Contents

1 Nonviolent Intervention – What is it?

1.1 Intervention

1.2 A history of Nonviolent Intervention

1.3 Actors

1.4 “Nonviolent” or “civil” intervention?

2. Activities and Functions

2.1 Peacekeeping

3. How and When Does It Work?

3.1 Chances to Have Impact

3.1.1 Peacekeeping Lessons

3.1.2 Peacemaking Lessons

3.1.3 Peacebuilding Lessons

3.2 The Issue of Peace Enforcement

4. Outlook: Nonviolent Intervention As Alternative To the Military

4.1 Looking Closer At Military In Peacekeeping

4.2 Summary

Literature Quoted

1. Nonviolent Intervention[1] – What is it?

There are hundreds, if not thousands of examples of nonviolent intervention[2] – an approach to conflict transformation which Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber in their recent book justly call a “recurrent vision”. [3] Before looking closer at different activities and strategies, a few general remarks are probably in place.

1.1 Intervention

First it needs to be said that nonviolent intervention is a subcategory of conflict intervention, and that conflict intervention is only one of two categories of conflict transformation: We speak of intervention when the actor is a third or external[4] party. If it is the parties to the conflict themselves who work on the conflict, or members of these parties, we can speak of ‚internal conflict transformation’. For example, when villages in Colombia decide to declare themselves „zones of peace“, then this is an example of an internal actor trying to transform the conflict nonviolently, but not of nonviolent intervention.

Having said this, it also needs to be emphasised that the distinction between internal and external actors is not as clear as it seems at first glance. Rather, it should perhaps be thought of as a continuum, or as an onion with different layers, beginning with many fully internal actors and ending with very few almost purely external ones.[5]

There are many different definitions of intervention. For the purpose here, the following seems most useful:

“Social intervention is any act, planned or unplanned, that alters the characteristics of another individual or the pattern of relationships between individuals. The range of acts covered in this definition is intentionally broad. It includes such macro phenomena as national planning, military intervention in the affairs of other nations, population policy and technical assistance. It also applies to psychotherapy, sensitivity training, neighbourhood action programs, experiments done with human beings and other micro changes”.[6]

It needs to be emphasised right from the beginning that nonviolent intervention does not need to be impartial or non-partisan. There are many example of partial conflict interventions, one just need to think of the diverse solidarity movements.

TABLE 1

And as a last remark: Intervention may not mean action in the target country at all. Take the example of the boycott of all South African goods during Apartheit: The focus of these activities was in Western countries, but the target was to hit the South African regime.

1.2 A history of Nonviolent Intervention

A comprehensive history of nonviolent conflict interventions covering more then just projects of nonviolent peacekeeping has yet to be written. So far, there is no more than a handful of books dealing exclusively and explicitely with nonviolent interventions[7], though much more information can be found in the growing literature on civil conflict transformation. It would probably be a history beginning with the 19th century, pointing out some earlier activities and events - like mediation undertaken by Quakers between colonialists and Indians in the 17th and 18th century[8] - as their prehistory. There would have to be mention of the conceptualisation of peace by international law as it started in the period of enlightenment with philosophical studies[9] like the probably best known and most influential oeuvre, Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace", written in 1795. These thoughts survived more then one hundred years of realpolitics and war as a legitimate means of politics, influencing not only the peace movements of the outgoing 19th century, but also directly or indirectly the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations with its Charter, the different Covenants on civil and human, and of course its peacekeeping missions.

A major role in such a comprehensive history the rise of pacifism[10] would play, the growth of nonviolent action[11] and nonviolent (social) defence[12], and of peoples' struggles[13] around the world, many of them fought with nonviolent or mostly nonviolent means - all predominantly developments of the by-gone, 20th century.

There are different types of nonviolent intervention which will be dealt with more further below. Here it shall only be remarked that there have been at least five different starting points or approaches:

1. One starting point has been the idea to establish a standing “peace army” –Gandhi called it Shanti Sena. It seems that between World War I and today there have been at least about one dozen of proposals of that sort that made their way into the literature on nonviolent intervention. But none of them so far was really successful –most often they foundered even before having gotten to the field, like the rather famous and often quoted attempt by the British Anglican minister Maud Roydon [14], who in 1932 proposed to organise a nonviolent 'army' to intervene in the war between Japan and China. (In 1931, China had occupied Manjuria, and the fighting threatened to start again in 1932.) Royden was inspired by Gandhi whom she had met personally. Together with two supporters, she published the proposal in the London Daily Express, and later presented it to the League of Nations which did not consider her idea. Because of lack of both recruits (instead of the numbers they hoped for they only found about 1.000 volunteers) and funds, the peace army proposal failed. The initiators continued to work for a few years on their idea, sending a team of volunteers to Palestine for a couple of years. The initiative eventually died with the beginning of World War II.

2. There has been a larger number of spontaneously formed groups and projects in order to protest or stop violence, or to contribute to peacebuilding- peace walks, peace caravans and the like. There has been one wave of such actions from the middle of the 1960s to middle of 1970s: Cyprus, Vietnam, India, the Middle East and Northern Ireland being the conflicts around which such actions were conceived and carried out. Another wave of such spontaneous activities started in the 1990s first with the second Gulf War (Gulf Peace Team) and then different actions around the war in Bosnia/former Yugoslavia in general. Latin America became another focus.The difference to the first approach – to which this second otherwise bears much similarity – is that they have focussed fully on self-organised actions on a concrete conflict rather than appealing to an international body to set up a new institution. Maud Roydon’s peace army actually could rather be considered a hybrid of approach 1 and 2, because she tried to enlist volunteers by herself.

It is interesting to notice that there has been an obvious relationship between the different actions just because probably often the same people were involved in them, and also a clear relationship between spontaneous actions to the foundation of more stable groups and organisations.

The number of participants has a rather large range. “Mir Sada”, a peace caravan to Bosnia planned by an Italian and a French organisation in 1993 gathered the probably largest group of about 2.000 people. The smallest had perhaps 20 participants. But as impressive as the larger numbers are, considering the risk the participants took willingly (most actions made it quite clear to all prospective volunteers that they might get killed in the course of the action), it must not be forgotten that all of these projects were of a short-term character. The own experience of the author is that it is far more difficult to find persons to commit themselves for a longer time like one or two years without offering proper compensation (salary) what of course none of the projects described here did.[15]

Iraq Peace Team

“I am in Baghdad with the Iraq Peace Team, and we will stay here throughout any war. We will share the risks of the millions who live here, and do our best to be a voice for them to the world. Our risks are uncertain. Thousands here will surely die. But most Iraqis will survive, and so too, I hope, will I.

A banner the government put up a few blocks from where we stay reads simply, "Baghdad: Where the World Comes for Peace."

It's meant as propaganda, I'm sure, flattering Saddam Hussein. But without knowing it, it states a simple truth: that the world must be present for peace. We must be present in Baghdad as in America - in Kashmir or Chechnya, the Great Lakes, Palestine and Colombia - where there is war, and rumors of war, we must be present to build peace.

We are present.

My country may arrest me as a traitor, or kill me during saturation bombing, or shoot me during an invasion. The Iraqis may arrest me as a spy, or cause or use my death for propaganda. Civil unrest and mob violence may claim me. I may be maimed. I may be killed.

I am nervous. I am scared. I am hopeful. I am joyous, and I joyously delight in the wonder that is my life.

Different things move different members of our team, but all of us are here out of deep concern for the suffering of our brothers and sisters in Iraq. 20 years of almost constant war, and 12 years of brutal sanctions, have killed hundreds of thousands of innocents in Iraq.

We are here, today, because most of the world refused to be present, then. What more right do I as an American have to leave then all the people I've come to love in Iraq? An accident of birth that gives me a free pass throughout the world?

All of us are here out of a deep commitment to nonviolence. Peace is not an abstract value that we should just quietly express a hope for. It takes work. It takes courage. It takes joy.

Peace takes risks. “

Source: This Present Moment: Living in Baghdad on the Eve of War (excerpt)

by Ramzi Kysia, Email from March 18, 2003

In regard to the effects/goals reached by the projects setting out to stop or prevent a war, it seems to be correct what Weber says in his summary: "Most of the early major initiatives stalled at the proposal stage primarily because of a lack of money and the absence of international organisational and logistical support".[16] Others at least arrived in the field, but none of them reached the goals they had set out for themselves, which was to stop a war. [17] What they have managed to do, though, has been to draw additional attention to the conflict, and through being a witness providing a unique view on the events.

3. Another route some of the’peace army’ initiators took was to found small-scale, stable NGOs, sending individuals or small teams into the field, like Peace Brigades International or the German Civil Peace Service did. In the 1990s alone several new organisations formed almost at the same time as spontaneous actions were carried out - Balkan Peace Team, Civil Peace Services in several European countries, International Solidarity Movement and related groups in Palestine, and Nonviolent Peaceforce as the most recent, to name only a few.

These smaller-size projects – often called peace teams or peace services – have more of a success story to tell. Some of them are engaged in the prevention of violence, others in the broader field of peacebuilding. There is simply an uncountable number of projects working on reconciliation, training, empowerment, trauma healing and so forth – be they called peace services, conflict resolution initiatives, or be they projects being undertaken by development co-operation organisations.

If there is a difference between peace teams and civil peace services, then it is a difference between those projects that concentrate on peacekeeping activities (accompaniment, presence, interpositioning), and those groups that concentrate on peacebuilding. But while there is presently no group calling itself Civil Peace Service that focusses solely on accompaniment (though there are other forms of peacekeeping practised), there are a few groups calling themselves Peace Teams that have been more focussed on peacebuilding than on peacekeeping tasks (Balkan Peace Team, Osijek Peace Teams). That means that neither Civil Peace Service nor Peace Team is a clear-cut concept that separates the two clearly from each other on the one hand, or from other (older) volunteer services on the other. If there is a proprium to the European Civil Peace Services, then it may be that the term Civil Peace Service expresses a new political movement generally characterised by the following elements or goals:[18]

· Institutionalise peace services/peace teams and have corresponding legal provisions in place, or making use of already existing ones,[19]

· Access public funding for grass-roots work for conflict transformation and building up civil society,[20] and

· Strong emphasis on the necessity of preparatory training that in some cases (not all) goes hand in hand with the objective of professionalising peace services.

4. A very different type of nonviolent intervention represent those projects which aim at mediation or other kind of “good offices” to get policy makers to resolve a conflict peacefully. While most of this is done by diplomats, there are also some professional "unofficial" conflict resolution workers. They may either come originally out of the Track One system (e.g. elderly statesmen like Jimmy Carter), or from religious or professional (often academic) backgrounds.[21] They may offer unofficial good services and mediation (e.g. the Quakers who entertain a house in Geneva for this purpose)[22], which is often a preparation for more official negotiations taking place later, or conduct Conflict Solving Workshops[23].

5. A fifth very common category is that of citizens' initiatives. These are initiatives that get involved in international work on a very grassroots level, seeking a person-to-person contact and either trying either to help people/groups in another country, or building networks on issues of mutual concern.[24] Examples would be all those grassroots groups which form themselves to collect money for social projects or refugees in conflict areas, be it street children in Brazil, orphans in Chechnya or a church community in Kenya. They usually work in a area of conflict but with a predominantly humanitarian approach, and unlike the professional aid organisations often have little awareness of the impact their work might have on conflict.

Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly

One of the better known networks is the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly[25], which was founded in 1990 as a citizens' mirror to what was then still the CSCE. The HCA has organised regularly conferences of representatives of country groups from all CSCE/OSCE countries, and in addition got involved in some conflicts in the area on a more concrete basis. One of their most successful projects were conducted by two women from Armenia and Azerbaijan who managed to negotiate an exchange of war prisoners in the 1990, and won international recognition by doing so. And though not citizens-only, the twinning projects between towns and schools as they flourish in Europe should also be mentioned here. Many of them are supported by an active group of citizens who regularly visit each other, and organise support in cases of crisis as for example when the war in Yugoslavia broke out.

1.3 Actors

Actors in conflict intervention include a large and very diverse number of organisations and categories: The well-established differentiation between governments on the one side (“track 1”) and all the others (“track 2”) does not give an adequate picture. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald[26] have therefore introduced the concept of Multi-track Diplomacy which distinguishes 9 tracks: governmental; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizen; research, training and education; activism; religious; funding; and public opinion. Building on their concept, I would like to propose that there are two main types of actors with several subtypes each:

a. States/governments with two broad categories:

• Individual states
• International organisations and interest-based coalitions (UN and its bodies and regional organisations, e.g. the OSCE or the OAS, other regional governmental organisations; World bank, NATO etc.[27]

b. Non-state actors with also two broad categories:[28]:

• Locally or nationally active
• Transnationally active

Several types of non-state actors to be found in both these categories (see table below):

Table 2

This is of course an ideal picture; in reality many non-state actors have very clear connections and even dependencies to the state in which they live and work.

1.4 “Nonviolent” or “Civil” Intervention?

Nonviolence is not a very exact term. It not only describes a whole class of activities, but also describes attitudes and life-style. The debate among nonviolent activists is whether the latter are preconditions to the first, or whether nonviolence is a principle or a technique.[29] Although it is certainly possible that the difference between both approaches might be an ideological rather than an empirical question. On the one hand, elements of coercing the opponent can be found in campaigns of principled nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King.[30] Any action has an impact on the opponent. On the other hand, many defenders of the pragmatic approach might profess an ethical foundation for themselves, but believe that they should not impose their convictions on others, and that they might better win support by using rational-pragmatic arguments.[31]

Because of the “ideological” burden of nonviolence, often the term civil intervention is used instead of nonviolent intervention. But this has its own problems: The term civil conflict intervention as a subcategory of intervention may have three different meanings, depending on if the means actors or approach are considered. It may mean to influence a conflict:

• Through solely non-military means by non-armed (civilian) actors
• By civil society (NGO) actors

• Table 3

  By aiming to "civilize" it, bringing it back to institutionalised and nonviolent forms of transformation.

For the purpose of this paper, the term nonviolent intervention shall be used when there is no parallel threat or actual use of physical violence.

Civil intervention would cover other cases where there may be a parallel military operation (for example peacekeeping operation) but the activities described are "not military-based" no matter who the actors are, be it states, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, churches, business or whoever.

2. Activities and Functions

Since the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,[32] published the Agenda for Peace, the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding have become well known. But it wasn't Boutros-Ghali who invented them, nor were they originally meant to function in a strict sequential order as he puts them. Johan Galtung - who called them “approaches to peace” 20 years before Boutros-Ghali, first described these three peace strategies.[33] Since then these terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan[34]. When referred to in this study, they are used within the broad civilian tradition, and not as described in the Agenda for Peace. Together, these three strategies formulate a general theory of achieving or maintaining peace: "keeping the opponents apart, negotiating a political solution and finally, tying the adversaries into something that one could call a peace system."[35]

Johan Galtung defines peacekeeping as (to): "control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves".[36]

Peacemaking: “embed the actors in a new formation, in addition, transform attitudes and assumptions”. Stephen Ryan defines peacemaking perhaps clearer as being concerned “with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties".[37] This can occur at the diplomatic level or between ordinary citizens that are caught in the conflict.[38]

Peacebuilding: “overcome the contradiction at the root of the conflict formation”.

These strategies must not be confused with activities. For example: "Dialogue" might be used both to find a solution to the conflict and to foster understanding between two groups in conflict. The former usage puts it in the realm of peacemaking, and the later in the realm of peacebuilding. This shows that many activities include aspects of at least two, if not all three strategies. Nevertheless, the author believes that it makes sense to distinguish between them because they highlight different functions and problems.

The three strategies need to be applied at the same time.[39] Peacekeeping without peacemaking and peacebuilding would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm the process, and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed clashes. If peacebuilding is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support of their communities, and if peacemaking is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that violence would start (again) soon is high. [40]

The three strategies are not per se nonviolent strategies. They may include coercion - like negotiations under the threat of bombing or military peacekeeping. But on the other side, all nonviolent tactics/methods can easily be related to one, or sometimes to more then one of the strategies[41].

The peace strategies are usually presented as strategies to be used after a conflict has escalated to violence. Here it shall be argued that the same strategies are also used before violence takes place (preventive stage). Although prevention is an important concept when looking at any given conflict, the peace strategies used are the same no matter if the conflict is pre-violent or post-violent, only some of the tactics (means) used might differ[42].

Strategy	Peacekeeping	Peacemaking	Peacebuilding
Problem	Violent behaviour	Perceived incompatibilities of interest	Destructive processes which accompany violence, social and economic injustice
Function	Control, prevent or reduce violence	Deals with the interests and positions of conflict parties	Work on the structural causes and consequences of conflict
Target group: governments	Military, armed forces	Governments, leaders	Population, large categories of population
Activities governments and international organisations	Military peacekeeping, civil or military monitoring	Mediation, arbitration, facilitation, good offices etc.	E.g. educational programs, support of media, economic aid, support of democratisation
Examples of civil or nonviolent interventions	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Bougainville Truce/Peace Monitoring Group	Oslo Agreements, Sri Lanka peace process	Work of UNICEF, UNDP
Target group citizens	Violence-prone groups and individuals, death squads etc.	Middle and grass-root level	Specific groups and locations
Activities citizens	Monitoring, interpositioning, presence, accompaniment	Conflict-solving workshops', Dialogue-meetings, ‘micro-negotiations’	Conflict transformation trainings, trauma work, educational work, development cooperation focussing on conflict
Examples of civil or nonviolent interventions	Peace Brigades International, Nonviolent Peaceforce	Quaker, San Egidio Community, International Alert	European Civil Peace Services

2.1 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is primarily a dissociative approach. It "is often the most urgent and necessary of all peace strategies because it is the only one which deals directly with the warriors on all sides who are engaged in mutual destruction."[43] Traditionally it is considered a task of the military and perhaps the police. The practice developed by the UN of sending peacekeeping troops, so-called blue helmets, gave the strategy of peacekeeping a classical instrument. But there is no logical reason why unarmed civilians could not carry out the same task, and there have been some cases of larger-scale civilian peacekeeping actions.

Authors[44] who are mainly interested in nonviolent intervention have broadened the concept of peacekeeping to include other, smaller-scale activities like (unarmed) accompaniment of human rights activists threatened by death squads. Since these activities are also about control of violence by using a dissociative approach, it makes sense to include them in the peacekeeping strategy, only with a more limited scope than the violence of a conflict as a whole.

Small-scale groups involved in what Schirch calls intercecessionary peacekeeping (which "maintains unequal distance between the parties” and is used when the parties in conflict are not easily separated) [45] are using somewhat different approaches. Some of them – like Peace Brigades International – put much store on their non-partisan role, while others – like Christian Peacemaker Teams or the International Solidarity Movement in Palestine– get actively involved in nonviolent action and interpositioning, not hesitating to take sides or to break the laws of the country in which they are working. [46]

One of the most developed method used in intercecessionary peacekeeping is protective accompaniment. Peace Brigades International is the organisation which has the most experience using this technique. ‘Starting in Guatemala and El Salvador, and since then in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico, their teams have accompanied clergy, union leaders, campesino leaders, human rights activists, and returning exiles (such as Nobel Prize Winner Rigoberta Menchù).

In most instances death squads and other human rights violators do not want their actions exposed to the outside world. Thus the presence of a PBI volunteer, backed by an emergency response network, deters violence directed against local activists. Where possible PBI initiates contacts with all parties to the conflict to inform them of their presence. To increase this effect, PBI forges links with the diplomatic community locally and with media and human rights networks globally.

Armed only with a camera, PBI volunteers are a walking embodiment of the pressure the international human rights community is ready to apply in the event of abuse. As potential perpetrators know, PBI’s exposure of such abuse may adversely affect a regime's foreign aid allocation.’[47]

Peace Brigades International – Indonesia Project

“Koes' Story

Mr Koes Sofian disappeared on 14th March from his home town in Blang Pidie, South Aceh. He was the district head of a province-wide organization called SPKP-HAM (Solidaritas Persaudaran Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia - Association of Human Rights Victims) that is made up of torture survivors and provides aid based on shared experience and solidarity.

His wife requested assistance from LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum), a non-governmental legal aid organization. Investigations of this nature involve high personal risk for Indonesians Only last year, a local human rights lawyer was killed in the same area while conducting similar investigations into human rights abuse. Because of the risk, LBH requested Peace Brigades International's (PBI) assistance to accompany a lawyer into the area where Koes disappeared.

Two members of PBI, Tony Sheldon and Tyna Hickerson accompanied Syarifah Murlina, a LBH lawyer to Blang Pidie to establish the events surrounding Koes Sofian's disappearance. All local authorities had previously denied any knowledge of his whereabouts, but local reports indicated that he was taken by Indonesian special military forces (Kopassus) and was being detained in a make-shift detention facility behind the local police station.

Upon arrival, PBI introduced the LBH lawyer, and stated their purpose. The fact that the leading police officer had good memories of an earlier networking visit with PBI helped ease the tension slightly. The LBH lawyer, Syarifah asked after Koes, and the trio was led outside the station to the back of the building. They were greeted at first by confusion, and then by open hostility by angry Kopassus soldiers. The policeman had apparently overstepped his office by intruding in such a manner and he quickly ushered the investigatory body out of the make-shift military camp.

[Description of the negotiations. Finally Koes Sofian is led from the camp into their presence, showing clear sign of torture]

After almost three months in detention, Koes Sofian was released. During this time awareness was raised by both PBI and LBH, and responses from Embassies and Indonesian authorities were forthcoming. One can only imagine what occurred to Koes during this time. Upon his release, Koes fled to the relative safety of Banda Aceh, 10 hours drive from his family and home, to reside in the proximity of LBH and PBI, where he knew a repeat of his nightmare would be less likely to occur in presence of these valuable friends.”

Source: PBI Webpage, Indonesia projct, www.peacebrigades.org (date: 4.4.03)

2.1.1 Larger-scale Nonviolent Peacekeeping

It is probably well known that civilians tend to play a major role in modern UN (or NATO-led) peacekeeping missions of the so-called second, third and fourth generation[48].

But in addition to these complex missions with a strong civilian element, there have been a few larger-scale international missions based entirely on civilians. Here will be presented only three examples with different characteristics. Two of the examples may be considered successes; one was withdrawn but without any fault of its own:

· In South Africa several election monitoring programs were organised by churches (Ecumenical Monitoring Program in South Africa), NGOs and intergovernmental bodies around the first free elections in 1994, and later in preparation for communal elections in KwaZulu/Natal. The various South African NGO monitoring programs are the only examples found of larger-scale civil missions, where the organisation of the missions lay in the hands of local organisations that co-operated with international sending organisations, and who deployed mixed local-international teams.[49]

Two of the NGO monitoring missions (EMPSA and NIM) have been evaluated by a Swedish team, looking at the missions from the Swedish sending organisation's viewpoint but containing a lot of general information on outcomes and impacts of those two missions, as well as comparing them to some extent with the UN mission. There is no information of that quality on the later program in KwaZulu/Natal, but from the report it appears that, regarding outcomes, there were no substantial differences from the earlier reports. The following immediate (positive) outcomes were listed[50]:

1. All monitoring missions managed to reduce the level of violence by their presence, monitoring and interpositioning at different events. This was associated with the fact that the various actors knew the peace monitors' presence meant a risk of sanctions.[51]

2. Providing encouragement and a link to the so-called wider world, both for citizens in general and for the churches with which the monitors worked.

3. The peace monitors contributed to improving the exchange of information between different organisations and, in the case of NIM, the monitors felt they had been able to contribute to strengthening NIM's capacity and its legitimacy (civil society building).

4. They also contributed to the formation of public opinion through their use of mass media both in their countries of origin (Sweden, but this could probably be generalised to include other countries as well), and the South African press.

The short-term success of the monitoring was dependent on the degree to which the monitors managed to make contacts with all sides, and a good knowledge of the local actors. Where this was missing, either because of the monitors’ short stay or because they had to cover too wide an area, their capacity to intervene was effectively reduced.

Because of this lack of anchorage, doubts have been raised about the longer-term impact of the monitoring missions on work for peace in general. Some church leaders interviewed by Ewald/Thörn believe they failed to build long-term competence in local societies.

Nevertheless, the Swedish evaluators compare EMPSA monitors positively to the UN election monitors, and relate this to two aspects:

1. Time: the EMPSA monitors were present for at least five weeks, the UN for only two weeks. This gave the NGO monitors more time to make themselves known in a local context, and create continuity in the monitoring work.

2. Space: The UN election monitors lacked the local anchorage gained by the peace monitors through the recipient organisations and their co-ordinators. This criticism was echoed by interviewed Inkatha members who were very critical of the UN mission, saying that they came to "have nice vacation and to live a life of luxury at nice hotels."

• In Bougainville (South Pacific) the Truce Monitoring Group/Peace Monitoring Group (TMG/PMG) started working at the end of 1997 to monitor the peace agreements between Papua New Guinea and the warring parties in Bougainville. TMG/PMG are organised by the militaries of four neighbouring countries, but the teams do not carry weapons and include additionally civilians from these countries.[52]

The monitoring mission in Bougainville seems generally to have been considered successful. Böge says that the TMG quickly managed to win the trust of all sides, specifically of populations in the villages, thereby contributing in a high degree to the development of a peace-friendly climate. The Commander of the Mission Osborn says the same: "In my view the TMG and the PMG have been outstanding successes whatever criteria you apply to measure their performances." [53]

· In Kosovo, the Kosovo Verification Mission of the OSCE, was deployed for a few months in 1998-99 to verify a cease-fire agreement between Yugoslavia and the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army. The KVM was staffed by a mixture of internationals from all OSCE member states and included local staff mainly as interpreters, drivers and aides.[54]

The KVM is an example of very mixed outcomes. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localised outbreaks of violence. In addition, their mere presence obviously played a role. [55] Specifically at the beginning of the mission the cease-fire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down. [56] Loquai: "When looking from the present perspective back to the beginning of the KVM, one could imagine what could have been reached if the KVM had arrive quickly, spread densely and covered the whole of Kosovo." ^[57] Even in January/February 1999 when the situation became tense again, their arrival on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect. [58]

But the verifiers did not manage to contain all violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time in varying degrees. The cease-fire was also used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew. [59] At the beginning of February they controlled more or less the areas they had controlled before the Serbian offensive in the summer of 1998, but this time they were better organised and armed. There were warnings of a spring offensive by the UCK.[60]

In January and February the security situation also deteriorated for the verifiers themselves. In mid-January two verifiers were wounded when their vehicles came under small arms fire. [61] Their movements and activities became restricted. [62] At the end of February eight cars were refused permission to enter FRY from Macedonia, and a Russian verifier was shoved back into his vehicle[63]; two verifiers were stopped at gunpoint by Serbian police and hit by them. [64] There had already been attacks in January, e.g. on KDOM personnel eating in a restaurant. [65]

But did the KVM have any chance to succeed? The mission was agreed to by the Yugoslav side only under the threat of war, and that threat was kept up during the time of the Mission by the presence of NATO planes monitoring air movements, the NATO extraction force waiting in Macedonia, and the fact that the Activation Order was not cancelled. On the other hand, the Kosovo-Albanian side wanted a military intervention because they had always (in fact since 1991) [66] anticipated the internationalisation of the conflict, and especially an international military presence. They saw this as the way to reach their political goal of independence, so NATO’s continuing threat to intervene was just what they wanted. [67] Under these circumstances the KVM basically stood no chance, so it is rather surprising how successful they actually were in the field given this very negative framework in which they had to operate.

2.1.2 Nonviolent Peaceforce

At the moment, a new project called Nonviolent Peaceforce[68] is being developed.

Nonviolent Peaceforce is a so-far US-based international organisation of citizens working together to expand the power and potential of nonviolent peacemaking. It aims at succeeding where others so far have failed – setting up a permanent “peace army”.

Its mandate reads like following: The Nonviolent Peaceforce wants to

· Help reduce global conflicts through the sending of international teams into conflict zones to co-operate with local peace and justice organisations that are seeking to prevent violence.

· To facilitate the creation of a trained, international civilian nonviolent peace force. The Peaceforce will be sent to conflict areas to prevent death and destruction and protect human rights, thus creating the space for local groups to struggle nonviolently, enter into dialogue, and seek peaceful resolution.

· To build the support needed to create and maintain a standing force of at least 200 active members, 400 reserves and 500 supporters by the end of 2003, building to a force of 2,000 active members, 4,000 reserves and 5,000 supporters by 2010.

Beginning in 2003, the Nonviolent Peaceforce will send teams to Sri Lanka to work with local organisations to ensure the peace process there moves forward, hoping to reach the number of 30-50 fieldworkers by the end of 2003. The Nonviolent Peaceforce, as a non-partisan external intervener, will be working across Sri Lanka protecting civilians and offering both conflicting parties the opportunity to demonstrate that they are willing to make changes. It will work with all parties who exhibit a desire for peaceful resolution, and maintain its presence in Sri Lanka through 2005.

2.2 Peacemaking

Ryan distinguishes three methods of peacemaking[69] as the imposition of a solution through either:

1. Violence and power
2. Law

3. Negotiation (classical mediation or second-track diplomacy)

International mediation and arbitration has received considerably more attention from the academic world than the other two strategies.[70] In fact, often conflict resolution is used interchangeably with peacemaking,[71] because peacemaking is the strategy that deals with the contents of a conflict. Many different tactics and methods have been proposed.

Again, the terminology varies widely among the different authors. But most recognise a continuum defined between third-party negotiators who use considerable pressure to bring the parties in conflict to an agreement (examples: the Dayton agreement after the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995, and the Rambouillet negotiations carried out under the threat of military intervention in 1999), and third-party negotiators who act as facilitators helping the parties in conflict to find their own solution (Norway in Sri Lanka for example). How these different negotiating techniques are named, differs. Perhaps the major confusion stems from the fact that in international politics mediation is often used for the more coercive forms of negotiation, while in the intra-societal projects (family mediation, community mediation) mediation means exactly the opposite viz. not making one’s own proposals.

Kumar Rupesinghe proposes some rather fundamental differences between state versus non-state diplomacy.[72] State-based diplomacy is, he says, based on perceived self-interests, state-to-state relations, the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. It relies on UN, international organisations and bilateral governmental relations, and is a short-term approach. Non-state diplomacy, in contrast, is based on people-to-people relations, concentrates on trust building, networking and solidarity, has a long-term commitment, is flexible and creative and is low-profile foundation building.

· When small-size NGOs get involved in peace-making, it is rarely on the highest level, although there are a few which have the credentials to do so (Community of San Egidio, Quakers, International Alert).

· A rather typical activity of NGOs is the conduct of Conflict Solving Workshops[73]. This is a special method developed and carried out by a smaller number of international conflict resolution organisations like International Alert (based in London), Nonviolence International (Washington), Berghof Centre for Conflict Resolution (Berlin) or Simon Fisher and his team of the Harvard School. Their purpose is to get people together who are not first Track themselves, but who have good access to the power holders of their society.

· More usually they get involved with mediation and negotiation on the local level. Supporting dialogue: One of the Pax Christi teams (Benkovac) has been supporting dialogue between the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches.[74]

· Examples of mediation described were activities at the micro level, e.g. mediation between a returning displaced family and people currently living in their house,[75] or between two youth groups in a divided town.

§ Offering meeting space, be it the flat/house where the volunteers live or the Youth Centre they have helped to create, is a function that seems to be common to many projects.

§ Opening doors to authorities and international agencies:[76] Networking and linking functions between NGOs and internationals, accompanying activists or regular citizens to such bodies, and being an advocate for local groups are important functions played by many CPS projects. Specifically in those areas of former Yugoslavia where a large number of international actors are present, local NGOs often have found it difficult to be accepted as equal partners, or even to be listened to at all. International volunteers setting up meetings with such international organisations, or insisting in the participation of local NGOs in co-ordination forums (e.g. what the ForumCPS team did in Prizren), play an important role for these local groups. CPS volunteers have also served the same function from time to time in communication with local authorities. For example, Pax Christi Benkovac managed to get their local partner organisation in contact with their mayor who had previously chosen to ignore that group.

2.3 Peacebuilding

Finally, Peacebuilding, more than peacekeeping and peacemaking, is the strategy that includes normal citizens in the peace process. There are many examples of peace processes that have failed because there was no peacebuilding. The recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a good example of this problem.

Peacebuilding activities include many very different tasks, it is the category under which both small, person-oriented approaches which concentrate on encounter between the opponents, having as a goal the removal of distrust and hatred, and making it possible for former enemies to live together, as well as large-scale approaches intending to foster major, even structural changes fall. Examples for the second would include resettlement of refugees, development co-operation, rebuilding of infrastructure and the revitalisation of the economy etc, the organisation of elections, establishment of democratic rules and rule of law, development of civil society, free media, respect for human rights and the like.

In the following the activities of organisations with a non-violent approach will be highlightened. All of their activities would fall under small-scale approaches, because their scope is never a conflict area as a whole but rather either a single community, or a certain, well-defined sector (like media for example).[77]

2.1.1 Activities of Peace Services

Several categories of peacebuilding activities were found in the NP Feasibility Study[78]:

1. Multi-ethnic or multi-communal social work

This term is used in a thesis written by a German social worker, Ruben Kurschat,[79] who worked as a Civil Peace Service (CPS) volunteer in Jaice/Bosnia. He describes a multitude of activities that are typical activities of social workers but have the implicit function of bringing people together across ethnic or other perceived lines of conflict. This kind of social work creates a neutral space or protected area in which people, independent of their ethnic or religious identities, come together and do things together, such as attending a computer course or playing football. The objective of furthering reconciliation is rarely made explicit because of the fear that work concentrating on the ethnic lines of conflict might strengthen those lines and thereby deepen the conflict.[80] The social worker or peace expert might insist on participation from all sides and would try to stop all attempts to close one project or activity (e.g. language course) to members of the other groups. But rather then making "the conflict" the issue to meet about, the activities are used to reflect on group processes and one’s own behaviour, and thereby deal with the conflict indirectly.

In detail, such activities might be:

· Found and run youth centres.

§ Organise social activities for different groups, for example courses and circles (knitting and senior groups) in refugee camps.

§ Organise community-building projects: Pax Christi Benkovac (Croatia) has been interviewing citizens in order to find out their interests and special resources, thus encouraging the consequent formation of groups according to purpose, not ethnicity.

§ Organise youth camps: Several organisations have occasionally organised international youth camps in addition to their daily work, in order to give children and young people a chance to leave their daily life behind for a while.

§ Organise/facilitate cultural activities: Several local groups that are partners of Austrian Peace Service organise cultural activities, from theatre plays to rave parties, with the support of the Austrian volunteers.

§ Offer meeting space: This function sometimes develops almost without planning when the flat or house of the volunteers becomes a protected meeting space. Youth centres, of course, fulfil the same function.

§ Visit citizens: This is an activity reported by most CPS projects. It is both a by-product of other activities and a conscious effort to support isolated people in the countryside.

2. Support for local groups and civil society development

Supporting local groups and civil society development is one of the objectives of most CPSs, and one for which many related activities can be found:

§ Advising: The Austrian Peace Services placed volunteers with an Albanian Education Development Project where they gave advice on where to get materials, did some budget writing, edited a project newsletter, and generally were responsible for co-ordination and evaluation. Pax Christi Benkovac helped a humanitarian women’s association establish itself as an NGO, and also initiated biweekly meetings of village representatives to discuss upcoming issues and problems in village development.

§ Supporting local activists in their activities: Volunteers provide translations, facilitate meetings, serve in the office, take care of administrative and organisational tasks, drive people around, produce project newsletters and engage in other similar activities specifically in projects where volunteers were placed with local NGOs (as specifically the Austrians do). Of special importance here seems to be fund-raising support that the German ForumCPS team in Kosovo offered to a local group.

§ Networking activities: Most projects are involved in networking in one way or another, for example by furnishing international contacts and/or by bringing the partner organisation in contact with other local groups.

§ Co-organising public activities: Some CPSs have been doing this, for example Pax Christi Benkovac together with Balkan Peace Team helped several local humanitarian and human rights groups organise a Croatian-Bosnian Round Table on the return of refugees from Bosnia to Croatia.

Peace Team Beli Manastir

“In May 1999, a representative of the newly formed Association of the Roma came to the Peace Team in Beli Manastir to ask for help about 2000 Roma members of the Roma community who have stayed in Baranja and want to live in Croatia were in a difficult situation. The early post war period was still uncertain and dangerous. During the war, when they lived under the Serbian authorities, some of them were members of the Serbian army or various paramilitary forces. They were all ridden with a feeling of collective guilt and pressured by returnees. The new Croatian authorities and police were not protecting them, the humanitarian organisation were not giving them aid, they did not have any personal documents, jobs or hope. Members of the Peace Team Beli Manastir, Martina Bukalo, Bojan Lalic, Miroslav Dvornic and Olivera Petrovic started visiting Roma settlements talking to people and then initiated the active listening program, thus encouraging them to do something for themselves:

"It would be important if the police would protect us and not the other way around,”

"The municipality is not giving us humanitarian aid. Although we need it and are entitled to it.^”

"The public should know what our life is like”.

"Our children do not go to school, •something should be done about it."

Those were their first expressions of their needs and some hints about solutions.

They started going to the police, municipality headquarters of the Red Cross, first accompanied by the Peace Team members and later individually. They contacted journalists so now an organization is filming a documentary about the life of the Roma community in Baranja. They formed branches of the Association in ten villages in Baranja ,and even got permission to use community premises. They joined the Days of Culture of Peace activities by erasing graffiti with messages of hatred in Bolman and Beli Manastir.

…

And last. but not least, they invited representatives of the Association of the Roma of Slavonski Brod and Belisce to learn something from their experience. They also took pari in the training for listeners, so that they could carry out listening programs in their own community and even beyond the borders that separate them from other inhabitants of Baranja: to listen in order to understand and be understood.”

Source: Culture of Peace, ed.: Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and human rights, Osijek, 1/2001

3. Training and education in conflict-related skills

Although they belong to the realm of civil society building, training and education in areas such as conflict transformation, dealing with violence, and democratic decision-making skills should be considered in a category of their own because of their predominance in some projects. There is even one project supported under the German CPS scheme that concentrates solely on training: A Yugoslav expatriate who had worked with a German training organisation, together with (by now) six other trainers from all parts of former Yugoslavia set up a training centre (Centre for Nonviolent Action) in Sarajevo/Bosnia. There they offer training in conflict transformation and civil society building for all parts of Bosnia.

4. Psycho-social support

Psycho-social support for war victims and otherwise traumatised target groups has become an important activity in the realm of peacebuilding in many parts of the world, not only in former Yugoslavia. The Civil Peace Services surveyed have displayed two kinds of activities in this field:

§ Active listening (Austrian Peace Services);

§ Trauma counselling with groups (ForumCPS and Pax Christi Benkovac), and self-help groups for those with chronic illnesses (ForumCPS in Vojvodina).

5. "Social Reconstruction" projects

Social Reconstruction describes a concept that is closely related to multi-communal social but combines physical reconstruction, rather than social work, with peace work in a broader sense. The first project of this type in the area of former Yugoslavia was a reconstruction project in a divided town (Pakrac) in Western Slavonia. The project was started by a Croatian organisation (Anti-war Campaign) in co-operation with the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV), and used short-term and middle-term volunteers from abroad. The international volunteers came to help with the physical reconstruction of houses, and on the side joined or organised social activities. While the Croatian and international volunteers could work only on the Croatian side of the town, UNOV together with Austrian Peace Services ran a parallel project for some time. Its Austrian members had UN passes and were therefore allowed to work on both sides of the border.

A project started recently by the group Switzerland Without an Army in Kosovo is based on the same concept.

6. Emergency and rehabilitation aid

Material aid of this sort has been more a by-product than a central purpose of the CPS projects in the survey (with the exception of the above-mentioned projects of social reconstruction). There has been both direct distribution of humanitarian aid and financing of projects (for building houses for needy families in Bosnia by Pax Christi), and indirect aid by linking needy persons to other humanitarian agencies that would then support them. In one case, volunteers took over advertising and selling products refugees had produced in their camps (Austrian Peace Services).

2.3.2 Humanitarian Aid and Development Services

There has been an increasing recognition of the relationship of both humanitarian aid and development aid with conflict and conflict transformation. This is partly[81] due to the growing number of humanitarian catastrophes in the last 10/15 years, creating an enormous challenge for both humanitarian aid and development aid. Most of these catastrophes were human-made, caused by civil wars or protracted[82], stale-mate conflicts. As a result, many resources that formerly went to longer-term development aid must now be diverted to first aid measures; and, in consequence, efforts of longer-term development projects have been destroyed.

In the case of humanitarian aid, the discussion centres mainly on the negative and positive impacts which humanitarian aid may have as a by-product of conflicts. [83]

In development co-operation, the issue is more complex. [84] Though many organisations in this field have always seen peace and development as two sides of the same coin[85], in practice dealing with conflict did not play a major role until perhaps 10 years ago. Now more and more development and aid organisations recognise that the sustainability of their efforts depends on a safe environment. [86] While some of them see conflict as part of the environment to be taken into account when planning a project, others have started projects concentrating on conflict transformation itself. Conflict Impact Assessment research, a new branch of peace research, evaluates the impact of these kinds of projects on conflict. [87]

Many different organisations are working in the field of development, aid and conflict transformation. These include:

1. International/intergovernmental agencies such as the UN agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNHCR, World Food Program, UNICEF), and the World Bank.

2. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent are in their own category due to their special status in International Humanitarian Law.

3. International NGOs (e.g. Médecins sans Frontières; Oxfam), NGOs based in one country (e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council), and church/religious-based NGOs (e.g. Caritas or Catholic Relief Services in the Catholic Church);

4. State institutions and organisations in the target countries;

5. NGOs in the target countries. [88]

A growing number of organisations world-wide are concentrating on humanitarian aid. In addition to the older ICRC, Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, etc., new organisations[89] were founded in the 1970s and 1980s, many due the impact of the Biafra war 1967-1971[90]. Though it would be wrong to generalise, at least some of these have broken with the ethical and behavioural codes of their older siblings in regard to absolute neutrality in the field. They do not hesitate to confront local actors with criticism of human rights violations, and define a right or even duty to intervene. Organisations like Médecins sans Frontières[91] publish regularly on human rights issues, and base their decisions on active involvement in a crisis area more on a day-by-day risk analysis, than on the formal invitation or permission of the government of the respective country in which they want to work.

The borders between humanitarian aid and development work tend to dissolve increasingly as the same organisations engage in both. There is growing agreement among the organisations that aid and development are more an issue of emphasis than two absolutely separate activities. [92] Some even speak of a "continuum concept": Development Co-operation - Emergency Relief - Rehabilitation - Development Co-operation, with the principal focus on the use of emergency relief and rehabilitation to support development of local structures and capacities capable of sustainable development. ^[93]

3. How and When Does It Work?

The two questions most often asked are: Does it not depend on the good-will of the parties? And: Aren’t there many situation where only enforcement can help?

It has been described above that there are different approaches to third party nonviolent intervention in conflict situations. The two strategies mainly to be found again and again in the examples are those of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with a lot of secondary peacemaking going on at a local level in order to be able to implement the peacebuilding or peacekeeping project. One important lesson to remember is that all three strategies have to be used in any given conflict simultaneously. That ”peacekeeping without peacemaking can end up being little more than a stunt”[94] is no doubt evident to all. But though they both need to go hand in hand, they need not being carried out by the same persons/organisations – a job share is perfectly possible.

Only a few of the civilian projects have peace-keeping either by accompaniment or by monitoring as their only focus (PBI, Christian Peacemaker Teams, the South African missions), and a few more seem to settle for a combination of monitoring or accompaniment with peace-building activities. This is what Eguren calls an "expanded role of international observers" as an integrated tool for third party intervention.[95]

In regard to relief and development work, some NGOs (e.g. PBI) argue that aid should be separate from peacebuilding. The reasons given are that it takes too much of a team’s time, that it is being done by many other organisations, that it does not directly reduce violence or challenge the so-called powers that be, and that it is a form of colonialism - Western outsiders invade region with their ideas of what local people should do in order to progress.[96] The contrary argument maintains that development and relief activities provide an entree into situations and increase an intervenor’s credibility: And many project do combine these strategies successfully.[97]

3.1 Chances to Have Impact

Impact Assessment[98] as a subcategory of evaluation is a relatively new art. It is "the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes - positive or negative, intended or not - in people's lives brought about by a given action or series of actions."[99]

Three cautions need to be made, though, when impact assessment is used on conflict transformation projects:

1. One of the biggest problems is the question of attribution: Has a development, event or non-event something to do with the project at all?[100]

2. The process of conducting an impact assessment itself may influence the conflict situation, and therefore needs to be handled with much care.

3. Outcomes and impact are not the same[101].

To give an example for these three cautions: A project accompanies human right activists working in a NGO who received death threats for over one year. In that time there was no attack on any of these activists.

1: It would be wrong simply to assume that the project was the cause for the absence of any attack - perhaps the death squads decided that they the group was not worth pursuing, or the police put up a presence and prevented an attack, or, or, or. To be able to say that the project had anything to do with the safety of the activists, the evaluators would have to take the whole of the political situation into account, and for example see how comparable but un-accompanied NGOs fared in the same time.

2: Ideally (though in that case probably impossible) the evaluators would also interview the leaders of the death squads why they did not attack the activists. But assuming that was possible, in doing so they would probably draw the attention of these leaders to the NGO accompanied, and may easily cause the death squad to reconsider their decision to leave the NGO in peace.

3: If now the evaluators come to the conclusion that the accompaniment played a role in the absence of an attack, this absence may be called an outcome. The impact would be if because of the lack of an attack the group enlarged/strengthened its work, or perhaps simply was able to continue while other NGOs had to close down.

In spite of these problems, the number of evaluations of peacebuilding projects (development projects, Peace Services etc) is growing, many of them showing positive outcomes and impact in several ways, although so far nobody has been able to compile the results in a way as to list a definite number of criteria which would make “success” of a project likely.[102]

3.1.1 Peacekeeping Lessons

1. Have a stake in peace: Success with peacekeeping missions seems to rely on one condition: that both sides in the conflict really want peace, have a stake in international support and in retaining some minimum respectability[103] . Only when this condition is present can the civil intervenors use available incentives and threats. [104] In South Africa, there was the possibility of reports to the international world and of sanctions in the case of undue violence. [105] On the situation in Bougainville one Mission commander stated: "I was always confident that the Bougainvillean leaders were aware that contributing governments could be expected to withdraw their personnel if the security situation deteriorated." [106] It has been argued above that the lack of this element was one factor for the failure of the KVM.

2. In larger-scale nonviolent peacekeeping missions the peacekeepers have to rely on the local people for security. All civil missions have had to rely on this protection to some degree; therefore it has been important to establish good contact, and win trust and acceptance. Instead of just keeping people apart, civil peacekeepers seem to have to bring them together, at least by making themselves the link between the parties. "Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the realisation that peace on Bougainville is the responsibility of the Bougainville people. They are only too aware that, should the safety of the PMG be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols in difficult circumstances."[107] "The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst ... at the time, but it was the right one--there were at least two occasions I encountered which may have gone differently if we had been armed"[108]

In the case of the KVM, there seems to have been a lack of understanding of the character of an unarmed mission. To contrast a quote from Mission head Walker with the quote of his colleague above: "It's a dangerous place; it's very risky. I think that people who are coming there, coming in unarmed under the agreement--and all of our people are unarmed--makes a very dangerous situation, as I've said. And the quote in the paper as recently as today, we're probably the only people in Kosovo who do not carry side arms of some sort, if not bigger weapons. So, we're hoping that this is somehow going to protect us from those with weapons." [109]

3. For both larger-scale and small-scale civil peacekeeping missions it seems that susceptibility to pressure, be it international pressure or influential local actors, is an important factor. If there is no cease-fire agreement, or if there are strong elements of spoilers, a condition for some success under such circumstances is that the parties in conflict have a stake in international support and retaining some minimum respectability. They need to care for international opinion, or be otherwise susceptible to influence. If this factor is given, then a peacekeeping mission may have a chance even if one of the parties is not interested in peace. This question becomes of special importance when violence is privatised - if it is closely linked to organised crime as in Columbia. But it is also is a problem when armed political movements or whole states are seemingly immune to international pressure, like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was for many years in the 1990s.

3.1.2 Peacemaking Lessons

As already said above, most of peacemaking is done by governments and international organisations – neither of them well-known for an emphasis on nonviolent approaches. For nonviolent actors on the other side the issue of access to high-level political leaders makes mediation at a national basis very difficult. Those organisations and individuals which managed to establish themselves as informal mediators have a long track-record of trust-building, keeping confidentiality, and often some personal link through ex-diplomats or elder statesmen already known to the political leaders.

For successful negotiations/mediation at a local level, the author is not aware of any literature researching in a systematic way the factors which play a role here. She has however the impression, that some of the same elements as listed under the category of peacekeeping (susceptibility to pressure) play a role as does managing to be accepted as non-partisan.

3.1.3 Peacebuilding Lessons

In regard to reconciliation work, Ryan emphasises that encounters per se are usually not helpful because interaction alone might not reduce prejudice and tension. He distinguishes seven sub-strategies of peacebuilding that combine contact with something else[110]:

1. Contact plus forgiveness is the religious approach of Gandhi, Martin Luther King and others. The question is, is it pragmatic enough to reach a sufficient number of persons?

3. Contact plus the pursuit of superordinate goals (joint sports, inclusion in a state umbrella like the EU etc);

4. Contact plus economic development, as soon as there is subjective economic justice for both sides;

5. Contact plus confidence building (e.g. law reforms);

6. Contact plus education for mutual understanding (e.g. multi-ethnic schools);

7. Prejudice reduction; exploring cultures.

Otherwise, there have been in recent years many evaluations and assessments been conducted of single peacebuilding projects. But it is too early to summarise these evaluations in form of general lessons learned. Long-term commitment, orientation on local needs instead of sponsor-driven programs, doing careful conflict analysis before beginning a project, cultural sensitivity, avoiding to “do harm” are some elements which can always be found. But as contexts are different, so have successful programs to differ. What may “work” in one context may be absolutely the wrong approach in the next one.

3.2 The Issue of Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement might mean different things. There is certainly a difference between a situation where two or several parties are in conflict and none of them feels inclined to agree to a cease-fire, and a situation where at least one party wants peace, or when the problem lies more with locally based groups not heeding the agreements made on a higher level (so-called spoilers). Surely, the mechanisms of non-armed peacekeeping as outlined above would work better when there is more agreement to stopping violence. If all sides in theory agree, then maintaining the ceasefire becomes a question of controlling the spoilers, and is a question of gaining respect and practising un-armed deterrence.

If the war in question is of high intensity, and neither side wants a ceasefire, it is very unlikely that an unarmed organisation would even find access to the area of conflict[111] – an experience many peace army initiatives made. The author cannot imagine almost any scope for a nonviolent intervention under such circumstances. There have been individuals coming from a nonviolent background arguing in the case of Rwanda that if there had been a Civil Peace Service in place, these volunteers would not have left the country but stayed to prevent mass murder. But other people with knowledge of the situation in Rwanda strongly disagree.[112] There was no leverage for un-armed peacekeepers to make the perpetrators desist from violence. If a quick strengthening of the UN peacekeeping mission present, and giving them an enforcement mandate, would have changed things, needs of course to remain open because of the wide-spread and decentralised nature of the violence. They would have had to be almost omnipresent in order to stop all violence.

Generally spaking, the picture does not look much brighter when including military interventions here. [113] The number of successful military peace enforcement missions is very small, if as “success” the creation of a situation with more security and human rights protection for everyone is counted. East Timor is one such a case, but the role NATO played in bringing the Dayton Agreements about is questionable – the shift of military power on the ground played probably as much of a role than the bombing by NATO in summer 1995- , and in the case of Yugoslavia/Kosovo the attack by NATO brought about what it pretended to set out to prevent – the attempted ‘ethnic cleansing’[114] of Kosovo.

Chances for a nonviolent peace enforcement project the author can only see, however, if the war in question is more of a protracted kind with a smaller number of actual fighting incidents involved. In such a case the chances of entering into the field, moving in the field, and influencing what happens might be higher. If at least one side in the conflict is interested in achieving a cease-fire, the task of the international intervenors would be to create a situation in which the other sides (or side) see more advantages in peace than in continuing war. Here presence on the ground of practising peacekeeping functions of different types combined with peacemaking activities by different actors at all levels might not be hopeless. On the other hand, it would be a high-risk enterprise and chances for success probably depend on the conflict in question. are. In theory, nonviolent activists could

· Convince all sides to lay down arms by means of mediation; by involving influential third parties; by engaging in peacebuilding activities that makes peace more attractive than war (e.g. economic aid programs), or

· Raise the costs of continuing the war by sanctions or boycotts; by creating unwelcome international publicity or by undermining the will of the individual soldiers to continue to fight (methods of civilian-based defence)

4. Outlook: Nonviolent Intervention As Alternative To the Military

The goal of developing nonviolent, large-scale intervention as an alternative to military intervention is a recurrent subject[115]. Many peace services as well as at least a dozen short-term projects have professed this goal, as it was described in the first section of this article.

This last section will look in general at the issue of alternatives to military intervention: What is done by the military that could be done better by civilians?

In a broader sense, the search for alternatives to the military is one of two basic approaches in the pacifist debate: While one stresses resistance to unjust structures, accusing and making public what goes wrong and what the real interests behind are, the other always has accepted that there might be some functions which the military fulfils today which are necessary to fulfil and, consequently, need to be replaced in order to overcome war and organised violence. The most elaborate outcome of this approach so far has been the concept of civilian-based or social defence[116] that aims at being an alternative to defence, one if not the basic function of the military. Of course, both approaches interact with each other and supplement each other, for example, when lessons learned in peoples’ struggles became integrated elements of social defence.

4.1 Looking Closer At Military In Peacekeeping

The military has been fulfilling the following tasks/functions in the framework of military conflict interventions:[117]

· Deliver humanitarian aid and taking care of peacebuilding activities;

· Provide communication and logistics in complex missions[118]

· Broker agreements, e. g. over demarcation lines or cease-fires

· Monitoring and verification (in Monitoring and Peacekeeping missions of all generations);

· Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

· De-mining

· Peacekeeping of buffer zones and cease-fires, including prevention of infiltration;

· Creating a safe environment for reconstruction and democracy building (in complex missions);

· Protecting safe zones or safe havens

· Protecting humanitarian aid and refugee camps

· Assuming executive policing tasks, e.g. arresting war criminals or riot control.

· Enforcing a cease-fire or peace agreement against the will of one or all of the parties including the forcible separation of warring parties and the guarantee or denial of movement (e.g. no-flight-zones).

The military also has different inherent characteristics that need to be distinguished.

· It has the material resources necessary for effective deployment – both the equipment (planes, ships, trucks, armoured cars etc.) and very good and easy access to money, almost unlimited in comparison to other governmental and non-governmental actors.

· It has good personnel resources (even without conscription) and training facilities.

· It is always available at short notice, being a standing force.

· There is a lot of special knowledge and special skills relevant to movement and security-conscious behaviour in war situations.

· The personnel serving in the military understand that their profession is a dangerous one, and generally accept the possibility of injury or death as a professional risk.

· It has weapons and people trained and ready to use them.

· It has a high grade of legitimacy and prestige in many countries of the world. Just the fact of being a soldier might make acceptance by other soldiers easier.

These are often the reasons why the United Nations or other international actors decide to send a military mission rather than a civilian one.[119]

On the other hand, the military in peacekeeping missions also has certain inherent weaknesses:

· It is a large and centralised bureaucracy, that means that decision-making is slow, individual initiative is often discouraged, that there is a lack of flexibility and also distortions in information flow.[120] Often the formal chain of command gets disturbed by an informal one: Commanders of national contingents often preferring to what is called to phone home for orders rather than working within the international structure.

· Its security provisions often prevent its members from making easy contacts on the ground and gaining trust

· It is structured according to sending nations (national battalions instead of a ”UN-army) which leads to local people perceiving them rather as reps of these nations, giving warring factions a chance to play on the perceived differences, becoming therefore a hindrance to co-ordination of the mission (because battalion commanders tend to ask for orders rather back home then from the commander of the mission)

· The presence of military with a population that has been traumatised by soldiers before the arrival of the international mission might cause distrust and fear.

· Its presence reinforces the implicit message of only the military can solve the conflict- civilians are helpless victims.[121]

Therefore, it can be argued that some of the inherent characteristics listed above could be transferred to a civilian body/organisation without any problems other than the political will to do so: Material resources, personnel resources, being a standing force, the personnel having the knowledge and skills needed, and accepting the professional risks (as police and fire brigade personnel do).

There is no inherent reason why the tax money spent today for the military could not be used for an equivalent civilian organisation (or a number of such organisations). The equipment that would be useful could be transferred to these organisations, e.g. in form of a centrally administered pool available on request for everyone in need of it.[122] Volunteers could be recruited and trained in the skills necessary, and the necessary legal provisions[123] made in order to allow a larger number of people to be able to leave their jobs at short notice in order for one or two years of deployment with a civilian force. Sufficient professional positions could be created in addition to have a small trained corps available at all times that then would only have to be filled up by the reserves.

There remain two very central characteristics of the military: Having means of physical protection and enforcement available (being armed), and the issue of prestige.

Classical peacekeeping missions have not been based on the real capacity of the peacekeepers to enforce the separation of the parties. The peacekeepers were allowed to use armed force only for their self-protection. Even today, when the rules of engagement have changed, and so-called robust peacekeeping is almost universally accepted[124], it is still[125] considered to be an essential condition for both classical and complex missions that the parties previous to the deployment have agreed to the cease-fire, and to the presence of the peacekeeping mission. What has changed in regard to the use of weapons is that peacekeepers nowadays usually have leave to use force in order to make sure that they can carry out their mandate.

The question to be raised here is if the same results (or even better results) could be achieved by other means. Putting together lessons learned from military peacekeeping missions and from non-armed intercessionary peacekeeping as it is practised by nonviolent groups, it seems that having physical means of enforcement available is only one of the tactics possible. Respect for the peacekeepers, and consequently refraining from use of violence, depends on many factors besides the peacekeepers being armed:

· Identity. Factors here might be age, gender, country of origin, religion and others.

· Role (peacekeeper), and whom you represent (e.g. the UN). This has become important in international missions when members of those missions would probably not have been respected because of their identity alone.

· Law and tradition (For example rules against harming unarmed opponents, rules of hospitality).

· Communication: making oneself known and trusted by creating personal relationships, using rational argument and moral appeal, or setting examples, by displaying a behaviour different from usual (e.g. working in teams whose members come from nations known as enemies of each other)

· Co-operation with all sides. Often it might be possible to identify issues where there are interests of let's say a paramilitary group that coincide with broader interests of everyone. For example, many such groups have taken up social welfare functions in territories they control. Or they might also be concerned with containing normal criminal acts. If the international missions manages to begin co-operation on such issues, they might succeed in winning trust and access to the leaders of such groups.

· Having leverage to apply pressure, e.g. by granting or withholding goods or privileges sought by the sides in conflict. That is a strategy that might work both with governments and with other armed groups (guerrilla, even criminal gangs) if it is possible to identify objects they are interested in (continuing to) obtain or to avoid losing.

· Being able to organise international pressure, both from international grassroots’ and governmental levels[126]. This seems to work in cases when the perpetrators are related to the government, and that government cares about international opinion. Activating the great chain of nonviolence (Johan Galtung) might work in such cases when no direct communication is possible between the parties in conflict.

· Having access to public opinion in the country. This is something that might work in countries with some degree of functioning society and state, when the government is dependent on voters, or at least of some general acceptance of what it does.[127]

· Being both creative and stubborn when confronted with the threat of violence. Doing the unexpected, one of the rules taught in nonviolent self-defence classes, might also be a good rule for non-armed peacekeeping. There are many examples to be found in peoples’ struggles and nonviolent resistance movements, as well as in the experience of Peace Brigades International.

This list is possibly incomplete. Still, it might serve as an argument that being an armed soldier is not the only way to gain respect in a peacekeeping situation, even in countries and situations where being a soldier at first glance seems to be essential for being respected. The peacekeeping rule of do not allow yourself to be stopped can be met by other means, because there should always be possibilities for gaining respect another way.[128] But replacing the military in such settings is not a one-by-one exchange, having non-armed people doing the same as military peacekeepers do. Rather, in order to replace military peacekeeping, it would be necessary to combine un-armed peacekeeping with peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts.[129]

Here is also the point where the mentioned structural weaknesses of the military come into play. Many of the tactics described above require a high degree of well-funded personal knowledge of the actors on the ground, and much flexibility in adopting to changing situations. Many of them work better if the belligerents fail to divide up the international mission into friends and enemies as they like to do with nationally structured UN missions.

Another argument for the use of armed peacekeepers usually is that they must have the means to defend themselves. But it has to be pointed out that wearing weapons for self-protection consists of two factors: One is deterrence of a potential aggressor, and the other is the actual use of the weapon in case deterrence did fail. Deterrence, or respect, as it has been argued above, can be reached by other methods then the threat to wound and kill. But if deterrence did not work, then the non-armed peacekeeper does not have the possibility of defending himself or herself. That is the risk nonviolent peacekeepers would have to take, as it is the risk that soldiers take if it turns out that their arms are of no use with the result they still might be killed.

4.2 Summary

Most of the functions the military fulfils today in peacekeeping missions could be transferred to nonviolent peacekeepers. But there are two residues: One is the need for fulfilling some policing tasks in situations when law and order broke down in a country, or when local police is unwilling/unable to act in accordance with international law. Here is probably a need for some kind of international police.

The other residue is the question of intervening in on-going armed conflicts of high intensity. Perhaps some kind of Rapid Deployment Force under the auspices and control of the United Nations as a safeguard - such as police often maintain a heavily equipped anti-terror unit that is rarely if ever used -might satisfy the felt need for having an instrument ready to prevent mass murder and genocide in the worst case.[130] If nonviolent peacekeeping on larger scale proves efficient, perhaps one day this rapid deployment force would be considered unnecessary and be abolished as the last remnant of what once was the military?

In order to reach this goal, civilian-based Defence would have to be introduced to replace the function of military defence, and international politics would have to undergo a radical re-orientation away from serving national interests to serving justice, meaning the interests of all world citizens.

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[1] This article is based partly on Chapters 1 and 2 of the Feasibility study of Nonviolent Peaceforce (published in 2001 as an internet documentI, which was commissioned by Peaceworkers and financed with the support of USIP. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in the publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace nor that of Nonviolent Peaceforce.

[2] Three examples are reprinted in this text further below.

[3] Moser-Puangsuwan / Weber 2000

[4] The author prefers the term 'external party' to 'third party' because, as Galtung has pointed out, there are usually more then two parties to a conflict. (Galtung 1994)

[5] See Lindgren et al., p.45, diagram reprinted in Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993:31

[6] Kelman and Warwick, 1978, quoted after Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993, P. 26

[7] See Büttner 1995, L’Abate 1995, Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber (eds) 2000, Müller/Büttner 1998, Muller 1995, Schirch 1995, Schweitzer et al 2001, for overviews. There is more literature on single cases, e.g. PBI and the German Civil Peace Service. (Allenbach et al 2001, Evers 2000, Mahony/Eguren 1997, Coy 1997)

[8] Büttner 1995:71, Walker 1981:61 pp.

[9] Like Erasmus of Rotterdam, Pierre Dubois, Eméric Crucé, Maximilien de Sully, William Penn, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Friedrich von Gentz. See for example Dougherty/ Pfaltzgraff 1997, p.190

[10] See: Brock/Young 1999, Holl 1988

[11] See Sharp 1973, Boulding 2000, Ackerman/Duvall 2000

[12] And/or Civilian-based defence. See Boserup/Mack 1980, Burrowes 1996, Ebert 1981a, Ebert 1981b, Martin 1993, Müller 1996, Roberts (ed) 1967, Sharp 1985

[13] See for example Ackerman/Duvall 2000 and Martin 1991

[14] Büttner 1995, Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000

[15] Though it might sound contradictory, it seems that it is possible to find people to risk their lives - as long as the action is over in a few weeks and people may then return to their daily life of work or study.

[16] Weber 2000:16

[17] Those with more modest goals, like giving protection to returning refugees, had much more chances to succeed.

[18] In some countries, specially in Germany, CPS tries to distinguish itself from all these other types of civil intervenors by emphasising its professional structure, but their concept has not generally been accepted by the projects in the other countries.

[19] For example volunteer laws like those in France, have provisions for COs to do their alternative service abroad (Austria, Italy).

[20] The leaflet of the European Network states: "CPS is building up a civil society in which conflicts are resolved in a nonviolent way," and further on: "CPSs are operating at grass-roots and civil society level."

[21] Diamond/McDonald 1993:42

[22] See Burton/Dukes 1990

[23] See Hill 1982, Ropers 1995

[24] See Diamond/McDonald 1993:65 pp. on "track 4: private citizens".

[25] See 'hca Quarterly' that was produced by the HCA headquarters at Prague.

[26] Diamond/McDonald 1993

[27] Their commitment varies quite a lot. One of the most powerful regional organisation, the European Union, is concentrating primarily on building up its own military capacities. The EU announced that it wanted to develop civil instruments of crisis prevention parallel with this, but there is very little co-ordination between the single member states (some of them are doing quite a lot on conflict resolution), as well as an imbalance in the distribution of funds, and the development of the usual EU bureaucracy. See Debiel/Fischer 2000

[28] Funders (Track 8) do not easily fit into this categorisation because they might be governments, NGOs or business. Therefore they have been omitted here in spite of the doubtless importance they have in conflict resolution work.

[29] See Burrowes 1996:98 pp. for an overview of a debate with too many contributions to quote them all. The best-known protagonist of the 'pragmatic' approach is perhaps Gene Sharp.

[30] See Burrowes 1996:117pp, Müller/Schweitzer 2000

[31] Theodor Ebert is certainly one of these persons.

[32] Boutros-Ghali 1992

[33] Galtung 1976, reprinted in Galtung 1982

[34] Ryan 1995

[35] Galtung 1976, quoted after Müller/Büttner 1998:8

[36] This and the following two quotes: Galtung 1996:103.

[37] Ryan 1995:106. Galtung 1982 describes peacemaking as being 'directed at reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation'

[38] Ryan misses this second aspect, which other authors have called “micro-negotiations”.

[39] Lederach, who acknowledges the need for a comprehensive approach in order to achieve conflict transformation, uses the term 'peacebuilding' for all three of them. (Lederach 1998). In order to avoid confusion, I prefer the more narrow definition.

[40] Ryan 1995:117 pp.

[41] See Müller-Büttner 1998

[42] Ackermann argues somewhat similar, although from the opposite starting point: She says that the approaches taken to prevent conflict can be found also in post-war situations (Ackermann 2000:19).

[43] Ryan 1995:106

[44] Schirch 1995, Mahony/Eguren 1997

[45] Schirch 1995, pp 20-31

[46] See Donna Howard’s section on Peace teams in NP Feasibility Study (Chapter 2.1)

[47] Quote from the PBI Webpage, www.peacebrigades.org (date:6.4.03). On the theory and experience of protective accompaniment, see Mahony/Eguren 1997

[48] Kühne 2000 distinguishes four generations of peace-keeping: traditional, multidimensional, robust and as an emerging fourth robust plus multidimensional plus executive mandate. Fetherston (1993:23f) points out that there had already been 4 multidimensional missions by 1987. There are three important aspects of these missions in regard to the role of civilian approaches: First, there are usually a greater number of civilians involved in these missions, being trusted with carrying out peacebuilding tasks. Secondly, there is the issue of division of labour between the armed forces and these civilians who are considered to be able to do their work because of the protection of the military. And thirdly, there is the issue of military forces assuming civilian tasks, such as the setting up of refugee camps and reconstruction work. See also the Brahimi-Report 2000.

[49] See Ewald/Thörn 1994

[50] Ewald/Thörn 1994:76 p., 102 p., 109 p.

[51] Ewald/Thörn 1994:16 p.

[52] See Böge 1999, Ramsbothan/Woodhouse 1999, Wehner 2001

[53] Quote from the commander of the PMG in 1998, Brigadier Bruce Osborn. Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/osborn.htm

[54] See Loqua 2000, Wenig 1999/2000

[55] Ambassador William Walker, "On-the-record-briefing on the Kosovo Verification Mission", released by the Office of the Spokesman, January 8, 1999; Loquai 2000:62.

[56] Wenig 1999/2000:89.

[57] The German original: "Blickt man aus heutiger Pespektive auf diesen Beginn der KVM zurück, so kann man sich vorstellen, was mit einer raschen, dichten und flächendeckenden Präsenz der OSZE hätte erreicht werden können." Loquai 2000:61 p.

[58] Wenig 1999/2000:84.

[59] Loquai 2000:62 p.

[60] Loquai 2000:39 p.

[61] OSCE press release No 10/99 (www.osce.org/inst/secret/presrel/kpr10-99.htm).

[62] Kosovo Update 22.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990222_kdom.html

[63] Kosovo Update 26.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990226_kdom.html

[64] Kosovo Update 23.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990223_kdom.html

[65] Kosovo Update 27.1.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990127_kdom.html

[66] See Clark 2000

[67] See Loquai 2000:24, 54, Schweitzer 1999, Calic 1998.

[68] See Webpage of Nonviolent Peaceforce at www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org

[69] Ryan 1995:106 pp.

[70] See Goodwin 2001, Jentleson 2000, Mitchell/Webb (eds) 1988, Ropers 1995, Rupesinghe 1998, Rubin (ed) 1981, and many others.

[71] See Ropers 1995

[72] Rupesinghe1998:111

[73] See Hill 1982, Ropers 1995

[74] Pax Christi Germany is generally involved in interreligious dialogue in the area of former Yugoslavia. Source: Interview conducted for Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study

[75] In one case (Pax Christi Benkovac) the solution found was that both share the house for the time being. Source: Interview conducted for Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study

[76] Large (1998:75) considers this to be an activity in the realm of mediation.

[77] See Miall et al 1999:203 (but attention: they define peacebuilding more broadly than it is defined here), Ropers 1995, and chapter 1.3 in Schweitzer et al 2001

[78] Schweitzer el al 2001

[79] Kurschat 2000.

[80] Kurschat 2000:59.

[81] One other factor may be the transformation of Eastern Europe, which has made necessary political strategies that combine development with conflict prevention or transformation. Another contributing factor may be the general growing consciousness of the possibilities and necessities of conflict resolution. Ropers 1999:8.

[82] Ropers 1999:7 pp.

[83] See Anderson 1999, Donini 1996, de Waal/Omaar 1996.

[84] The question of doing harm is of course as valid for development co-operation as for humanitarian aid. Development aid has long been accused of cultural hegemonialism. While organisations try to transfer Northern values and technologies to the South, it is becoming more and more clear that the Northern way leads to an impasse, that development aid often has negative impact on local economies, and that it inhibits rather then supports self-reliance. (Freise 1994:48).

[85] Fricke 1997:98.

[86] A comparative study of the relationship between development co-operation and conflict in six countries has shown that development projects may increase conflict potential as well as decrease it. (Dieringer 2001:18)

[87] Reychler 1998.

[88] The importance of NGOs in target countries is often forgotten in discussions on humanitarian aid and development co-operation, or they are merely mentioned as the famous local partners. However, they do not only implement the projects which are designed in the North as the term local partner sometimes seems to infer, but in many, if not most countries, play an important role of their own as well. In Bangladesh e.g. there is one development NGO that claims that it reaches 2.5 Mil rural people living in poverty (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, see Roche 1999:12).

[89] For example Médecins sans frontières, Médecins du monde, Komitee Kap Anamur.

[90] Also the older organisations were usually founded under the impression of a specific war. The ICRC was a response to - the battle of Solferino. Save the Children Fund began after WW I and the Russian civil war. Oxfam and CARE were founded after WW II. See Slim 1997:123.

[91] Idems 2000:220 pp.

[92] See Adams/Bradbury 1995:43, quoting ACORD.

[93] Concept of the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit-GTZ. See Gass/van Dok 2000:56, and also Dieringer 2001:19

[94]Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber - 2000: 24

[95] Eguren 2000:22

[96]Schirch - 1995: 41-42

[97] See Olson 2001

[98] There are different terms around impact assessment analysis, with slight differences in meaning. The first to develop impact assessment tools were John Paul Lederach and Marc Howard Ross. In the second half of the 1990s, methodologies started to develop, and have drawn interest by donors. Some like Care and Oxfam developed their own methods, others adopted the Do-no-harm approach.

[99] Chris Roche 1999:21. Impact assessment is also done in the appraisal stage of a project - assessing the potential impact of a planned project.

[100] Judith Large writes in her study „The War Next Door“ (London:Hawthorne Press, without date, ca 1998): “In any policy decision, where issues pose varying costs and benefits to different actors in the equation (both within the institutional social and political system and without) it will be several factors which prove decisive. It may not be the actions of one particular challenging group. Change will happen at convergence points of interest and actions.” (p. 139)

[101] See Roche 1999:23.

[102] For an overview of different aproaches and their evaluation, see the handbook by Reychler /Paffenholz (2001)

[103] Depending on the good will of the local parties is also an important factor for normal UN Observation Missions. Even if they are staffed by soldiers carrying side arms, they also rely on their symbolic presence. Hillen states. "The ration of force to space in UN observer missions would be considered completely impractical by any military standards. As a rule, UN observers themselves could not fulfil their observation mandate because of their small force and the large amount of space under their control. This reinforced the UN role as an impartial and limited force - an honest brother and secondary player in the conflict... As a result of these features, the chief operational imperative of these missions was that they relied entirely on the co-operation and goodwill of the belligerents... The consent and co-operation of the belligerents toward the UN force was reinforced by the unquestioned neutrality and impartiality shown by the UN observers during the mission." Hillen 1998:34 p. See also Stuart 1994:64 p

[104] "Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements", 2000.

[105] Ewald/Thörn 1994:16 pp.

[106] Quote from the commander ofthe PMG in 1998, Brigadier Bruce Osborn. Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/osborn.htm

[107] Quote from Major Luke Foster from the Australian Defence Force, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/foster.htm

[108] Quote from Andrew Rice, Department of Defence, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/rice.htm

[109] Quote from Ambassador William Walker, "On-the-record-briefing on the Kosovo Verification Mission", Released by the Office of the Spokesman, January 8, 1999. There is also the observation that the Europeans did not believe in a possible success of the mission right from the beginning. (Loquai 2000:67)

[110] Ryan 1995:134 pp.

[111] This is NOT the argument that ‘there is nothing nonviolent actors can do during war’, which is definitely a false argument. There are many things groups are doing during wars – from humanitarian aid to trying to keep people safe.

[112] This refers to an unrecorded debate that took place at an early conference on Civil Peace Service in Berlin/Germany in 1994 or 1995.

[113] Probably the most successful measures taken in this field are a combination of diplomatic means, perhaps some well-directed sanctions, and otherwise generally waiting for the moment a conflict is 'ripe' to be ended. (Zartman 1995)

[114] In contrast to refugee movements due to fighting activity between the Yugoslav forces and the UCK. (Schweitzer 1999)

[115] I am referring here to so-called humanitarian military interventions, not to wars of aggression like the one led by the USA and Britain in Iraq in March/April 2003.

[116] The probably best-known protagonists of social or civilian-based defence are Gene Sharp (e.g. 1985), Adam Roberts (1967), Brian Martin (1993), Robert Burrowes (1996), Jean-Marie Muller (1995) and Theodor Ebert (1981).

[117] For references on military interventions, see Chapter 2.5 on Military Interventions in the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study, or the handbook by Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999 for a quick overview.

[118] See Seiple 1996:11

[119] Of course, there are also other factors external to the mission that may be very influential to the decision such as:

· Politicians needing justification spending so much of the annual budget on the national military.

· Influence of important advocacy groups like the arms industry lobby. They have a need for the military being used because that creates new demands on weaponry.

· The deep-rooted conviction that military force is the only solution, and that civilians need protection by soldiers in war-prone situations.

· Expectations raised by public opinion (”something must be done”), and violence being the seemingly easy and clear-cut answer.

[120] This is of course true for all large bureaucracies, not only of the military. But it seems that at least some armies suffer from these disadvantages much more then civilian bureaucracies because of their emphasis of giving and taking orders rather then team leadership.

[121] See the Do-no-harm-approach of Mary B. Anderson (1999)

[122] In some countries, humanitarian organisations already have started or at least are discussing establishing such a pool.

[123] For example job guarantees (like maternal leave provisions) and insurance cover including pension provisions and life insurance.

[124] See Hillen 1998, Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999, Schweitzer al al 2001:Chapter 2.5

[125] It would be correct to say ”again” because it is rather a return to this rule from the side of the United Nations, after a period in the 1990s when deployments in ongoing wars were tried.

[126] That is what Mahony/Eguren consider as "deterrence" in accompaniment (1997:84 pp.)

[127] This is a tactic often referred to in civilian-based defence theory. See, for example, Mellon et al 1985:92

[128] And not being armed might even prove an advantage because it takes the temptation away to ”test” the peacekeepers as has been described for example in the case of Lebanon. There every time the contingents changed over, the new ones where shot at from the nearby militaries just to greet them and to see how they reacted. (See Heiberg 1990) The un-armed peacekeepers of course would have to remember that they might be tested as well.

[129] It is important to point out that military peacekeeping missions also use these other tactics, and are rarely based on deterrence by arms alone. Both the work of armed missions and of unarmed groups shows that the element s of communication, of creating new relationships, of peacebuilding activities are also important factors in reducing violence. In many settings peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities and functions have been combined successfully.

[130] This is what the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan (1998) has proposed.