed onto blacks, without any conscious awareness of the scapegoating involved. The situation was clearly cultural, the process, all too “natural.”

There are other likely connections: Think, for a moment, about “justice,” and ask what is really going on when victims demand punishment ... nearly always claiming, of course, that they are *not* out for revenge. But in fact, aren’t they insisting – although not in so many words - that their pain be off-loaded onto someone else? Once the wheels of pain have begun to spin, what really seems to matter is that someone – anyone - must suffer, must be made to “pay.” In the US, there was a dramatic example in the case of Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombing - “seeing justice done,” I suggest, really involves victims and the families of victims demanding that their pain be redirected onto others. Revealingly, there is a deep insistence on the part of victims and their families that – by virtue of their suffering - they are *entitled* to a punishment, almost without regard to the matter of guilt. Moreover, the urge among victims to redirect their aggression is so strong that society steps in to make sure that this powerful impulse is handled decorously.

Modern science may even owe its existence to scapegoating ... or rather, to those who were able to *overcome* the urge to redirect their anger and pain. The argument, in brief, is that when bad things have happened to innocent people there has been a powerful tendency for these people to seek someone, or some group, to blame. And so, Jews were slaughtered during the Great Plague, and witches were especially likely to be burned whenever times were hard. By “taking out” their pain on these supposed transgressors, a burden was lifted from the suffering survivors. Today, of course, we know that people get sick because of disease organisms, not the “evil eye.” The point is that in order for science as we now understand it to have

developed, it was necessary for people to stop looking for the causes of disasters, and thus, of their pain, in scapegoats and search in the natural world. In short, we didn't so much stop burning witches because we had developed science, but rather, we developed science only when we were able to get beyond burning witches.

Literature, too, is awash with the three R's. In addition to the well-known "revenge tragedies," from *The Iliad* through Elizabethan England to Charles Bronson movies and Quentin Tarantino's *Kill Bill*, pain-passing is a pervasive theme in fiction no less than in life. Usually, the wheels of mayhem are set in motion when someone is wronged, and typically, the deeper the wrong the more bloody the response. It is noteworthy that even here, in works of the imagination (where, one might think, anything goes) only rarely are bad guys presented as doing evil for evil's sake: the mustache-twirling villain who gleefully ties the heroine to the railroad tracks because he is simply cruel, and that's that. Almost inevitably, for a bad actor to be believable, he or she must be shown to have suffered some injury. Then it all makes sense.

James Joyce's story "Counterparts," appearing in his collection, *Dubliners*, gives us the poignant tale of Farrington. "He longed to execrate aloud," we are told, "to bring his fist down on something violently." But he couldn't. He went drinking with his buddies, only to lose two arm-wrestling matches to someone much younger (Mr. Farrington, we learn, is a large man, much esteemed - at least in the past - for his strength).

As a result, it was a sullen Farrington who headed home that evening, full of smoldering anger and revengefulness. He felt humiliated and discontented; he did not even feel drunk; and he had only two pence in his pocket. He cursed everything. He had done for himself in the office, pawned his watch, spent all his money; and he had not even got drunk. ... He had lost his reputation as a strong man, having been defeated twice by a mere boy. His heart swelled with a ... fury that nearly choked him.

Farrington's young son comes running down the stairs to meet him, small and vulnerable, pitifully eager to do his father's bidding, altogether innocent of the day's misfortunes, and unaware of the older man's pent-up rage:

"What's for my dinner?"

"I'm going ... to cook it, pa," said the little boy.

"On that fire? You let the fire out! By God, I'll teach you to do that again!"

He took a step to the door and seized the walking stick, which was standing behind it. "I'll teach you to let the fire out!" he said, rolling up his sleeve in order to give his arm free play.

The little boy cried "O, pa!" and ran whimpering round the table, but the man followed him and caught him by the coat. The little boy looked about him wildly but, seeing no way of escape, fell upon his knees.

"Now, you'll let the fire out the next time!" said the man, striking at him vigorously with the stick. "Take that, you little whelp!"

The boy uttered a squeal of pain as the stick cut his thigh. He clasped his hands together in the air and his voice shook with fright.

"O, pa!" he cried, "Don't beat me, pa! And I'll ... I'll say a *Hail Mary* for you. ... I'll say a *Hail Mary* for you, pa, if you don't beat me. ... I'll say a *Hail Mary*. ..."

Mr. Farrington is not a very likeable character. In some ways, he isn't really a character at all but rather a sluiceway, a conduit for anger and pain. We have all known Farringtons, and to some extent, most of us have probably been Farrington's as well. Furthermore, one needn't be a specialist in developmental psychology or psychopathology to predict what sort of father, and victimizer in his own right, Farrington's young son is likely to become when he gets his chance.

Next, the good news: There are ways out. Redirected aggression – and thus, to some extent, violence generally - isn't inevitable. But we need to ask some hard questions. For instance: What should be done about violent transgressors, notably sociopaths and other perpetrators of evil; i.e., those with "poisonous personalities" and who act upon their venom? If it is not acceptable to pass along our pain, how *should* we respond?

What will provide order, security and personal satisfaction, as well as minimizing "subordination stress," without simply passing along the pain of the victimized and without creating new victims?

This, in turn, leads to another difficult question: If people who seek to hurt others are doing so "because" they have themselves been hurt, does that diminish their responsibility or guilt? Should we pity the poor perpetrator? Are *all* victimizers themselves previous victims? And what if they are? Does that let them off the hook? When does passing the pain become passing the buck?

The world's great ethical systems have long struggled to define an acceptable defense of victims that preserves personal and collective security, without falling into excess. This challenge is particularly appropriate at a time when the word "evil" is bandied about by politicians and extremists to *condone* war and terrorism; no less than wars *against* terrorism. An important matter, accordingly, is to explore not only how aggression is typically misplaced or displaced, but also how it should be placed,

which is to say, the same way that porcupines are reputed to make love: very carefully.

We might conclude, therefore, with a new look at some of the world's oldest wisdom. Pain is prominent in Buddhism, which is founded upon the recognition that suffering is ubiquitous and unavoidable, yet can be minimized. The first of Buddhism's "Four Noble Truths" is that life inevitably entails pain, followed immediately by specific methods to reduce suffering, called the "The Eightfold Path." In addition, among the fundamental teachings of Mahayana Buddhism is the *kshanti paramita*: "the capacity to receive, bear and transform the pain inflicted on you by your enemies and also by those who love you."

Hinduism – ancestral to Buddhism - focuses on the repeating cycle of death and rebirth, and of ways to break this cycle and achieve nirvana. What about breaking the cycle of pain and the "three R's"? (It isn't quite so easy as simply adding a fourth: "restraint.") One cannot avoid mentioning Gandhi, whose way of "*satyagraha*" and nonviolence was explicitly developed with an eye toward *not* demanding an eye for an eye, not passing along one's pain.

Christian tradition, too, venerates and validates the role of pain. Christ's agony is widely taken as crucially related to God's redemption of humanity. Hidden within dense layers of theology is this equation, one that is, however, rarely made explicit: the more pain (the more suffering on the part of Jesus), the more redemption for the rest of us. But *why*? Perhaps because the crucifixion of Christ, who is considered the epitome of innocence, provides an especially potent example of scapegoating as route to social cleansing. Also consistent with my thesis is this possibility: insofar as Christ suffered ("for our sins"), this enhances the social, personal, and even biochemical status of the rest of us, helping to overcome subordination stress among His followers.

In a masterpiece of painfully accurate revelation, G. K. Chesterton once wrote that Christianity hasn't been tried and found wanting; rather, it has been found difficult and left untried. Never has this been truer than in cases of personal pain and our reaction to it. Thus, Christ urged us to love our enemies, and, if slapped, to turn the other cheek. But for millennia - before Christ and after – human beings and their animal brethren have been far more likely to respond to pain and injury with a retaliating barrage of the same sort, generating yet more injury, more pain.

Perhaps Jesus did not entirely appreciate the magnitude of the demand he was making upon *Homo sapiens*, because in asking his followers to refrain from retaliation - to absorb pain without passing it on to someone else - he was asking people to inhibit one of their most widely shared, deep-seated inclinations. Nonetheless, the potential solutions to be discussed are all based on an equally deep, equally shared truth: that human beings, perhaps unique among animals, are capable (at least on occasion, and once the issues are made clear) of acting *against* the promptings of their biology.

Here are some specific proposals to help produce a world that is less infested with retaliation, revenge and redirected aggression: Blocking bullies (paying close attention to the causes of bullying and other pain-inflicting behavior, and protecting victims from their actions), encouraging genuine family values (supporting social programs likely to minimize domestic trauma), making the punishment *fix* the crime (rewriting the Mikado's famous song to emphasize restitution rather than punishment *per se*). As to terrorism and terrorists, we need a deep awareness of how the behavior of the West has inflicted pain on many Muslims and Arabs ... not to excuse their response, but to make it less likely that there will be additional violent responses.

I shall end with what I call the "Maxim of Minimizing Pain": Given that pain, in one form or another, is unavoidable, ask one's self whether a contemplated course of action will increase or decrease the world's burden, and always choose the latter.

Conclusion: a new prayer for peace.

"Although pain and suffering are inevitable, since there will always be bullies, cheats, and jerks, as well as plain old bad luck and the unavoidable vicissitudes of life, when I am hurt by others, the pain stops here. I will not pass it along. I will think before retaliating. I may seek justice or restitution, health and healing, but never revenge, and I renounce redirected aggression."

The Language of “Terrorism”

Anat Biletzki*

Abstract

The perspective of this presentation is philosophical. Concretely, it tries to answer if philosophy can confront global terrorism or promote social change, peacefully or otherwise. Intuitively, the answer to this question would be that philosophy provides the analytical tools and the conceptual methodology with which to address all problems, including terrorism and social change. But this paper suggests something more demanding of philosophy and philosophers than mere intellectual activity. Namely, it focuses on the philosophers’ commitment to critique and more specifically social critique. The essay suggests that philosophers are compelled to constantly question consensus, social and cultural presuppositions, and to promote political and social discussion. The paper elaborates a critique on the particular uniqueness of the term “terror”. Such an analysis is born of a deeply felt conviction that it is in and by our use of language that we do things – including fight against terrorism.

Preamble

The itinerary for this conference, titled “Non-violent Strategies for Confronting Global Terrorism and for Promoting Peaceful Social Change”, has been introduced as including a “philosophical” dimension and an “empirical” one. Although placed, surprisingly, in the empirical session, the perspective of this presentation (and its contribution, if it be such) is philosophical. The language of “terrorism” is, indeed, an empirical phenomenon; but the point is to analyze it, dissect it, and fathom it from a philosophical vantage-point.

Can philosophy deal in “Strategies”? Can philosophy “confront” global terrorism or “promote” social change, peaceful or otherwise? A Centre for Peace Studies can and should, indeed, broach these questions pragmatically and concretely, but the question of what it is that philosophy can contribute to the discussion should be taken seriously. And an answer to the question is herewith ventured, which has to do, naturally, with my own view of what it is that philosophy does. Quite intuitively, one submits that philosophy provides the analytical tools and the conceptual methodology with which to address problems, all problems, and even very down-to-earth problems like those presented here (“confronting global terrorism” and “promoting peaceful social change”). But I would like to propose something more

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demanding of philosophy and philosophers than simply being the intellectual handmaiden for the (political, diplomatic, social, economic, or military) lords. I am speaking here of the philosopher's commitment to critique, more specifically social critique, as her professional task; and of her obligation to question consensus, to query social and cultural presuppositions, to raise issue with both sides – all sides – of any discussion, but especially political and social discussion.

I take my cue more explicitly from Giovanna Borradori¹, locating the philosophical job of critique in Hannah Arendt's model of *social critique* (as opposed to Bertrand Russell's position of *political activism*). I will, in the sequel, elaborate on the particular uniqueness of the term “terror”; suffice to point, now, to my adoption of this stance as the essential reason for the things I want to say. In other words, I view my discussion here, from the philosophical perspective, as a discussion that is devoted to social critique (rather than strategizing). Whether such critique can help to confront global terrorism or promote social change is clearly an important question but one which will not be taken up here.

Furthermore, let us clarify the special perspective, within philosophy, from which our analysis springs, namely, the philosophy of language. The critique offered is mandated by the terminology and ideas of the philosophy of language; more so, it is born of a deeply felt conviction that it is with language, in language, and by our use of language that we do things – including fight against terrorism. An additional angle here proffered will address some spurious fights against terrorism.

Finally, some apologetics. It is around the term “terrorism” that this story revolves. It is, of course a global story, but the details that can be more facilely reported, the details I am familiar with, have to do with a local context: Israel-Palestine. I am referring here, of course, to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, for over thirty-eight years, which is a paradigm of the victory of rhetoric over reason in politics. I will extrapolate from it to talk about that same, sad, victory in a global context.

¹ *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, 2003.

Definition of Terrorism (once again)

Terrorism. So many questions have become the philosopher's run-of-the-mill in dealing with terrorism. First among them is, of course, the question of the definition of terrorism, and immediately upon its heels, questions about global terrorism vs. local terrorism, about "regular" terrorism vs. state terrorism, the relation between terrorism and targeted killings (assassinations), terrorism and the intellectual, terrorism and human rights, and so on.² While all of these are adjunct to any accepted definition, and while some of them will engage us presently, we cannot here delve deeply into the question of the definition of terrorism *per se* but will only mention certain pertinent elements of the received definitions. Most proposed definitions are problematic in that one can always find a falsifying example for each of them. Consequently, we don't treat the definitions as sufficient and necessary conditions, but only as a family of articulated intuitions that help us in theoretically identifying that which we intuitively identify quite easily. A different way of articulating this stance on definition is, of course, utilization of the Wittgensteinian term "family resemblance", leading us down the path of a singularly different methodology – that which turns to different uses of "terrorism" as related by family resemblance.³

The three obvious and natural *loci* by which to speak of terrorism are the victims, the perpetrators and the causes of terrorism. So, first, one can define terrorism by pointing to *the victims* of terrorism⁴, usually seen as "innocent" bystanders, civilians, or what have you. This becomes complicated when the

² The corpus of relevant texts for the definition of terrorism is immensely wide. Beyond the institutional definitions (in, e.g., the League of National Convention (1937), the "Rules of War" in the Geneva Conventions, or lately the novel "definitions" by the U.S. State Department), some paradigmatic formulations can be found in Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 1977; C. A. J. Coady, "The Morality of Terrorism", *Philosophy*, 60, 1985; Walter Lacqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 1987; J. Teichman, "How to Define Terrorism", *Philosophy*, 64, 1989; I. Primoratz, "What is Terrorism?", *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 7 No. 2, 1990; Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, 2003; and especially Ted Honderich, *Terrorism for Humanity*, 2003.

³ These and the following insights, criteria and even terminology (having to do with the definition of "terrorism" have been collected from talks given at the Tel Aviv University conference on "Terrorism: Philosophical Aspects", 2004 ; especially significant is the talk given by George P. Fletcher "The Problem of Defining Terrorism. See also his "Defining Terrorism" (<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fletcher9000>) and *Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

⁴ E.g., the General Assembly of the U.N. ("an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian"), Walter Laquer ("...innocent people are targeted.."), and James M. Poland ("...murder, mayhem and threatening of the innocent..").

distinction between terrorism and war crimes (specifically the war crime of targeting civilians) is brought into play, complicating the discussion with the question of the appropriate court to administer these different violations. One can, alternatively, ask about the definition of terrorism with regard to its *perpetrators*, thereby bringing in to the discussion the question of states as engaging in terrorism (by bombing civilian populations or by financing terrorists). It is noteworthy, if not ironic, that The Organization of Islamic Countries in the U.N. has demanded the official recognition of state terrorism. Finally, the definition of terrorism can be addressed via the question of the *cause* for which the terrorist is fighting, such cause being generally recognized as a political cause. Is a “terrorist” who is a “freedom fighter” to be exonerated given the end to which terrorism is a means? Or should terrorism, like torture (according to Human Rights Law), be absolutely prohibited? The intricacies of this query, concerning causes, have manifested themselves in the question of political vs. religious ends, which has come up in legislative discussion, with legislators taking care not to use religious motivation as an automatic identifying mark of terrorism.

These criteria by which we define terrorism, usually anchored in legal parlance, lead us down the unruly path of being able to associate almost any species of violence as terrorism. So we try by some less legalistic, more intuitive pointers, to isolate terrorism. A tempting option is to talk of terror literally, as that which instills fear, terror, irrational dread and fright in human souls. We then ask what it is about terrorism that is responsible for this type of horror. Three factors that have been noted by (legal) scholars, still in the attempt to define terror (for legalistic reasons), are not irrelevant for our discussion. The first is terrorism’s organizational nature – terrorists are (assumed to be) members of groups, organizations, and these are, for some reason, potentially more frightening than the lone terrorist. Secondly, the practitioners of terrorism embody an extreme of no-regret – bringing forth its repetitive nature and worse, the ultimate sacrifice of suicide bombers. Thirdly, terrorism is identified by its public, surely theatrical, nature. Without the component of actors *vis à vis* audience terrorism becomes merely another criminal act; with it, irrational fear is instilled.

It is, then, fear which is the ultimate point of terrorism. But we here address fear not in any legalistic context, neither as an aid in definition, but as that ingredient of terrorism which can be used by “the other side”, those fighting terrorism, or more

precisely, those entrusted with fighting terrorism – who use terrorism for their own ulterior motives (of power, control, and sovereign rule). Most interestingly, it is indeed the theatrical character of terrorism – without this, terrorism cannot communicate its threat, cannot infuse fear – which encourages its appropriation by the powers that be to collaborate with terrorists in order to use and abuse terrorism for their own intents. So there are two agents here purveying fear – the terrorists and their enemies – using theater and rhetoric to fight their fight. Analysis of that fight, as it's used by terrorists, is the object of current discourse, but it is the analysis of that fight as being used on the anti-terrorist side, which is now called for.

Semantics of the exceptional

While "terrorism" is the term on our agenda presently, several other "suspects" can be grouped with it: "security risk", "emergency", "violence", "warfare", "ticking bomb", and, of course, "global terrorism" itself. These are all grouped together for reason of their common function – of describing a situation, a condition, and a family of activities – that is supposed to ensure a listener's (or reader's) attention and to direct it to the *exceptional*. The focus of our semantic discussion is the unsurprising categorization of these certain concepts as referring to situations which are deviant, in some manner or form, from regular ones. The exact criteria for such categorization is not at issue here but we can suppose agreement that emergency situations, those having to do with security risks, definitely those involving violence, etc., in general, and situations involving terrorism, in particular, are in contrast to regular, routine, ordinary situations. One cannot understand the meaning of "terrorism" without being able to gauge the un-ordinariness of its object of description.

We now need to delve a little more intricately into our semantics. In the attempt to define "terrorism", there is an effort made to distinguish it from other terms, even those on our current list, such as "violence" or "warfare". That is to say, terrorism seems to be characterized by its clear and present distance from, the euphemistically termed, "regular" violence and warfare. If one supposes that violence or war are, or can be, a normal condition of human intercourse; if one accepts that violence and war are a commonplace of human enterprise; if one acquiesces to viewing times and places of war and violence as regularly present in

human endeavor, then one can accept regular violence and warfare without the scare-quotes. Yet even within the context of regular warfare, there is a special place reserved for terrorism, that exceptional, unacceptable, and (supposedly) inexplicable manner of waging war which has come to rate a special, extraordinary status in human warring activity. In the discourse of politics terrorism is the certain sign of special attention since, while speaking of regular warring situations and events, one can point to terrorism as the place where regularity gives way to the exceptional.

So our group of problematic concepts has to be delicately differentiated. There are the “regulars” (violence, war), and there are the “exceptionals” – specifically, terrorism. Somewhere in the middle, but, I dare say, nearer to terrorism and used (and soon to be exposed as rhetorically abused) in conjunction with it, are the terms “security risk” and “emergency situation” (with “ticking bomb” being an adjunct to both). Since security is that demand which a group, any group, places on its environment in order to sustain precisely its regular or ordinary existence, security would seem to be a mainstay of the ordinary. Security risks are therefore grouped with terms of the unusual in a roundabout way; security has become the catchword for the extraordinary in a more subtle and nuanced fashion. For security is that which is usually pinpointed as violated when extraordinary events are mobilized to expose the violation itself: security is the umbrella under which one can group all events which seem to breach it, and these are, mostly, emergency situations, out-of-the ordinary events.

Whether or not this semantic exercise – of grouping “emergency situation” and “security risk” together with “terrorism” as icons of irregularity – is, semantically speaking, sound is undecided; in any case, it is pragmatically relevant. It is with the use of these three concepts, indeed with their meaning in use that we will continue, in the following sections, to adumbrate the rhetoric that is involved in their implementation. All of these terms are on a special list because of their vulnerability to cynical and opportunistic rhetoric. We turn to the now prevalent use of these words – a use which has emerged, recently or not, as the ultimate rhetorical tool to excuse decisions and behaviors which would otherwise be censured (or, at best, censored). This will be the next point of the argument, which began with semantics.

Legal grounding of the exceptional – "security" and "emergency"

There is a problematics involved in deciding the practical implications of any ethics when confronted with concrete situations, whether they are ordinary or extraordinary. It is, in fact, that problematics – of the regular vs. the ordinary – that has given rise to certain familiar elements of international law in general, and humanitarian law in particular.

Let me elaborate: The story of international humanitarian law, beginning with the Hague conventions, and continuing with the Geneva conventions and their attendant protocols *et al*, is well-known. Humanitarian law and covenants of war are there to regulate irregular times – times of war, times of strife, times of conflict, times with lack of *security*, times of *emergency*. Humanitarian law takes into consideration, not as an aside or as an afterthought, but as its constitutive rationale, exactly those situations and those events which might entice us to waive ethical demands; which might bring us to that oft-quoted monstrosity: "all's fair in war". Not all is fair in war, not everything is permissible in war. Constraints on human behavior are just as relevant, in fact, perhaps more so, in times of war as in "regular" peace times. Emergency and security situations do indeed present rulers, soldiers, armies, organizations, sovereigns and others with dilemmas that may seem "different" in a sense from encounters that take place in ordinary circumstances. Precisely for that reason it has been deemed necessary to formulate clearly and explicitly the dos and don'ts of wartime and emergency times. International law takes it upon itself to specify the (legal) workings of such situations; humanitarian law is even more bounded, dealing with more specific situations in the workings of wartime.

Together, then, semantics and law serve as theoretical background to the perusal of some "exceptional" terms at work – "emergency" and "security" in point. The use of such terms in such a manner is to be viewed with concern, to say the least, and there are some paradigmatic cases, one of which we will shortly present, where they play pivotal roles.

"Emergency" is the most obvious, and perhaps the easiest to discharge. Emergency laws are there, explicitly and intentionally, to treat emergency situations. A legal system should, of itself, be able to countenance the vagaries of emergency; but barring the general, a priori, formulations of emergency laws within an

established and running system there is also the possibility of proclaiming an official, legal “emergency situation” with its rules, regulations, provisions and laws. Next in line is “security”. Security is the safety blanket surrounding the actions of actors that deliberately choose to be so blanketed. Under cover of that term – “security” – the deliberations of courts, the operations of armed forces, the policies of governing authorities, and, of course, the machinations of “security forces”, enjoy a breadth of activity that is exempt from both regular legal procedure and the basic ethical foundations that support it. There is, undoubtedly, an affinity between the concepts of “emergency” and “security”, with emergency being the stated situational bedding for security measures and security functioning as a safeguard for, against, and during emergencies.

The paradigmatic case is, for us, Israel, where history – a short history of/in the twentieth century – illustrates our semantic/legal point, through the instatement of an official “emergency situation”. This is the option adopted by several colonial regimes in times of uprisings; this is, in particular, the option that was adopted by the British authorities during the period of the British mandate in the Middle East. Instatement of an emergency situation with far-reaching action for the authorities was the British solution for (what was perceived as) an irregular situation that could only be thus controlled. Whether this was just, fair, ethical, efficient, or practical is of no consequence to our discussion. That this legal framework was then adopted, for various reasons, by the Israeli authorities, and that it has continued to be maintained until this very day (over fifty-seven years), is the real monstrosity, rather than the emergency itself, of the discussion. The use of “emergency” in labeling a situation as an emergency situation, the acceptance of this label by both legislative and judicial authorities (that it is accepted by the executive is not to be wondered at), and the acquiescence of the general populace to such a label of their (regular) life, is our object of investigation. If “emergency” is a special situation, if it is to serve as a pointer to irregularity, if it is to provide exceptional resources for the maintenance of a semblance of regularity, how can a fifty-seven year duration of emergency be explained or countenanced? Our suggestion will be that it cannot; or that if it can, this is only because its natural semantics has been perverted. Furthermore, this perversion has been intentionally, cynically and rhetorically performed.

So much for “emergency situation”; how does “security risk” enter the fray? One could, perhaps, entertain a lukewarm hypothesis: that in areas not ruled by law

or by civilian regulation, i.e., in military contexts, “security” might be a winning card, but that it is precisely the court-system, not to mention the legislative authorities, that can ensure that security is measured against other weights – for example, and most importantly, human rights – that can then prevail. It is here, however, that attention must be called to the (almost) single-minded workings of the Israeli judicial system itself, which (almost) always decides on the side of security. Given a set of inputs and considerations, it is the element of security which (almost) always trumps. In its deliberations over the past fifty-seven years the Israeli Supreme Court has consistently, though not always unanimously and barring an exceptional verdict here and there, upheld the security angle of any discussion. Security has always been the one consideration which seems to stump the judges, denying them the open deliberation and reflection which is expected in and demanded of any decent court. True, in “quiet” times, in hopeful times, in optimistic times, there seem to be more balanced verdicts, with security receiving more stringent examination as to the force of its argument. But in more fearful times, in times of greater conflict, in times of alleged emergency, security seems to be the be-all and end-all of deliberation – including, sadly, judicial deliberation. So security and emergency are not unrelated: terms of exceptional use have become a linchpin for the description of a state’s existential condition. Consequently, people’s inalienable human rights are routinely, blatantly, and indifferently violated by the authorities – all in the name of “security”, in times of “emergency”. These two are always trump cards.

The rhetoric of “terrorism”

Behind the concepts of emergency and security, and these days giving the reason to their rhyme, is “terrorism”. Usually, almost consensually, terrorism elicits a general consensus as to its absolute negative standing in the ethical and political arena. There might be debates concerning the explanation – if not the justification – of terrorism; there may be discussions concerning its reasons and causes; there could be different estimates of its efficacy; there are ruminations about its perpetrators and victims. But with no relation to the intricacies of its attempted definition, the term itself garners rhetorical usage that overrides any definition of choice. So let me pose the following set of questions about the “reference” (rather than the definition) of

“terrorism” in the Israeli context and go on to questions about the use, the rhetorical use, of the term.⁵

Would an attack by Palestinians on soldiers in the Occupied Territories be called terrorism? Would an attack by Palestinians on armed (male) settlers in the Occupied Territories be called terrorism? Would an attack by Palestinians on armed (female) settlers in the Occupied Territories be called terrorism? Would an attack by Palestinians on unarmed male or female settlers in the Occupied Territories be called terrorism? Would an attack by Palestinians on children in the settlements in the Occupied Territories be called terrorism? Would an attack, by Palestinians on soldiers within the State of Israel be called terrorism? Would an attack by Palestinians on civilians in a bus, men, women and children, be called terrorism? Would an attack by a suicide bomber be more an act of terrorism than that by a simple murderer? Would an attack by the Israeli army on residential areas housing civilians – men, women, and children – be called terrorism (albeit state terrorism)? Would an attack by an Israeli bulldozer on an American unarmed volunteer be called terrorism? Would the targeted killing by the Israeli army of a suspected armed militant be called terrorism? Are the deaths of his family and innocent bystanders, caused by the Israeli army, due to terrorism? Would the random shelling, by the Israeli army, of cars on a civilian road be called terrorism (and is this state terrorism)? Would dropping a one-ton bomb by the Israeli army on a house known to be non-empty be called (state-)terrorism?

Political philosophers and legal scholars have suggested answers, variegated and not necessarily consensual, to this horde of questions since they are, indeed, questions that must not go unanswered. Perhaps it is ethics and law that should be entrusted with the analysis of the term “terrorism”. Legal and ethical analysis, however, do not preclude or detain ordinary language. And ordinary usage has adopted the following precept: *Killing by the other side is continuously termed terrorism and fighters on the other side are invariably terrorists; therefore, not only is killing by our side and by our fighters always justified and always well-explained, but any action undertaken by our side is excusable*. I submit that in this case, the use of the term “terrorism” by the authorities, and on their heels by the media, has become the epitome of abuse. Not only is this a powerful use of words, it is abuse –

⁵ For a succinct, comprehensive and relevant discussion on the *definition* of terrorism in this context see David Rodin, “Terrorism without Intention”, *Ethics* 114/4 (2004): 752-771.

since terrorism indeed strikes terror into the heart of the listener. Fear, panic, and terror in the general ambience of a place and a populace then permit atrocities – violations of human rights, sometimes even to the tune of war-crimes – to be committed in the name of security, in times of emergency, in reaction to "terrorism".

Fear, pure and unadulterated, is achieved via this new rhetorical device that has become a catchword of the twenty-first century. We have seen terrorism defined in legal terms; analyzed by military experts; discussed in academic forums and symposiums; presented in books, movies, and documentaries in the finest of details. But it is the further step that has now been taken, the use of a word, "terrorism", as an icon striking fear into listeners' hearts that has distanced any and all *rational* discourse over the war against terrorism. The "War against Terrorism", local or global but viscerally identified, needs no rationality.

Rational discussion can address a multitude of subjects that are involved in this issue: the ability of one group to rule over another (and the inability of the other to negate such rule), the justness (or lack thereof) of colonialism and land-appropriation, the fairness (or lack thereof) of political subjugation, the balance of power (or lack thereof) between state armies and underground guerilla fighters, the wisdom (or lack thereof) in revenge and counter-revenge, the profit and loss of apartheid regimes, the impossibility of separation between warring parties, and, of course, the question of human rights. On and on and on the (rational) discussion can continue; but such is not the voice of practical politics (worldwide, but specifically in Israel today). Rather, the shrill voice of rhetoric, using and abusing the semantic icon of terrorism, wins the emotional war and, in doing that, wins the (ir-)rational war as well. Reason, logic and rationality seem to be losing the day to emotion all over the world of politics. Spinoza recognized this when he said that "minds, nevertheless, are conquered by love and generosity." I would add – more so, minds are conquered by fear.

Conclusion

Given the many "terrorisms" one encounters in the global context of these dire times, it behooves us, as critical philosophers, to engage with the question of the ethical norms that are to be discovered, exposed, analyzed and implemented in addressing them, with the very explicit purpose of locating guidelines for daily,

routine decisions and actions since “daily” and “routine” have now worn the garb of scare-quotes themselves. Yet it is precisely this conventional dichotomy – between exceptionalism, on the one hand, and routine, on the other – that must be questioned; or rather, perhaps we, as philosophers, or as philosophers of language, may begin to undermine the accepted view that there is something exceptional about such situations that provides background for a special attitude to terrorism.

It is the use of these so-called exceptional terms and concepts that should be investigated, especially the term “terrorism” itself; more specifically, it is the *rhetorical* use of these terms that should be unearthed by insisting that this conceptual cleavage – between the ordinary and the exceptional – has opened the door to their abuse in the service of (certain) powers that be. In other words, we turn to language and semantics to ground an ethical *cum* political hypothesis: that the use of the word “terrorism” is sometimes, oft-times, a suspect political maneuver that might lead us down torturous paths.

This is an attempt, then, to portray the use of certain words and concepts as a rhetorical use, a use mobilized intentionally to promote and support unethical acts of certain powers (mostly acts of human rights violations but also, of course, acts of warfare, etc.). The basis of such action lies in assuming that irregular circumstances ground a special ethics that acts as permission to loosen reigns, to tolerate atrocity, to make terms more flexible; and then in using the language of terrorism to manipulate, intentionally and rhetorically, the emotions, activities, decisions and judgments of (otherwise) decent people. “Terrorism”, along with other members of that family of terms, becomes a tool in the mouths of unethical warlords, supported by a cynical media, trying to convince a normal population easily given to manipulation, that their acts are necessary in safeguarding security, in dealing with emergency, and in preventing terrorism.⁶

⁶Parts of this article have been published, in somewhat different form, focus and emphasis, in my “‘The Rhetoric of (anti-)Terrorism’”, in I. Kucuradi, ed., *Threats to Human Rights*, Ankara: Hacettepe University Centre for Research and Application of the Philosophy of Human Rights, 2004.

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Research Imperative: Children are a Resource for Promoting Peaceful Social Change

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Abstract

Children in conflict zones are relevant participants in social change because they already have a role within that context, either by choice or coercion. Children are not only vulnerable victims without agency and capacity to make choices about the role they might play. The agency of youth in conflict and post-conflict societies must be considered. Children represent a large constituency that has the capacity to be a resource for promoting peaceful social change. It is increasingly important to gain understanding of the dominant discourses and systems that influence children's reasoning when choosing to participate in violent conflict, or issues that make them vulnerable to coercion. Social and political inclusion of youth in conflict transformation and peace building thus makes pragmatic and constructive sense. For peace to be sustainable, the adults of tomorrow need to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for the creation and maintenance of a climate of peace. There is an important need for further research to explore the role of youth participation related to conflict transformation theory. Adults have an important role in relation to the recognition and development of youth as peace builders - - to provide them with skills, opportunities and forums to make their voices heard. This paper presents two examples of peace work with youth in Kosovo and South Africa.

Part I.

We are here to make the case for children's role as agents of peaceful social change.

Children in conflict zones are relevant participants in social change because they already have a role within that context, which is more or less shaped by the fact that they live within a society in conflict. For many children war/conflict is a fact that they are born into – not a choice they have made. That fact does not, however, mean that children are only vulnerable victims without agency and capacity to make choices about the role they might play. Their particular role is affected by many factors – structural, political, societal, cultural, familial, personal – and can result in either positive or negative participation. The agency of youth in conflict and post-

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conflict societies must be considered, as they represent a large constituency that has the capacity to be a resource for promoting peaceful social change, but alternatively the ability to exacerbate conflict. That dichotomy and the potential to positively impact possible decisions of children and youth are what concern us here, in our work and in our research.

The agency of youth in conflict transformation and peace building is often overlooked due to the western conception of youth as apolitical. Pamela Reynolds (1998) has made the point that this western conception includes children being politically ignorant and uninvolved, and she argues that it risks obscuring children's actual contributions to society. There is evidence that children in conflict zones and other dangerous and oppressive environments are aware of and sensitive to political realities, and that they make political and moral decisions accordingly (Coles 1986, Garbarino et al 1991, Hart 2004, Melton & Limber 1992).

Taking children and young people's agency seriously gains extra urgency when one examines global dynamics identified as likely to have a profound impact on violent conflict over the next 15-20 years. Kevin Clements (2001) identifies two factors that have direct relevance for children. Firstly, he highlights the fact that most recent civil wars are fought by young men who are either unemployed or under-employed, and combines this with the fact that many developing states already have a disproportionate number of children (often 50% or more) and that 95% of the 1.1 billion increase expected in world population during this time period (up to 2020) will be in developing countries. There will therefore be an increasing number of unemployed youth in some of the potential conflict zones. Secondly, Clements identifies the world refugee, and internally displaced persons, situation as a continuing source of discontent and a fertile recruiting ground for soldiers and militia – and children and young people are disproportionately represented in these groups.

Studies of conflict areas provide some evidence that in fact the disruption of societal systems due to conflict actually increases the likelihood of children's involvement in social, economic and political activities (El Sarraj 2005, Hart 2002). It is therefore necessary and prudent to consider young people's participation (according to their evolving capacities), and to bear in mind their scope of influence as representatives of a large portion of their local and national communities, and ultimately the global community.

Another compelling reason to examine the agency of youth in conflict is the role they already play in violent conflict, sometimes by coercion and sometimes by choice. (Reynolds 2000, De Waal 2002) The recent focus on ‘child soldiers’ has also tended to overlook issues of children’s political awareness and agency. Rather there has been a ‘moral outrage’ about child soldiers that has parallels with an earlier one about ‘street children’ (Cave 1998). For instance, the term ‘child soldier’ itself can be misleading and hide a wider problem – it detracts attention from a wider group of *girls and boys associated with armed forces* and fulfilling a variety of roles that may not include direct involvement in hostilities, but who are at least as vulnerable to having their rights violated. The images that build up around the term can also be unhelpful – people in the West tend to see child soldiers as victims, while those in their own country may see them as killers and perpetrators of abuse, while the children themselves (and others), in some circumstances, may see themselves as freedom fighters and heroes (Straker 1992 cited in Reynolds 2000). These inconsistent perspectives must be teased out and systematically examined, from the point of view of the youth involved, in order to gain understanding of the dominant discourses and systems that influence their reasoning when choosing to participate in violent conflict, or issues that make them vulnerable to coercion.

Social and political inclusion of youth in conflict transformation and peace building thus makes pragmatic and constructive sense. These young people may have experience and capacities that can either work for or against the new social and political constructions. For peace to be sustainable, the adults of tomorrow need to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for the creation and maintenance of a climate of peace (Kemper 2005, McEvoy-Levy 2001).

The OECD *Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention (2003)* makes the point that disenfranchised youth are a recruiting ground for terrorist groups (or other forms of violent participation in conflict). Today’s young people must have a reason to hope for a future in which their needs are met and the achievement of their aspirations is possible. Therefore an important aspect to consider is how structural issues influence the choices of youth regarding participation in conflict. To what extent are youth ‘mobilized to discontent’ because of structural conditions within their societies (e.g., poverty, unemployment, underemployment, destruction of family systems, homelessness, lack of mobility, lack of access to schools, violence, corruption, displacement)? How can youth

experience ‘transformational participation’ (Hart, 2004) in their conflict and post-conflict societies, which both empowers them individually, and also impacts policies and policy-makers, i.e., has both personal and systematic (and synergistic) transformational qualities (Lederach 1995)?

The DAC Guidelines for Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD 2001) see the solution to children’s active involvement in conflict as being on two levels: the ending of recruitment of children, and addressing the lack of jobs and educational opportunities that can push poor young people into armed groups out of economic necessity. We feel this approach is valid but inadequate, and that further systemized research is necessary in order to address youth in conflict and post-conflict societies effectively and comprehensively.

We have a conviction that there is an essential need for further research to explore the role of youth participation related to conflict transformation theory (Bigdon and Korf 2002, Galtung 1996, Lederach 1997), linking this with rights-based approaches to development. The link between youth and a transformation approach to conflict is a significant approach to explore, given that those involved in conflict transformation tend to be grassroots organisations, development and humanitarian NGOs; and their activities are targeted at those most affected by the violent conflict, and include capacity building and empowerment, development and humanitarian assistance, and human rights work (Bigdon & Korf 2002, Lederach 1997). This approach would include an effort to understand the youth perspective on the immediate and root causes of conflict and on their role as social actors within the context of the historical, political and structural realities of their lives. We also think it is important to study concrete examples where youth’s participation and empowerment have made an important contribution to peace building.

Adults have an important role in relation to the recognition and development of youth as peace builders - - to provide them with skills, opportunities and forums to make their voices heard. This requires information sharing and dialogue between children and adults, which is based on mutual respect and power sharing, (Lansdown, 2004) Therefore, adults, in particular those who work within systems which have a specific responsibility for the development and well-being of youth, must have education and training that gives them an awareness that children are capable contributors, and provides them with skills to facilitate those capacities. How to achieve that in the context of conflict is another important topic for research.

My colleagues will now give some examples from their work with youth in Kosovo and in South Africa.

Part II

My task during this 10-minute presentation is to bridge the theoretical introduction made by Lori Drummond – Mundal with the video about the Desmond Tutu Peace Center Emerging Leadership Programme and comments presented by Clem van Wyk. My presentation will therefore focus more on my observations from the field rather than aiming to be a scientific one. My own research the last ten years has mainly been related to issues of children's rights, especially children's rights and situation in war and postwar phases. I have documented lives and situations for refugee children from Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo – their situation in exile in Norway as well as in their home countries. For the time being, I am based at the Desmond Tutu Peace Center(DTPC) doing research about The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and children an youth.

In 2004, five years after Nato's bombing of Kosovo and after the Rambouillet agreement, I went to Kosovo together with a child psychiatrist and a clinical pedagogue to interview Albanian children and youth. We wanted to know what Kosovo Albanian children thought about their present life and what reflections they had about their future. What were their hopes and dreams? Did they think that different ethnic groups could live peacefully together in the future? How did they imagine their own participation in reaching such a goal? Through cooperation with Albanian contacts we were taken to Rajac, a small village four miles outside Prishtina, which is regarded as the capital of Kosovo. This was the same village where a massacre took place in January 1999, and incident that made the Head of OSCE Verification Mission, William Walker, state that the Kosovo conflict had escalated into genocide. A few weeks later, NATO started to bomb the region.

Visiting the village school where the interviews were planned to take place, the principal and staff informed us about all the young pupils who had lost their fathers, and mothers during that incident. Nearly 40 children had become orphans, and a large group of children had lost other family members. Every day those children passed by the their graves on their way to their school. Every day was a reminder of what had happened in their young lives. Here we did in-depths

interviews with three boys and three girls aged 11-12. In Prishtina I interviewed 15 boys and girls of the age of 15 – 17. I was deeply moved by the reflections coming from all of them, and especially impressed by the reflections from the youngest ones. They had never discussed issues relating to their future and challenges of reconciliation with anybody else before. Some of our questions brought tears, especially when we touched issues related to the flight and the hard way to survive, escaping to the mountains during cold winter days without any warm clothes or food, insecure and unprotected. Yet their concern about the future was not at all about themselves. The young 11-12 year children first of all were worried about what would happen with the orphans who had lost their parents in the mass murders. What kind of protection and support would be given to them? The wounds from the war seemed to be deep. And these young children expressed little hope of a future peaceful society. How could they ever feel safe and live peacefully together with people who had murdered their close and dear relatives?

The views from the teenagers were a little more optimistic. However, none of them had experienced death of close relatives, and several of them had been fortunate enough to be brought to temporary refugee camps in neighbouring countries or to Europe or Canada. Their hopes and plans for the future were to be able to leave Kosovo and live abroad. They felt they had lots of ideas and energy to offer in Kosovo to improve conditions there – not at least within the schools and on community level – but nobody would listen to them. Both groups had very little belief in the idea of a future multicultural and multiethnic Kosovo. They had experienced too much and meant they could not trust “the others”.

Some young Kosovo Albanians in exile, who I have been in close contact with for more than 10 years, shared their views. In short: it seemed that rejection, hatred and hostility from the Kosovo Albanian children and youth towards ‘the others’, and especially the Serbs, had increased during the years after the peace agreement. The former suppressed group had now started feeling superior. And several of their parents and other adult Kosovo Albanians seemed to be speaking with two tongues: on one side they supported the idea from ‘the internationals’ about a mixed Kosovo. However, discussing this issue more deeply with them, they admitted that they would prefer to live in ethnic enclaves like is the situation in Bosnia. The views from the grown-up role models were communicated to the young ones, of course. I became concerned about this development and wanted to explore it

further. How did these enemy images develop? What could be done to reduce them? What maintained the hostile pictures and stereotypes of “the others” among the children and youth? Could “enemy pictures” among children today represent a societal safety risk tomorrow?

Staying at the Desmond Tutu Peace Center during my year of sabbatical, I hope to study this issue within the South African context and in the aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. My plan is to interview some of the children and youth who took part in the Children’s Hearings as victims as well as perpetrators. Ten years has passed since the TRC took place and some of these victims got amnesty. What are their lives today? What are their reflections, looking back on what happened? Can anything be forgiven? What has the reconciliation process meant to them, regarding images of ‘the others’?

After just a few weeks in Cape Town, it has struck me how much more inclusive people are here, regardless of race and colour, than my experiences from Balkan. As we know, South Africa has undergone a major social transformation the last ten years and been able to end apartheid with peaceful means. But why has South Africa been able to achieve peaceful social changes, while Kosovo, Bosnia and other conflict areas have achieved so little during the same period of time?

To me it seems that one of the main reasons for this may be related to the philosophy and practice of UBUNTU, as we experience this in real life be great South African role models such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. UBUNTU is a Zulu word (a Nguni expression: Umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu) , and is roughly translated as “humanity towards others”. It essentially means that *you are only a person because of other people, and you can only grow and develop if you help other people*. It means that you are an individual only through other persons, and that every individual is indissolubly linked with other human beings. Descartes’ philosophy states “I think, therefore I exist”(cogito, ergo sum). Desmond Tutu points out that the UBUNTU philosophy states “I am a human being because I belong. “. “... “I participate, I share.””

UBUNTU is a heritage that has helped South Africa deal with major challenges. It is a value system that has guided the behaviour of the South Africans and influenced them on individual level as well as family and community level. The UBUNTU value concept drives communities to act in solidarity with the weak and the poor, and helps community members to behave in a particular way for the

common good. Within the South African diversity, UBUNTU bind communities together and ensure social cohesion. This philosophy distinguishes South Africans from other nationalities.

The Desmond Tutu Peace Center has developed a pedagogy and methodology of training that reflects this platform. The aim is to run programmes and activities built on the philosophy, core principles and non-negotiable values according to this understanding of “The Tutu Pictures”: 1) the centrality of the individual 2) the need for community 3) the inclusivity of all people 4) the interconnectedness of all things 5) the morality of the universe 6) the practice of spirituality 7) the existence of God. I leave it to my colleague Clem van Wyk to introduce the Peace building Educating Model developed at the DTPC, focusing on how various modules in this methodology focuses on issues related to (intra)personal (‘Peace within’) group level (‘Peace between’) and system level/global level (‘Peace amongst’).

The Desmond Tutu Peace Center will target the public as well as researchers and other groups, e.g. young people, community leaders, parliamentarians etc in order to contribute to sustainable peace building processes initiated around the world. Based on the UBUNTU philosophy, the South African experiences from the Truth and Reconciliation Process and the vision and values related to the “The Tutu Pictures”, this specific, indigenous South African contribution may also be of importance to other cultures and areas of conflict and war, searching for non-violent strategies to fight violence and terrorism.

The mission of the Desmond Tutu Peace Center is to nurture peace by promoting ethical, values-based human development through teaching, training, research, documentation and being an area for dialogue for all kind of people. The DTPC aims to change peoples’ destinies.

One of the programmes at DTPC, the Emerging Leadership programme (ELP) aims specifically at youth between 15 – 25 years of age who have already proved capacities of good leadership within their schools or communities. Through a training programme where the participants meets regularly during a period of eight months DTPC supports these young potential leaders and nourishes their capacities and competence in the perspective of peace and peace building. In this way, DTPC actively relates to children and youth - the new generation after apartheid - who could easily inherit the enemy images of “the others” and pass on old myths and hatred. The youth groups get involved in meaningful discussions related to diversity,

inclusiveness and human rights in a peace perspective, and are able to demonstrate through their own capacity and experiences that children and youth actually are most important agents of peaceful social change.

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Responding to Wrongdoing: Overcoming Evil With Good⁷

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Abstract

How do we respond and how should we respond when confronting other people's wrongdoing towards ourselves or towards a third party? The paper considers three possible responses: (1) retribution, (2) restoration, and (3) forgiveness. The first two kinds of exchange are well known, while the last one is more unexplored. This paper briefly sketches out retribution and restoration to then focus on the psychological possibility of forgiveness. Then, it considers two perspectives on the nature and possibility of overcoming evil with good: Attribution theory (the fundamental attribution error) and Spinoza's philosophical psychology.

This presentation contains elements from my ongoing PhD project at the University of Oslo. The working title is: *A Change of Heart – An Inquiry into the Principles of Conflict Resolution*. The underlying question to be discussed in that project is the following one: How do we respond and how should we respond when confronting other people's wrongdoing towards ourselves or towards a third party? Hence, the project clearly has a normative ambition in trying to determine how we should respond to wrongdoing. In view of that, I shall consider three possible responses: (1) retribution, (2) restoration, and (3) forgiveness. The first two kinds of exchange are well known, while the last one is more unexplored.

In what follows, I will not be discussing the normative dimension of forgiveness. Rather, I will discuss the psychological possibility of forgiveness. First, I briefly sketch out retribution and restoration. This is to provide the necessary background for my discussion. Then, I consider two perspectives on the nature and possibility of overcoming evil with good: Attribution theory (the fundamental attribution error) and Spinoza's philosophical psychology.

⁷ Since this is a working paper and part of my ongoing PhD project, I would be thankful for any comments, suggestions or critical remarks.

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1. Retribution

Retribution instructs us to overcome evil with evil – for example by responding to other's anger with anger, hatred with hatred, or violence with violence. At this level one is motivated by a desire to get revenge. This way of responding rests on the belief that when a person is harmed or injured by somebody, the need to strike back will be the dominating force.

Retribution obviously has a number of problems of its own. One has to accept the fact that retribution contributes to a negative interaction spiral and an escalation of the conflict where anger begets anger, hatred begets hatred, and violence begets violence. This is seemingly attested to by mankind's long history of revenge and violence. It is also apparent from numerous conflicts throughout the world today: In the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and in the Northern Ireland conflict; to name but two. Here we may also add the occurrence of such things as mutual mistrust, unwillingness, blood vengeance and arms race.

2. Restoration

Restoration can be said to be motivated by a wish on the part of the victim of wrongdoing to control the need for revenge, and so avoid a negative interaction spiral. In this way the claim for revenge is transformed into a claim for just punishment or compensation. Restoration begins from the premise that the most effective response to conflict is to repair the harm done by the wrongful act. For those harmed, restoration means repairing the actual damage caused by wrongdoing and restoring their sense of unjustified treatment.

Apparently, the restorative response has some advantages compared to that of retribution. To begin with, it contributes to the avoidance of a negative interaction spiral where anger begets anger, hatred begets hatred and violence begets violence. In other words, it has the potential of establishing the balance necessary to begin the job of resolving conflicts. Within the practice of restoration, we find approaches such as third-party mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, and intervention in attempts to resolve human conflicts. A great deal of today's research on conflict theory and

conflict resolution is located within the paradigm of restoration and restorative justice.⁹

3. Forgiveness

Forgiveness continues one step further. At this level one is neither motivated by revenge nor just compensation or punishment. Instead of responding to evil with evil, i.e. to other's anger, hatred or violence with reciprocal anger, hatred or violence, one attempts to respond to evil with good, i.e. with forgiveness, love and nonviolence. Here the wrongdoer is not considered an enemy or threat to be conquered, but more like a fellow human being – one who is receptive to forgiveness and who, at a deeper level, carries a potential for moral transformation. Her one assumes that human beings, in so far as they manage to develop appropriate dispositions, will be able to overcome evil with good.

A. The nature and possibility of overcoming evil with good – learning from attribution theory

An important psychological question is, however, whether such a response is in fact possible, and if so, how it is possible? It is generally assumed in ethics literature that a “should” or an “ought” implies a “can”. According to this view, morality and psychology go together. Morality tells us what we ought to do, but there is little point to it if we are not able to do as we ought. To say that we should respond to wrongdoing with forgiveness is empty unless we are capable of forgiving.

In cases of wrongdoing, the victim must often work through a process of responding to the wrongdoing to reach a state of forgiveness. Forgiveness involves moderating our negative emotions towards those who have wronged us. These negative emotions include, besides anger, resentment, hatred, disappointment, disillusionment, sadness, contempt and various others. Now it is generally assumed that in order for forgiveness to be an appropriate moral response, the wrongdoer must in some way show remorse, repent, apologise etc: we expect people to own up to

⁹ The body of literature on the theory and practice of restorative justice is vast but worth mentioning are the contributions by Väyrynen (ed.) (1991); Schellenberg (1998); Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999); Deutsch and Coleman (2000); Klimchuk (2001); Rigby (2001); Strang (2002); and Johnstone (2002) & (2003).

what they have done. This is sometimes referred to as *conditional forgiveness*.¹⁰ On the other hand, we have what is called *unconditional forgiveness*, which does not depend upon remorse or regret from the wrongdoer. Instead, it is argued that the appropriateness of forgiveness depends on the internal preparation of the person who forgives. The victim of wrongdoing must work through a process of moderating his or hers negative emotions towards the wrongdoer. As much as I would like it, I shall not here pursue the discussion of the relationship between conditional and unconditional forgiveness. What I would like to do, however, is say something more about the process of moderating one's negative emotions towards the wrongdoer.

It might be that the question of the psychological possibility of forgiveness should be reformulated in another way: How is it possible to become free of the destructive emotions and attitudes of anger, hatred, and resentment that motivate us to strike back? I have the impression that modern research in attribution theory in one way or another attempt to answer this question. Here one assumes that each person's capability to integrate and control his negative emotions deeply influences the person's interpersonal emotions and attitudes of love, forgiveness, tolerance and non-judgement.¹¹ Here the emphasis is placed on trying to reflect on one's own negative reactions and attitudes to the wrongdoer. One simply asks: Who is the *actual* adversary or enemy? Is it the wrongdoer, or is it rather one's own negative reactions? If the answer is the wrongdoer, one is most likely to project enmity on others, which contributes to a negative interaction spiral. If, on the other hand, the answer is that the real enemy is in fact one's own negative reactions, one will look to redefine the adversary in such a way that one's own negative emotions, attitudes and feelings become the actual enemy. This may well contribute to changing a negative interaction spiral into a positive one. Or, at least this is one of my working hypotheses.

¹⁰ Cp *The Bible* on conditional forgiveness: Mat 6:12 (TEB) "Forgive us the wrongs that we have done, as we forgive the wrongs others have done us." Luke 6:37 (NIV) "...Forgive, and you will be forgiven." Mat 6:14-15 (NIV) "For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But, if you do not forgive men their sins, your Father will *not* forgive your sins."

¹¹ Attribution theory was developed overtime from the theories of Fritz Heider (1958), Edward Jones & Keith Davis, and Harold Kelley. The literature in this field has become quite extensive over the last forty years or so, but I should mention Averill (1982); de Rivera (1984); Tavis (1989); and Weiner (1986&95), as central to this discussion.

Furthermore, in attribution theory one has what is often referred to as “the fundamental attribution error”. This is a tendency we have to attribute other people’s behaviour to their dispositions, (such as their personality traits, emotions, attitudes etc.); while at other times attributing it to the external circumstances in which they find themselves. Let me illustrate this point with an example.

Imagine yourself having made an appointment with Peter at a café downtown at 1300, but that Peter is late. Furthermore, imagine yourself automatically generating feelings of anger and frustration towards Peter in the belief that he alone caused you to wait (It should be noted that Peter several times before has turned up late for appointments). However, imagine that when Peter finally arrives, you are told that there was a traffic jam at the time of your meeting. Then your anger and frustration towards Peter will probably decrease following an awareness of the fact that Peter’s delay was conditioned by external circumstances in which Peter found himself.¹² He was not to blame for the delay.

What are the implications of the fundamental attribution error for understanding conflicts and conflict dynamics? For my part, I think it is useful in that it helps to identify some of the causes of anger, hatred and resentment in conflict. It is a common human tendency to respond with negative emotions when we believe other people to be responsible for their actions. However, it is also a common human tendency to not respond with negative emotions when we believe other people not to be solely responsible for their actions. Hence, the more the person is seen as causing the action, the less the environment will be perceived as causal, and vice versa. Likewise, the more the person is seen as causing the wrongful act, the more anger and hatred will be directed towards him, and vice versa. It would seem that by recognising the causes of human wrongdoing, we can develop a more compassionate understanding for the wrongdoer. He or she is a fellow member of the human race, and struggles with the same pressures we struggle with. And he or she is vulnerable to error just like the rest of us.¹³ Personally, I would imagine that this view has some

¹² But then another question comes up: if you have become free from your emotions of hatred towards Peter, do you not now merely have a set of new causes against which you can direct all your anger and frustration, i.e. the service company responsible for the city’s public transportation system etc.? I assume several different answers may be given to this question, but I shall have to leave that to one side at present.

¹³ Cp Holmgren (1993), p. 350.

consequences for the way in which we look at terrorists, as was also discussed during the conference in Tromsø.¹⁴

Unfortunately, a thorough investigation of remedies against destructive emotions is still lacking in the academic literature on conflict theory and conflict resolution. I believe it would prove very helpful in determining how a person may transform his motivational structure from negative to positive emotions, attitudes, and actions.¹⁵ A basic concern is what impact the destructive emotions of anger, hatred, prejudice and so forth have on society as a whole, and what role they are playing in the many conflicts around the world. By investigating into the nature of destructive emotions, analysing them, looking at their effects, and exploring possible ways of moderating them, I believe we can advance in our understanding of the principles of nonviolent conflict resolution.¹⁶ A central part of my ongoing PhD project aims at exploring possible ways of moderating destructive emotions.

In view of that, I believe the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza could prove an important contributor to the discussion on destructive emotions and how to overcome them. Therefore, in the concluding section of my paper, I would like to put forward some remedies against destructive emotions as portrayed by Spinoza. It should be noted that Spinoza himself did not explicitly formulate any philosophy of conflict resolution. However, I believe some aspects of his philosophical system can be reconstructed so as to offer a theoretical framework for an ethics of conflict

¹⁴ A fundamental question is in fact how we should treat terrorists? Other related normative questions would be the following ones: Are there some cases in which forgiveness are wholly inappropriate as a response to wrongdoing? Are some wrongs, or some wrongdoers, unforgivable? Does it make sense to forgive a wrongdoer who remains unrepentant? Can we forgive on behalf of others? Should forgiveness be deserved, or may we grant it from a sense of human solidarity with the offender? Furthermore, in thinking about severe wrongdoings, such as the Holocaust or the Rwanda tragedy, what would be the appropriate response to the persons responsible for these atrocities? Should we consider them as monsters whose actions put them outside the moral pale, beyond any possibility of pardon or forgiveness? Or, may we think of such wrongdoers as victims of moral bad luck; people who are not, at root, worse (or better) than ourselves but who had the misfortune of becoming a part of collective wrongdoings? This last question obviously relates to the first question regarding terrorists; should we regard terrorists as victims of moral bad luck, or should we consider them as monsters whose actions put them outside the moral pale? These are all questions that need to be answered. However, that is a task for another article. Scarre (2004) attempts to answer some of these question, and his book can be recommended.

¹⁵ Much interesting work is being done on the role of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in the process of moral transformation. This is relevant to my discussion of the process of moderating the destructive emotions that motivate violent conflict. See Hollander (1928); Sorokin (1954), Fromm (1960&73); Rogers (1951&67); Rubin (1996); and Goleman (Eds) (2003).

¹⁶ See the excellent book by Goleman (Eds) (2003) on destructive emotions. This book contains references to relevant literature on destructive emotions, both from a Buddhist perspective, but also from the perspective of modern brain research etc.

resolution. The following is merely an attempt to extract some parts of his philosophy which allegedly have a bearing on conflict resolution.

B. The nature and possibility of overcoming evil with good – learning from Spinoza

A basic supposition in Spinoza's thinking about conflicts is that interpersonal conflicts arise as a result of people being "slaves under the bondage of the passive affects".¹⁷ These "passive affects" include among others the destructive emotions and attitudes of anger, hatred, resentment, dislike, aversion, and violent action based on them. Here the assumption is that the more someone suffers these emotions, the more one is likely to respond to evil with evil. This way of responding contributes to an escalation of a negative interaction spiral which, according to Spinoza, will prevail as long as the causes determining these emotions and attitudes are not put to an end. Spinoza assumes that this is the situation for many people and that conflicts will emerge as a natural consequence of this bondage. In this way, Spinoza has quite a realistic view of the human condition, and his assumptions seem as relevant today as in the 17th century. In view of the fact that overcoming evil with good to a large extent depends on freedom from destructive emotions, it will be useful to have a closer look at how Spinoza formulates the nature and possibility of overcoming evil with good.¹⁸

Generally speaking, in the philosophical system of Spinoza, there is an intimate connection between cognition, affects and moral action. Someone who has what Spinoza calls inadequate cognition will be subject to passive affects, such as anger, hatred, contempt etc. Conversely, someone who has adequate cognition will have active affects, such as love, generosity, fortitude etc. Turning to moral action, the more a person has inadequate cognition and passive affects, the more he will be

¹⁷ Spinoza's term "passive affect" includes a large number of affects. The most interesting ones in connection with conflict theory is anger, hatred, and contempt, together with violent action which is motivated by them. I will sometimes use the term "negative affects", "negative emotions", or "destructive emotions" when referring to these passive affects.

¹⁸ I use the following abbreviations when referring to Spinoza's *Ethics*: Df – *definitio*, e.g.: 1Df1 – part 1, definition 1; Ex – *explicatio*, e.g.: 1Df6Ex – explanation to definition 6 in part 1; A – *axioma*, e.g.: 1A1 – part 1, axiom 1; P – *propositio*, e.g.: 1P1 – part 1, proposition 1; D – *Demonstratio*, e.g.: 1P1D – demonstration to proposition 1 in part 1; S – *scholium*, e.g.: 1P8S1 – the first scholium after proposition 8 in part 1; C – *corollarium*, e.g.: 1P6C – the corollary after proposition 6 in part 1; App – *appendix*, e.g.: 1App – appendix to part 1; Pr – *praefatio*, e.g.: 4Pr – preface to part 4; AppCap – *appendicis caput*, first chapter in the appendix to part 4, e.g.: 4AppCap1.

disposed to overcome evil with evil, while the more a person has adequate cognition and active affects, the more he will be disposed to overcome evil with good. The turning point becomes how each person can transform passive into active affects. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza summarises several remedies for such a transition to active affects. Especially important in this connection is one rather long passage from part 5 of the *Ethics*. Allow me to read at length from 5P10S:

5P10S: Therefore, the best course we can adopt, as long as we do not have a perfect cognition of our affects, is to conceive a right method of living (*rectam vivendi rationem*), or fixed rules of life (*certa vitæ dogmata*), and to commit them to memory and continually apply them to particular situations that are frequently conquered in life, so that our casual thinking is thoroughly permeated by them and they are always ready at hand. For example, among our practical rules, we laid down earlier (4P46 & S) that hatred should be conquered by love and generosity, and not repaid with reciprocal hatred. Now in order that we may have this precept of reason always ready to hand, we should think about and frequently meditate on (*cogitandæ, et sæpe meditandæ*) the wrongs that are commonly committed among mankind, and the best way and method of warding them off by generosity; for thus we shall associate the image of a wrong with the presentation of this rule of conduct, and it will always be at hand for us (2P18) when we suffer a wrong. If we also have in mind what is truly useful to us, as well as the good which follows from mutual friendship and common society, and remember that the highest repose of the soul originates from living according to right norms, and also that man, like other things, acts according to the necessity of nature, then the injury or the hatred which usually originates from that necessity will occupy but the least part of the imagination, and will easily be overcome; or supposing that the anger which generally arises from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not without fluctuation of the mind, in a far shorter space of time than would be necessary if we had not meditated on these things.¹⁹

Judging from this passage, Spinoza seems to think that overcoming evil with good may, under the right circumstances, offer a realistic possibility. As he says, it does not represent an easy task; however, by programming oneself to think of the disadvantages of overcoming evil with evil, as well as of the advantages of overcoming evil with good, one will strengthen one's ability to respond to other's wrongdoing with love and generosity.²⁰ For the person seeking freedom from

¹⁹ Cp also the *Ethics*, 3P43: "Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and may on the other hand be destroyed by love"; and 4P46: "He who wishes to avenge injuries through reciprocal hatred lives a miserable life indeed. But he who strives to overcome hatred with love is surely fighting a happy and carefree battle. He resists several oppositions as easily as one, and stands in least need of fortune's help. Those whom he conquers yield gladly, not through failure of strength but through its increase. All this follows clearly solely from the definitions of love and intellect that there is no need of detailed proof."

²⁰ It should be noted that there are several other passages from the *Ethics* which are relevant for understanding Spinoza's theory of intrapersonal conflict resolution. Among them are 5P2-4S in particular, where Spinoza presents his remedies against the passive affects. Unfortunately, space does not permit a further outline of these remedies in this paper.

destructive emotions, these norms will function as “norms of training” or “norms of practice”.²¹ Their role is to provide the person with the necessary guidance in respect to which motives, attitudes and dispositions needs to be strengthened, and which ones need to be weakened. This is done by way of training the mind to always think of this norm when confronted by wrongdoing. In this way, it amounts to a kind of conditioning. Gandhi, we recall, practiced “silent Mondays” in order to acquire the inner strength and power that, among other things, enabled him to act nonviolently. It might well be that Spinoza has something similar in mind when he talks of meditation.²²

All the same, Spinoza seems to hold that a person – through the kind of reprogramming displayed in the *Ethics* – will be able to increase his awareness of his own negative responses and how he keeps suffering in respect to them. In so far as he has the power to bring it about that he becomes aware of his own responses in this way, he will be on his way to controlling his negative affects, motives and reactions. This is certainly a time-consuming process for some people, but perhaps a less time-consuming process for others, depending on the degree of freedom and awareness a person has. Ultimately, one will form and develop active interpersonal affects and attitudes such as generosity (*generositas*), humanity (*humanitas*), respect (*honestas*),

²¹ Cp. Wetlesen & Naess (1967) and Wetlesen (1979) for a more extensive outline of Spinoza’s gradual strategies of liberation.

²² At this point I should like to add a comment on the significance of distinguishing between the words “meditation” and “contemplation” in the bringing on of Buddhist and other Eastern traditions to the West. These words come from the contemplative traditions of the West church, and are based on the Latin words *meditatio* and *contemplatio*. *Contemplatio* was in turn a translation from the Greek word *theoria*, “viewing” but with the Christian mystics the word received a less philosophical meaning and was understood more in connection with religious contemplative praxis. The classic usage of these words is found in the teaching on the art of reading holy texts (*lectio divina*). This art is usually divided into four stages: (1) to read (*lectio*) in order to acquire an intellectual understanding of the text, (2) to meditate (*meditatio*) in order to remember or memorise the text, and think through it so that one appropriates it in a personal way, (3) to pray (*oratio*) in order to appropriate the text so that it becomes a guiding force for one’s conscience, and (4) to contemplate (*contemplatio*) the text in an intuitive, wordless prayer. In this connection the word “meditation” is used to cover the discursive activity, whereas “contemplation” is used to cover the intuitive activity. Cp. Guigo II (1978), and also Casey (1996), p. 57 and Pennington (1998), p. 27ff and 57-69. It would be interesting to find out how Spinoza’s usage of the word *meditandæ* in 5P10S is to be understood against this background. Possibly, Spinoza combines both the discursive and contemplative or intuitive activities outlined in the *lectio divina*, but this would require a more thorough investigation into the writings of Spinoza than is possible here. Thanks are due to Jon Wetlesen for helping me clarify these notions of meditation and contemplation.

forgiveness (*clementia*), and piety (*pietas*) – all in accordance with the dictates of reason.²³ The wise person, forming and developing such attitudes and desires:

4P73S: ...hates nobody, is angry with nobody, envies nobody, is indignant with nobody, and despises nobody²⁴.

It might be objected that Spinoza is too optimistic with regard to the possibility of overcoming evil with good. Some would argue that it is simply impossible (and perhaps also undesirable) neither to be angry with nobody nor to hate nobody. We remember the old saying: “To err is human, to forgive divine.” On this view, overcoming evil with good is only possible for divine creatures, and not for human beings. How would Spinoza respond to this? For one thing, I think it is important to emphasise the realism inherent in Spinoza’s philosophy. He acknowledges the human condition of bondage under the emotions of hatred, contempt etc. However, it seems to me that Spinoza combines his realism with a good portion of optimism. Although freedom from destructive emotions is difficult, it is nevertheless possible. For Spinoza, such a transformation has both individual and social implications; freedom, in his theory, affects the relations to other persons as much as the state of the individual person.

In conclusion, I am not sure I have accomplished my initial goal of answering the question of how we can overcome evil with good. What I have attempted, however, is to illustrate the role our emotions of anger and hatred play in conflict, and possible ways of warding them off by realising their destructive nature. In this connection, I think there is something to gain from studying both attribution theory and the philosophical psychology of Spinoza. For Spinoza, it is ultimately how one understands oneself and relates to oneself in interaction with other people that make the difference. The cultivation of awareness, motivation and disposition of mind plays a crucial role. The development of such awareness on an interpersonal scale

²³ Cp. Generosity: 3P59S, 4P46 & D & S, 5P10S, 41 & D; humanity: 3P29S, 3AffDf43, 4P37S1; respect: 3AffDf33E, 4P18S, 37S1, 58D & S, AppCap15 & 24; forgiveness: 3P59S, AffDf38E; and piety: 4P37S1, 51S, AppCap15, 16, 22, 24 & 25, 5P4S, 42 & S.

²⁴ See also 2P49S: “This doctrine assists us in our social relations, in that it teaches us to hate no one, despise no one, ridicule no one, be angry with no one, envy no one.” Relevant to this context are also the following passages: 1P13, 15, 16, 18, 28, 29, 32, 33 & S2, 36, 4P46 & D & S.

would, I presume, be of great importance for the realisation of peaceful, nonviolent resolution of conflicts.

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Gendering Human Security

Kari Karamé*

*"It is normally said that one hand cannot clap alone.
That means that we need both sexes to reconstruct this very vast land."*²⁵

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show how the use of a gender perspective is an added value to the assessment of the level of human security in all phases of a conflict, from the pre-conflict to the post-conflict. It argues that the use of a gender perspective will broaden the knowledge of the needs, hopes and aspirations of the local population, and therefore enhance the chances for a lasting, sustainable peace and improve international interventions. As most analysis of the underlying causes of a conflict, and further on of the basis for peace negotiations, peace agreements and international missions tend to be so-called gender-neutral, that is, founded on male norms; this paper will focus on women's human security, mainly in South Sudan.

Introduction

The title of this paper, which was given to me by the organisers of the Peace and Research Conference at the University of Tromsø, September 7-9 2005, needs some comments on my behalf. It was in fact the subject of a forum co-organised by The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science in Oslo in January 2001, that is just a few months after the UNSC resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was adopted on October 31 2000.²⁶ The conference was co-funded by the Governments of Canada, Switzerland and Norway, and gathered some 40 people from international organisations, governments, NGOs, universities and research institutes. Some of the participants were women from conflict areas, as nobody can or should talk on their behalf.

The purpose of the forum was to develop an understanding of gender and decision-making in post-conflict transitions and identify relevant recommendations for practitioners on how to integrate women in peace building processes. The focus was on women, but the ultimate aim of the debate was to improve the basis for viable peaceful solutions to conflicts to the benefit of the total society, both women and

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²⁵ Woman from South Sudan participating in the conference "Sudanese Women and the Peace Process" in Oslo, January 2005.

²⁶ Kari Karamé (2001): *Gendering Human Security*. From Marginalisation to the Integration of Women in Peace-Building. Recommendations for policy and practice from the NUPI-Fafo Forum on Gender Relations in Post-Conflict Transitions, Oslo, Fafo-report 352, NUPI-report no.261.

men, elderly and children. In other words, the concern was people's or human security, rather than state security.

The title is short, but it still includes two frequently used terms: Gendering and human security. Neither of them has been fully integrated in traditional security studies, and seem to have been more easily adopted by scholars within peace studies, and to be used above all by scholars, policymakers and practitioners working in the field of peace building. Whereas the term 'gender', usually meaning 'women', gradually has gained an important place in analysis and policy, the notion of 'human security' has known both ups and downs. Around the turn of the millennium, as the world had realised that the majority of the victims of the contemporary conflicts were civilians, a lot of concern was given to human security. Then it faded away for some time, but now there seem to be more focus on it again. Both terms need a further definition.

Definition of "Gendering"

The term 'gender' refers to the roles, responsibilities, values, etc., acquired by men and women as members of a society, and the interrelation between the two sexes. In principal the term 'gender' therefore refers to both men and women, but because there has been – and still is - less focus on women and women's issues both in traditional security studies and in intervention projects in conflict areas, gender has increasingly over the last decades become synonymous with women.²⁷ As will be developed in the following, though, the aim is the total society, and the ideal, comprehensive "gendered" study would include both men and women.

War, as well as peace and security are gendered experiences. The majority of the combatants, the prisoners of war and of the disappeared in our day's conflicts are men, whereas the majority of the killed, the refugees and the growing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are civilians, among whom women and girls outdo a majority. Women and girl's bodies have even become 'battlegrounds' as rape and forced prostitution in many conflict areas all over the world have been used as a

²⁷ For further development of 'gender' in the context of peace and conflict, see among others Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) *Gender and Nation*, London, SAGE Publications Ltd.; Kari H. Karamé and Torunn L. Tryggstad eds. (2000) *Gender Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Studies*, Oslo, NUP; Inger Skjelsbæk and Dan Smith eds. (2001) *Gender, Peace & Conflict*, London, SAGE Publications Ltd.

strategy to undermine the moral and the cohesion of a society.²⁸ But women are not only victims, some are combatants, others are active in the supportive functions of the armed forces, whereas the majority have to face the struggle of the survival of the extended family alone, in the absence of most grown up men. In addition to suffering, war and other kinds of stress on the society may therefore constitute windows of opportunity for change of the traditional women's roles.²⁹ In the post-conflict phase, on the other hand, women and girls often experience a backlash and have to go back to the domestic obligations.³⁰

On the background of these different experiences and on the traditional gender roles pattern of their society, women and men tend to have different expectations and priorities concerning security issues and of what constitute the basis for a sustainable peace for all. To quote Noeleen Heyzer, the Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM):

“.. protection of women during conflict is not enough. Gender justice and women's rights must be integrated in the peace agreements and in the legal and institutional structures supporting post-conflict reconstruction.”³¹

As women are still usually not invited to the negotiation tables, peace agreements tend to be gender neutral and women's rights and interests either go unnoticed or are mentioned in very general terms, like “no discrimination based on race, religion or gender”. Women's deep knowledge of the needs of the civil population, of hopes and aspirations for the future, as well as their various capacities and experiences, may therefore not be included in the planning and realization of the reconciliation and reconstruction process. The international community has a great responsibility to set a stop to this trend, as a peace agreement can hardly be labelled as comprehensive when more than half of the population has not had their say.

²⁸ There is a vast literature on this issue: Elisabeth Rehn & Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2002) *Women, War, Peace*, The Independents Experts' Assessment, Progress of the World's Women 2002, UNIFEM.

²⁹ Jeanne Vickers (1993) *Women and War*, London & New Jersey, Zed Books; Olivia Bennett, Jo Bexley, Kitty Warnock (1995): *Arms to Fight – Arms to Protect*. Women speak out about conflict, London, Panos; Kari Karamé (1999): ‘Women and War: a highly complex interrelation’, in Helland, Karamé, Kristensen and Skjelsbæk eds.: *Women and Armed Conflicts – a study for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Oslo, NUP1, pp.4-35; Inger Skjelsbæk and Dan Smith eds. (2001) opus cited above.

³⁰ See notes 2 and 3.

³¹ Noeleen Heyzer (2004) *Women, War and Peace*. Mobilising for Peace and Security in the 21st Century. The 2004 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, p.23.

‘Gendering’ or the use of a ‘gender perspective’ in conflict and peace studies involves looking at both women’s and men’s activities and roles before, during and after a conflict. As an analytical approach it recognises men’s and women’s situation and agencies as enmeshed in social relations and divisions, both locally and globally. Such an approach may be rights-based, focusing on women’s human rights, or utility-based where the improvement of women’s situation and the use of their agencies and capacities are seen as beneficiary for the whole society.

Using a gender perspective in the analysis of a conflict and for the possibilities of a lasting peace, and in the planning and preparation of international intervention and humanitarian assistance, may therefore in the first place prevent so-called ‘gender neutral’ studies, where the norm is men’s agencies and needs, and where women are mainly seen as victims and their needs and capacities therefore overlooked. It may also avoid essentialist attitudes like ‘men make war – women make peace’. Real life is far more complicated. Looking to the women as well as to the men will lead to a broader knowledge of the nature of the conflict, and consequently also of the basis for a lasting peaceful solution. Finally, it may improve the quality of international intervention and assistance, as these will be based on a broader knowledge of the needs and capacities of the local community. Focusing on women should therefore not be interpreted as less concern to men’s situation and needs, but as an added value seeking to take the whole society into consideration.

Defining Human Security

There are various definitions of human security, which all share the characteristics of being extremely vast and all-inclusive. Many scholars, policymakers and practitioners are therefore reluctant to the use of the term. The concept was first introduced in the Human Development Report of 1994 meaning: “... *safety from constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily lives, whether in our homes, our jobs, in communities or in our environment.*”³² Security is here seen as related with people, rather than with territories, representing an ideological change – from territory and state to the community and the people.

³² United Nations Development Programme (1994) *Human Development Report*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.22.

The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 in response to the UN Secretary-General's call for a world '*free of want*' and '*free of fear*'. Until the Commission concluded its activities in 2003, it concentrated equally on problems linked to conflict and linked to poverty, considering that these are closely related. Human security was seen as "*protecting people's vital freedoms from severe threats, in ways that empower people to fulfil their strengths and aspirations.*"³³ The focus was on people, considered both as individuals and as communities, and the Commission proposed a framework to advance the goals of human security based upon the protection and empowerment of people, seen as mutually reinforcing. The concept was considered as a complement to the concept of state security as "*it focuses on people, and identifies security threats that have never previously been considered as the concern of states.*"³⁴ In other words, the concept of human security can never replace the concept state security, but is a means to broaden the notion of what security is. State security is in fact a condition for human security, as only a well functioning state can provide its people with freedom from fear and need. On the other hand, it is a paradox and a sad fact that many regimes around the world represent a threat to the human security of large parts of the population.

With the ambition to create a more holistic and comprehensive definition of security the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung proposed a new model for human security: "*Poverty, hunger and deprivation of human rights are all factors that constitute real threats to international – and national security.*"³⁵ In this context, state security and also international security, are seen as closely related to what extent "*people live in freedom and safety, under just and fair laws and with their essential needs met.*"³⁶ The same way of thinking can be found in most interpretations of the causes behind contemporary international terrorism.

Asking the question whether the notion of human security represents a paradigm shift or just some short-lived diversion of the traditional security concept,

³³ Francois Fouinat (2004): 'A comprehensive framework for human security', in *Conflict, Security & Development* 4:3 December 2004. Carfax Publishing, pp.289-297.

³⁴ Same, p.291.

³⁵ In Bernedette Muntheim (2001): *New Routes, A Journal of Peace Research and Action*, vol.6, number 3/2001, special issue, Life & Peace Institute. Quoted in Agneta Söderberg Jacobsen (2005) *Security on whose terms? If men and women were equal*, Stockholm, the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, p.7.

³⁶ Same as above.

Roland Paris gives the following definition: “*Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms – including common security, and comprehensive security – that encourages policymakers to think about international security as something more than the military defence of state interests and territory.*”³⁷ He argues that different users of the term, scholars, policymakers and practitioners, may have different opinions on whether the term is too all-inclusive or not. What they all share, though, is that it is a necessary complement to the notion of state security.

But none of these definitions discuss whether there is a gender dimension to the notion of human security, that is whether it can be applied in the same way to men’s and women’s situation, agencies and priorities. If just and fair laws constitute an integral part of human security, are the same law just and fair to both women and men, or is there an imbalance between the two sexes? This is the kind of questions both scholars, policymakers and practitioners concerned by gender disparities, would ask – thereby obtaining a broader knowledge of the situation and the society in which they are studying and working.

Human security as a doctrine

Convinced practitioners see “human security as a doctrine that could be a promising platform and framework for the international community to promote peace, human rights and human development.” Those among them who are concerned by enhancing women’s human rights and security, their empowerment and the use of their capacities, underline that “with its focus on people instead of states, the doctrine also makes it easier to argue for women’s empowerment. If women were not deprived of power over their lives it would reduce poverty and help to eliminate risks for war and conflict.”³⁸ Still, the human security doctrine has not been central in the debates and in the promoting of issues concerning women, war and peace. With some exceptions, like the conference arranged in Oslo in 2001³⁹, there has been a reluctance to use the concept.

³⁷ Roland Paris (2001): Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? In *International Security*, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall 2001), pp.87-102.

³⁸ Agneta Söderberg Jacobsen (2005): *Security on whose terms?* If men and women were equal. Stockholm, The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, p.7.

³⁹ See note 2.

Threats to human security

Because the people's human security is such an all-inclusive notion, it may be threatened in many ways. War – both between states and within states, in all phases and levels of intensity – will break down the conditions for freedom from fear, and also from freedom from needs. As showed below, women and men - usually – participate in and are affected by – the breakdown of the freedoms in different ways.

Terrorism today represents a threat to human security all over the world, whether it happens within one particular state (Spain, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Iraq, e.a.), in a conflict between two peoples living in the same area (Israel/Palestine), or so-called international terrorism when a group or movement hits a target in another country like the Twin Towers in New York, the railway stations in Madrid and the London subway.⁴⁰ By attacking civilians in their daily occupations, by spreading death, suffering and destruction in spectacular ways and unpredictable places, the purpose of terrorism is to paralyse the enemy by breaking down the freedom from fear.

The gendered pattern of terrorism is not as clear as that of war and armed conflicts, and some regional differences are appearing. Among the perpetrators of terrorism we find both men and women, even though the latter still represent a minority compared to the men. On the other hand, the majority of the victims often seem to be men. In Iraq, the main target of terrorism are young men lining up to join the police forces, others are market places and mosques or other places where men come together. One of the consequences for the women of Iraq has been a growing seclusion from public life. In New York, Madrid and London, where women's share of the work force is much higher than in Iraq, the gendered pattern of the impact of the attacks is most probably different, but we do not yet have sex segregated statistics to support this assumption.

There is an ongoing – though limited – discussion on whether natural disasters should be included among the threats to human security. Generally, it is agreed that only man-made disasters belong here, but it may sometimes be difficult to draw the line, as at least catastrophic consequences of natural disasters may be blamed on men's work and decisions, like building hotels too close to the shores in

⁴⁰ This is not an analysis of the different natures or backgrounds of terrorism, but a short description of the effects on human security, and its gendered aspects.

Thailand, and neighbourhoods and industries under the sea level in New Orleans. Also, the organisations – national and international – that move in to rescue and assist the victims are the same as those who work in conflict areas around the world. A gendered perspective would without any doubt be an added value in this context, too. A better knowledge of the local population - or even just being used to observe the different needs of men and women – would make it easier to reach the most needed part of the population. In the aftermath of the Tsunami's destructions in the Aceh province, it was estimated that around 20.000 of the women were pregnant, and that 25% of them were going to deliver within the first months. Assistance to pregnant women and newborn babies should therefore most probably be a priority in such circumstances, as well as during armed conflicts and among refugees and IDPs. Without going into the discussion of whether natural disasters should be considered as threats to human security or not, it is worth noticing that the consequences on the people offer many parallels.

Growing acknowledgement of the importance of gender

For decades, focus on women's needs and women as a resource of capacities was an important aspect of international development studies and assistance projects. This resulted in The Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 where women's right to full participation on all levels of decision-making, on equal terms with the men is inscribed.⁴¹

The media coverage of the plights of the women in the wars on the Balkans in the early 1990ies, and later in various conflicts in Africa, and above all in Rwanda, triggered a reaction from the international, and rape and other kind over gender based violence was finally recognized as crimes of war. Finally - because these kinds of crimes have been committed all through the history of human mankind, but were universally considered as some kind of normality in wartime, alongside with other collateral damages. The presence of the international media in the conflict areas, and the agencies of the refugees abroad, and also the growing awareness that this was in reality a strategy of war, radically changed this attitude. On October 2000 UN

⁴¹ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 1995. Adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace. Working paper.

Security resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was unanimously adopted.⁴² The resolution was followed by two reports in 2002, one submitted by the Secretary General,⁴³ and one initiated by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) headed by Elisabeth Rehn, former minister of defence in Finland, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, former minister of justice in Liberia: *Women, war, peace*.⁴⁴ These two high profile women, both with a broad experience from politics and international missions, travelled with their team to conflict areas all over the world, and interviewed women in their precarious day to day life. In addition to violence against women, health problems and other threats to women's and girls' safety, both the resolution and the two ensuing reports pay attention to women as actors and as a resource, both on a local and on an international level. Five years on, the resolution has without any doubt, proved to be a useful tool, at least where there is a sufficient political will to apply it. But all too often, the debate on gender issues is postponed until a later stage in the peace process, instead of being an integrated part of the negotiations. In this way, they will probably not be part of the mandate of peace building missions either, and experience shows that what is not mentioned here will get less attention and less funding. The post-conflict phase therefore often proves to be a situation of backlash for most women. Implementation and accountability remain the most urgent concern.

Ten years after the Beijing Platform for Action, and five years after the adoption of UNSC resolution 1325, it is encouraging to see that equal rights for women are one of the Millenium Development Goals. On the other hand, one of this year's most important UN reports in the field: *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, where efforts are made to bring forward the interconnection between development and security does not make use of a gender analysis or a gender perspective. Further efforts are needed on all levels, both national and international.

⁴² UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on October 2000.

⁴³ Women, Peace and Security. Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), United Nations 2002.

⁴⁴ For full reference, see note 4.

The case of South Sudan

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and the 9th in the world. It gained its independence in 1956 within borders traced by the former colonial power, Great Britain. Its population is estimated to be some 30 – 35 millions and is extremely composite and consists of 570 different groups. 25% are ethnically Arabs, whereas 70% are Africans; 1/3 of the population live in South Sudan, which indicates some degree of cohabitation. The majority are of Muslim belief, 5 millions are Christians, and an unknown number are animists. The legal system in the North is based on Shari'a, while in the South people follow mainly the traditional African laws that highly limit women's rights and make legal empowerment one of their most urgent demands. Finally, the South is rich in natural resources, first of all water and oil.

The war in Sudan is the longest lasting armed conflict on the African continent, and had gone on for more or less 40 years when the peace agreement was signed in January 2005 by the two main opponents, the government of Sudan (GOS) in Khartoum and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SPLM). In addition to this man fault-line, both inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts have taken place. Oil companies have also inflicted damages on the population, both material and physical. Combats are still taking place in the province of Darfur, and riots occur from time to time in the eastern areas of South Sudan. This paper will discuss the women's human security situation in South Sudan, mainly based on the outcomes of two recent events in Oslo, Norway.

The people of South Sudan have paid a heavy toll to this conflict: it is estimated that 2.2 millions are killed, most of them civilians; hundreds of thousands are maimed; 4 millions live as internally displaced persons in the North and other parts of this enormous country; and finally 1 million find themselves as refugees dispersed all over the world, many of them in refugee camps just over the border with Uganda.

Another impact of the war is the nearly total destruction of the infrastructure, like roads, schools, hospitals and homes. The system of communication – roads, railways and airports, as well as electricity plants and installations for water distribution – needs both reconstruction, modernisation and upgrading. South Sudan is in fact today a country to build, more than to reconstruct.

The long war has had a heavy impact on people's life and human security situation in general and on the women's human security in particular. They have suffered from all kinds of fear, and still live with lack of physical security in many regions and above all when they are on the move. They have faced all kinds of need, and most of them will have to do so for many, many years to come. Many young girls were abducted by the combatants and were forced to follow them out in the bush. Others did so out of their own will and conviction. During the war gender based violence and domestic violence were common, and many fear that violence against girls and women will increase in the post-conflict phase on the return of the disarmed combatants. 90% of the South Sudanese women are illiterate and 70% are widows. The maternal deaths rate is among the highest in the world (865/100 000), and there is only one doctor for every 220 000 people.⁴⁵ The situation can hardly be worse, and these women's human security is threatened in the post-conflict phase as it was during the long war.

During the war women had taken on many activities, both civilian and military. The majority of them had shouldered the main responsibility for the extended family. In post-conflict South Sudan 60% of the households are headed by women, despite the many limits imposed on them by customs and the traditional laws that forbid women to inherit or possess properties. Still they have to be breadwinners, and the majority of the farmers are women. Young girls and widows are married away against their will, and there is a high drop out of girls from school. During the war a certain number of women and young girls were combatants, some of them even in commanding positions, whereas many served in supportive functions. Other women had founded humanitarian and peace organisations and worked both on a local and a national, and even an international level. These women represent capacities and resources that should be included in the reconciliation and reconstruction process, and thereby contribute to the improvement of the human security in the country. Still they were not invited to the peace negotiations. Several international actors now seek to give them a voice and a possibility to have an influence over their own future, by offering them an arena from where they can call upon both their countrymen and the international community.

⁴⁵ These figures are approximate, and based on information given to the conference in Oslo in January 2005. There is a lack of sex segregated statistics for South Sudan, as well as for most other conflict areas.

Sudanese Women and the Peace Process

One such event took place in Oslo in January 2005, in cooperation between UNIFEM, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Based on the principles of resolution 1325 that women should be included in peace building processes, on all levels and in all functions, and that all peace processes should be locally owned, the purpose of this conference was to gather women from South Sudan and give them a possibility to present their own priorities for the peace process. 12 women made their way, defying practical and formal problems, in addition to the cold of the Norwegian winter. They represented different organisations, political currents and regions - only women from the Southern Blue Nile district were not able to attend. A few women from the Sudanese refugee community in Norway were also present. The Norwegian Minister of International Development, Ms Hilde F. Johnson, who had taken part in the negotiations and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) on Sudan, opened the conference. Her message to the conference was: *"The war is over, now you have to win the peace"*.⁴⁶

The delegates had been asked to prepare a short presentation of their priorities, based on their own their organisations experiences and situation. They were also asked to give their views on how the international community can best facilitate the Sudanese women's inclusion in the reconstruction and reconciliation process. The priorities they agreed upon belonged to the following areas: girls' and women's education; capacity building; women's economic, political and legal empowerment, including major law reforms; health care, including HIV/AIDS; the construction of more women's resource centres. They pointed out that most women, and also most men, did not know the content of the peace agreement and asked that it should be translated into local languages and distributed. Security was hardly

⁴⁶ For a full presentation of the conference, please see Kari Karamé ed. (2005): *Sudanese Women and the Peace Process*. Priorities and recommendations for women's inclusion and empowerment. Conference in Oslo 13-15 January 2005. Oslo, NUPI.

mentioned, but they expressed deep concern about the situation in Darfur. They expressed a desire to meet with women from North Sudan, and urged the Norwegian government, as host of the upcoming Donors, Conference, to make gender issues a specific item on the agenda.

Women's rights and leadership in post-conflict Sudan

The symposium was arranged as a direct response to this demand, by the same organisers and took place on April 10 2005, that is the day before the international Donors Conference on Sudan which gathered delegates from more than 60 states and international organisations. The UN/World Bank Joint Assessment Mission for Sudan (JAM) formed the basis for the deliberations of the conference. The report is organised around 8 clusters that together come very close to the different aspects included in the notion of human security: Institutional Reform and Capacity Needs Assessment; Governance and Rule of Law; Economic Policy; Productive Sectors; Basic Social Services; Infrastructure; Livelihoods and Social Protection; Information and Statistics.

The objectives of the gender symposium were to bring together women from the North and the South of Sudan to define shared priorities for interventions on issues of women's rights and leadership, as defined in the JAM; to advocate for donor support for actions promoting gender equality and women's rights; to encourage a coordinated response; and to strengthen partnerships for promoting and protecting women's rights through women's leadership in post-conflict Sudan. The outcome was to be presented at the Donor's conference, something that had never been done before.

These women met for the first time, came from opposite sides of the conflict, but sharing a hope and ambition of a better future for their country. In the lapse of one day they managed to work out a common statement that was read to the Donors Conference on its second day. In this effort they were supported by many of the participating states, but most important by their own political leaders. The Chairman of SPLM, Dr John Garang and the First Vice President of Sudan, Mr Ali Osman Taha, had visited the symposium, and both the Sudanese delegations ended up with a few women included.

One woman from the North and one from the South presented the statement to the conference, starting with the symbolic words: “*Here we stand together as women from South and North united*”. The women proposed the following minimum urgent priorities and actions for reconstruction during the interim period: governance and the rule of law; fighting gender-based violence; capacity building and institutional development; economic policy and management; livelihoods and productive sectors; basic social services for health and education. They urged the donors to commit themselves to follow the principles of gender responsive resource allocation, which in this context would mean that at least 80% of the budget support and resource allocations to the reconstruction of Sudan would meet at least three of the following criteria: combating HIV/AIDS and decreasing maternal mortality; reducing gender inequalities in law, policy and practice; directly benefiting young people, especially girls, in disadvantaged communities; targeting rural areas⁴⁷.

The statement clearly expressed the problems of human security in Sudan, and the lack of freedom from fear and freedom from need that still exist. It also pointed to tools to improve this situation. These women are strongly engaged in the efforts to ensure a peaceful future for their country. They showed their ability to build bridges between the North and the South after decades of war and division. Seeing the human security situation through women’s lenses may prove to have a positive effect on the development inside Sudan, when both national and international actors work together in the same direction.

⁴⁷ For the full text of the statement, and for more on the gender symposium and the Donors conference, please see the report: *Centrality of Women’s Leadership and Gender Equality*. Towards Achieving the MDGs in Sudan, UNIFEM, NMFA, NUPI, 2005.

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Woman from South Sudan participating in the conference “Sudanese Women and the Peace Process” in Oslo, January 2005.

Friction and Discomfort: Visual Representations and Security Policy

Frank Möller *

Abstract

Although we are living in a world that is saturated with and dominated by pictures and images, both the cultural turn and the discursive turn in International Relations and security studies have so far failed to pay sufficient attention to visual culture. This omission is problematic because culture cannot be diminished to norms and values, and discourse cannot be limited to language. It is therefore suggested here to include in peace research the study of visual representations. The exclusive focus on language in discourse analysis is problematic, especially when it comes to security, because the articulation of security is not medium-specific and security may very well be visualized. Promoting peaceful social change therefore requires understanding how visual representations function in security policy.

Introduction

It is about ten years ago that W.J.T. Mitchell proclaimed a “pictorial turn” in the human sciences and in public culture. By “pictorial turn” he did not mean that “we have some powerful account of visual representation that is dictating the terms of cultural theory” but rather that “pictures form a point of peculiar friction and discomfort across a broad range of intellectual inquiry.”⁴⁸ Friction and a feeling of discomfort certainly seem to arise from some of the most memorable images that have been made in connection with the most recent events in international affairs, especially the “war on terror,” images that can be seen as being intimately related to those events while at the same time both contributing to the framing of these events and constructing them as events in the first place. Here I am referring to the images of the hijacked civilian planes crashing into the World Trade Center, images that each person – at least each person in

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⁴⁸ W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 13.

the western multimedia world – inevitably carries with them. I am also referring to the picture of President Bush after being informed of the attacks on the World Trade Center, cowering on a children's chair, with a children's book in hand, contemplating what to do next or just helplessly staring into space. I am also referring to the photographs of soldiers torturing prisoners in the prison of Abu Ghraib, Iraq, that, too, have become a part of each person's visual reservoir and popular memory.

However, the academic analysis of foreign and security policy in International Relations, security studies and also in peace and conflict research has as yet not paid sufficient attention to the use and function of images. It is true that Mark Lacy wrote about the relationship between war and cinema; Liam Kennedy analyzed photography as cultural diplomacy in the context of post-9/11; Michael Shapiro elaborated on photography as an ingredient of the politics of representation; and David Campbell searched for resistance and counter-hegemony in images of war.⁴⁹ Authors such as Christine Sylvester and Barbara Jenkins were interested in, respectively, Abstract Expressionism as a component part of cultural hegemony during the early Cold War and architecture as an element of the creation of both identity and alienation.⁵⁰ Still, compared with the degree of interest in visual representations in other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities it can be said that the above mentioned disciplines are still largely unaffected by the pictorial turn. For example, the Journal of Peace Research

⁴⁹ Mark Lacy, "War, Cinema, and Moral Anxiety," *Alternatives*, Vol. 28, No. 5 (November–December 2003), pp. 611–636; Liam Kennedy, "Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy," *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 315–326; Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), pp. 124–178; David Campbell, "Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance: Reflections on the Imaging of War," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, Special Issue (December 2003), pp. 57–73. In the context of nation/state-building, see also Erin Manning, *Ephemeral Territories: Representing Nation, Home, and Identity in Canada* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) and Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). In German political science, Ekkehart Krippendorff's work is the most informed approach to the study of the international with recourse to artists and the arts. See, for example, *Die Kunst, nicht regiert zu werden. Ethische Politik von Sokrates bis Mozart* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999).

⁵⁰ Christine Sylvester, "Picturing the Cold War: An Art Graft/Eye Graft," *Alternatives*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October–December 1996), pp. 393–418; Barbara Jenkins, "The Low Politics of High Art," *Alternatives*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April–July 1999), pp. 193–217.

has not published a single article or reviewed a single book specifically devoted to visual representations during 2002–2005 (Vol. 39–42).⁵¹

The lack of interest in visual representations is surprising especially in security studies because the academic treatment of issues related to security is often said to be one of the most innovative parts of the study of international relations. It is also surprising because there can be observed an abundance of references to “culture” in recent IR and security studies. This cultural turn might have served as an invitation for scholars in these disciplines to take a closer look at visual representations. Yet, so far this invitation has not been accepted. The lack of interest in visual culture is also surprising because as a part of the renewed interest in security after the end of the Cold War and the hopes connected with it of security policies that would take more adequately into consideration human needs, critical approaches to security have emerged with such referent objects as human beings, their needs and their perceptions of needs. Human beings – again: in the western, media-saturated world – are exposed to an ever increasing degree to images and visual culture. It may therefore be expected that their needs and perceptions of needs are also increasingly shaped by visual representations. Since popular culture is said to be important among other things because “it provides a database and safe house for the lives of those who leave few other sources”⁵² and since the adherents to the concept of human security can be expected to be interested in those people who are otherwise marginalized and silenced, human security could include in its agenda the study of visual culture and its relationship to society and security. As an ingredient of the flourishing literature on human and critical security, however, visual culture does not figure prominently.

The absence of interest in visual representations is finally surprising because one strand of post-Cold War security studies is explicitly devoted to the analysis of discourse, “look[ing] for the rules governing what can be said and what not.”⁵³

⁵¹ There is, however, one review of a book on Balkan media in war and peace (Vol. 40, No. 5, September 2003) and one review of a book on symbols, honor and war (Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2002).

⁵² Tara Brabazon, *From Revolution to Revelation: Generation X, Popular Memory and Cultural Studies* (Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), p. 72.

⁵³ See, for example, Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” in *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London/New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 29.

However, by concentrating on language it largely disregards that discourse is more than language: “public texts”⁵⁴ may very well be images. Especially approaches that focus on the articulation of the word security and its political consequences⁵⁵ have so far failed to understand that speech acts are not medium-specific. Thus, processes of securitization are not necessarily dependent on language. This is not to say that speech acts through language function in the same manner as do speech acts through other media. It is only to say that “I can make a promise or threaten with a visual sign as eloquently as with an utterance.”⁵⁶ Most work on the articulation of security still prioritizes language over images and does not seem to sufficiently understand the extent to which and the mechanisms through which securitization unfolds through images.⁵⁷

Friction and discomfort while recalling the images of 9/11 and other equally memorable and (therefore?) powerful images result not least from the difficulty scholars have in establishing how exactly images function in the context of international relations and security policies. It is thus easy to assign importance to images; it is a different thing entirely to reveal the dynamics emanating from visual representations. As Mitchell acknowledges, “we still do not know what pictures are, what their relation to language is, how they operate on observers and on the world, how their history is to be understood, and what is to be done with or about them.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, the treatment of images as just another text (“reading” images⁵⁹), while having contributed to a better understanding of images, also tends to obscure the differences emanating from written and visual representations and accounts of the world (more on which below). The

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86.

⁵⁶ Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 160.

⁵⁷ That the “power of the image” includes both mobilizing and criticizing possibilities in the context of securitization and militarization is now acknowledged in *Security Dialogue*, special issue on “Securitization, Militarization and Visual Culture in the Worlds of post-9/11,” Call for Papers, July 2005. Likewise, Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 511–531, argues that “modern media is a central element of security relations” (p. 524) and should therefore be included in Copenhagen-type security analysis. While I would certainly agree with this claim I would also argue that images should be limited to neither media images nor television, and speech act-type of analysis should not be restricted to Copenhagen-type of analysis with its multitude of contestable assumptions.

⁵⁸ Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 13.

⁵⁹ See Julia Thomas, ed., *Reading Images* (Hampshire and London: Palgrave, 2001).

disciplines of International Relations and security studies – despite the recent cultural turn – are of no great help while trying to find answers to these and other questions such as: how do audiences interact with images to produce meaning? Do different forms of visual representation operate in similar ways on observers or are there substantial differences between, say, photography and film, television and video? Whose story do images reveal – the producer's, the subject's, the viewer's or a combination? Whose interests do images serve? Is there a causal relationship between images and subsequent policies? How do images relate to language? What happens when images are translated into words? Does such a translation elevate or diminish an image? Other questions are even more profound: how does knowledge relate to aesthetics? How do images relate to truth? In this paper, tentative answers to some of these questions are searched for in the writings of the filmmaker and visual anthropologist David MacDougall.⁶⁰ While this is admittedly a rather narrow frame of reference, these writings are a good starting point because MacDougall is an inter-disciplinarily working, self-reflective and very well informed filmmaker/scholar and as such an important source of inspiration and insights. The paper starts, however, with a short review of the cultural turn in International Relations and security studies.

Culture in Security Studies ⁶¹

The end of bipolarity in the late 1980s and early 1990s was followed by critical scholarly self-appraisal and the reformulation of international relations in academic writings. The way the Cold War came to an end weakened Realism's leading position in International Relations.⁶² It brought to the fore constructivist and culturalist approaches which deviate from Realism by, among other things, claiming that the structures of

⁶⁰ David MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema*. Edited and with an introduction by Lucien Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), hereafter referred to as TC.

⁶¹ This part is based on Frank Möller and Samu Pehkonen, "Discursive Landscapes of the European North," in *Encountering the North: Cultural Geography, International Relations and Northern Landscapes*, eds. Frank Möller and Samu Pehkonen (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 13–22.

⁶² See Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," in *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 23–56.

international relations are social rather than material and that such immaterial and cultural factors as ideas are constitutive of power and interests.⁶³ Like Realism, some alternative approaches emphasize studying national security because much in world politics is about national security. Other approaches, while breaking with the preference given to national security issues, equally focus on security. After all, in world politics the search for security appears to be “universal” and security is said to be “the highest end”⁶⁴ in an international system characterized by the absence of central government and the presence of nation-states.

Security discourse and analysis is currently displaying a variety of cultural features, some of which follow the logic of “old wine – new bottle.” In some cases it thus seems to be appropriate to speak about a *return* of “culture”⁶⁵ or, better still, “cultures” in International Relations and security studies. Michael Desch, for example, identifies at least two cultural approaches to security prior to what he calls the “post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies.” The World War II wave of discussions of how to deal with the Axis powers was strongly cultural or anthropological in the sense that ostensible national characters of the Axis powers were linked with actual or expected conduct of war. During the Cold War wave of cultural approaches, US theories of warfare and strategy were said to largely ignore cultural characteristics of the Soviet enemy and to incorrectly expect the enemy to have the same understanding of rational decision-making as oneself supposedly had. Differences in strategic and organizational cultures were referred to in order to explain differences between the United States and the Soviet Union in preparing for and actually fighting war. Strategic cultural theorizing also included speculations about contrasting American and Soviet political cultures leading to different attitudes to conflict and international relations.⁶⁶ Later, US foreign policy analysis began to question the rationalism ostensibly

⁶³ For a concise statement, see Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71–81.

⁶⁴ See, respectively, Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Seventh Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 85, and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1976), p. 126.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

⁶⁶ Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141–148 (see p. 142 for the quotation).

underlying foreign policy decision-making in the United States by paying more attention than before to bureaucratic cultures, traditions within decision-making groups and game-playing among decision-makers and bureaucrats.⁶⁷ Similar to Desch, Fred Halliday calls into question the novelty of many recent cultural writings in international theory. He hears “many echoes of earlier thinking in the current discussions of culture,” including the *Annales school*, regarding history as medium and long-term events, among others cultural ones; the *English School* in International Relations, arguing for a view according to which a society of states is based on shared values and assumptions; or, by contrast, the view of international relations prevailing during the 19th century “in which culture played a central part not to promote interdependence, but as part of an explicitly *unequal and warlike* system – the right, and duty, of the white races, superior to all others, to impose their ways on the rest of the world.”⁶⁸

According to Desch, significantly different and potentially contradictory concepts of culture are nowadays being pursued simultaneously in IR and security studies.⁶⁹ This is not at all surprising first of all given the complexity of the term’s meanings. Furthermore, “culture” as used in International Relations is not different from other key words in the sense that the meaning of many of them is disputed. This cannot be otherwise because the meaning assigned to a word reflects political processes, including precisely the power to give words a particular, binding meaning and make others accept this meaning and take it for granted – a process of which the current reduction of “culture” to norms, values and identity in parts of IR is characteristic. Struggles over the meaning of words are at least struggles for scientific hegemony and resource allocation. However, the “oversupply of *potentially rewarding* definitions”⁷⁰ of “culture” does not necessarily have to be seen as a problem. Definitions such as the one suggested by Desch – “collectively held ideas that do not vary in the face of

⁶⁷ See Brian Ripley, “Cognition, Culture, and Bureaucratic Politics,” in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, eds. Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 85–97.

⁶⁸ Fred Halliday, “Culture and International Relations: A New Reductionism?” in *Confronting the Political in International Relations*, eds. Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 53–56 (the quotations are from p. 55).

⁶⁹ Desch, “Culture Clash,” p. 152.

⁷⁰ Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, p. 7.

environmental or structural changes” – or the somewhat colloquial “the way things are done around here” referred to by Brian Ripley; Alexander Wendt’s “cultures of anarchy” in the international system, reflecting particular knowledge on the use of organized violence prevalent in a particular system, or Peter Katzenstein’s sociological focus on culture, norms and identity and explanatory power assigned to them with regard to national security policies independent of the distribution of material capabilities are useful in the light of a specific research interest and declared theoretical mission.⁷¹ Furthermore, Halliday’s attempt to departmentalize culture without atomizing it is helpful. Halliday has suggested four different meanings of culture:

culture as “artistic culture”, i.e. literature, art, music, painting; culture as contemporary media – satellite TV, fashion, pop music, lifestyle; culture as “civilization” – i.e. long-term systems of value and meaning, such as language, and religion; culture in the sociological sense, as a set of values defining community, as in identity, tradition and in legitimating or challenging systems of power.⁷²

According to Halliday, the relevant questions from the point of view of IR social science are “what use existing states and contenders for state power are making of culture [as well as] how culture is an independent influence on politics, or how it is weakening the power of states.”⁷³ Although all four meanings of culture are represented in current IR to some extent, there is a certain preponderance of the fourth, sociological meaning over the other meanings. Questions pertaining to identity, norms, values and community figure prominently among recent IR and in particular constructivist writings while questions concerning artistic culture do not.

⁷¹ Ripley, “Cognition,” p. 89; Desch, “Culture Clash,” p. 152; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 246–312; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 2–6.

⁷² Halliday, “Culture and International Relations,” p. 53.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

The Politics and Economics of Interpretation

Above I have quoted W.J.T. Mitchell to the effect that, although we are surrounded by and exposed to pictures, we still do not know what pictures actually are. The photographer William Eggleston adds that a “picture is what it is [...]. It wouldn’t make any sense to explain them. Kind of diminishes them.”⁷⁴ However, while pictures are difficult to grasp and defy simple explanations, politicized interpretations of pictures precisely aim to diminish them and deprive them of their ambivalence. This attempt reflects the discomfort with difference and ambiguity that can be observed in large parts of the western world.⁷⁵ However, I am more interested here in the reduction of images as a political strategy. Such a strategy is especially obvious in cases of visual securitization when images are used to depict someone or something as a threat to a given community. In such cases, unambiguous threat designations are required and aimed at by assigning to images some ostensibly clear and obvious meaning that is then claimed to be true. In other words, the truth value of images has to be emphasized. Politicized interpretations of images claim validity on the basis of what the image is alleged to show clearly and unmistakably. Validity claims, by pointing at an image’s truth value, aim to narrow the range of possible interpretations of a picture until ultimately one specific interpretation becomes a duty, is accepted by a given political community and has to be accepted by individual members of this community in order not to exclude themselves from the community or be excluded by others. For example, the pictures of planes crashing into the World Trade Center do not show much more than planes crashing into the World Trade Center. They do not show that the crash is an act of terror; it could be a criminal act or an accident. That the images show an act of terror is a political interpretation that has been ingrained in collective narratives to such an extent that adhering to an alternative interpretation would almost automatically result in exclusion from the US community.

⁷⁴ William Eggleston in an interview with Sean O’Hagan, “Out of the Ordinary,” *The Guardian online*, 26 July 2004.

⁷⁵ Instead of ambiguities, ambivalences and grey zones, western thinking (including conventional thinking in IR) often prefers clear dichotomies such as I/you, order/disorder, good/bad, East/West and so. See Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, Issue 4 (December 2004), pp. 21–49.

This procedure disregards the nature of pictures, namely, that they allow – at any given moment as well as over time – multiple and even contradictory interpretations that are equally appropriate. It is indeed one of the as yet unsolved puzzles why visual securitization functions although images do not seem to be suitable vehicles with which to securitize something or someone. They are unsuitable tools because pictures carry with them a “surplus of meaning”⁷⁶ or “excess meaning” (TC, p. 68). It is precisely this surplus of meaning that makes pictures ambivalent and that politicized interpretations of pictures have to disregard and dispute. They can succeed only because audiences, rather than critically engaging with the translation of images in words, often uncritically accept it or because the audience consists of visual illiterates or both. There is, however, no guarantee that the audience (or at least parts of it) will indeed fail to engage with politicized interpretations of images. Such interpretations are incantations and as such fairly weak political tools, open to disagreement, opposition and resistance. For example, the interpretation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the US State Department, Patricia Harrison, of photographs of Manhattan’s Ground Zero after the September 11 attacks as “remind[ing] the viewer of the true face of terrorism” and as showing “a threat that must be combated” not only in the United States but everywhere is just that: an interpretation that may or may not be shared by the viewers. It is a politically motivated prescription of the way in which the images ought to be interpreted by “freedom-loving people” everywhere but there is no guarantee that they will be interpreted in such a manner in fact.⁷⁷ Some viewers may decide to support terrorism because they find its “true face” attractive. Likewise, the notorious Abu Ghraib prison pictures may shock some viewers but may fail to shock others. Some viewers may see them as expressions of deviations from normal behavior in the US armed forces while others may see them as a confirmation of this very behavior. Some viewers may conclude that the practices revealed in the photographs cannot be justified even in the light of the “war on terror” while others may include them in the repertoire of practices that are justified when the national security is said and

⁷⁶ Barry King, “Über die Arbeit des Erinnerns. Die Suche nach dem perfekten Moment,” in *Diskurse der Fotografie. Fotokritik am Ende des fotografischen Zeitalters*, ed. Herta Wolf (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003), p. 173–214.

⁷⁷ See <http://www.911exhibit.state.gov/index.cfm>.

shown to be threatened. In Mark Danner's word, identifying two master narratives with regard to the Abu Ghraib prison pictures:

Even public officials charged with investigating the scandal [...] at the same time seek to contain it by promoting the view that Abu Ghraib in its essence was about individual misbehavior and sadism: "Animal House on the night shift," as former secretary of defense James Schlesinger characterized it, even as his own report showed in detail that it was a great deal more.

The second "master narrative" of Abu Ghraib is that of the Muslim preacher Sheik Mohammed Bashir [...] and many other Arabs and Muslims who point to the scandal's images as perfect symbols of the subjugation and degradation that the American occupiers have inflicted on Iraq and the rest of the Arab world.⁷⁸

Given the surplus of meaning that images carry with them it can be argued that the translation of images into words always is not only a translation but a reduction. This is so because, first, rather than being easily accessible to representation in words, "visual culture as a whole surely *cries out* for its representation in visual media."⁷⁹ This is so, secondly, because "[w]ritten descriptions express what can be grasped in their own languages, and are thus effectively blind (or inhospitable) to things outside them" (TC, p. 246). This is so, thirdly, because of the economics of interpretation that make interpreters focus on selected ingredients of an image rather than attempting to describe everything they see. Take for example a video showing Ayman al-Zawahiri announcing further attacks on the United Kingdom. The video was shown on television on 4 August 2005 and Mr. al-Zawahiri's performance was described by Jason Burke in *The Guardian* as follows:

The iconography is relatively easy to decode. The gun to his right is a more potent looking weapon than usual, with a grenade launcher fixed to its barrel, indicating a desire to reinforce the threat of violence. The black turban like that worn by the Taliban suggests a concern to show solidarity with the rump of the movement still fighting, just about, in Afghanistan.

The white robes are fairly standard but, combined with the long white beard and the military props, indicate a warrior-statesman or a fighting cleric, an archetype familiar to anyone with an interest in Islamic political history.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Mark Danner, "Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. LI, No. 15 (7 October 2004), p. 44.

⁷⁹ Lucien Taylor, "Introduction," in TC, p. 16.

⁸⁰ Jason Burke, "Al-Qaida is now an idea, not an organisation," *The Guardian online*, 5 August 2004.

These words are carefully chosen. The gun is more potent *looking* (there is no way for the viewer to know whether or not it is more potent in fact); the weapon is *indicating* “a desire to reinforce the threat of violence”; the black turban *suggests* a concern to show solidarity with the Taliban; the combination of white robes, a long white beard and the military props *indicates* a fighting cleric or warrior-statesman. Thus, although this iconography is said to be “relatively easy to decode” there is actually nothing in it that the viewer knows for certain. The image’s iconography suggests this and indicates that but it does not proof anything and it may suggest and indicate different things to different viewers. Furthermore, that what is absent from the written description – but not from the image – is as important as that what is included in it. Most basically, while visual representations co-represent the general and the particular, writing prioritizes peculiarities and details such as the gun, the turban, the beard and so on. By focusing on these details, Mr. al-Zawahiri is represented as an embodiment of difference rather than commonality. What he obviously has in common with the readers of the description in *The Guardian* and elsewhere is absent from the description but obvious in the video, for example, that Mr. al-Zawahiri is a human being with a head, a body and extremities (at least some of them are visible in the video and the freeze-frame images disseminated in newspapers worldwide) and that he is capable of speaking in a comprehensible manner (regardless of whether or not the viewer/listener likes and agrees with what he has to say). Mr. al-Zawahiri even wears glasses and leaves a cultivated and well-groomed impression. Thus, while language takes “the commonalities of being human” (TC, p. 246) for granted, images, by “co-represent[ing] [...] centered and peripheral details in the same frame” (TC, p. 69) and by “constantly reiterate[ing] the general forms in which the particular is contained” (TC, p. 246) show the commonalities “explicitly and redundantly” (TC, p. 246). Thus, images and language do not seem to give similar accounts of human existence:

Pictures and writing produce two quite different accounts of human existence, however much filmmakers and writers strive to describe the same thing. Writing contrives to evoke the ordinary features and substructure of an entire scene by implication, and then concentrates its attention on a few notable details. [...] By comparison, the account produced by films is at once more and less strange than that of writing. What is noted and what is left unnoted form a continuous co-presentation, even when details are singled out for attention. Thus, on the one

hand, pictures draw our attention to the visible differences between human groups, emphasizing particularities of body type, dress, personal adornment, and habitation. [...] On the other hand, films and photographs also convey features of human appearance and sociality of a much less diverse and more widely recognizable kind. (TC, pp. 246–247)

Thus, while language tends to emphasize differences, pictures show both differences and commonalities, thus envisaging living with difference rather than by reducing it. Pictures show the complexity of the world by showing similarities and differences, the central and the peripheral, the general and the particular. By showing the complexity of the world in its complexity, pictures oppose easy solutions based on we versus them, good versus bad, right versus wrong.

The videomakers certainly want to transport a clear and unmistakable message and they have different shooting and editing techniques at their disposal in order to ensure that they are understood as intended. However, the triangle of film-/videomaker, viewer and subject is a very complex relationship indeed. This is so, first, because like any ingredients of visual culture “[f]ilms are objects, and like many objects they may have multiple identities” (TC, p. 150). This is so, secondly, because the film-/videomaker, although being equipped with a variety of means with which to manipulate the viewer into a specific way of seeing, is never fully in control of what he or she is actually doing: “no author is fully aware of what constitutes its voice – it speaks differently in different contexts, it undergoes shifting subjectivities with others, it is a ventriloquist for its teachers, parents, friends, and heroes” (TC, p. 274). This is so, thirdly, because the “work conducted by an audience in interpretation allows a film to be grafted onto personal experience.”⁸¹ Thus, Baz Luhrmann’s statement that his film, *Moulin Rouge*, is “an audience participation film”⁸² is a tautology because every film is an audience participation film in the sense that “[m]uch of the film experience has little to do with what one sees: it is what is constructed in the mind and body of the viewer” (TC, p. 71). The same is true of photography: a photograph “draws the viewer into an interpretive relationship that bypasses professional mediation” (TC, p. 68). Finally, the relationship between producer, viewer and subject is difficult because:

⁸¹ Brabazon, *From Revolution to Revelation*, pp. 176–177.

⁸² Cited in *ibid.*, p. 177.

A film (or a video, FM) can involve the subjectivities of its subjects, the viewer, and the institutional or individual filmmaker in compound ways. From a textual point of view, each of these perspectives can become an “I,” from which the other two are redefined as “you” or “they,” just as kinship terms are dependent on who is speaking. The perspective can oscillate between two or more focuses, or assimilate both, as when we begin to associate our viewpoint in the film with a first-person speaker who has previously occupied a third-person category. (TC, p. 98)

How “the complex fields” that the orchestration of “a set of overlapping codes of position, narrative, metaphor, and moral attitude” creates is experienced is “largely dependent upon who we are and what we bring to the film.” (TC, p. 98) Thus, “audiences interact with films to produce meanings” (TC, p. 140) and they do so in a manner that the producer regularly finds difficult to predict. For example, “we have seen mounting evidence that many films designed *not* to shock, but to bridge cultural differences, have quite the opposite effect when shown to at least some audiences.” (TC, p. 140) The reverse can also be observed: many images designed, if not to shock than at least to shake up the audience and to trigger political responses to the events represented in the images have profoundly failed to do so. In David Campbell’s words referring to images of concentration camps in Bosnia, “the images are read in a way that appears to make a particular response likely if not inevitable, yet that predicted response fails to occur and is instead actively avoided.”⁸³ That an audience’s response to filmed or photographed images is difficult to predict is an experience the US government had to make in the early days of its “war on terror” when it sent on tour *After September 11*, a photographic exhibition sponsored by the US State Department. The intention was to convey to foreign audiences the simplistic notion of good vs. evil underlying the current US foreign and security policy, to raise sympathy with this very policy and to underline its global relevance. While the exhibition seems to have worked reasonably well in London with the Museum of London running a parallel exhibition on the Blitz, in Nairobi, Kenya, the audience criticized the simultaneous showing of images from

⁸³ David Campbell, “Atrocity, memory, photography: imaging the concentration camps of Bosnia – the case of ITN versus Living Marxism,” Part 2, <http://www.virtual-security.net/atrocity/atrocity2.htm>. For a discussion of why this may be so, please refer to Barbie Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s Eye* (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), especially pp. 202–239.

September 11 and from the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi and surrounding buildings in 1998 with the former being perceived as dwarfing the latter. In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the exhibition was criticized as propaganda.⁸⁴ What we have here is not so much, as in Kennedy's interpretation, that "the exhibition seem[ed] less legible, despite the efforts of diplomatic missions to frame its meanings"⁸⁵ in Nairobi and Dhaka than in London but that it was contextualized and, therefore, understood differently. For example, one commentator in Dhaka found "outrageous" "how the US government is capitalizing on the tragedy [of September 11] [...] when the Israeli government is carrying out genocidal programs against the Palestinians."⁸⁶ It may also be pondered whether or not a part of the audience's discomfort with the exhibition may exactly have followed from the diplomatic missions' attempt to stipulate meaning. Without these attempts, the images may have been understood differently. Finally, the results of taking for granted the saturation of the world with images is revealed by Declan Walsh reporting on US-sponsored "wanted" ads starting to appear on Pakistani television, specifically targeting the country's northern border area of Waziristan:

"Who can stop these terrorists? Only you!" implored a voice as images of Bin Laden and 13 henchmen flashed across the screen. Embarrassed counter terrorism specialists felt the calls were just a gimmick. "I'd prefer not to comment," said one US official. After all, hardly anyone has a television in Waziristan.⁸⁷

While there seem to exist substantial differences between written and pictorial accounts of human existence, it does not automatically follow that all pictorial representations deliver similar accounts or even the same account. The "representation of anything is by definition the creation of something different" (TC, p. 48). Although being ingredients of visual culture, television and video, photography and film have so many peculiarities that it seems advisable not to expect them to result in the creation of the same account. Here, I would like to suggest that the difference is resulting from, among other things, what I have called above the economics of interpretation. As noted,

⁸⁴ Kennedy, "Remembering September 11," pp. 324–325.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁸⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 325.

⁸⁷ Declan Walsh, "Most wanted," *The Guardian online*, 1 August 2005.

images carry with them a surplus of meaning. While it may be that the “onus falls upon the filmmaker to control any potential misinterpretations of the material – not upon the viewer to be a better interpreter of it” (TC, p. 70) and while this argument may be extended to include also photographs, it is ultimately the viewer who has to decide in which possible meaning of an image he or she wants to believe in a given situation. Here, photography’s advantage over film and video clearly is its slowness that gives each viewer the possibility to think of, reflect on and contextualize the image. This possibility is absent from many films and videos (save for freeze-framed images on the VCR) that are increasingly following the MTV-aesthetics of rapid cuts and the evaporation of time. Images require reflection and reflection requires time.

Conclusion

While images certainly are ingredients of and tools used in security policy, the extent to which security policy can employ and rely on images should not be exaggerated. The other side of the coin is that, while images can become ingredients of opposition to security policy, the extent to which opposition can employ and rely on images should not be exaggerated, either. Ambivalence works in both directions and it is difficult indeed to analytically come to terms with images. Securitization through language seems to be much more straightforward and unambiguous than securitization through images. Therefore, in the process of securitization images are often supported by language in order to give them the desired clarity and unequivocalness that they otherwise would not possess. It is important for the viewer to differentiate words from images and to ponder over the reduction in meaning that inevitably follows from the translation of images in words. However, the pace of consecutive television images makes such a differentiation difficult. This is why photography offers more space for oppositional interventions. Just as films, photographs “create a new reality in which the viewer plays a central role, or at least is invited to do so” (TC, p. 71). Contrary to films, photographs offer the time needed to critically engage with this new reality. They also offer the space needed to engage with the image producer’s and one’s own role in creating this reality.

The political relevance of images is clearly understood by practitioners. For example, Steve Coll reveals to his readers the following episode from the early stages of the US “war on terror”:

The rebels had to run through Soviet-laid minefields as they approached fixed positions around Jalalabad. The Afghans were trained to send mules ahead of their soldiers to clear the fields. They would tie long wooden logs on ropes behind the mules and drive them into a minefield to set off the buried charges.

“I know you don’t like this,” an Afghan commander explained to Gary Schroen as the Jalalabad battle began, “but it’s better than using people.”

“Yes, but just don’t take any pictures,” Schroen advised. Nobody back in Washington “wants to see pictures of little donkeys blown up.”⁸⁸

While the assessment that nobody in Washington “wants to see pictures of little donkeys blown up” is immediately plausible it is more difficult to analyze how images exactly work in the social context of international relations and security policy. Approached with the benefit of hindsight, the analysis often has a sobering effect, at least for peace researchers. For example, referring to the Persian Gulf War Mitchell affirms that:

CNN has shown us that a supposedly alert, educated population (for instance, the American electorate) can witness the mass destruction of an Arab nation as little more than a spectacular television melodrama, complete with a simple narrative of good triumphing over evil and a rapid erasure from public memory.⁸⁹

It has also been noted with respect to one of the most famous photographs in the history of photojournalism, the shooting on 1 February 1968 of a Viet Cong suspect on a street in Saigon by Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan of the South Vietnamese National Police, that “there was no evidence of any public fury in reaction to the Saigon shooting image.”⁹⁰ Remember also David Campbell’s and Barbie Zelizer’s analysis of photographs from Bosnia referred to above. Furthermore, a direct relationship between images and subsequent policies is easier to claim than to prove. Policy change after the

⁸⁸ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 193.

⁸⁹ Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 16.

⁹⁰ David D. Perlmutter, *Visions of War: Picturing Warfare from the Stone Age to the Cyber Age* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2001), p. 206.

publication of photographs does not necessarily mean that policies changed because of the photographs. For example, it may be said that photographs arriving from the Vietnam battlefields created an anti-war sentiment in large portions of the US population and that because of this sentiment the United States finally withdrew from Vietnam. However, it may equally well be argued that an anti-war sentiment already existed among large parts of the population for a variety of reasons – most prominently, no doubt, because US soldiers got killed in Vietnam by the thousands – and that the arriving photographs strengthened this sentiment rather than creating it in the first place. Looking at the current war in Iraq it may be that to “allow citizens to see [the Iraq war’s] reality – the shattered bodies, the wounded children, the incomprehensible mayhem – is to risk eroding popular support for it.”⁹¹ This may be so but it does not necessarily have to be so. The war’s reality may be accepted if the current US government succeeds, as its predecessors historically did, in convincing the American people “that military action is both unavoidable and necessary to achieve some greater good.”⁹² Current developments furthermore show that decline in support is not necessarily depended on images. Thus, the relationship between photographs and subsequent policies is often very complex indeed.

It is even more difficult to predict how images will work in the context of security policy. It is difficult to say beforehand what kinds of dynamics images will unfold after their release. This is probably one of the reasons for the difficulties faced by several Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the US State Department who tried to convey to the public “not only the facts but also emotions and feelings, [...] beliefs and values” and to communicate to (foreign) audiences “the essence of the American people.”⁹³ However, they had to realize that this is easier said than done: the “essence of the American people” as identified by some viewers may be different from the image that the producers want to convey. Viewers may interpret images in a variety of ways so that different interpretations of an image co-exist at the same time or follow one another. Interpretations of images are arbitrary and subjective

⁹¹ Gary Kamiya, “The Photos Washington Doesn’t Want You to See,” *Der Spiegel online*, 25 August 2005.

⁹² Karen Houppert, “Who’s Next?” *The Nation online*, from the 12 September 2005 issue.

⁹³ Charlotte Beers, as quoted in Kennedy, “Remembering September 11,” p. 317.

rather than being an objective reflection of truth contained in and transported by the image. The public diplomats obviously did not succeed in creating a virtual parallel world, in the shadow of which the de facto foreign and security policy would become invisible and unassailable, to the extent to which General Norman Schwarzkopf succeeded in making the horrors of the Persian Gulf War disappear behind the “abstract image provided for television by the remote, robotic sensors of a ‘smart bomb’.”⁹⁴ In the latter case, the disappearance of human bodies from the television pictures arguably helped not only win the war by stifling resistance at home but also delete the Vietnam War from public memory and replace it with more saleable war images (that, again, are likely to be replaced by the experiences and memories of experiences of the current fiasco in Iraq). All the same, the gap between security policies and their visual representations is widening, not in the sense that images are replacing security policies but rather in that security policy is becoming invisible to such an extent that it appears questionable if “representation” is really the right word any more.

Returning to one of the topics of this conference, *promoting peaceful social change*, it may still be argued that visual representations and especially photography with its inter-subjective character (requiring an audience that is capable of responding to the photographs) and communicative nature (obtaining meaning only through the dialogue between the photographer, the image and the audience) can help break with institutionalized orders of knowledge, violence and (in)security production and envision a more peaceful understanding of the past, present and future, provided that the audience uses photography’s slowness in order to carefully negotiate the image’s meanings. This, however, requires that the audience sees photography’s slowness as an asset and not as a liability. It also requires an increase in visual literacy among both the general audience and those academics specializing on issues pertaining to security, peace and war. That pictures have no undisputed and unequivocal meaning means that it is all the more important to understand how they work in the social context of international relations and security policy. Although it is not an easy task, a starting-point for such an understanding can be the retrospective empirical analysis after the act of visualization. For example, comparing with one another different processes of visual securitization

⁹⁴ Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 402.

including the audience's responses may help in coming to a general understanding of the role of images in the social context of security and security policy. Furthermore, understanding why one interprets a given photograph in a certain way may help one understand the arbitrariness of one's own interpretation and, by implication, the arbitrariness of everybody else's interpretation. This, in turn, could both increase one's skepticism of validity claims made by decision-makers on the basis of images and thereby reduce images' possibilities to be used as a political legitimacy provider. Rather than discussing the "true" meaning and the truth-value of visual representations, the audience, knowing that the meaning of an image always consists of an interpretation and its alternatives, should be encouraged, as a general principle, not to approve of the visual articulation of security. By so doing the audience would at least commit policy-makers to the established rules, to present more evidence for their claims and to argue their case in public rather than relying on the allegedly self-evident meaning derived from images.

Finally, I would like to suggest that in the absence of serious interest in these questions in major parts of International Relations and security studies, peace research should engage with these very questions – not least because peace research does not carry with it the state-centric and military-centric heritage that makes the adaptation of IR and security studies to the post-Cold War world so difficult. This heritage, to the extent that it has already been critically addressed in parts of IR and security studies, seems to have been replaced by a new reductionism, namely, the limitation of culture to norms and identity. Furthermore, the interest of IR and security studies in both doing "science" and – equally importantly – being seen by others as doing "science" – i.e. making objective, disinterested, often quantitative research in order to produce cumulative knowledge and generalizable laws seems to be a noteworthy obstacle to visual analysis in IR and security studies because by their very nature images defy generalization and theory-building across time and over space. Finally, peace research's openness towards related and not-so-related disciplines and its own inter-disciplinary approach is a necessary condition for successfully dealing with issues related to visual representations. Thus, in brief, it should be one of peace research's tasks to help increase the society's visual literacy.

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Research on Peace Education: Interesting Findings and Challenging Questions⁹⁵

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Abstract

Conflicts are accompanied by and mutually reinforced by psychological elements. In this sense, the collective narrative of a group in conflict plays a major role. One of the major characteristics of an intractable conflict is the delegitimization of the other side, that is the absence of respect for the other side's history, collective narrative, aspirations, claims, beliefs and actual experiences. The overall goal of peace education is to cultivate a legitimacy of the adversary's perspective. This overall goal entails three sub-goals, which are further outlined in the paper. Peace education programs in regions of conflict are often effective in attaining such goals. However, peace education programs do not have the same effects on members of the two sides to the conflict. At the same time, the author suggests that peace education programs are not as effective in modifying convictions, as they are in modifying peripheral attitudes in a group.

Collective narratives and the delegitimization of the adversary

Intractable conflicts are based on both political as well as psychological elements. Conflicts about land, independence, control, governance and such are accompanied by and mutually reinforced by psychological elements such as fear, hatred, negative attitudes, distrust, prejudices, and their likes. These emanate from a society's collective narrative.

The collective narrative of a group in conflict plays here a major role. For one thing, it turns beliefs, hypotheses, attributions, and suspicions into firm facts: *Everybody knows* that the Israeli are pushy, that the Palestinians do not care about human life, or that the Americans want to rule the world. There is no need to prove anything, nor is there a desire to examine anything as there is clear agreement on the

⁹⁵ This is an abbreviated version of the talk given at conference on *New Directions in Peace and Conflict Research* held in Tromsø, September, 2005.

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issues. For another, information is attended to very selectively, and interpreted in a very biased way. Beliefs, attributions and suspicions are guarded against any evidence that might shake them and since it is clear and socially agreed upon that perspectives of the other side are not legitimate, then there is no reason to question these convictions. A collectively held belief is self-validating.

One of the major characteristics of an intractable conflict, emanating from a society's collective narrative, is the de-legitimization of the other side: The absence of respect for the other side's history, collective narrative, aspirations, claims, beliefs and actual experiences. As stated by Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998):

These beliefs [about "us" and "them"] deny the adversary's legitimacy through dehumanization, negative trait characterization, outcasting, use of negative political labels, and negative group comparisons. Thus, the opponent is categorized "into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within limits of acceptable norms and/or values.

De-legitimization of the adversary entails a number of elements: A sense of superiority over the adversary, depersonalization, rejection, stereotypes and prejudices. It is often accompanied by ignorance about the other side as well as about the complexities of conflicts, thus allowing society members to ignore the contribution of their own side to the conflict.

Goals of peace education

Thus follow the main goals of peace education, as follows:

The overall goal is to cultivate a legitimacy of the adversary's perspective. This overall goal entails three subgoals: (a) A cognitive goal: Acknowledgment of the "contribution" of one's own side to the conflict; (b) An affective goal: Cultivation of empathy for the other side and its humanization; and (c) A dispositional/attitudinal goal: Development of non-violent dispositions, reduced stereotypes of the adversary and more positive attitudes towards it.

Perhaps the most difficult goal to attain is the acknowledgment of our own side's share in the conflict. Given a "Beloved enemy" (Barash, 1994) – one's identity is easily defined. Everything good is in us; everything bad is in the enemy. This allows the deligitimization mentioned above as well and an easy life. But once we acknowledge what we did to the other side and how we contributed to the conflict, the bad parts of the other are discovered to be also in us (Bar-On, 1999). The clear

demarcation between enemy and us becomes blurred. And this threatens us no less than the external adversary: Looking into the mirror is not very pleasant! But once we do it, empathy and non-violent dispositions are likely to follow.

Achievements of peace education programs

Peace education programs in regions of conflict, such as Northern Ireland or Israel/Palestine are often effective in attaining such goals (Salomon, 2004a). Thus, for example, participation in a yearlong school-based program served as a barrier against deterioration of perceptions and attributions, which was typical of non-participation (Biton & Salomon, in press). That program led also to greater legitimization of the other side and to the reduction of stereotypes. Participation in a three-day peace education workshop cultivated led interpersonal friendships which then became generalized (Bar-Natan, 2006). Maoz (2004) reports on similar findings. One might say that despite a host of barriers and hurdles facing peace education in the context of peace education (Salomon, 2004b), well designed and executed programs are quite effective.

However...

Peace education programs do not have the same effects on members of the two sides to the conflict. The two sides to the conflict come to peace education with different perceptions, expectations, and desires. For example, whereas the weaker side in the conflict seeks an accounting of what has been done to it by the stronger side, the latter prefers to look into the future (Maoz, 2000). The two sides also react differently to peace education. Participation in peace education empowers Palestinians in the sense of increasing their adherence to their own collective narrative; Participation in peace education by Israeli-Jewish participants makes them more willing to accept the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative.

However, most importantly is the finding that concerns the importance that each side attributes to the collective narrative of the other side. Palestinians contribute no lesser importance to the Jewish narrative than their Jewish peers. Not so Jewish youngsters; they attribute no importance at all to the Palestinian collective narrative although the Palestinians, quite obviously attribute to their own narrative great importance. It appears that the Palestinians read the Jewish mind quite well, but

the Jews do not read the Palestinian minds well at all. How are we to explain such a strange finding?

Interviews, daily experience, and recent research (e.g., Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005) suggest that the behavior of Jewish youngsters is based on a mixture of superiority and ignorance. These two feed on each other in a vicious circle: The sense of superiority prevents these youngsters from becoming familiar with the Palestinian culture, experience and collective narrative, while that ignorance facilitates the sense of superiority. Both of these follow from the delegitimization of the Palestinians. Several joint working committees of the American Psychological Association have recently identified “Belief in the superiority of one group's cultural heritage (history, values, language, traditions, arts and crafts, etc.) over another's” as a defining characteristic of the phenomenon they termed *ethnocentric monoculturalism*. The cluster of attitudes commonly associated with this world view includes a sense of specialness, deservingness, and entitlement. (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003).

Related here are collective efforts to prevent the in-group's moral purity from being polluted. In some cases, these pollution-prevention strategies take the form of totally ignoring the point of view of the de-legitimized adversary. *Hence follows self-imposed ignorance*. It is self-imposed by individuals and by the whole society to protect its collective, monolithic identity and to continue justifying the delegitimization of the other side. A school curriculum that denigrates the other side, or even only ignores it, contributes significantly to this process. Self-imposed ignorance, motivated by the sense of superiority, serves very well the function of protecting one's collective narrative from acknowledging its contribution to the conflict. Hence follows the Jewish youngsters' way of dismissing the importance of Arabs' collective narrative as unimportant even in the eyes of the Arabs themselves.

Is there a way for peace education to overcome such motivated ignorance? Apparently there is: Real dialogue based on *prolonged* open exchanges of personal stories and genuine and equitable interactions. But not all peace education programs can be of such quality, intensity, depth and duration. Most programs are short, conducted by well-intended semi-professionals in a rather unsupportive environment. Are they effective? Yes, they are, as we have seen in the examples above, but only if you measure effectiveness *the morning after*. Indeed, a series of findings shows very clearly that positive effects revealed immediately following the completion of a

program, *evaporate a month or two months later*. There is room of some suspicion that effects are only short-lived. How do we explain this disappointment?

We could explain it by dismissing the programs, or invalidating the studies, but this sounds much too simple. Most of these programs are trying to change attitudes and beliefs, whether about the legitimacy of the adversary or about its actions, whether about its basic nature or about its hidden motives. But attitudes and beliefs are not born equal. Some are stronger, more central, and more important than others. Indeed, the social psychologist Abelson (1988) has pointed out the difference between what he calls *convictions* and regular attitudes. My attitude concerning the sanctity of life is a conviction but my attitude about vegetarianism is just an attitude. For a feminist, the belief in gender equality is a conviction that serves as a backbone of her belief system, not so her belief in the value of vitamins. Convictions are very strongly held attitudes and beliefs and there is a large literature that deals with these. It is very interesting that peace education so far has not benefited from this literature. This distinction has simply been overlooked.

What are some of the differences between more and less strongly held attitudes, that is – between convictions and regular attitudes?

- They are central since other attitudes and beliefs are connected to them and emanate from them;
- They are rooted in more knowledge;
- They are held with great conviction;
- They are held with greater certitude;
- They are accompanied by greater ego-involvement;
- They are more tightly related to actual behaviors;
- And most importantly, they are not susceptible to change.

Peace education cannot affect the more central attitudes. It can affect and it does affect the more peripheral ones. Here is what David Barash says about this:

Give ground – grudgingly - if you must – but only at the periphery. At the same time, strive by all means to preserve what is central, whatever is fundamentally important to you world view (Barash, 1994, p. 15).

Indeed, as I shall show below, peripheral attitudes and beliefs can be affected by peace education. *However, it is precisely those peripheral attitudes and beliefs that*

while being affected by peace education can also become eroded after a while. What can be changed by a planned intervention can also be changed back by social and political forces that counter it.

Rosen, in a very recent study, shows very nicely how peripheral beliefs change as a function of participation in a year-long peace education program, and how the more central ones do not. He also shows that the positive effects thus attained disappear after a while. An example of these trends is shown in Figure 1. (Appendix)

Why is this? Why are the changed beliefs not more enduring and sustainable? The reason is a rather simple one: Peace education programs in regions of ongoing conflict, like programs of human rights, democracy, anti racism and tolerance, often face a formidable challenge posed by a belligerent, so-called patriotic, and gung-ho social and political environment that cultivates a culture of fear and siege, an atmosphere of danger from a real or imaginary adversary. It is an environment that is not very hospitable to peace education and similar programs. Here is Barash again quoting General McArthur (1965):

Our government kept us in a perpetual state of fear; it kept us in a continual stampede of patriotic fervor- with a cry of a grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up.

The social and political context in which peace education operates can be pretty powerful; the old, well-entrenched collective narratives (capital N Narratives) can easily erase the newly developed and still feeble new, peace-oriented narratives (lower case narratives).

So, what does all this lead to? Bar-Tal & Teichman (2005) argued recently that peace education in the context of intractable conflict cannot possibly remain the sole property of some peace loving schools or other good Samaritans. As the conflict is rooted in a society-wide collective narrative, the history from which it emanates and the beliefs to which it leads, a society-wide change of that narrative, or ethos, needs to take place. The media, politicians, the street, the neighborhood, every institution and organization need to take part in this. But in democracies you cannot engineer a society wide change of heart or conversion of ideology, and hence, according to Bar-Tal, peace education, in the absence of societal support, cannot possibly be very effective.

Bar-Tal & Teichman (2005) may be asking for a bit too much. May be that more limited changes would be good enough. That is what Mark Ross (2000) has called "Good enough conflict management". May be that changes of peripheral attitudes and beliefs would be fine attainment *provided* of course that these modest changes endure and can be sustained over time.

We seem to know how to change attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and attributions, *but we are far less knowledgeable as to how to sustain these changes* in the face of a belligerent social and political context. This, in my opinion, is the new challenge facing peace education today.


There are some ideas as to how to do it: Forced compliance, peer tutoring, and inoculation programs... All we now need is to try these out. May be that the next time we have here such a conference I will be able to report on how we have learned to sustain desirable changes.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Changes of beliefs about the importance of the Arab Narrative in Jewish eyes.



Peace Studies and the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri

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Abstract

Peace Studies have to grow at a time when the original idea of a modern university is in ruins. Culture has ceased to be the university's purpose and philosophy is no longer its guardian. Knowledge lacks structure and orientation. The contemporary main purpose of universities is quality and excellence. But what does this mean? More specifically, what are excellent Peace Studies? Ironically, only philosophy can answer this question. Xavier Zubiri's critique of Western thought is a good reference for this. His ideas on reality, reality by postulation, intelligence, objects of knowledge and processes of generation of knowledge can be used to determine, structure Peace Studies and resuscitate the value of intellectual life.

Introduction

The bases of the *modern Western university* can be traced back to the philosophical work of the *German Idealists*, from Schiller to Humboldt. For them, *reason*, as thought about by Kant, was to develop *knowledge* and this *knowledge* was to determine *culture*. This *rational culture* guarded by *philosophy* was to function as the unifier of the activities of a *university*, whose purpose was to function as the producer of knowledge, conflict solver and organiser of the life of the people of a *rational state*.

From this starting point, American scholars substituted *philosophical tradition* by democratically chosen *canons of literature*, as the guardians of *culture* in their *universities*. Eventually, this led to a process of “de-referentialisation” of *culture*, in the end of which the word *culture* came to mean nothing at all as such. The result was that *culture* ceased to be the unifier of research, teaching and learning in a *university*, and it was substituted by the “normalising” (Foucault, 1975: 183) notion of *excellence*.

Readings suggests that culture used to be the soul of the university, and now it is a program of study: *Cultural Studies*. *Peace Studies* could be seen as a

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development in this direction. In other words, when the main purpose of a university ceases to be developing culture that can among other things guarantee peace, it becomes relevant to have Peace Studies as an independent field of study.

Such tendencies become increasingly widespread in the contemporary phase of globalisation characterised by *Americanisation*, which has implied to a large extent more focus on *excellence* than on *cultural development* in universities throughout the world. But as the term *culture*, or *peace*, the word *excellence* says nothing by itself, just as long as it is not accompanied by philosophical considerations that establish the criteria that ideally make something excellent (Readings 1994).

What then should be the standards of *excellence* in *Peace Studies*? A multidisciplinary field that becomes impractical unless the different sciences can play a specific role in it, with a purpose and as a part of a greater intellectual project. Ironically enough, the only possible way to answer such a question successfully is by returning to what the *German Idealists* identified as the unifier of the activities of a university; namely, philosophical reflection on the purposes, the object of knowledge, the process of knowledge and the epistemology of Peace Studies.

A good reference for reflections on such issues is the lifetime work of the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri. He developed a *materialist open realism* (Samour 2003: 3-5), which culminated in the trilogy on "Sentient Intelligence" given out in 1980. Already in 1942, Zubiri identified the reduction of philosophical life in universities that was pointed out by Readings in 1994:

- 1) *Levelling positivation of knowledge*: Sciences lack systemic unity and perspective. They are all set in the same plane. One is as important as the other. When disciplines are regarded as scientific, they acquire the same rank. Lyotard identified a deepening of this problem. For him, "classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are... called into question". (Lyotard 1979: 109)
- 2) *Disorientation in the world*: The intellectual function lacks a clear role in the current world. Intellectual activity is only measured in relation to how useful it is. The rest is disregarded as mere curiosity. This view parallels the notion

of legitimation of knowledge by performability identified and opposed by Lyotard (Lyotard 1979).

- 3) Lack of intellectual life: Scientific methods are increasingly simple techniques, a sort of meta-technique. (Zubiri 1944: 5-32).

1. Who was Xavier Zubiri?

Xavier Zubiri was born in San Sebastián, Spain, December 5th, 1898. He started studies on philosophy and theology at the Seminar of Madrid. In 1919, Zubiri met José Ortega y Gasset. As Zubiri's mentor, Ortega y Gasset introduced Zubiri to the main currents of European thought, especially Husserl's phenomenology. Already in 1920 Xavier Zubiri obtained a doctorate of philosophy in Rome. A year later, he moved to Belgium to study philosophy in the Superior Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Louvain. In May that same year, Zubiri presented his doctoral thesis in the University of Madrid with the title "A Phenomenological Theory of Judgement".

Before becoming thirty, Zubiri was tenured to the *Chair in History of Philosophy* at the *Faculty of Philosophy and Literature* of the *Central University of Madrid* in the year 1926. Three years later, his interests in phenomenology took Zubiri to Freiburg to attend courses with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. But he did not remain there very long. A year later, in 1930, Zubiri's interest in physics moved him to Berlin, where he met among others: Einstein, Schrödinger, Zermelo and Jaeger. He concentrated on trying to find how to incorporate the most recent findings in physics in to philosophy. By 1931 he returned to his *Chair* in the *Central University of Madrid*.

It can be said that Zubiri moved away from wars in the course of his life. First, a year before the outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1935, he moved to Rome to study linguistics. After a year there, he travelled to Paris, where he imparted courses in the *Institut Catholique*. His stay there was interrupted in 1939 when he decided to return to Spain and started working as a lecturer in Barcelona. He had left Paris just a year before it fell to the Germans during the Second World War. Despite the fact that the civil war was over in Spain, his return was not problem-free. The

political climate in fascist Spain was repressive and due to lack of liberties in Franco's regime, Zubiri resigned from work in Spanish universities in 1942. From then on, a circle of close collaborators financed his work. In 1944 he got to publish one of his best-known works; "Nature, History, God".

His first contact with the English-speaking world was in 1946, when he attended a conference in Princeton and lectured on the real in mathematics. Nevertheless, his lecture was in French and had the title "*Le réel et les mathématique: un problème de philosophie*".

In 1947, Zubiri presided the *Society of Studies and Publications* in Madrid. This society became a new intellectual forum where Zubiri was able to expose and discuss his thought with a growing number of students. In 1953, a group of his collaborators gave out the book "A Tribute to Xavier Zubiri". However, Zubiri's distance from universities implied that his thought was not well known outside very limited circles. For many years, Zubiri did not publish at all. Nonetheless, his oral courses reflected growing maturity and the development of his own philosophy, which was created in discussion with the work of contemporary philosophers as Heidegger.

The culmination of Zubiri's philosophy would be his theory of *Sentient Intelligence*, which was not finished until in 1980. The first step in this process was given with the publication of "On Essence" in 1962 and the follow up to this work "The Dynamic Structure of Reality" in 1968, which was not published until later. In between these two books, Zubiri worked with the popular book "Five Lectures on Philosophy". In 1970 a "Second Tribute to Xavier Zubiri" was published. The Seminar Xavier Zubiri was created in 1971 within the Society for Studies and Publications. Here, Zubiri got the chance to discuss his thought with close students. In 1974, this seminar started publishing the journal titled *Realitas*, which gathered articles inspired in much of Zubiri's work and other philosophers. In 1979, the Federal Republic of Germany granted Zubiri the Cross of Merit (*Das Grosse Verdienst Kreuz*), and in 1980 he received a *Doctorate Honoris Causa* in the *University of Deusto* in Bilbao; the same year his landmark trilogy "Sentient Intelligence" was published.

In 1983 Zubiri started working with a new book called "Man and God" but he never fulfilled this task. He died the 21st of September. His students and collaborators in the *Xavier Zubiri Seminar* (which later became the *Xavier Zubiri Foundation*)

started publishing Zubiri's unedited works. The first of these "Man and God" (1984) was edited by Ignacio Ellacuría, one of Zubiri's closest collaborators. Then the following books were published: "About man" (1986), "The Dynamic Structure of Reality" (1989), "On Emotions and Volition" (1992), "The Philosophical Problem of the History of Religions" (1993), "The Fundamental Problems of Western Metaphysics" (1994), "Space, Time and Matter" (1996), "The theological problem of man: Christianity" (1999), "Man and truth" (1999). In the year 2000 his "First Writings" (1921-26) were published. In 2001 the book "On Reality" came out and in 2002 "About the problem of Philosophy and other writings" (1932-1944) (The Xavier Zubiri Foundation, 2005).

Fritz Wilhelmsen, A.R. Caponigri, Thomas Fowler and Nelson Orringer have translated some of Zubiri's work to English (Fowler 2004: 1).

2. An Attempt to Rescue Metaphysics

Zubiri's work can be seen as an attempt to save metaphysics in the twentieth century (González 2004: 60). His intention must have been to provide a solution to the problems with knowledge that he identified in 1942: levelling of the tasks of sciences, lack of orientation of knowledge in the world and the relative unimportance of intellectual activity (Zubiri 1944).

For this task Zubiri took a starting point in Heidegger's revival of the question of Being and metaphysics. Heidegger wrote, "The question of the meaning of Being must be formulated. It is a fundamental question, or *the* fundamental question..." (Heidegger, 1926: 24). Zubiri criticised what he called Heidegger's "'substantivation' of Being", which was the result of substantivating *space*, *time* and *consciousness*. In the introduction to the English translation of "Nature, History, God" Zubiri wrote,

"*Space*, *time*, *consciousness*, *being*, are not four receptacles for things, but only characteristics of things which are already real, they are the characteristics of the reality of things, and things, I repeat, are already real in and by themselves. Real things are not in space or time, as Kant thought (following Newton), but rather real things are spatial and temporal, something quite different than being in space and time. Intellection is not an act of consciousness, as Husserl thought. Phenomenology is the great substantivation of consciousness, which has been current in modern philosophy since Descartes. However, there is no conscience; there are only conscious acts. This substantivation has already been introduced into a great portion

of the psychology of the end of the XIX century for which "psychic activity" was synonymous to "activity of consciousness", and conceived all things as "contents of consciousness". It even created the concept of "the" subconscious. This is inadmissible, because things are not contents of consciousness, but only terminus of consciousness: conscience is not the receptacle for things. From its own perspective, psychoanalysis has always conceptualised man and his activity with reference to consciousness. It has told us about "the" consciousness, "the" unconscious, etc. Man would be, ultimately, a stratification of qualified zones with respect to consciousness. This substantivation is inadmissible. "The" activity of consciousness does not exist, "the" consciousness does not exist, and neither does "the" unconscious, nor "the" subconscious; there are only conscious, unconscious, and subconscious acts. But they are not acts of consciousness, or the unconscious, or the subconscious. Consciousness does not perform acts. Heidegger took a step further. Although in his own way (which he never managed to conceptualise or define), he accomplished the task of substantivizing being. For him things are in and through being; because of this, things are entities. Reality would only be a type of being. This is the old idea of "real being", *esse reale*. But real being does not exist. The only thing that exists is the real being real, *realitas in essendo*, I would say. Being is only one moment of reality." (Zubiri 1944: 4-32)

Zubiri identified two problems in Western thought that were the source of these substantivations:

- 1) *The logification of intelligence*. This is to think that human intelligence is limited to logos (Greek for word-thought). Accepting this mistake, which is present in Western philosophy since Parmenides, leads to postulate that thought refers to things that can be represented ideally/verbally. Parmenides wrote that only *esti* (Greek for 'it is') is, and that it is impossible for it not to be. On the other hand, Parmenides thought that to consider if the negation: *ouk esti* (Greek for "it is not") is, implies taking a "wholly incredible course, since you cannot recognise *not being* (for this is impossible), nor could you speak of it, for *thought and Being are the same thing*." (Fairbanks 1898: 91). In other words, for Parmenides that which cannot be stated verbally as something that "Is", does not exist. According to Jordan William, Parmenides' *esti* played a similar role as *cogito* for Descartes. In the *Way of Truth*, Parmenides wrote; "It is, and... it is impossible for anything not to be". Later Descartes paralleled this with his famous premise: "*Cogito ergo sum*". In other words, thinking is Being (Jordan Willams 1993: 30). This leads to the other error identified by Zubiri:
- 2) *Entification of reality*: Reality is seen as a zone of things. A set of entities with an essence that can be verbally represented. (Fowler 1998 [2]: 68)

The origin of these two problems lies in the acceptance of a dualism between intellectual knowing and sensing. This dualism limits human intellection to the efforts that logically organise concepts. This dualism has a long history in Western thought. For example, Aristotle considered reasoning and recalling of already known principles as two *intellective acts*, which could be considered as separate from the *sensual apprehension* of the reality in question (Zubiri 1980: 349-350).

Zubiri rejected this dualism between intellection and sensing, and consequently this confusion between intellection and Being. For him, all intellection happens as a result of one condition: reality. Zubiri thought of human brains as organs of formalisation that re-actualise reality through a faculty that has three modes:

- A) *Sensual apprehension*: Senses
- B) *Logos*: Distinguishing one thing from another.
- C) *Reason*: Allows to explain what things are (their form and content) and why they are.

The faculty that is composed by these inseparable modes is called *Sentient Intellection*. There is no duality in sensing and thinking. Reason is not more actualisation of reality, only better. When actualised reality is retained in the brain it generates knowledge. When knowledge is the result of reason it is called *understanding* (Fowler 1998 [1]). This shows that all knowledge has an empirical base.

Logification of Intelligence disregards sensual apprehension and reason, and therefore leads to a limited and inappropriate view of reality, which is only very partially understood by logos. Sensual apprehension, intuition and manifestations of reason like imagination are needed to understand other aspects of reality. Examples of this are how in physics, Einstein came up with the theory of relativity through sensing reality and imagining possible situations. If Einstein had been limited to the logos (language) that existed in his time for confronting a *zone that is out there* called physical reality (with for example *Newtonian Physics* and maths of the time) he would have never figured out that the speed of light should be seen as a constant independently of the speed of the observer. Further, he would have never realised that in such a model, Time and Space are no longer given facts, but that they can

warp and bend depending on the presence of mass, energy and momentum (Greene 1999: 5-7). Einstein's findings showed that Time and Space are not substantives but characteristics of reality. Therefore, Zubiri tries to incorporate this to philosophy. Reality is not a sort of Being in a zone called *Spacetime*, as Phenomenology's substantiation of *Dasein* or *being there* (in a zone) would suggest. This opposes Newton's view of Space and Time as fixed, and resolves Kant's confusions on the topic. Already in 1783 Kant conceived Space and Time as necessary a-priori concepts or forms of seeing the world, and not as given facts, when he wrote *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Further, human reality is not consciousness/sub-consciousness of *being there*. Consciousness/sub-consciousness are just characteristics of real human acts.

For Zubiri, reality is open and for this, it can never be fully understood by sentient intellection. For instance, Einstein's relativity theories are more convenient for explaining reality in *outer space* and large distances, but they do not apply so well to elementary particles and everyday situations. It has been a struggle for physicists to bridge the gap between General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. String Theory is a set of theories that attempt to resolve this, but even if these theories succeed, they will hardly tell us everything about reality. Saying that reality has the characteristic of Time, implies acknowledging dynamism. This makes it even more problematical to pretend that intelligence can apprehend everything that reality has not yet *given of itself* (Orringer 2002).

2.1 A Philosophy about Reality

For Zubiri, philosophy's main concern should not be Husserl's *Phenomenological Method*, Heidegger's *understanding of phenomena*, or Ortega y Gasset's notion of *life*. Philosophy's main concern should be *reality* that exists in and by itself. (Fowler 1998 [1])

“For Zubiri, reality in the primary or fundamental sense is a *formality*, not a zone of things. We sense not just *content* (that would probably be impossible), but necessarily something more. We sense the content in a determinate form, as something *other*; and this form of otherness, *which completes the content but is not reducible to it, is formality*.” (Fowler 2005)

Fowler adds that *formality* refers to the specific forms in which reality is *imposed* to human senses. Some animals could call formality *stimulus*. Human beings call it reality. *Content* is the structured and dynamic notes that exist in and by themselves. Formality is not added to content. These are two juxtaposed aspects of reality. These notions are not necessarily new. We find already in the writings of Aristotle a distinction between *form* and *matter*. Thomas Aquinas took further this concept and Kant used it when analysing *space* and *time* (Cohen 2003, Watkins 2003, McInerny 2005).

The word reality does not refer to a zone of things that is outside the mind. Such a reality could only be discovered by intelligence. Reality refers to a formality with a content that is re-actualised in humans' brains through sensing, logos and reason, modes of intelligence, which is in itself a part of reality. These recognitions are the basis of Zubiri's critique of Hume's analysis of causality (Fowler 1998 [3]). They imply that reality is not only imposed on human beings. We can also postulate reality. Fowler wrote, "Postulations are indeed, real; they have the formality of reality. They differ from rocks, chairs, and tables in that their content has been constructed according to concepts" (Fowler 2005: 5). Although the acceptance of *postulated realities* has many similarities with (weak and strong) *constructivism*, the two should not be confused. The acknowledgement of *postulated realities* does not question the existence of a reality in and by itself. However, many constructivists (especially strong constructivists) argue that *all* facts can be constructions of the mind (Goldman 2001). Zubiri's suggestion was more modest and argued that *postulated realities* refer to things like literature, mathematics, political entities, and so on. (Fowler 2002)

" When a mathematician (or anyone else) speaks about the number Π or e , he is speaking about something which really exists, though neither he nor anyone else grasps the content of these transcendental irrational numbers through ordinary sense perception" (Fowler 2005: 7)

These postulated realities presuppose the existence of things in and by themselves. There cannot be postulation of reality without the previous existence of non-postulated realities. A person is an example of a combination of reality in and by itself and a postulated reality. For example, elements have interacted through evolution and conception to render the persons. And persons themselves are a

combination of body and psyche, which are themselves a combination of reality in and by itself and postulated reality. Further, society is a combination of persons and their postulated realities, and culture, society's collective psyche. This collective psyche can be peaceful or non-peaceful. (See Appendix Figure 1).

2.1.1 Understanding and Science

Intelligence can re-actualise postulated and non-postulated realities and generate knowledge about them. This knowledge can be called *understanding* if it comes from reason. A scientist follows a particular method to achieve this. Fowler suggests that,

“In his work, the scientist *postulates* reality, and then *explores* that reality to draw out its consequences and to see how well it corresponds to reality beyond apprehension. This is the true meaning of the so-called *model building* to which many writers on science refer.” (Fowler 2005: 8).

In other words, scientists postulate explanations on the base of experience. If verifiable by contingency or necessity, these explanations generate understanding accepted as reality. Fowler adds that the Scientific Method in light of Zubiri's thought can be summed up as follows:

- 1) *Start with some knowledge of reality at all three levels: sensing, logos, reason.*
- 2) *Postulate reality.*
- 3) *Explore the postulated reality.*
- 4) *Verify.*
- 5) *Modify the canon of reality.*

These postulations show that all science is normative to a certain degree, because scientists norm or decide in every stage of this process and they influence what human beings call reality. This proposition parallels pragmatic thought that states that what is *true* is that which is regarded as relevant for pursuing determinate goals in reality in the short or long term (James 1907). Agreeing with Lyotard, there are no truths, just opinions. "True knowledge is always indirect knowledge; it is composed of reported statements that are incorporated into the meta-narratives of a subject that guarantees their legitimacy" (Lyotard 1979: 107). However, some

opinions are more useful and describe reality better than others. This *open reality* is more than what *closed meta-narratives* can say about it, since logos or even sentient intelligence can never understand reality fully. Therefore, Lyotards' claim that there is a "truth requirement of science being turned back against itself" (Lyotard 1979: 109), should not be taken as argument in favour of the illegitimacy of scientific knowledge. Such observation only serves to confirm the limits of scientific knowledge; a method that nonetheless possesses fewer limitations than other forms of knowledge that do not combine the three modes of intelligence; sensual apprehension, logos and reason. Philosophy should be thought as the result of science and a rational attempt to provide an overview that tries to overcome some limitations of science. It cannot overcome all, but this does not mean that an attempt at this should not be made.

Since the scientist postulates models of reality, in this sense, science is always subjective. However, if the objects of scientific inquiry are non-postulated realities, in this sense, science can have non-subjective objects of study. Successful or excellent scientific theories modify what human beings call reality. Thus the Theory of Relativity gave us relative space, relative time, speed of light as a constant, $E=mc^2$ and eventually nuclear weapons (Fowler 2005: 10).

Social Sciences' immediate objects of study are postulated realities. Psychology studies postulated psyches; anthropology deals with postulated notions of what it is to be a person. While sociology analyses postulated social realities; economics investigates postulated systems of production, distribution and consumption. History on the other hand studies postulated accounts of the past.

3. Science and Peace Studies

A Peace Researcher postulates reality on culture, conflicts and society. He or she inquires about that reality in order to establish how to drive the situation to peace and to see how well this corresponds to reality beyond his or her apprehension. Peace Studies is model building about conflicts with the ultimate purpose of non-violence.

Culture, conflicts, society, non-violence and peace are all real, but they are all a particular sort of reality: *postulated realities* by human beings. They exist, but it is

hard to perceive these realities other than through reflection. Reflection is performed by subjects, and this presents a particular challenge for peace studies, since each postulated reality can take individual forms. There are consequently different forms of the concepts of culture, conflict and society. However, when there is agreement on the forms of these issues, it can be said that there is inter-subjective understanding on them.

4. Conclusion: Excellent Peace Studies

For Readings, the main objective of contemporary universities has become excellence. According to Fowler's interpretation of Zubiri, Excellent Science would be that one that can be verified, accepted and which modifies the canon of reality. Peace Studies (as any study) include science, but they are something more. They are also meta-science. That is, reflection upon the relationship of science to reality, its methods, the relationships between sciences and the purposes of all this.

Excellent Peace Studies would then be viable models or postulations of experiences of culture, society and conflict; formulated in appropriate academic language and style; in a verifiable way that makes them acceptable; transforming the inter-subjective canons of culture, society and conflict in the direction of peace. But besides this, Peace Studies is also reasoned reflection on the relationships between the different postulations that are made from different standing points in reality. (See Appendix Figure 2).

The figure in the appendix shows that a precondition for Peace Studies is the object of Peace Studies: sensual apprehension of realities. Qualitative, kinetic, spatial and quantitative ways of apprehending reality serve as the basis for language and maths, which help us name and organise these experiences. This is the basic material that reason uses to give form to scientific postulations about the world. Reason is a pre-condition for these scientific postulations, which can be organised according to the sort of realities that are their objects study. For example, if they are postulated realities or realities in and by themselves. Sciences in the outer circles are not only dealing with reality in and by itself, but also postulated realities. Thereby what are often referred to in Norwegian, as *Real Sciences* would be those that deal mostly with reality in and by itself: the inner circles represent them. What Norwegian institutions of higher learning call *Theoretical Sciences*, would be those represented

by the outer circles. However, these are sciences dealing with real things too. It's just that they deal mostly with postulated realities as psyches, society, accounts of the past, stories, systems of production-distribution-consumption, and so on. In the end, philosophy's task is to make sense of all the results from these sciences and to try to determine how their postulations can affect what humans call reality. In Peace Studies, philosophers are to find out if the culture that originates from the scientific knowledge of reality we have is peaceful or not, and how to drive reality to peace.

This way of seeing things might remind some of Comte's "Encyclopaedic Law" or his "Hierarchy of Sciences". What it has in common with Comte's scheme is that it is an attempt to structure knowledge and define functions of the different disciplines. But it differs from Comte's positivism in that it does not limit itself to science. According to Comte's "Law of Human Progress" throughout history, humanity has gone through three stages in the development of knowledge: theological, metaphysical and scientific. This last one is according to him the final one and the access to all truth. This law is based in what Lyotard called the emancipation and the speculative narratives. According to Lyotard these narratives expose the limits of scientific method. Zubiri acknowledges these limitations. Moreover, Zubiri does not admit Comte's higher praise for science than for metaphysics. Therefore the "Encyclopaedic Scheme" we have produced here for Peace Studies should be instead called the "Hierarchy of Knowledge" (according to Zubiri) instead of the "Hierarchy of Science", and it should be read with flexibility. (Martineau 1858)

Zubiri's philosophy helps solve for Peace Studies the problems in the university identified by Zubiri. Let's try to recall these problems:

- 1) *Levelling positivation of knowledge:* Zubiri's philosophy gives order and structure to the function of knowledge. Sciences can be structured in relation to the reach and character of their main objects of study. For example, those that study different sorts of non-postulated realities and those that study different sorts of postulated realities. Moreover, philosophy is not in the same level as science. Philosophy gives structure and interprets the results of science.

This opens for four general philosophical fields in Peace Studies corresponding to each of the modes of intelligence identified by Zubiri:

- a) **Cognitive frames** with which we experience reality. How do they affect peace?
 - b) **Logos:** Ways of verbalising, conceptualising or representing reality. Are they conducive to peace or not?
 - c) **Scientific Models of reality:** How can reality be explained in a way that drives it to peace?
 - d) **Creativity:** It structures the studies and tells us how the results of the studies can drive culture to peace.
- 2) *Disorientation in the world.* According to Fowler's reading of Zubiri, quality science modifies what human beings call reality. Science with a purpose, as Peace Studies, has a direction. Its purpose is to modify realities into peace.
- 3) *Lack of intellectual life:* In a dynamic world Peace Studies needs constant philosophising about objects of knowledge, process of knowledge and their relationships. Moreover, the results of research in Peace Studies cannot remain isolated. They must be set in perspective by intellectuals (philosophers) in relation to all the disciplines that make out Peace Studies.

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Appendix

Figure 1

Static Picture of Reality and Postulated Reality

Forms with content





Figure 2

Structuring the function of knowledge in Peace Studies



Against Unipolarity: Hegemony, Resistance and Renewal in Global Politics

(Book Proposal)

Owen Worth and Chris Farrands *

Abstract

The purpose of this proposed study is both to contest the conceptualisation of unipolarity and at the same time to critique the core practices at the heart of the foreign policy discourses and doctrines which it represents. To do this, the authors plan to undertake a book project which sits at the heart of the mainstream study of international political economy, in looking at the interaction of economic, financial, corporate and cultural power; at the reproduction of inequality; and at interactions between global economy, culture and politics. The resulting book is planned as a co-authored monograph of 74,000 words, comprising eight chapters of 9,000 words maximum each and a short introduction.

Introduction and Rationale

There have been widespread debates about the significance of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and their aftermath, debates which as often ask about the meaning of those events as about their causes or consequences. Given the amount of public discussion. The ordinary 'person in the street' has as often been

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engaged in puzzling these questions as professional journalists, academics or politicians. Although there are a number of traps in simply asking the question and taking the debate that follows at face value, it remains an important question to ask. It has given rise to a set of debates in the theory of international relations which interlink with, but are not the same as, a set of practices in foreign policy and international politics: both turn on the idea of the emergence of a unipolar international system and of the events of September 11th as some kind of a reaction to unipolarity. The purpose of this study is both to contest the conceptualisation of unipolarity and at the same time to critique the core practices at the heart of the foreign discourses which it represents. To do this, the authors will undertake a project, which sits at the mainstream study of international political economy in looking at the interaction of economic, financial, corporate and cultural power; at the reproduction of inequality; and at interactions between global economy, culture and politics.

Some of the literature, and much of the political comment, especially but not only in the United States, suggests that nothing had happened beforehand which brought about the attack on 9/11. In trying to make sense of global politics surrounding the attack on the Twin Towers, we start with a clean slate at around 9am New York time that morning. But of course there was a specific context to 9/11, and there were specific causes of the attack which need to be properly understood. The Cold War had ended a little over a decade before; the world had passed through a brief period of liberal triumphalism (symbolised more than anything else in the arrogance of Francis Fukuyama's (1993) book *The End of History and the Last Man*. Europe had been transformed both through the growth of the European Union and through the transformation of Eastern Europe and Russia. And the developing world had forged greater ties of dependency to the developed world, as the changes which are often lumped together under the label of 'globalization' unfolded. By 2001, the superficially liberal 'post cold war era' had, as Michael Cox has noted, moved on to a 'post post Cold War' period of uncertainty and of new forms of insecurity, in which, alongside extreme ethnic and social violence, the optimism of 1989 had been challenged by the economic crash of the early 1990s, the succeeding financial crisis in Asia in 1997, and then the collapse of the 'dot-com' boom after 1999. Global inequalities had increased even as

'globalization' became the vogue word to describe an alleged increased homogeneity. Writers such as Robert Kagan (2004) and Samuel Huntington (2002) had challenged the liberal optimism of the period of immediate post-communist collapse with much darker visions of ongoing world conflict, including the image of a continuing clash between civilizations, which has sometimes come to seem very like a systematic attempt to justify a war by the West on Islam and on Islamic communities.

Central to the emerging patterns of conflict in global politics have been newly significant conflicts between social movements on the one hand and established state power on the other. It is true that conflicts of this kind have existed for centuries, and are embedded in the characteristic forms of modern state power, as writers as diverse as Michael Mann at a global level (1986/92) and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (for example in his micro history of a particular moment of conflict, *Carnival in Romans*, 1981) have shown. But since 1990, the cleavage between the state system and global social movements has become much more important as the main axis of conflict in global political struggles in the post-Westphalia global system. And they have become increasingly acute as part of the changes associated with 'globalization', most obviously, in international relations, in the areas of poverty, debt and the environment. Anti-globalization movements have articulated a series of critiques of increased inequalities; some rooted in a re-assertion of religious values, some in a direct attack on capitalism, some in new versions of liberal, feminist or environmentalist concerns. Many of these are non-violent, and many have sought to find a more genuine form of democratisation to replace the state imposed forms of democracy currently offered by governments in exemplars of 'democratisation without popular democracy' in countries such as Jordan, Pakistan, and (perhaps) potentially Iraq. But while much of the criticism of globalization seemed to offer possibilities of progress captured in the progressive reflexive modernisation of Beck (1997) or the re-interpretation of political community imagined by Linklater (1998) or Touraine (2002), it also needs to be recognised that some of the anti-globalisation movements of the 1990s were as problematic, or plain dangerous, as they were powerful. Nationalism of extreme kinds has characterised some responses to the attempted imposition of global cultural and economic power. A resurgence of ethnic, religious and racial hatred has taken different forms, from the casual hatred of foreigners

of much legislation against refugees, to the more obvious activities of extreme neo-nazi parties. These more obviously extreme movements include a revived anti-Semitism in many parts of Europe, an assault on Islam almost everywhere, and powerful pressures to reject the heritage of civil liberties built up over centuries in the name of protection against 'terror'. The conflicts have been fought out both within the west and within-the Islamic world, as studies such as that by Kepel (2004) have shown.

At the same time, this growth of radical extreme politics includes a powerful anti-intellectualism. Some political responses to 9/11 seem to include the idea that it is much better to know nothing than to know something uncomfortable, and this idea is found in unexpected places. This anti-intellectualism is evident in a fierce rejection, especially but not only on the neo-conservative right, of serious attempts to think through what is changing or what changes mean on the part of talk-show demagogues, popular journalism, and opportunist members of old right elites, especially in the United States. It is most obvious in, Alan Dershowitz's (2003) plea that we should not even ask the causes of terror, as well as in all those who ignore the long history of state terrorism in international relations. But it is most powerful in the widespread media dismissal of voices which represent excluded groups and individuals, and most potent in the speeches of political leaders who want to ban dissent in the name of the war on terror, and most insidious in on-campus efforts to prevent the voice of dissidence to the current vogue from being heard, at least in the US and in many Middle East universities. 9/11 is a powerful challenge to academic and theoretical debate. It poses very difficult puzzles. But it also provides a field of contention, which begs questions about what critical thought, and the critical intellectual's roles might be. The relationship between theory and practice could not be more important, or more complex, than in thinking through this case. Thus one of the most serious challenges to understanding has been the need to defend the importance of understanding itself.

One theory, developed by Wohlforth among others (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000; Schweller and Wohlforth, 2000), which has emerged as of central significance is the argument that the international system has been transformed from a more diverse, balance of power based system into a unipolar system. While many other writers have characterised the US as an emerging or actual 'hyperpower', that phrase is often used in a

general and journalistic way. However as the US' status in the world system is described, the concepts need closer and more critical examination (Smith, 2002). These arguments touch on what hegemony is, how it is used, and how it might be legitimised. These are ideas, which different versions of Gramscian theory in IPE have explored for some time, and this study draws extensively on this literature (starting from Germaine and Kenny, 1998 and Gill and Mittelman, 1997), although it also critiques key aspects of it. In the conception of a unipolar system, there is, at least superficially, an apparent convergence between the constructions of neo-realist or structural realist theory and world systems or structural theory; with the obvious difference that what the first celebrates, the second seeks to critique. But equally interesting to the international relations theorist is the apparent disappearance of a whole set of traditional realist assumptions and concepts used to describe international relations. For the core concepts of 'classic realism', the theory which has dominated

Conventional thinking in IR since the 1940s, have become displaced by radical idealist conservatism for many writers. Thus 'sovereignty' is eclipsed wherever the dominant power finds it inconvenient, the 'balance of power' is delegitimised as a policy or as an explanatory concept (since only a 'terrorist' would want to balance the power of a supremely just and all-knowing superpower), national rights to self-defence are denied, and deterrence doctrines are abandoned. The traditional boundary of inside/outside has equally been tossed aside as a justification has been sought for different forms of intervention either in the name of the war against terror or in the name of 'humanitarian intervention'. One does not need to be a traditional realist to find this abandonment of core concepts extraordinary. But most important, at least in our view, is to ask what potential there is for resistance in such a system, where it might originate, how it might unfold, what forms it might take, and how it can be evaluated. The possibilities of some forms of renewal in the global system rest, it might well be imagined, primarily on the potential for resistance, but also on the question, which we acknowledge from the outset is a difficult one, on which there are many possible positions, of whether resistance might be turned into renewal, and what kind of renewal is available.

In asking these questions, we admit to a certain initial attraction towards Hardt and Negri's (2000) theories of 'Empire' and 'multitude'. But on consideration, we find

that this attempt to reformulate a version of global political economy fails for a number of reasons. The study draws on a critique of Hardt and Negri's work. Equally, while we are more sympathetic to a Gramscian analysis of the interaction of hegemony, labour processes and culture, we find that some of the key arguments of the recent 'neo-Gramscian' school are flawed, and it is part of the project of this book to map out carefully the areas of difference and agreement we have with other writers in this field so as to sharpen the ways in which Gramscian thought is used to understand -and resist- global hegemonies. The challenge one faces here is at once a practical one and a theoretical one.

This project clearly has a great deal to say about the US position in the global system. To characterise the direction of the current global system as one of 'Americanisation' mistakes many of the complexities of globalisation and consumerism (Arrighi and Silver, 1999). But it also attributes more power (in all its forms -symbolic and discursive as well as economic and military) to the US, and in this sense might even be seen as an argument valuable to those interests which have come to dominate that global system. It may well also attribute more coherence to US policy than has actually been the case. But to deny the importance of US state power in the maintenance of global hegemony as Hardt and Negri try to do is mistaken, and underestimates the significance of US cultural identity as well as its military and economic weight. Much of the comment on unipolarity and the changed world order neglects the importance of internal divisions and political forces within the US (and North America). There is a role which diverse opposition groups and movements play in American politics, economic and social life, including environmental and women's groups, at least some consumer groups, and concerned citizens. At local state level, as well as in transnational groups, there is more potential for resistance than is often allowed. At the same time that it enjoys a military preponderance, the US remains in a position of structural vulnerability, owing especially to the size of its indebtedness, its dependence on external financing, and the difficulties of managing its various external deficits. Part of this project aims to examine the cohesion of the core and the potential for resistance there. In doing so, it also explores the 'political economy of the war on terror' in some depth, a subject on which there is so far no substantial literature. Historical sociologists have suggested that

one cause of the transformation of major imperial systems has been their inability to deal with diversity or difference internally. They have also pointed to the difficulties which arise either from the technical failure of very large-scale systems of debt or from the political fall-out of attempts to manage high levels of indebtedness at the core. These questions need to be asked of the relationship between the US and the world.

Indeed, the political context of the US illustrates the main starting point for all the arguments that we want to explore. That is that, while the theory of unipolarity suggests that the US has captured (whether temporarily or in more stable form) the support of key parts of the global state system, and can compel, bribe or blackmail states and their leaders into line, there is worldwide a strong, albeit very diverse, opposition among communities of people, social movements and groups of individuals. The claim to 'unipolarity' may make some sense in a 'world of states' (although even this claim is one we contest); but to describe international relations in terms of states alone (the 'Westphalian system') no longer makes sense. The global system is increasingly shaped by many groups, organisations, campaigns, religious consociations, movements inspired by religious commitment (such as Jubilee 2000, the global campaign against debt), transnational groups of workers, as well as of consumers, indigenous peoples in defence of their rights, and squatters in defence of their land, where all these oppose the drift to unipolarity, and the specific forms of domination which stem from it that affect them most. This is a challenge to material, cultural, symbolic and discursive power relations at the same time. The claim that the world has turned unipolar under the aegis of a just, all-knowing, unchallenged and all-punishing hyperpower turns out to be as wrong as it is dangerous. The costs of globalization, far from being a fair exchange for growing consumerism, as writers such as Thomas Friedmann (2000) suggest, are not sustainable. In this book, we explore the implications of this political change and the challenge, which has emerged to this form of domination. Using a version of Gramscian theory, we suggest this is better understood as a particular evolution in a long-standing trajectory in the world system, rather than as a sudden and entirely new transformation. We also argue that it represents a shift in power relations, which entangle economic and cultural and financial forms of power, and that symbolic and discursive patterns of domination

interpenetrate the structures, which a more conventional political economy would recognise as key sources of global behaviour.

To approach these questions with a single formula would be mistaken. There is a wide range of theoretical resources available to anyone who wants to address the problems which unipolarity poses. These resources are articulated in many different voices and from many different places. Different countries and regions have their own experiences and their own inputs into the debate. An epistemological pluralism is not a weakness but a necessary part of the argument: it forms a necessary basis for opening out discussion. And it would be contradictory indeed to attack what seems very much like an epistemological monolith in the orthodoxy of contemporary international relations theory, only to replace it with some other intellectual hegemony. So, to repeat the central point about the approach taken in this book, the book combines critical theoretical (Gramscian) and critical post structural approaches (drawing on approaches to interpreting and understanding meanings and discursive and symbolic power) to understanding the significance of both the neo-realist theory of unipolarity and the practices of unipolarity as a form of global policy (or global politics). The approach in the book is grounded in a sense of the epistemological pluralism, which, one might argue, a non-exclusive political economy demands. Equally, and more practically, it draws on an epistemological eclecticism, which many writers in IPE in the last decade, starting with Susan Strange, have suggested is necessary.

Market and Competitors

This is intended to be a high quality academic book that addresses serious questions in the literature in international relations, international political economy and international cultural studies. Given the attention to work such as Hard and Negri's in cultural studies, we would expect this book to command a readership beyond IR/PE, although clearly the core readership will be based in IR/PE. The book is also intended to be accessible to a wider readership than just to academics, to the person who might watch *Newsnight* or listen to a BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme. The ideas main market will nonetheless be university libraries and university level readers. There is not

comparable book -no book that makes these kinds of arguments- either in the UK or US. There is a substantial literature on the significance of 9/11 in international relations and, more generally, in popular current affairs writing. Some of it is good, some of it is good but descriptive, and some of it is very poor. There is presumably a substantial market for books of this kind, judging by the piles of quickly written journalistic material available in the average bookshop or station airport newsagent. But we would expect the reader of this book to be looking for a longer term perspective, which is reflective and concentrates more on explanations and debates rather than causes of 'what happened'. We would cite the example of the success of Gilles Keel's *The War for Muslim Minds* as an example of a book, which is a serious academic study but also has had a much larger impact in this field. Ours is a book about how international relations and international political economy theorise about major structural and foreign policy changes, how they (in our view) get it wrong, and how a more focused and critical approach can make a better job of making sense of this. The book is however distinctive in four main ways: it forms a critique of conventional writing on theories of unipolarity and their implications, on which there is some literature in the journals, but, so far, very little so far in sustained monograph debate. It uses methods and arguments from international political economy to scrutinise debate in IR. Secondly, it offers a sustained critique of much of the neo-Gramscian literature in international relations and IPE. Thirdly, it broadens the debate on 'Empire', both the idea of global Empire as an American Empire and critical writing on that question'. Fourth, it offers a sustained, critical, but ultimately optimistic account of the possibilities and perspectives of resistance in the contemporary global system, drawing on the previous three areas of debate.

The book is a particularly strong candidate for inclusion in the Routledge IPE series because it is critical, contemporary and original. It develops a set of ideas rooted in specific theories of IPE, which have a significance for IR as well as for IPE in a narrow sense. It develops a critique of important theories in IPE, and shows how the critique can be used to take forward the understanding of power and hegemony in the world system. It should sell well, and will no doubt stimulate some controversy. Like other books in the series, it is written to a high standard and for a knowledgeable readership.

Chapter Breakdown

Against Unipolarity: Hegemony, Resistance and Renewal in Global Politics

Introduction

A short summary of the argument.

Chapter One: The 'Post-Post Cold War'?

The first chapter will look at the global environment in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on the Twin Towers and discuss the various assumptions, actions and positions that have been made since. In particular it will critique positivist attempts to reconstruct a legitimate form of aggressive unipolarity, which appears consistent with neo-conservative policy-makers in Washington. It will also begin to contest two key ideas in the current debate about global hegemony and US foreign policy. Firstly, that you are either 'for' or 'against' 'us', a position which denies any intellectual debate, or any democratic pluralism. Secondly, that the world was in some fundamental sense remade whole on 9/11, and that there are no continuities or evolutions from previous actions and policies, an argument which makes it impossible to ask about the various causes of both the attacks and the significance of the changes which are taking place in the world system associated with the 'war on terror'.

Chapter Two: Contesting Unipolarity

This follows on from the last chapter by advocating a form of post-positivist pluralism to understand the emergence of a 'post-post cold war' global society. Whilst engaging with Marxist scholarship such as Luxembourg and Gramsci, it critiques new forms of (reductionist) Marxist accounts that have emerged through the subsequent 'wars on terror'. In particular, certain 'critical' and neo-Gramscian ideas of hegemony that were

elaborated towards the end of the cold war have more explanatory potential in looking at the rhetoric and power plays involved in defining and prosecuting the wars of terror than traditional concepts of Imperialism. It will be argued here that such developments have stifled the potential to build an epistemological critique of the post-cold war era. It will also be argued that the relationship between theories of unipolarity and foreign policy practices is close and intricate. Unravelling these connections and giving an account of the strategies involved in unipolarity or hyperpower positioning requires an approach, which is able to move between global system or structure levels of analysis and foreign policy or behaviour levels of analysis.

Chapter Three: Unipolarity and Exclusion

This chapter argues that far from being a process that relies upon the traditional Marxist relationship between the dominator and dominated, US-inspired hegemony has produced a world framed by its fragmentation and by its variations of contestation. It is argued here that the adoption of hard-line neoliberal economic policy since the end of the cold war has resulted in a highly divided, highly fragmented, uneven world. Such fragmentation has provided an atmosphere of resistance. However, we argue that the aggressive US foreign policy that has been adopted by neo-conservatives in Washington has allowed this resistance to be directed far more explicitly at the US, rather than at the societal consequences of economic neoliberalism. From this chapter we suggest that resistance appears not as a single move against the organizational forces of production, but as a collection of separate, diverse but important reactions to the consequences of globalisation. In this chapter, the strengths and weaknesses of the conception of 'multitude' as a way of conceiving of global resistance movements will be explored.

Chapter Four: The Political Economy of the 'War against Terrorism'

The emergence of powerful challenges to established patterns of international relations in the post Cold War period has involved a substantial restructuring of the global political economy which has received much less attention than some of the other

changes which have taken place. The chapter explores the dynamics of global finance and debt as the United States seeks to make its will felt among countries which now own the majority of its assets, and on which it depends to go on lending it money in order to try to sustain the deficits which it has created (deficits in federal, state and farm finance, as well as in trade and consumer borrowing). The chapter also suggests that the costs of maintaining military forces for long periods of time across the world undermines the goals of stability and growth which not just the US alone, but the OECD group as a whole has set itself.

Chapter Five: Conflicts at the Core

This chapter explores the potential for conflict at the heart of the global system. First of all, taking a long time perspective, it argues that historical sociology suggests that conflict within the imperial heart of many international systems in the past has been a principal cause of their weakening and eventual collapse. Secondly, it looks at the underlying political, social and religious conflicts within the North American system, including NAFTA and in domestic US politics. Thirdly, it explores conflict between the US and the EU, and the ways in which debates around increasing US-EU conflict (such as that provoked by the work of Robert Kagan, himself a key member of the neo-conservative elite in Washington). Finally, it explores how the growth of the state apparatus in the name of the war against terrorism has provoked powerful new political forces, which, while not directly undermining the core itself, introduces new instabilities, risks and unpredictabilities into the management of the core political system in the advanced capitalist societies.

Chapter Six: Unipolarity, Resistance, Terrorism

Following on from the previous section, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how resistance to unipolarity has become entwined with disillusionment with the global economic order. From this we outline a number of diverse and ideologically competed social movements that all seek to contest and resist the unipolaric moment. Here we

identify the problems inherent within the anti-globalisation movement and particularly how it has transformed in the light of the US-inspired war on terror. In addition we outline how ethnic revivalism, the growth of the far right in advanced industrial states and the rise of international terrorism have all materialised from the breakdown of the bipolar international structure and the emergence of economic globalisation and unipolarity. In this chapter, the growth of both a phenomenon of violence and a set of discourses about popular violence will be explored, and the extent to which 'terrorism' and the 'war on terror' are mutually dependent and sustaining forms of discourse explored.

Chapter Seven: Cultures of Hegemony and Resistance: Systems of Meaning after 9/11

Explores the patterns of meaning and symbolic power generated or reproduced after the attack on the twin towers and the ways in which specific meanings have been articulated and argued against others through the mechanisms of consumption and symbolic meaning as well as through explicit political actions. The chapter also explores how a sense of the diversity of meanings opens the possibility for resistance through the refusal of fixed hegemonic frameworks of meaning. The chapter suggests that assumptions of a more diverse pattern of meaning both opens the opportunity to subvert orthodox frameworks of meaning and argues that patterns of meaning and symbolic power are as much central to resistance as they are to forms of domination, and examines how specific examples of resistance can be produced and articulated against hegemonic ideas in the global political economy.

Chapter Eight: Re-thinking Unipolarity: Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony

This concluding chapter brings us back to the main points that are outlined in the book. That by adopting a critical epistemology that moves away from reductionism; unipolarity can be critiqued as a misplaced neo-realist structural 'norm' that negates the complex structural issues that have arisen within the global political economy. This final chapter argues that in order to develop both the study of International Relations and for

this to have a distinct change on policy-makers, a greater emphasis needs to be placed upon the notions of democracy, cosmopolitanism and pluralistic practice. The book concludes with suggestions that for the world to change, theory and practice need to develop a more sophisticated critique of the status quo as well as of more ineffective or inadequate ways of reading hegemony and resistance.

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Policy Statement

Traditional peace research has focused on violence and its consequences. Such a focus may divert attention from nonviolent conflict handling and similar action which often exist even in the midst of massive violence. It is possible that traditional peace research has thus neglected nonviolent conflict handling as well as the capacity for nonviolence in peoples and cultures.

Therefore, the main task for the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS) at the University of Tromsø is to contribute to examining ways of creating peace by peaceful means and to make nonviolent handling of conflicts more known and recognized. We believe that valuable knowledge may be found in areas of low levels of violence and that more useful lessons may be learnt from successful conflict handling than from areas of atrocities and from failures.

Peace studies are concerned with inter-state relations, but also with a wide range of other social conflict lines, such as those related to gender, generation, culture, class, race, ethnicity and nation, as well as the conflict between human society and nature. Although our studies are global, our position in the peaceful Far North, a vast and sparsely populated area in a tough natural climate, with a history of complex ethnic and cultural relations including the problems of hierarchy, recognition and cultural oppression, gives us a chance to learn from a wide range of nonviolent conflict handling. The wider region of the North of Europe also gives us a unique context in which to study conflict handling. Another aim is to compare our experience with experiences from other areas.

Peace studies consist of theoretical-empirical, critical and constructive work. As an applied science, peace studies should pay attention to the constructive part of the work.

From numerous and diverse cases, ranging from everyday quarrels to large-scale massive unarmed revolutions in the last two decades, there are experiences to be learned which may have been underestimated, lost or unjustly treated as insignificant by researchers. Even in the midst of violent conflicts, there are often actors using active nonviolence. CPS will study nonviolent conflict handling empirically and comparatively and will apply a multi-disciplinary and a pluralistic approach, a realist as well as the approach of the realist and the idealist. We will discuss the theoretical implications and communicate the results to a wide audience

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