Norwegian experiences
with peace- and
reconciliation processes
Geir Sjøberg, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway
Conference on Peace,
Development and Rehabilitation
in North-East Sri Lanka
University of Tromsø, 28
February 2003
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am pleased to be here with you
in Tromsø this morning, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway,
one of the co-sponsors of this conference. At the outset let me take the
opportunity to congratulate Professor Mjøs on his appointment as Chair of the
Nobel Peace Prize Committee and wish him the best of luck in this important
capacity.
My remarks this morning will
focus on Norwegian experiences with peace- and reconciliation processes in
general, exemplified through our involvement in Sri Lanka.
Norway’s strong commitment to
international cooperation is motivated by values like freedom and justice,
peace and security, democracy and human rights, the fight against poverty and
for sustainable development. Our strong commitment to the UN, our involvement
in support of peace and reconciliation processes, our support for human rights
and humanitarian action and our development co-operation should be seen in this
perspective.
As a small country, Norway is not in a position to
impose its views on others. The best way for us to safeguard our foreign policy
interests is to be consistently aware of how we conduct ourselves in relation
to key players on the international scene. In other words dialogue and
partnership are our strategies
Norway is playing an active role
in peace and reconciliation efforts and in promoting human rights and democracy
in parts of the world as far apart as Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Africa and
Guatemala.
You may ask why Norway is so involved in
attempts to facilitate reconciliation around the world. The answer is complex,
but some key elements can be identified.
Norway has long traditions of being actively
involved in humanitarian issues and supporting international structures set up
to provide collective security.
Since 1945 few countries have
matched Norway's faith and large investments in the UN - not to mention its
general enthusiasm for the Organisation. Whatever the political colour of the
Norwegian governments in power, the UN has always been a vital instrument of
its foreign policy. Since Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie became the UN's
first secretary-general in 1945, historians have described Norwegian foreign
policy as being "as pro-American as it dared, as pro-Soviet as it had to
be, and as pro-UN as it possibly could be."
During the Cold War the main responsibility for
keeping world peace was pinned on the UN and large regional organisations.
Today we are witnessing a number of conflicts that instead call for a rather
low-intensity approach in order to build peace and reconciliation. Most of today’s conflicts have a strong and important
asymmetric element: it is the state against rebels. In such situations
international governmental organisations will at times have only limited
effectiveness since they are not designed to deal with intra-state problems.
Norwegian NGOs have over several decades gained wide
international experience. As a result, we do have a number of contact points
with non-governmental actors in many countries. Such contacts can create the
basis for participation in peace and
reconciliation processes, and in situations where we are well placed to
contribute, we believe we have a responsibility to do so.
In many ways our involvement in attempts to
facilitate reconciliation around the world is a continuation of our
long-standing commitment to peace through humanitarian action and development
co-operation, as well as through the UN, NATO and OSCE and other international
organisations.
To some extent, self-interest is also a factor.
Peace and stability in remote countries in Asia, Africa and America serves
collective security interests and contributes to economic stability. It reduces
the pressure of refugees at international borders, including our own. And it
ensures a smoother international economic exchange, which is beneficial for us
all.
More broadly, as a small country we are committed to
a world order based on international
co-operation, international law and freedom from human suffering, unrest and
war. Helping to promote these ideals is ultimately in the interest of
any small country – and in the wider interest of the security of all states and
individuals.
As a relatively wealthy country, Norway is a fairly
large provider of humanitarian assistance and an active partner in
international development co-operation. This stems from a desire to help
alleviate human suffering and promote human security. However, as I have
indicated, we believe we are in a position to contribute in a broader sense
than just financially. Economic assistance can never replace political
solutions to conflicts that are by their nature political. If we can provide
political support to efforts to create peace, we are supporting the very same
objectives that we are pursuing through our humanitarian assistance,
development co-operation, and dialogues on human rights.
In the global village, the security and prosperity
of each human being are the responsibility of all. We feel privileged to be
given the opportunity to play our role. Seeing the results of such efforts is a
rewarding experience.
No two conflicts are the same, and there are also
different kinds of peace and reconciliation processes. Some are public, some
are secret. Some require involvement at political level, some take place at
civil society level. Some seek specific solutions, some simply aim to keep a
dialogue going.
Nonetheless, there are many common features in the
Norwegian involvement in the various peace processes.
·
In most cases the
involvement started through the long-term commitment of a Norwegian
non-governmental organisation or through collaboration between academic
institutions.
·
The parties directly
involved have themselves taken responsibility for the process. Norway has, on
request, played the role of facilitator, and has not led the negotiations as
such.
·
Norwegian humanitarian
assistance and development co-operation contributed to confidence-building
processes and reconciliation between the parties.
·
The support offered by
Norway as a neutral outsider helped to strengthen the parties' conviction that
a negotiated solution was possible.
·
Secrecy and discretion were
often, but not always, a prerequisite for success.
·
It has been important to
understand our own function and look for possible roles for other actors, be
they international organisations, countries in the region or major powers.
Our role is also made possible by the fact that
Norway is a small country with no colonial past and few vested interests.
Furthermore, we have a level of political stability and consensus that enables
us to participate in such processes regardless of which government is in power
in Norway. Because of this, we can have a long-term perspective on our
involvement.
We also pay attention to the fact that each and
every conflict has its specific dynamics, and this highlights the need for
in-depth knowledge and analysis of the political dynamics of the country
concerned. Building good relations on all sides is critical. So is a
substantial amount of patience and readiness for enduring involvement. Conflict
resolution calls for a long-term perspective and sustained and adequate
co-ordination.
Norway’s involvement as a
facilitator in the peace process in Sri Lanka exemplifies a number of the
elements I have mentioned with regard to Norway’s work for peace and
reconciliation.
Both the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) have made it clear that they do not believe a military solution
can be achieved and are ready for painful compromises in the pursuit of a
negotiated peace. The conflict has claimed over 60 000 lives over the past
two decades.
Norway has been involved in the peace efforts since
1998. President Kumaratunga, as the leading advocate for a negotiated
settlement to the conflict on the government side, and LTTE leader Prabakharan
honoured us with their requests for Norway to play the role of impartial
third-party facilitator.
Norway’s role as facilitator is to assist the parties in
their efforts to reach a political solution, not to impose a solution on them.
A significant part of Norway’s efforts have been focused on facilitating
understanding between the parties: we have spent much time providing a channel
for communication between the parties and helping them bridge the gap between
their respective positions. In this effort, we take only those actions, such as
making proposals or arranging meetings that the parties have explicitly
requested of us. Most of the attributes that can make Norway suitable for
assisting peace processes, which I have touched upon in general terms, do seem
to have contributed to Norway’s acceptability as a third party to Sri Lanka,
the LTTE and major powers inside and outside of the region.
Over the past year, the peace process in Sri Lanka
has made significant headway, though much remains to be accomplished. A cease-fire
agreement between the Government and
the LTTE came into force on 23 February 2002. The parties have largely
fulfilled the agreement both in terms of military measures and with respect to
confidence-building steps to improve living conditions for the local
populations. The cease-fire has secured the absence of hostilities for a longer
period of time than at any previous stage in the armed conflict. The cease-fire
has saved thousands of lives this year: Only a handful of lives have been lost
since it came into force, while 2 000 or more people were killed annually in
the conflict before the cease-fire.
The incidents in which lives
were lost during the cease-fire are NOT understood to be cases where the leadership
on either side sought conflict. To the contrary, the respective leaders, in
cooperation with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), have acted to prevent
such incidents from escalating and to stop them from recurring.
The fact that the cease-fire
has held so well is not least due to the agreement of the parties to SLMM,
led by Norway and staffed with 46 monitors from the five Nordic countries.
The cease-fire agreement also
testifies to the wisdom of the step-by-step approach taken by the parties.
Fifty years of ethnic conflict and two decades of brutal war have resulted in
deep-rooted mistrust on both sides. This mistrust between civilians and between
security forces on both sides can easily escalate ordinary disputes into ethnic
tensions and violent action. This mistrust can only be overcome when the
parties demonstrate to each other that they can be trusted by gradually and
patiently implementing peace-building measures.
The parties have taken just
such an approach in implementing the cease-fire agreement: it set out a series
of specific measures to be implemented according to a number of deadlines.
These deadlines have by and large been met, and in the process the parties have
built sufficient confidence between themselves to embark on the next phase of
the process: direct negotiations.
Now that the parties have
entered into direct negotiations, they remain fully committed to upholding the
cease-fire and building on its achievements. They are aware that this takes
constant effort. Security and consolidating the cease-fire remains one of
the three key topics discussed at the peace talks at this stage.
At the first five sessions of talks, the parties
have agreed to expand confidence-building measures. These measures to promote
human security and inter-ethnic co-operation in the north and, particularly, in
the east where Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalese all live in considerable numbers.
Measures being taken include monthly meetings between the SLMM, the Sri Lankan
military and the LTTEs military command, as well as committees in the three
districts of the Eastern Province with membership from Muslims and the LTTE
to resolve land and other issues between Muslims and
Tamils in these areas.
A second area the parties have
focused a great deal on in the peace talks is the humanitarian and
rehabilitation needs in the war-affected areas. They are aware of the
imperative of meeting the humanitarian needs of the population on the ground,
while tackling the political issues.
A challenge for the process after
a year of cease-fire and five sessions of peace talks is to sustain popular
support for negotiating a political solution by demonstrating a tangible peace
dividend to the population. For progress
on political questions to be possible, living conditions must improve both
in the war-affected areas of the north and east, and in the south where
development has been dampened and poverty exacerbated by the indirect effects
of conflict.
In the 2nd session of talks last October,
the parties set up a Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and
Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN). The first task of this
committee was to assist the Norwegian Government in preparing for a
political-level meeting of key governments in Oslo on 25 November. The meeting
mobilised political support for the peace process and drew pledges of USD 60-70
mill. for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation action in the north and
east and development projects in the south.
The joint Sub-Committee has identified three priority
areas for assistance in the north and east:
- Resettling and rehabilitating
Internally Displaced Persons,
- Rehabilitating war-affected
women and children, and
- Assisting with re-establishing
livelihoods for war-affected people in the north and east
The World Bank has agreed to administer a Northeast
Reconstruction Fund (NERF) to channel assistance to projects selected by
the parties in the these priority areas. Governments and organisations can also
fund projects directly in consultation with the SIHRN. The government of Japan
is arranging a Donor Conference for Sri Lanka in June to gather support
for longer-term reconstruction and development in all of Sri Lanka.
In addition to focusing on (1) the consolidation of
the cease-fire and (2) measures to facilitate humanitarian activities in the
north and east, the parties have made important progress on political issues
relating to a final solution to the conflict.
At the third session of talks
in Oslo in December 2002, the parties reached agreement on the basic principles
for a political solution “founded on the principle of
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the
Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.” In the talks ahead the parties plan to focus
on substantive issues in designing a federal system for Sri Lanka
including: Power-sharing between the centre and the region, as well as within
the centre, the geographical region, human rights protection, political and
administrative mechanisms, fiscal federalism, and law and order. The LTTE has
appointed a Political Committee of leading young political cadres, which has
begun to study political models, particularly federal systems, and which will
contribute to political capacity building and transformation within the LTTE.
As in other areas, capacity, public education and acceptance and implementation
will be long-term challenges for both sides in developing a federal solution.
The parties have already made progress in the area
of human rights. They have appointed a leading HR expert (Ian Martin,
former Secretary General, Amnesty International) to advise them on addressing
human rights in the peace process. Martin will join the 6th session
of talks in Japan in March (18-21) to discuss a possible human rights roadmap
with the parties. Also relating to the area of human rights, the LTTE has
agreed with UNICEF to work out a comprehensive plan for ending underage
recruitment and rehabilitating children affected by war. A Sub-Committee on
Gender Issues will meet for the first time in early March to work on the
effective inclusion of gender issues in the peace process.
Looking ahead, the parties will continue to work on
the three key challenges of consolidating the cease-fire, securing humanitarian
assistance for the north and east and developing a political solution. This
process will take time and face setbacks along the way. The parties will
need the support of the population, civil society and the international
community to reach their goal. Norway is committed to assist the parties as a
patient partner in this effort, and we are pleased that many partners in the
international and local communities are assisting the process in their own
ways.
The Peace Process in Sri
Lanka and the Role of Civil Society
By Camilla Orjuela
Presentation at Conference on Peace, Development and Rehabilitation in North-East Sri Lanka, in Tromsö 28 February 2003
Thanks a lot for inviting me to this far northern place, which to me appears more exotic than Sri Lanka (as I have visited that island many times over the last ten years, but never in my life been this far north). I will spend this little less than an hour to talk about the ongoing peace process – but most of all about civil society peace work and the role of civil society actors can play in this process. I will discuss whether there is a peace movement in Sri Lanka, what type of peace work civil society actors engage in, and the obstacles to the creation of a peoples movement to peace in Sri Lanka, and finally I will list some challenges to civil society in the current peace process.
The Peace
Process
When I two years ago asked peace activists and experts on conflict resolution, about the prospects for peace, the most common answer was “No, it doesn’t seem that there will be any change towards peace within the next five years”. The war had escalated dramatically after the failed peace process in 1994-95 and there was no hope for any change.
But today the situation looks fundamentally different. We have since a year back a ceasefire agreement which have managed to put a stop to the violence – violence which have dominated life in Sri Lanka over the last 19 years, since the war broke out in 1983. In 2001, 2500 persons were killed in the war. In 2002, only 20 persons were killed. Although this of course is 20 too many, we can see a fundamental change in the level of violence.
The ceasefire also means an improved situation for the war weary people in Sri Lanka. Checkpoints are taken away, people are more free to move and travel. Roads are open, for instance the A9 road linking Jaffna to the south of the country. Fishermen are allowed out to the sea again, and displaced families are moving back to their former homes, and the rebuilding of the war torn areas is being planned and started. In the south, civilians do not need to fear bombs, and can rejoice over the fact that the ‘defence levy’ earlier charged on goods and services has been taken away.
These improvements gave an initial optimism about the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka. However, a year and five rounds of peace talks later, we have to realise that large amounts of patience is needed in this difficult process. The reconstruction and resettlement in the northeast is not going as fast as expected - people still live in extremely difficult situations - while in the south, costs of living have continued to rise, in spite of the end of the fighting.
While the first rounds of talks afforded positive surprises and unexpected steps forward, during the last few months, the process seems to have slowed down. The high security zones of the Sri Lankan military, making it impossible for civilians to resettle in large parts of the Jaffna peninsula, and the continued military presence there have been brought up as one major problem, as has the human rights abuses of the LTTE – continued child recruitment, abductions and extortion of taxes.
But there are major achievements. The fact that a third party is involved is crucial. The ceasefire agreement, as well as the peace talks, have been facilitated by Norway, and Scandinavian monitors are in Sri Lanka to overlook its implementation. The importance of having a third party keeping up the dialogue between the parties, and investigating accusations of violations of the ceasefire agreement cannot be underestimated in a conflict where mistrust has throughout the years grown strong between the parties.
The peace talks have also proved that dialogue is possible, and mutual trust has been established between the representative of the two parties. The agreement that there will be a federal solution to the conflict is also a large step forward: both sides have agree that the Tamil areas in the northeast will have self-determination, without threatening the territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan state. This is so far only a statement – official agreements and forms for how this is going to be implemented still have to be worked out.
This is a peace process at an
official level, or along track one, in the conflict resolution vocabulary. But
what I now will turn to is the peace building and conflict resolution efforts
which are needed – and carried out – at other, unofficial levels, among
representatives of civil society and among grassroots people.
Searching for
a Peace Movement in Sri Lanka
In my research I have interviewed and spent time with civil society representatives, peace activists and NGOs in SL, to see the work they are doing to promote peace – mainly in southern Sri Lanka, but also in the North and East. I was on the outlook for a peace movement in Sri Lanka, which would be able to pressure for a just end to the war, and to start reconciliation processes from the bottom, in order to make the main actors in the war make peace (and justice) at the top level.
In Sri Lanka there is a wide array of organisations working for peace, foreign as well as local (I am here mainly interested in the Sri Lankan organisations), active at national as well as local levels. There are professional conflict resolution organisations such as the National Peace Council, research institutions such as the International Centre for Ethnic Studies and Centre for Policy Alternatives, cultural groups like Centre for Performing Arts, several women’s organisations working for peace, the Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality, SEDEC which is tied to the Catholic church and the Sarvodaya movement inspired by Gandhian and Buddhist philosophy. There is also an increased interest among organisations working with development, women’s issues, culture etc. to also work for peace and conflict resolution.
Since the late nineties and up to this last year, organisations like these have been expressing ideas that were not commonly accepted, and which went against the war-logic: they have stressed the need for a negotiated, political settlement, and the futility of the military strategy. Today, they are “fighting a winning battle”. The dominant discourse is that for peace and political solutions to the conflict. But this, naturally, does not mean that the work of civil society actors is no longer needed.
The Task of
Peace Organisations
One important task for the civil society actors is to raise awareness about the causes of war, and about the grievances of the other side. This is order to counter the ethnic polarisation which has taken place in Sri Lanka throughout the years of conflict and violence. The education system is segregated, and children and students learn very little about the history of the war, and about the language and religion of other ethnic groups, which they have very little contact with.. A large ethnic cleavage is visible also in the media. Sinhalese language media give one picture and Tamil language media another, and there is nowhere for these two pictures to meet. There is thus a great need to bring people together across ethnic divisions, educate them about peace, organise cultural exchange, promote dialogue between religious leaders, have youth visit youth in other parts of the country, and Sinhalese journalists travel to the Tamil parts of the island etc.
All this serves to build a peace constituency, that is to build from the bottom-up support for peace negotiations, and for political solutions involving some kind of power sharing. This will be necessary to legitimise the peace process.
Advocacy work is another important area of activity. Many civil society organisations provide political leaders with information about for instance the costs of the war, the popular support for peace, ideas on solutions to conflict, and pressure their political leaders to stop human rights abuses and to opt for and keep up dialogue. Mass demonstrations and rallies are valuable ways to show the politicians the view of ‘the people’.
However, in the history of Sri Lanka popular mobilisation has often served to augment conflicts and trigger violence. This has made analysts talk about ‘uncivil society’ rather than civil society. People have organised around narrow ethnic identities, and mobilised around prejudice, hatred or fear against the ethnic other. This was especially clear in violence against Tamils in 1983, but also in many other instances of ethnic violence. Popular pressure not to reach political agreements preserving the rights of the Tamils have also been frequently used in modern Sri Lankan history.
The role of peace organisations is here to prevent popular violence or chauvinist expressions – something which can be done if institutions for dialogue is created, if people know the other instead of fearing him/her, and thus not follow nationalist and violent leaders. And if resources and “development” are distributed justly between the different groups, their rights are respected, so that there is no need for protests along ethnic lines.
People and
the Peace Process
Today, most people is supportive of the peace process. In an opinion poll made in September last year with people from all ethnic groups in SL, 86 percent believed that the war could not be ended through a military victory of one of the sides, but that peace talks were necessary.
58 percent believed that an international third party is essential or has a positive impact for the talks, while 42 percent said they approve of Norway assisting (22 percent disapprove) in the peace process.
The war weariness and want for peace of the people has also been visible in election results, not least when the governing coalition came to power in December 2001 on their campaigns for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
However, there has also been demonstrations against the peace process. Not least last week-end when the first anniversary of the ceasefire agreement was celebrated. JVP, the third largest political party (which has a violent history), staged large demonstrations against the ceasefire agreement, and the peace process, which they mean is a sell-out of the country to the LTTE. Buddhist clergy and other Sinhalese nationalist groups have also taken part in protests against the peace process, as has important representatives from the Peoples Alliance, the main opposition coalition to which the president belongs. Fear of a division of the country is central in the rhetoric of those who oppose the peace process.
At the moment, popular support for the peace process is strong - very few people would like to go back to the war situation which prevailed before the ceasefire agreement and the peace process started – and these critical groups are keeping a relatively low profile. But when the peace process runs into serious difficulties, or comes to a standstill, and people get increasingly frustrated when nothing happens, they might be able to gain more support.
In the northeast, the anniversary of the ceasefire agreement was in many places not joyfully celebrated. Instead, general shut-downs and demonstrations were carried out, protesting the fact that for most people in the northeast, it has not brought normalisation. These protests are directed against the government of Sri Lanka, and its inability to improve the situation for the people in the northeast. In the northeast, there have not been a free and independent civil society, and freedom of protest, due to military rule by the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE. The protests against the ceasefire agreement was clearly sanctioned by the LTTE, and express standpoints which are on the lines with the LTTE views. Shows very clearly that the LTTE, and the people of the northeast, who live under their powers, still see the government as an enemy which is to blame for all the faults in the peace process – and not as a partner with whom one has to talk to solve the disputes which have lead to the long war.
Both in the northeast and in the south of Sri Lanka, the ability to see improvements from the peace process is important in order to create popular support for peace. In spite of all the problems with resettlement and rebuilding of the northeast, the Tamils are probably those who can most clearly experience the change brought about by the peace process – the new possibilities to move freely, and the stop to the violence.
But for the majority of the Sinhalese the war has not been experienced that directly - instead poverty and high costs of living are the largest problems – problems which the ceasefire agreement and the peace process has not brought a solution to. It is thus important, for the support of the Sinhalese, that they also see how they can benefit from an end to the war.
As I said before, the ongoing peace process is a top level one. In the opinion poll referred to above 80 percent of the people polled said that they were aware about the first peace talks held in Thailand. However, only 15 percent were aware of the outcome of the meeting.
Generally, the knowledge about the process is limited. In the south of Sri Lanka, much effort is spent on discussing disputes between the main (Sinhalese dominated) political parties and the war has always been “far away” (except for the fact that young men get employment – and maybe face death - in the armed forces). There is thus an urgent need to get the peace issue on the agenda of people and for people to receive correct information about what is going on and why.
To inform and involve the people in the peace process is a task for the parties in the conflict – but also something which civil society can and does contribute to.
Obstacles to
a Peace Movement in Sri Lanka
However, we have a long way to go before we can talk about a mass based peace movement in Sri Lanka. Although there are many individuals very committed to peace, and a lot of important and tireless activities going on, mass mobilisation is seldom seen. There are a number of explanations to this:
a) Difficulty to mobilise
Rallies organised by peace organisation, for instance the Peoples Peace Front, which is a coalition representing over 50 organisations, have drawn a few thousands of people in Colombo, and hundreds of people in other towns in the country. The Sarvodaya peace meditations have been far larger, but advanced no political peace messages.
This is to compare with the rallies organised by political parties which can easily draw tens of thousands of participants.
Why are most people not willing to come out on the streets for peace? For the Sinhalese, the answer is often that peace is not what is most urgently needed in their lives – day to day survival is much more urgent, and they don’t see a clear link between the war and their life situation. Political rallies can give advantages if the political party supported gain power – but peace marches give no such benefits.
For the Tamils, publicly taking political stands have made them targets for political violence (by both the government forces and the LTTE) – thus they often do not mobilise for security reasons. However, we have over the last year seen a number of large events in the northeast of Sri Lanka where civilians mobilise. E.g. the Pongu Tamil demonstrations, which are linked to the universities and have drawn thousands of participants. Sometimes the demonstrations have carried peace messages, but most often they concentrated on asserting the Tamil identity and rights, taking an LTTE position against the government. And these popular protests are not linked up with the peace movement in the south.
b) Ethnically divided civil society
But it shall also be emphasised that the peace movement, or the non-governmental peace organisations, are to a large extent based in southern Sri Lanka and dominated by the Sinhalese. Society in Sri Lanka suffers from years of ethnic polarisation, and a north-south divide – and this is very visible also in civil society. Many organisations do not draw members or participants from all ethnic groups, but only from one. As one Tamil activist I interviewed said to me: “What is this peace? Peace for the Tamils might mean that the army should leave the north and east. While peace for the Sinhalese might mean the elimination of the LTTE”. Thus the goal ‘peace’ needs to be specified and different ideas of what it means need to be negotiated.
c) Vague definition of peace
Often, civil society peace activists do not really define peace. The peace they work for is something vague, something good in general. This makes it possible to include a lot of people – even maybe those who are pro-war!! - but it is a blunt tool to use to make a difference. It needs to be more specific, in order for campaigns to be more efficient. There is also a tendency for a number of actors (including the parties to the conflict) to co-opt the word ‘peace’. The increased use of the peace concept makes it run the risk to lose its meaning.
d) Colombo based
Sri Lanka is since colonial times a heavily centralised state (which in fact is an underlying cause of the ongoing conflict). And the peace movement has followed that pattern. Many organisations are Colombo based, run by middle class, educated people – many of whom are doing a great job. But sometimes the links out to the rest of the country are not strong enough. Organisations with a mass base, such as trade unions, student organisations and village based organisations are often not involved, but are concerned with and work on other issues.
e) Dependency on foreign funding
Peace NGOs are also very dependent on foreign funding. Western governments have increasingly come to be interested in supporting peace in Sri Lanka – something which make possible a lot of the activities in civil society. But it also has a reverse. It is the English speaking Colombo based organisations which manage to get the funding – something which increases the gap between the urban and rural organisations. And many of the organisations cannot do much without the goodwill of the foreign donors, as they lack a spirit of voluntarism. Depending on foreign funding also creates a legitimacy problem for them as Sinhalese nationalists can claim that they are not genuine but bought by the foreign governments. Receiving funds from abroad also means that the organisations are primarily accountable not to the people of Sri Lanka but to foreign actors.
Although development aid make possible a lot of important activities within civil society, it cannot create a peoples movement for peace in Sri Lanka – that has to be done by the people themselves.
Challenges
for Civil Society in the Peace Process
All these problems needs to be worked with continuously, in order to develop a broad based people’s movement for peace, which can work for peace along other tracks than the official peace process track, and among the people.
Finally, I would like to point out some challenges for the civil society actors promoting peace in Sri Lanka;
1) To continue voicing people’s support and want for peace, to bring people out to the streets to show the leaders that they support the process – and – also very important - to hold the leaders accountable to their promises.
2) To continue awareness raising about the background to the conflict, the peace process, the perspectives and needs of the other side, and the possibilities for and importance of a solution. There is a need for self-criticism and reflection on both sides, as well as of an understanding of what people have learnt is the enemy. The wrongs committed has to be ransacked, the rational for it understood, so that the different sides can be partners, instead of enemies in this process.
3) A third challenge is to show that there are other voices to be heard too in the peace process – not only the ones of the government and the LTTE. Among the Sinhalese, the Tamils and other ethnic groups – not least the Muslim minority should be mentioned here - there are many other actors and stakeholders which need to be involved in the peace process. Other political parties, militants or civic groups are among these – some of which are supportive of the peace process, and some of which are highly critical to the way it is carried out, and who feel marginalized by it. The challenge is to provide space for these voices and actors too. The respect for human rights of all groups is an important concern which have already been taken up by civil society actors.
4) A forth important task is to build bridges between the north and south of Sri Lanka, to bridge the polarisation of ethnic groups and the isolation of the war areas (especially the north). It is now possible for people to travel and visit each other, and this is an opportunity to support cooperation between civil society representatives - youth, religious leaders etc. - but also to contribute to normalise and improve life in the war zone. People from southern Sri Lanka get to see the situation in the north, and could assist in the rebuilding of the north. A healing process has to take place where positive meetings and the building of structures for systematic cooperation will be important. Along with the processes of rebuilding, a reconstruction and democratisation of civil society in the northeast has to take place, assisted by civil society in the south.
5) Finally, I see an important role played by international civil society. Many of the organisations I have been studying in SL have international links, and cooperate with NGOs here in Europe and elsewhere. There is a global civil society with an interest in what is happening in SL and which has an important task in keeping Sri Lanka on the global agenda (I am not saying that Sri Lanka is ever at the top of such agenda, but it is there). It is essential that the international community sees what is going on in Sri Lanka, keeps an eye on human rights, keeps the pressure necessary to motivate both parties in the peace talks – and that international actors help (not least financially) in reconstruction and reconciliation processes which will have to continue a long, long time after the war is over.
By Dr. A. S. Soosai, Dept of Geography, University of Jaffna
It has been almost one year since
the war, which prolonged for the last two decades in the North Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka which is the traditional homeland of Tamils, was brought
to an end temporarily. The ceasefire agreed with by both the government headed by the Hon. Prime Minister, Mr. Ranil
Wickramasingha who came to power with the peace mandate from the people and the
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Elam (LTTE) who constituted a major participation in
the war and memorandum of
understanding, signed by both parties in February 2002 with the mediation of
Norway has been historically significant events in the peace process. So far,
four rounds of peace talks between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka
(GOSL) have been with the assistance of Norwegian government in various parts
of the world.
These
peace initiatives carried out in a convincing Manner have been admired by
various countries of the world victory
to peace. Several international countries and funding organization have come
forward to render possible assistance to restore the North Eastern of Sri Lanka
that has been devastated by the war. It is our responsibility to completely
build up our economically and socially undermined regions, by using these rare
opportunities. It’s notable that there is the confidence that peace would continue
to prevail and a viable and lasting
solution to the problems of the Tamils would be found after Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) was signed. As stated above the civil administration in
the North East region in a staggering state as this region is currently
administered by the LTTE in certain area and by Sri Lanka army in some other
areas. Further, the country witnesses the fragile government headed by the
Prime Minister Hon. Mr. Ranil Wickerama Singha on one hand and on the other
hand the rigid exercise of the executive President Her Excellency Mrs.
Chandrika Kumaradunga Bandarnayaka. The role of the opposition parties
including JVP and Sihala Urumaya has
always been an obstacle to the negotiation between the LTTE and the GOSL
under the patronage of the Govt. of Norway. In the East, the members of the
Muslim community have been agitating for a separate administrative unit.
Consequently, a conflicting situation which may resist considerably the
measures adopted to bring peace has
arisen. In the initial stage of the peace process though a memorandum could be
gained gradually a setback has been experienced due to the aforesaid
hindrances. The negative stand of the government and the security forces in
resettling the people in their own areas can be mainly ascribed to the setback
in the peace process displaced.
The NE province of Sri Lanka, is
composed of eight administrative districts. However, fragmentation of the
province in administration can be viewed as a sequel of the involvement of both
LTTE and state forces in their claming administrative power and authority as
follows:
01. Cleared areas (areas
controlled by SL Army).
02. Uncleared areas
(areas controlled by LTTE).
03. High Security Areas
in the cleared areas (1997 - August Gazette declaration).
(H)
Landmine areas (areas previously occupied by the state forces).
As a consequence of the long war in this
region there has been continuous displacement from this region, to the other
areas of the country. These displacements are of two types.
01. One type of
displacement was caused when civilian residential areas were captured by the
state forces and the residents were
ousted from their are as a part of military strategy.
The present security zones are included in the areas from
where people were displaced. It is also reported that the displacement of
Muslims community from the North of the country due to political reason is also
included in this type of displacement. The displacement of Muslim community
mostly occurred in the North.
Calamities
of war, Consequent deaths, paralyzed state of normal life and lack of
employment opportunities have been the factors that caused the type of
displacement from the NE to other parts of the countries. Those who were
displaced from the areas controlled by the state army to the areas controlled
by the LTTE are also included in this
type.
Members of the Sinhala and Muslim
communities and other some families residing in the areas controlled by the
LTTE were displaced from these areas to other parts of Sri Lanka.
Displacement and
re-settlement
As the result of the war of the last
twenty years, more than (1000000) people have been displaced from the North
East province and living locally. Around 6 million people have been displaced
to foreign countries (TRO – 2003). Among those displaced 45000 families are
staying in Welfare camps, 15,000 families in the houses their relatives and
friends, 65,000 persons in Tamil Nadu and 600000 persons in other foreign
countries. The particulars of those displaced district wise and AGA division wise are also available. (See
Table ).
The
most displacements have been from the districts such as Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Mannr, Mullaitheevu and Vavuniya in the North. Among these
displaced people 164711 person from 45600 families are assessed to be in
welfare camps and 788948 persons from 212208 families are staying out of their
camps.
As normalcy has been returned in certain
areas, a considerable number of people have resettled in their own areas.
However, the restriction of the SL Army still exists particularly in the Jaffna
district in the North. According to the MOU, the forces should have vacated
from public places, places of worship, schools etc within 160 days after the
date of agreement. But, the armed forces haven’t vacated from such places even
after the lapse of the deadline. The armed forces are observed stationed in
almost all parts of the NE region. Some
camps may have been shifted to other areas but there has been no change of the
movements of the forces with arms among the people. The camps of the forces can
be still seen in the civilian residential areas and new camps are emerging in
new places. (de-minering places). The president has been stressing that the LTTE should lay down the arms before
the peace talks and the army demands that the LTTE should be disarmed and the
cannons and mortars belonging to them
should be defused.
Another major threat to the
establishment of the peace in the NE region is the HSZs in the army controlled
area cleared areas, there zones declare in August, 1977 by the government.
These security zones were declared in the pretext of protecting the areas of Military strategic point in the
Jaffna peninsula these zone lie in thirteen places around the peninsula (See
Table ). The most important area of these included the Palaly Airport and the
Kankesanthurai harbour.
Within this area, an extent of 49 square
kilo meter has been declared as the high security zone. The high security zone
of 34.5 square k.m is at Eluthumadduval in Thenmaradchy. A total extent of
144.5 Sq.k.m. Constitutes the entire
high security zones. Around 30388 families have moved away from these areas. These areas comprising 67 G.S
divisions and 246 Hindu temples and 47 Government schools have been closed
down. The displaced subjects of these
areas include 16027 agricultural families and 4436 families of fishing folk. An
agricultural land of 12259 Hectare has been abandoned. Further, a coastal line
of 81.5 k.m has been prohibited from people’s entry. More than 40 industrial
units including the K.K.S factory have been closed down.
Under such circumstances, farmers,
fishermen and the employees of the 40
industrial units in these areas have been displaced and staying in refugee camps and relatives’ houses. In
this state of affairs, the state forces have expressed their reluctance in
leaving the high security zones and it could be only on many conditions they
might leave the high security zones.
Lieutenant General Mr. Nambiar who has been appointed as the Consultant
to the Sri Lankan Government has specified the conditions in his report
pertaining to the issue of high security zones, thus. The state army will
withdraw from the high security zones
provided that the LTTE is
prepared to display their arms for indiscriminate inspection and
withdraw them from their strongholds.
It can be observed that at this time
when ceasefire is effected and peace initiatives are in progress, the state
army deployed in the homeland of Tamils have constructed Viharas adjoining the
areas where their camps are situated,
in the name of religion only with the intention of seizing the land an uncivilized act. The Tamils are not anti Buddhist. However they have been at the
barbaric act of constructing Viharas in
their traditional homeland where they intensely observe their cultural values
and unique social norms. In fact the armed forces have been engaged in
consolidating their positions by extending their military territories in the pretext of practicing their religion.
For instance, at Ariyalai in Jaffna, such attempt of constructing a Vihara was
given up following a strong protest by the public. At Kantharodai, also, there
have been attempts to expand a certain area where a Buddha image has already
been enshrined, with a motive of making the area a significant place of worship to impress the travelers
from the South of the island when they visit this spot. Demonstrations against
this act are still going on.
There have been frequent instances when
the public were subject to physical harassment when they protested against the
brutal practices of the armed forces in the North and the East after the
Memorandum of Understanding was signed. When the people demonstrated against
the assault of the army on the Tamil militants in the first week of October
2002, seven members of the public were shot dead by the army. In a protest
march organized in Trincomalee against this killing, three participants were
killed. Similar protests were held at Vadamaradchy demanding the withdrawal of
the forces from school in 2002 and at Manipay in Jaffna even the women cadres
of the LTTE were assaulted by the army very recently.
An American scholar, Prof. Son. M.Richerson commented thus on 1st
of August, 2000.
“The
armed forces are trained in such a manner that they treat those whom they
encounter as enemies.
The act of a
Government to use its forces against its own nation probably implies the long
term crisis and conflict in the country. It is quite applicable to the current
situation in Sri Lanka as well.”
It’s
clear that if such sinister activities of the Armed Forces prolong, it may be a
threat to the peace initiative.
Subsequent to the signing of MOU,
measures are being adopted to expedite the development projects in the war torn
North and the East regions. It’s true that fund assistance is being provided
following the completion of four rounds
of peace talks. However the success of the developmental projects depends solely on the constructive
approach towards peace restoration. There are still some impediments on the
development schemes to be worked out in these regions.
It’s a deplorable state of affairs that
though the North East Province is a separate administrative unit, it is not
vested with adequate powers.
This
province is not empowered to adopt developmental measures or to provide
employment opportunities. Since the Central Government is vested with powers to
take decisions, the provincial based developmental schemes are carried out on
racial basis. During the last two decades no major industrial projects were
initiated or on the basis of the open economy scheme no foreign investments
were allowed to carry out. Projects like free Trade zone, and Industrial Park
which may provide career opportunities to the natives were not initiated .
Economic sanctions and ban on fishing were in force in these regions. The power
to take decisions with regard to these issues are with the Central Government
authorities. The politically indifferent tendency of the Government itself
is a hindrance to the developments in
the North and the East.
The shortage of human resource required
for the economic progress in the North East province is a big shortcoming.
Resource persons of adequate number processing technical know how are a must
for the successful implementation of economic projects. This province suffered
brain drain to a great extent following the outburst of war. Men of high
professions such as doctors, engineers, lecturers and teachers are included in
those who left for foreign countries. Consequently the Universities and
hospitals in this province have heavily
suffered shortage of professionals. A considerable extent of service in these
institutions has been rendered by NGOs and
Volunteer organizations. For want of expertise, many industries were
closed down and no new enterprisings
were started.
In the current situation, the services
of specialists , consultants and educationists are needed to restore and
restructure the shuttered economy of these regions. Schemes are underway with
the assistance from NGOs and Sri Lankan experts abroad. The NGOs are quite
considerable in stabilizing the economy. There is the acute shortage of
resource persons sectors like agriculture and marine resources. These who are
specialized in the field of information technology are also very rarely found.
This dearth of resource persons compels the local authorities to seek the
service of foreign experts. Institutions like the Advanced Technical Institute
and Tertiary level Educational
Institutions which may produce technical experts are very few in number
in these areas. Such shortages become major obstacle in promoting the economy
in these areas.
In order to accelerate the activities
involved in the economic promotion in the North East province, a proper
transport network and communication facilities are very essential. Transport of
people, and goods and services from one place to another is indispensable in
this regard. Due to the disastrous war, transport and communication have been
crippled in this part of the country. Particularly, the transport between the
chief administrative centers in the North East provinces and the capital of the
country has been adversely affected. Because of the restrictions and delay in
obtaining travel pass, increased fares, checking of luggages at Army Sentry points,
limited service of vehicles etc., the passengers suffered higher expense and
delay in reaching their destination. The main route called A9 route between and
the railway line between Jaffna and Colombo were completely closed and other
railway routes to the Eastern province from Colombo were also paralyzed.
Passengers were compelled to travel
from Jaffna with high flight cost and by ship with long time duration. The
marketing of products of Jaffna was completely disrupted.
There
has been a rapid change in transport following the opening of the A 9
route as a part of the ceasefire
agreement. Yet the transport between Jaffna and Colombo is still closed for
transport on Sundays and at night all
days. Besides the Jaffna – Mannar land route hasn’t yet been opened and the
railway still remains un-repaired. Some local streets adjoining army camps are
impossible on account of the defence purpose. Consequently, the wastage of
money and delay in travel are still continuing. The said shortcomings
pertaining to transport serve only to jeopardize the economic activities.
The electricity supply in the North
hasn’t yet been regularized. Further, the first communication facilities
including E-Mail, Fax, etc. are
available only in very few places and the inadequacy of such service urgent
messages. It’s needless to mention about the urgency of these facilities in
fulfilling needs connected with development project.
The following suggestions may be
appropriate to restore the economy in the war torn areas in the North East
province of the island.
The suggestions put forward and measures taken with regard
to the restoration of peace should build up confidence among the masses and
focus should be made on the following.
These
who have been displaced should be resettled in their own residential area
without delay.
All
basic facilities including housing and other necessities should be made
available to these resettled.
Arrangements
should be made immediately to provide essential service and satisfy societal
needs of the people resettled.
Action
should be taken to provide employment opportunities to the unemployed youths.
Initiative
should be taken to create a calm environment for the independent movement of
people.
An
appropriately structured institutionalized constitution should be drafted and
the state sector and the private sector organizations should be made to
function under a single administrative authority.
The
vacancies for resource persons should be filled immediately in these regions.
In consideration of the current need, suitably qualified and skilled resource
persons should be recruited.
The
public sector should be stabilised with necessary resources, including official
building, infrastructure facilities, residential quarters, communication
facilities, etc.
Sufficient
motivation should be given to encourage the private sector in these regions and
proper measures should be taken to make the private sector organizations to
realize their social responsibility.
The
financial Institutions should be encouraged to provide financial assistance to
the private sector so as to ensure investment in developmental projects.
Schemes
should be formulated to promote human resource by implementing the following.
1) Establishing
Advanced Technical Institutions.
2) Commencing technical
based courses.
3) Providing career
Guidance assistance.
4) Identifying the
school leavers and persuading them to incorporate into the society.
Sufficient attention should be made on reconstruction
activities to accelerate the economic process in the affected areas. The damages to the buildings caused by
shelling and bombing and deliberate demolishing by armed forces in connection
with defense purposes should be repaired with no delay. Several schools and Government
Departments still remain defunct. Hence action should be taken to renovate or
repair such buildings immediately. Further, in the process of planning and
implementing projects in industry, fisheries and agriculture service of
resource personnel including consultants, specialists and technical staff
should be obtained, if needed from foreign countries.
Above
all, the power of exercising law and order is in the hands of Police and Armed
authorities who occasionally misuse their power in an unjust manner leading to
public harassment in varying degrees and varying manner. Hence amendments
should be made to the constitution so as to transfer the legislative power to
the hands of Tamil representatives with regard to the exercise of law and
order. This move too will contribute to the perfection of peace
initiative.
Dr.A.S.Sosai
Senior
Lecturer
University
of Jaffna
28.02.2003
Ministry of Rehabilitation,
Reconstruction, Social Welfare, Buildings & Women Affairs, NEP.
(As at
July 2002)
|
District |
In Camps |
Out of Camps |
Total |
|||
|
Family |
Persons |
Family |
Persons |
Family |
Persons |
|
|
Ampara |
221 |
796 |
88 |
415 |
309 |
1211 |
|
Anuradhapura |
2167 |
9070 |
335 |
1249 |
2502 |
10319 |
|
Batticaloa |
5443 |
22007 |
62 |
142 |
5505 |
22149 |
|
Jaffna |
4333 |
16767 |
102451 |
356979 |
106784 |
373746 |
|
Kilinochchi |
6867 |
28755 |
23342 |
91795 |
30209 |
120550 |
|
Kurunagale |
225 |
925 |
261 |
1090 |
486 |
2015 |
|
Mannar |
5960 |
23179 |
17683 |
68859 |
23643 |
92038 |
|
Mullaitivu |
5667 |
23235 |
22912 |
94753 |
28579 |
117988 |
|
Puttalam |
3807 |
18443 |
10828 |
54252 |
14635 |
72695 |
|
Trincomalee |
1216 |
4726 |
2590 |
NA |
3806 |
NA |
|
Vavuniya |
4354 |
16808 |
31656 |
119414 |
36010 |
136222 |
|
Grand
Total: |
40260 |
164711 |
212208 |
788948 |
252468 |
948933 |
Source :
TRO, Kilinochchi.
ON THE SRI LANK PEACE PROCESS
By Mr.
Kalyananda Godage
Insurrections and lead up
to the current negotiations
Sri Lanka has seen three
insurgencies in the past 30 years. Two
of them were Marxist inspired in 1971
and 1988 in the south of Sri Lanka. These insurrections took almost 30,000 of
lives the third insurrection which began in the late 70s has become a
separatist’s war which has acquired even more horrendous proportions.. The figure of dead has been put at 60,000
combatants and non-combatants. During
the past 20 years, three attempts have been made to secure a negotiated
settlement and we have now embarked on a fourth. The first was brokered by the Indians between 1983 and 1987. That settlement took the form essentially of
an agreement between India and the
Government of Sri Lanka. It was in that sense inherently flawed and led to war
between Indian army and the LTTE. That
ended only when the Indian army was requested to the leave the country by the
Govt. of SL. The second attempt was
made immediately after the Indian Peace Keeping Force left Sri Lanka. The
Government of the President Premadasa negotiated with the LTTE for over one
year but the war recommenced in 1991.The third attempt was made after President
Kumaratunga took office in 1994. The
negotiations that commenced under her direction were conducted directly between the parties without a any third
party facilitator. That efforts too
failed and a fourth effort to reach a negotiated settlement has now commenced.
Several reasons could be adduced for the resumption of negotiations and this fourth attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. A stalemate has been reached in the war and both sides seem to have conceded that a military victory is not achievable. Both parties to the conflict feel drained. This time around there are also new factors which can be identified, the first being the international environment after Sept. 11th; equally important is the fact that this is the first time we have had a structured approach to the negotiations, commencing with a detailed ceasefire agreement (which many in the country considered be a sell-out.).
There is no doubt that events of Sept. 11th and the strong commitment of the international community to wipe out terrorism in all it forms, whatever the justification had an impact. This would certainly have been a consideration for the LTTE, which has been proscribed as a terrorist organization in many countries, agreeing to negotiate.
The long drawn out war had also drained the resources of both sides. The economy of the country was in shambles and its foreign debt absolutely enormous. The war had diverted resources from social and economic development and this was creating an explosive situation in the south. As stated earlier the LTTE itself was undoubtedly hampered by its proscription in the west. The challenge thus facing the government and the LTTE was to produce a win-win result, for no other option is acceptable to the two sides. The process therefore had to move away from positional bargaining to problem solving. I shall refer this to greater detail later. It is not only Norway but other Scandinavian countries are also playing an important role in the peace process. The Ceasefire Agreement provided for the establishment of an international monitoring mission composed of Scandinavian monitors who were required to monitor the CFA. I shall refer to the ceasefire monitoring exercise later.
The immediate dividend of the cessation of hostilities, has been an end to direct violence. I could say without fear of contradiction that over 2,000 lives would perhaps have been saved in this one year, not to mention those who have been maimed and injured during this past one year. It was also created a tremendous aura of tranquility in the south. In the north, despite the fact that there is a large presence of government troops, the fact that there is no war has meant that there is no violence and the people are grateful for that. They are also grateful that reconstruction and rehabilitation of the North and East has begun. Two extremely important projects which are having an immediate impact on the people in the Northern province itself, have been the humanitarian de-mining programme, for there is said to be over 1.5 million mines laid by both sides and secondly, the return of internally displaced persons to their homes.
I speak to you today after a year has elapsed since the ceasefire agreement was entered upon. Negotiations got into a regular timeframe and institutional mechanisms to underpin the peace talks have been set up and are functioned. The ceasefire agreement came into effect on the 23rd of February and comprised of a preamble and four articles.
The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) comprises a Preamble and four Articles:
Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire
Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy
Article 3:The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the Agreement.
The main provisions of these articles were, briefly, as follows:
Under this article the two
parties undertook not to engage in offensive military operations, including air
and naval operations. They undertook not to move into and move arms into each
other’s areas. The article also provided for the gradual increase in family
visits by the LTTE cadres, provided they were unarmed and in plain clothes. Political activity in government-controlled
areas was also permitted to LTTE cadres on a step-by-step basis (D+30, and D+60
days). After 90 days (D+90) there was to be no limit, provided they were
unarmed, in plain clothes and carried identity papers.
Under this article the two parties were to act in accordance with the standards of international law and refrain from “hostile acts against the civilian population, including acts such as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.”
There were a series of deadlines for the return of places of worship (D+30), school buildings (D+60) and a schedule for the return of public buildings was to be drawn up by D+30 days. All these were to be completed by D+160 days, which fell on August 2. Provision was made for special circumstances such as premises located in “high security zones.”
To facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, trunk roads which were subjected to restrictions such as the Trincomalee-Habarana (by D+ 10 days), and the A9 (by D+30 days) roads were to be opened up.
Fishing restrictions in place in the North and East provinces because of the war were to be eased by D+ 90 days.
The Agreement provided for a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), whose members were to be drawn from the Nordic countries. At present there are approximately 47 monitors drawn from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark.
Local monitoring committees were to be set up in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai consisting of five members. (2 appointed by the Government of Sri Lanka, 2 by the LTTE, and headed by an international monitor.)
Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the
Agreement.
Termination of the Agreement required 14 days advance notice by either of the parties.
Direct Negotiations
With
the cease-fire stabilizing and the growing confidence between the two parties,
direct talks between the Government and the LTTE, with Norwegian facilitation,
were begun. So far there have been five negotiating sessions held:
i) 16-18 September 2002 - at Sattahip, Thailand
ii) 31 October – 3 November 2002 – at Rose Garden Hotel,
Thailand
iii) 2-5 December 2002 – at Oslo, Norway
iv) 6-9 January 2003 – at Rose Garden Hotel, Thailand
v) 7-8 February 2003 – at the Norwegian Embassy, Berlin
At this
first round of talks decisions were taken to establish a ‘Task Force’ to handle
matters relating to the return of IDPs to the Jaffna peninsula, and to deal
with issues relating to the High Security Zones of the government; and a Sub
Committee address the humanitarian and reconstruction issues facing the people
of the North and East.
(ii) 31 October – 3
November 2002 – at Rose Garden Hotel, Thailand
Following up on the earlier round of talks, at the second round it was decided to set up two sub-committees instead of task forces:
1) A Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN). This sub-committee comprises four members selected by the LTTE and four by the government. Two of the four members nominated by the government were to be from the Muslim community; and
2) A Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN). This sub-committee comprises nine members appointed by the government and nine members appointed by the LTTE.
There was also agreement to set up a third sub-committee.
3) A Sub-Committee on Political Matters. This sub-committee was to be chaired by the heads of the two delegations to the peace talks, Prof. G.L. Peiris and Mr. Balasingham. And Mr. Rauff Hakeem, leader of the SLMC was to be among the other members on the government side.
This sub-committee was agreed to, to study and discuss political subjects e.g. the shape of the future political structure of the island, the models available in other parts of the world.
The need to underpin the peace process with economic progress was seen as urgent by both parties. Normally budgetary provisions were seen as either unavailable or thoroughly inadequate to fund the badly needed resettlement of IDPs, the rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the war-torn North and East. The idea of donor conference for the North and East was considered. And both parties gave their attention to it, and agreed on the text of an appeal to be made to the international donor community: “An Outline of an Appeal for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Support for the North and East.” Subsequently a Sri Lanka Support Conference for the North and East was held in Oslo, Norway, on 25 November 2002. This resulted in receiving approximately $ 60 – 70million of international assistance to be utilized through the World Bank which was to act as the custodian of the Fund established for this purpose.
It was also decided to hold the third session of the negotiations
(2-5 December) in Oslo, Norway.
(iii) 2-5 December
2002 – at Oslo, Norway
A significant outcome of the Oslo round was in the discussion of political matters. The parties agreed on a Working Outline for the Discussion of Political matters, which included the following statement:
“Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.” Both the government and the LTTE have thus made significant changes on hitherto held positions. The LTTE which up till now has had a separate state as their goal have agreed to explore a federal solution “within a united Sri Lanka.” And the government agreed to explore the “federal” path.
The parties also agreed to initiate discussions on substantive political issues such as:
Power-sharing between the center and the region,
as well as:
within the center
Geographical region
Human rights protection
Political and administrative mechanism
Public finance
Law and order
The parties also discussed matters relating to the consolidation of the ceasefire and humanitarian and rehabilitation action
It was also decided to appoint a Committee of Women to explore the effective inclusion of gender issues in the peace process.
(iv) 6-9 January 2003 – at Rose Garden Hotel,
Thailand
On the agenda were the reports being submitted by the two sub-committees, (a) the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN), and (b) the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN)
On the work of SIHRN the meeting decided to welcome the decision of SIRHN to select the World Bank as custodian of the North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF). It was also decided that the GOSL will promote SIHRN as the prime decision making organ for meeting immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the North East. The GOSL, in particular undertook to ensure that the respective roles of government institutions engaged in the North and East are properly clarified and coordinated with the SIRHN. And the membership of SIHRN was expanded from five to seven persons on each side.
The discussions on the work of the Committee on de-escalation (SDN) were quite rocky at the start. This was because of the LTTE’s reactions to certain government proposals that had been sent to the SLMM, and thence to the LTTE on the subject of the High Security Zones and the re-settlement of IDPs in the Jaffna district. The government proposals had called for certain confidence building measures on the part of the LTTE, like decommissioning of arms, before people were permitted to return to their homes in the HSZ. The LTTE found the linking of a humanitarian issue, such as re-settlement of IDPs and security considerations unacceptable.
The two sides therefore decided to concentrate first on the re-settlement of IDPs in areas outside the HSZ, where there was the much larger number. Thereafter the re-settlement of IDPs in the HSZ areas could be looked into. For this purpose, the two sides agreed on a document titled “An Action Plan for an Accelerated Resettlement program for the Jaffna District.” In the meantime, the GOSL side indicated that a study on the High Security Zones will be undertaken by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S. Nambiar, an Indian national who had the experience of working with UN Forces in Bosnia. And once this study was completed decisions will be taken on the resettlement of IDPs in the High Security Zones.
The membership and tasks of the Committee on Women was agreed on. The Committee on Women was to explore the effective inclusion of gender issues in the peace process. It was to consist of five representatives from each party. The following membership was decided on: From the LTTTE - Ms. Sivahimi Subramaniyam, Ms. Renuga Sanmugaraja, Ms. Mathimalar Balasingam, Ms. Sridevy Sinnathampi and Ms. Vasanthapireminy Samasundaram. And from the GOSL - Dr. Kumari Jayewardena, Dr. Deepika Udagama, Ms. Kumidini Samuel, Ms. Faizoon Zakariya and Dr. Fazeela Riyas.
In the area of human rights the two sides agreed to commence a process for discussion of human rights issues. Towards this end it was decided to invite Mr. Ian Martin, a former Secretary General of Amnesty International to work out a schedule on human rights issues. To be taken up at the next session of peace talks. This was indeed a significant breakthrough.
v) 7-
8 February 2003 – at the Norwegian Embassy, Berlin
The incident at sea off the coast
of Delft took place a little before the fifth session of talks were to begin.
The delegations to the talks tried, to avoid any adverse consequences from this
confrontation. As a result of the incident and its unfortunate outcome, the two
sides agreed that a meeting be held soon between the GOSL, LTTE and Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), to work out effective safeguards to avoid such
incidents at sea.
Following on the decision at the last session of talks, the former Secretary General of Amnesty International, Mr. Ian Martin discussed the work he was expected to do with the two parties. It was decided that Mr. Martin, would draw up a roadmap for human rights issues in the peace process for discussion in the sixth session of peace talks. The issues would include
- substantive human rights activities and commitments to be implemented throughout the negotiation process
- effective mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights
- training of LTTE cadres and GOSL officials in human rights
- training of LTTE cadres and GOSL officials in human rights and humanitarian law
- training of police and prison officers
The subject of recruitment of underage children by the LTTE was the subject of lengthy discussion. Prior to the Berlin talks the LTTE had met with the head of UNICEF, and had reached several understandings. The LTTE has agreed to work with UNICEF to draw up an action plan for children affected by the armed conflict in the north east. Such an action plan will include an intensified effort by the LTTE to stop underage recruitment. At the talks the LTTE restated its pledge to a complete cessation of recruitment of, and recruitment campaign aimed at, persons under 18 years of age.
The two sides expressed their intent to commence a discussion on the fiscal aspects of a federal structure at the next session.
The sixth session of the
talks would be held in Japan on 18 – 21 march 2003. Japan would also host the
principal donor conference in June. It is expected that this conference, which
would include the multi-lateral donor agencies such as the World Bank and the
ABB, would be held in June of this year.
Meanwhile the Japanese government has appointed Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former Under Secretary of the United Nations, as a Special Representative of the Government of Japan to the ‘Peace Process’ in Sri Lanka. He has been tasked with special responsibilities of contributing to the “progress of peace-building, rehabilitation and reconstruction process.” Mr. Akashi also participates as special advisor to the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN),
We need now to sit back and quite honestly
identify the shortcomings in the process we have hitherto followed. We need to
address ourselves to the matter of how the process can be carried forward. We
need to see where we have failed, to see whether the roadmap is being followed.
Do we have to change course and most important of all on how we could make the
process inclusive so that all the major stakeholders share ownership of the
process. What is the strategy we should
adopt to counter the 'spoilers'? What are the challenges that lie ahead? What
sort of structures should now be established to take the process forward? How and to what extent should Civil Society
be brought in? Whatever may be the strategic plan, it should have as a corner
stone of the strategy the making of every important constituency in the country
a stakeholder in the process.
There is also a perception in the country
that negotiations are being conducted between the governing United National
Party and the LTTE. The government is seeking to make the process as inclusive
as is feasible. It is an undeniable fact that the government needs the support
of the opposition to transform a settlement into law through the enactment of a
new Constitution. It is therefore imperative that the government reach out to
the Opposition. The approach must necessarily be bi-partisan if it is to
succeed. The government therefore needs to make the Opposition a stake-holder
in the process and they are indeed working towards that end. The President herself
may be invited to Chair a small 'watchdog committee' consisting of members from
both sides of the house. She would then be 'incorporated' into the process.
The people too are being kept informed to the furthest possible
extent feasible as any settlement must be placed before the people at a
Referendum. At present a revolutionary left wing political party, the JVP is
having the field to itself and indulging in a mischievous disinformation
campaign.
But I should now flag the important role which Norway has played in facilitating the process. Your country has indeed been playing a vital role in the peace process. Had it not been for Norway the process could not possibly have reached the stage we are at. Norway and its Ambassador Jon Westborg in particular, despite all the efforts of the spoilers has won the trust and confidence of both parties to the conflict. His has been a thankless task. It is indeed a great pity that he is leaving on transfer. Norway has not only facilitated the negotiations but has also ensured proper communication between the two parties at multiple levels. The opposition political parties in Sri Lanka have questioned the impartiality of the Norwegians. But this is more to do with domestic politics and political competition. That said however I do believe that Norway should do an assessment of its own role. I am of the view that being mere facilitator is not adequate. Norway must work towards making peace meaningful by ensuring that human rights are respected, fear from any source banished and justice is enthroned, not to speak of democratic rights for the people of the north and east.
As mentioned earlier, the international community is playing a crucial role. While supporting Norwegian facilitation, they have supported the leadership of the government in this exercise. They have also reached out to assure the Tamil people that they would act as guarantors for Tamil rights. Most important of all they have come forward to fund not only the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the North and East but also to support development of the South which has also suffered as a consequence of the diversion of funds for the war effort.
In
recent times there has been increasing concern in the country that there is a
emerging gap between word and deed with regard to the LTTE. It is pointed out
that the LTTE agreed to Pluralism in the north; to permitting other political
parties to operate but this has not happened. They have launched a number of
attacks particularly on another Tamil political party, the EPDP. Various
assurances have been given but words have not been matched by deeds. There is a
credibility problem emerging.
This perception is to say the least
unfortunate. The opponents of the peace process are making use of these
contradictions to cast doubts on the whole exercise. Ultimately if the peace
process is to succeed there cannot be any difference between words and deeds.
Those opposed to the peace process refer to these incidents and claim that the
LTTE is preparing for war whilst talking peace. It only serves to weaken the
government and undermine the peace
process.
In recent days we have seen a series of
serious violations of the Cease-fire agreement. The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission has not been able to stop the violations. It must therefore be
concluded that the present monitoring mechanism has proved to be ineffective
and weak to meet the challenges they face or to ensure security to the people
in the areas they operate in. The solution to my mind is to introduce a Peace Keeping
Force to enforce the Ceasefire Agreement and secure the peace process.
When one reflects on the LTTE's recent
transgressions, one is left to wonder as to whether the LTTE getting impatient
that power is not being transferred to them as they expected. There may perhaps
have been an expectation that an interim Administration would be created and
power transferred to them. The long road to peace may perhaps be irritating the
LTTE hierarchy. The need to arrive at a constitutional arrangement to establish
even an interim administration is not being understood.
There are many in the country who quite
honestly believe that the LTTE is only buying time to retrain, rearm to
re-launch the war. In recent days I have been informed that they purchased some
thirty under-water scooters and advanced communication equipment used generally
on ships from a Danish company. My
sources are certain of the veracity of this. The sceptics cite the continuing
violations of the MOU, the recruitment and training, the abduction of
under-aged boys, the arming of them, as not auguring well for the future. Many
in Sri Lanka are deeply concerned that the LTTE is preparing for war, but I
would like to think that the LTTE will not start Elam war 1V, for they would
have two wars on their hands one in the battle field in the north and east and
the other would be that they will have to contend with the extensive security
blanket on global financial traffic not to mention of course the growth of
close US and India defence co-operation to counter terrorism.
As
for the extensive security blanket on global financial traffic mentioned above,
the sustainability of a war would require regular re-supply and replenishment
of consumables and weapons. The funding and procurement processes used by the
LTTE in the past are heavily entrenched in the Diasporic structure mainly in
Western countries. If war breaks out again the LTTE would find it impossible to
depend on the Diaspora for support.
I list below some of the initiatives
undertaken by the international community to monitor and track sources of
terrorist financing.
1) Since the events of 11 September, the
US administration initiated "Operation Green Quest" the Foreign
Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre to mobilize the government's full financial
expertise against funding terrorism. The group is made up of investigators and
analysts from agencies including the Customs Service, the Internal Revenue
Service, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Secret Service, and the
FBI.
2) The initial push after September 11,
blocked more than $110 million in assets thought to be linked to Al-Qaeda,
according to a U.N. report.
3) The US Treasury Department has reported
a "remarkable degree of participation" by Western nations ; in April
2002, for instance, Spanish authorities arrested Ahmed Brahim, an Algerian
suspected of being al-Qaeda's chief accountant in Spain, and a Syrian known as
"Abu Talha," who is suspected of being another key al-Qaeda
financier.
4) The Financial Action Task Force, an
intergovernmental agency set up by the G-8 to foil money laundering in the drug
and illegal-arms trade, now is actively working on terrorist financing. The
task force relies on "naming and shaming" countries or jurisdictions
with weak regulations and financial controls that terrorists could exploit.
5) The G-8 also moved in May 2002 to make
it easier to monitor Internet communications concerning terrorism financing.
The United National International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism, and Security Council
Resolution 1373 on measures to prevent financing acts of terrorism are
additional frameworks for international solidarity on the matter.
I can assure you, if the LTTE abandons the
ceasefire it will take less than 48 hours to uncover the financial nodes of the
LTTE from Toronto to Phnom Penh and disband the KP Department.
Professor Mjos, ladies and gentleman and
friends of the LTTE, I wish to conclude by stating that the government of Prime
Minister Wickremasinghe has gone into this exercise with absolute sincerity,
with the intention of achieving peace with justice, he has sought to address
Tamil grievances and correct mistakes by predecessors. If the LTTE in their
impatience breaks the ceasefire and reopens the conflict all I can say is that
the organization would have swallowed its own cyanide capsule".
“The rehabilitation of the Fisheries in the Jaffna region - the role of
a Norwegian university”
Presentation
to the Conference on Peace,
Development and Rehabilitation in North-East Sri Lanka, Tromsø, February 28,
2003
by
Jens
Revold, Project manager, International co-operation
Norwegian
College of Fishery Science (NCFS), University of Tromsø
Ladies and
Gentlemen!
Let me begin
with the following statement
Peace and Fish
As you all know Norway
has, together with other countries, been involved in various conflict
resolution and peace keeping efforts over the world. We could mention Guatemala
and Colombia in Latin America, Mali in Africa, Palestine and now Sri Lanka and
the Thamil areas in the north. In general, very soon after a conflict has been
settled, the question of support to reconstruct society in general as well as
communities and productive sectors specifically, comes up. With relation
to countries with dominating coastal zones and marine natural resources to
exploit - Fish and sea-products soon become a field of interest. With a number
of approximately 22000 active fishing families in 1983, down to a lowest figure
in 1996 of 5500 and now an estimated number of 14000 families the Jaffna area,
we can easily understand that the development and rehabilitation of one of the
areas most important productive sectors is of utmost importance to create a
peace able to last. Being a person
from Tromsø and Northern Norway,
I must also add another notion, nothing makes us as peaceful as a good
meal of Norwegian cod, liver and roe.
Then I am really off!
However, and if we look around we also see that use of
natural resources frequently is a base
of conflict, and we could of course easily twist the initial concepts somewhat in the direction of
Fish or Peace?
There are
places in the world where fishermen fight with their lives to uphold
traditional rights to the grounds. In Norway in Lofoten in 1890, the famous
Trollfjord battle was just about this:
Traditional small scale fishermen fought new technologies as steamers
and purse seines, equipment so expensive that it became impossible for them to
acquire. They were then afraid that the system with proper owner ship should be
replaced with a capital strong shipowners and themselves in the roles as
salaried workers.
By this I
indicate an idea that a natural resource, basically to the benefit of all,
easily can be seen as scarce and therefore represents conflict potentials.
The
NCFS has had a rather long relationship to Sri Lanka. In the final part of the
70-ties and the beginning of the 80-ties, students from Sri Lanka came to the
University of Tromsø and enrolled at the College. Almost at the same time
Professor Hallenstvedt and senior lecturer Bjørn Hersoug participated in the
regional planning project of Habantota in the southern part of the island. A
Master of Fisheries candidate, Terje Marthinussen, wrote his thesis on that
specific project, while findings from this same project formed a part base of
Hersoug’s PhD thesis. The Habantota fisheries planning methodology is still
perceived as reasonably successful. Professor Terje Vassdal almost at the same
time realised studies on fishing boat efficiencies, finding that the
traditional boat technology rendered positive contributions to the general
value adding process, compared to more advanced and capital intensive
technologies.
In
1989 to 91 several preparatory meetings took place at the University of Tromsø
to start planning a joint connection between Universities in the North of Sri
Lanka, ie. the Jaffna peninsula. The Norwegian NGO FORUT was active in those
preparations, as well as Mr. Sivarajah, a Thamil in Tromsø that had come to
Norway in the 70-ties. Concrete steps were taken when the UoTø Rector Ole D.
Mjøs invited the Univ. of Jaffna Rector, Dr. Thurairajah to Tromsø. This visit
resulted in an agreement signed, as well as other preparatory issues. The basic
details on this engagement was outlined by Mr. Jens Revold of Centre for
Development and Environment Studies in co-operation with the NCFS’ Rector Bjørn
Hersoug.
In
the agreement, university collaboration on fisheries topics, regional studies
and environmental studies were outlined. A specific weight was given to the
fisheries issue as contacts already had been close and Rector Hersoug strongly
supported the idea. Additional aspects were to elaborate co-operation
possibilities in the fields of rural development and environmental studies. As
long as the severe situation in Jaffna seemed to be prevailing, an idea of
holding a conference between academics in Sri Lanka (Universities of Jaffna and
Colombo) and in Scandinavia came up (Universities of Uppsala and Tromsø). This
last suggestion was followed up with contacts to the Norwegian ministry of
Foreign affairs, but without success at that time
Further
on (1994) Dr. Rupamorthy, fisheries researcher of the Univ. of Jaffna stayed in
Tromsø one month to draw up a plan for a fisheries development in the region.
The main points in the Rupamorthy report covered for a future fisheries
development in the region focusing improved socio-economic conditions,
increased exports, increased employment and an improved situation with regards
to the nutrition and foods in the area. Strategies to reach these aims were to
strengthen fish production and maintain resource levels, develop knowledge
within aquaculture, improve processing and marketing facilities, form fisheries
co-ops and strengthen the institutional framework, funding situation as well as
systems for education and training.
In
1995 a joint delegation between the University of Tromsø and the refugees
executive officers from various Finnmark municipalities planned to go to
Jaffna. This mission was cancelled as hostilities made it impossible to reach
Jaffna. Unfortunately this became the reality up to these days when peace is
negotiated.
1998 - 1st
Feasibility study on Jaffna Fisheries
In 1998 a delegation consisting
of Dr. Nissanga, Dr. Shanmugaratnam of NORAGRIC, Mr. T. Marthinussen, at that
time managing director of the Norwegian Federation of Fish and Aquaculture Industries travelled to
Jaffna and made their report on the Restoration of Fisheries Activities in the
Jaffna district. This team was mandated to carry out an assessment with
reference to the current situation at that time and the actual needs of the
fisheries sector. The team came up with the outlines for a Restoration and
rehabilitation programme, underlining the needs for a flexible and process oriented
approach and dividing the initiatives in three phases. The first phase
consisted in rebuilding institutions and incremental changes through
rehabilitation. The second phase focused more on a period of peace and then to
recover the fishing capacity of the region. In a third phase one would still go
further focusing potentials in lagoon and coastal zone resources.
The whole plan indicated at total cost of 253 million Sri Lankan rupees
with a donor’s contribution of 225 million.
In general, however, the situation in May 1998 looked rather gloomy, and
the team summarises its views between one that is related to a war disaster
scenario, where little could be done – and another more hopeful RRD scenario,
where phase 1 can come into effect.
2002 - 2. Feasibility study on Jaffna Fisheries
Very
little happened indeed up to late 2001, when NCFS was addressed by NORAD to
undertake a second or third planning project of the Jaffna fisheries.
Counterpart was the Sri Lankan Office of Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the
North, who handled the contracts, signing and final remuneration to staff
involved. A team consisting of Dr. Sivalingam from Sri Lanka, Mr. Angelsen and
Mrs. Normann of the NCFS travelled to
Jaffna in August 2002. Purposes were fairly similar to that of the
Shanmugaratnam/Marthinussen team, but as peace negotiation already had started
– the group was allowed to travel quite freely in the area.
The
team suggests a 3-years’ start up programme – comprising the following
elements:
1.
Provide fishermen with boats, equipment, infrastructure (Housing, coldstores
etc.)
2.
Strengthening inst.: Fisheries Department in region
3.
Establish Programme co-ordinating committee
4.
Improve market opportunities
5.
Strengthen international institutional co-operation with partners in Norway and
other countries
6.
Make an evaluation and prepare a more long-term programme
The
totals for this new plan was stipulated at 1955 million Sri Lankan rupies, far
above the sum mentioned by the 1998 team. One should however, take into
consideration that while the first team did not deal with important issues as
to infrastructure, this team included a substantial share of 1550 m SRL for
housing, roads and other basic infrastructure.
Re-establishing
knowledge and capacities: University of Jaffna on educational issues and the
NARA[1]/NIFNE[2]
regional institutions on specific fisheries research and training
The
feasibility study covered a important section related to higher education and
research, mentioning the 1993 agreement signed between the universities of
Jaffna and Tromsø.
A very central
element in this is the overall re-establishment of the Univ. of Jaffna
facilities and support infrastructure for fisheries research. This could partly
be formulated as a programme to strengthen fisheries/aquaculture activities at
the university. Partly the idea of establishing and
strengthening a Fisheries centre or institute at the
University of Jaffna should be looked into. When going to further details, the
following ideas were mentioned
a)
Short term courses for lower and
medium level staff to strengthen industry and fisheries management.
b)
Develop a multi-disciplinary BSc
programme specifically oriented towards the needs in the region.
c)
Ensuring one or two fellowships on the Norwegian College of Fisheries Science’s
International Fisheries Management
programme, or other Norwegian fisheries/marine sciences programmes. This is
already being an option for students from
South Africa and Mosambique.
d)
Within 5 years, develop a MSc programme
in the field of fisheries and aquaculture at the University of Jaffna. This
can be realised in co-operation with the central NIFNE system and the regional
Jaffna office
e) Joint
research projects Fisheries and Aquaculture
Concretely
there is a need to proceed further on these specific issues:
f) A feasibility study to look
further into the needs of higher level learning institutions –
participatory set-up be different teaching institutions in Sri Lanka
northern areas and similar institutions in Northern Norway
g) If the
outcome of f is view as positive - A
co-ordination committee between University of Jaffna, NARA and NIFNE /
RIFNE and relevant Norwegian
institutions should be established