{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\uc1 \deff1\deflang1044\deflangfe1044{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fcharset0\fprq2{\*\panose 02020603050405020304}Times New Roman;}{\f1\fswiss\fcharset0\fprq2{\*\panose 020b0604020202020204}Arial;}
{\f2\fmodern\fcharset0\fprq1{\*\panose 02070309020205020404}Courier New;}{\f150\froman\fcharset238\fprq2 Times New Roman CE;}{\f151\froman\fcharset204\fprq2 Times New Roman Cyr;}{\f153\froman\fcharset161\fprq2 Times New Roman Greek;}
{\f154\froman\fcharset162\fprq2 Times New Roman Tur;}{\f155\froman\fcharset177\fprq2 Times New Roman (Hebrew);}{\f156\froman\fcharset178\fprq2 Times New Roman (Arabic);}{\f157\froman\fcharset186\fprq2 Times New Roman Baltic;}
{\f158\fswiss\fcharset238\fprq2 Arial CE;}{\f159\fswiss\fcharset204\fprq2 Arial Cyr;}{\f161\fswiss\fcharset161\fprq2 Arial Greek;}{\f162\fswiss\fcharset162\fprq2 Arial Tur;}{\f163\fswiss\fcharset177\fprq2 Arial (Hebrew);}
{\f164\fswiss\fcharset178\fprq2 Arial (Arabic);}{\f165\fswiss\fcharset186\fprq2 Arial Baltic;}{\f166\fmodern\fcharset238\fprq1 Courier New CE;}{\f167\fmodern\fcharset204\fprq1 Courier New Cyr;}{\f169\fmodern\fcharset161\fprq1 Courier New Greek;}
{\f170\fmodern\fcharset162\fprq1 Courier New Tur;}{\f171\fmodern\fcharset177\fprq1 Courier New (Hebrew);}{\f172\fmodern\fcharset178\fprq1 Courier New (Arabic);}{\f173\fmodern\fcharset186\fprq1 Courier New Baltic;}}{\colortbl;\red0\green0\blue0;
\red0\green0\blue255;\red0\green255\blue255;\red0\green255\blue0;\red255\green0\blue255;\red255\green0\blue0;\red255\green255\blue0;\red255\green255\blue255;\red0\green0\blue128;\red0\green128\blue128;\red0\green128\blue0;\red128\green0\blue128;
\red128\green0\blue0;\red128\green128\blue0;\red128\green128\blue128;\red192\green192\blue192;}{\stylesheet{\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f1\fs20\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext0 Normal;}{\*\cs10 \additive Default Paragraph Font;}{
\s15\qj \fi-720\li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext15 _level1;}{\s16\qj \fi-720\li1440\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext16 _level2;}{\s17\qj \fi-720\li2160\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\faauto\rin0\lin2160\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext17 _level3;}{\s18\qj \fi-720\li2880\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\faauto\rin0\lin2880\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext18 _level4;}{\s19\qj \fi-720\li3600\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\faauto\rin0\lin3600\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext19 _level5;}{
\s20\qj \fi-720\li4320\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\faauto\rin0\lin4320\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext20 _level6;}{\s21\qj \fi-720\li5040\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\faauto\rin0\lin5040\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext21 _level7;}{\s22\qj \fi-720\li5760\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\faauto\rin0\lin5760\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext22 _level8;}{\s23\qj \fi-720\li6480\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin6480\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext23 _level9;}{\s24\qj \fi-720\li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext24 _levsl1;}{\s25\qj \fi-720\li1440\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext25 _levsl2;}{
\s26\qj \fi-720\li2160\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\faauto\rin0\lin2160\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext26 _levsl3;}{\s27\qj \fi-720\li2880\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\faauto\rin0\lin2880\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext27 _levsl4;}{\s28\qj \fi-720\li3600\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\faauto\rin0\lin3600\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext28 _levsl5;}{\s29\qj \fi-720\li4320\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\faauto\rin0\lin4320\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext29 _levsl6;}{\s30\qj \fi-720\li5040\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\faauto\rin0\lin5040\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext30 _levsl7;}{\s31\qj \fi-720\li5760\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\faauto\rin0\lin5760\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext31 _levsl8;}{
\s32\qj \fi-720\li6480\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin6480\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext32 _levsl9;}{\s33\qj \fi-720\li720\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\tx6480\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext33 _levnl1;}{\s34\qj \fi-720\li1440\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\tx5760\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext34 _levnl2;}{\s35\qj \fi-720\li2160\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\tx5040\faauto\rin0\lin2160\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext35 _levnl3;}{\s36\qj \fi-720\li2880\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\tx4320\faauto\rin0\lin2880\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext36 _levnl4;}{\s37\qj \fi-720\li3600\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\tx3600\faauto\rin0\lin3600\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext37 _levnl5;}{
\s38\qj \fi-720\li4320\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\tx2880\faauto\rin0\lin4320\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext38 _levnl6;}{\s39\qj \fi-720\li5040\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\tx2160\faauto\rin0\lin5040\itap0 
\f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext39 _levnl7;}{\s40\qj \fi-720\li5760\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx0\tx720\tx1440\faauto\rin0\lin5760\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext40 _levnl8;}{\s41\qj \fi-720\li6480\ri0\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin6480\itap0 \f1\fs24\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 \snext41 _levnl9;}}{\info{\title HOW COGNITIVE HISTORY CAN CAUSE US TO MISPERCEIVE}{\author Administrator}{\operator Administrator}{\creatim\yr2004\mo2\dy3\hr18\min13}
{\revtim\yr2004\mo2\dy3\hr18\min13}{\version2}{\edmins2}{\nofpages49}{\nofwords16706}{\nofchars95227}{\*\company Universitetet i Troms\'f8}{\nofcharsws116945}{\vern8269}}\paperw11906\paperh16839\margl1132\margr1132\margt1132\margb1132 
\widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\ftnrstpg\hyphhotz376\revisions\aftnnar\noxlattoyen\expshrtn\noultrlspc\dntblnsbdb\nospaceforul\hyphcaps0\horzdoc\dghspace120\dgvspace120\dghorigin1701\dgvorigin1984\dghshow0\dgvshow3\jcompress\viewkind1\viewscale100\nolnhtadjtbl 
\fet0\sectd \linex0\headery1440\footery1440\colsx708\endnhere\sectdefaultcl {\*\pnseclvl1\pndec\pnstart1 {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnlcltr\pnstart1 {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pnlcrm\pnstart1 {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pndec\pnstart1 {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}
{\*\pnseclvl5\pnlcltr\pnstart1 {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl6\pnlcrm\pnstart1 {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pndec\pnstart1 {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl8\pnlcltr\pnstart1 {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1 }\pard\plain 
\qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f1\fs20\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 {
\par HOW COGNITIVE HISTORY CAN CAUSE US TO MISPERCEIVE
\par 
\par CONTEMPORARY U.S. ACTIONS TOWARDS CANADA
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par By Floyd W. Rudmin
\par 
\par 
\par Psychology Dept., University of Tromso 
\par Tromso, Norway N-9037
\par 
\par FAX: +47 77 64 56 10   Email: frudmin@psyk.uit.no
\par 
\par  OR
\par 
\par 9 Gibson Avenue
\par Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 4R1
\par 
\par Email:rudmin@king.igs.net
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par Draft copy revised May, 1997
\par 
\par 
\par Comments, criticisms, and suggestions very welcomed.
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par BRACKETED NUMBERS IN THE TEXT REFER TO REFERENCES IN THE ENDNOTES
\par 
\par 
\par A B S T R A C T
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
      As psychological phenomena, historical beliefs are components of self-identity, are powerful motivators, and are resistant to new information.  Cognitive history is the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of historical beliefs, including mecha
n
isms of misbelief suggested by Ichheiser's theories of social perception.  The present study examines the Canadian avoidance of evidence of threatening actions by the United States.  The method of study is to examine public reports of hostile behaviors by
 
agencies of the U.S. government in order to show the regularity with which Canadians have dismissed such reports without seeking to confirm or disconfirm them.  Various explanations for this blind-eye behavior are consistent with Bayes' Theorem of conditi
o
nal probability.  Numerous recent examples of evidently hostile behavior are cited to support the conclusion that the contemporary history of U.S.-Canadian relations is incomplete and maybe incorrect, to a degree unknown until cognitive mechanisms of misp
erception are understood enough to allow historical facts to be freely sought and evaluated.
\par 
\par 
\par 
\par Author Biography:   Floyd Rudmin is a cross-cultural social psychologist now holding the professorship in social and community psychology at the University of Tromso in north Norway.  He is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Canada, and author of the book, }{
\ul Bordering on Aggression}{  (Hull: Voyageur, 1993).
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\lang1044\langfe1044\langnp1044 \page }{I N T R O D U C T I O N
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      History is a very psychological discipline, and it is remarkable that there has be
en so little interdisciplinary collaboration between history and psychology (1).  To be sure, historical explanations of the causes of past events usually include inferences about the motivations and the decision processes of the individuals involved.  Tw
o
 sub-fields of history  --the "mentalitee" tradition of ethnohistory and recent studies in "social memory"-- both have psychological aspects (2).  When psychological methods have been used more overtly and formally in history, the focus has been on explai
n
ing the psychological development of important individuals or groups of individuals.  This is called "psychohistory" if inferences are based on Freudian interpretations and "historiometry" if inferences are based on statistical studies of multiple cases (
3).
\par 
\par COGNITIVE HISTORY
\par 
\par     But the role of psychology in history is not remote, not limited to far-away peoples or to dead personalities from the past.  Historical beliefs are psychologically active in the heads of all of us who are alive today.  Beliefs a
bout history strongly influence our thinking and our behavior, especially political behavior.  Thus, many governments find it important to control school history curriculums and textbooks.  History is psychologically intimate to us.  We identify ourselves
 
by history.  We possess and are possessed by history.  When we say, "I am an American, a German, a Jew",  we attach national histories to our personal biographies.  The political slogan, "Je me souviens", inscribed on Quebec license plates means "I rememb
e
r", referring to the 18th century conquest of New France by the English (4).  This is a psychological claim that testifies to the intimacy of history with psychology and political action.  It is predictable, perhaps self-evident, that national history and
 personal memory might become confused in our cognitive processes.
\par 
\par       Because historical beliefs are bound to psychology, they are bound by psychology and thus relatively resistant to new information (5).  To change an historical belief often requires t
hat we must also change many other cognitions in our minds.  It would be easier, for example, to consider and accept evidence that the moon has an atmosphere, than it would be for various readers to consider and accept evidence that only in 1879 were the 
R
yukyu Islands (Okinawa) first annexed to Japan (6), that in 1917 to 1920, Stalin supported Finland's independence from Russia (7), or that in 1934, the U.S. government authorized the immediate first-use of poison gas against Canadians in the event of war 
(
8).  Historical beliefs are powerful motivators and play a central role in our psychological readiness for war.  All over the world, from Rwanda to Israel to Bosnia to Armenia, Chechnya, Iraq, India, Indonesia, endlessly, people will risk death and dare t
he destruction of their own communities in order to assert their historical beliefs (9).  Yet, for all of this, historical beliefs have rarely been the focus of systematic study.
\par 
\par       There is need for the development of a sub-field called "cognitive history", to be defined as the interdisciplinary study of the psychology of historical beliefs (10).  Austrian psychologist, Fritz Heider, one of the founders of cognitive social psy
chology, was perhaps the first to suggest this:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
"One should write history as a development of 'beliefs' (not in the narrow religious sense), as a description of the succession and changes in the world pictures, the world images.  The changes in cognitive maps, the life  spaces."(11)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par The focus should be on the contents and the internal structure of historical beliefs and on their dynamics, meaning their acquisition, disposition, and interaction with motivations, emotions, and other beliefs and behaviors.  A
s cognitive phenomena, beliefs are held by individuals, but often collectively within national groups, within ethnic and religious minorities, and within specialist communities such as historians.  Thus, beliefs can be studied at both the individual and t
h
e group levels.  Furthermore, cognitive history can be approached from a variety of disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, literature, and communication studies.  The methodologies of these vari
ous disciplines are all reasonable approaches to understanding historical beliefs.
\par 
\par       Beliefs, of course, are difficult to study since they are essentially private, internal, phenomena.  Beliefs cannot be directly observed.  They must be inferred from b
ehaviors and self-reports, both written and oral.  When our beliefs are widely shared, they are doubly difficult to observe since we tend to be unaware of our beliefs without some contrasting points of external reference.  Historical beliefs stand out dra
m
atically as beliefs, and thus potential misbeliefs, when neighboring societies endorse contrary histories, as with the well-known example of Canadian schools teaching that the United States lost the War of 1812 and U.S. schools teaching that the United St
a
tes won.  Historical beliefs also stand out dramatically when new information is systematically ignored or tabooed, indicating that there is incompatibility with established beliefs that are actively maintaining their priority within our unconscious syste
m of cognitive organization.
\par 
\par 
\par NATIONS AS PERSONS
\par 
\par       Beliefs about national history seem to follow the cognitive forms and dynamics that shape our perceptions of persons.  We often speak about nations as though they were individual personalities, as in,
 "The United States did such and such," or "America thought that..." or "Washington hoped to...".  In many cases, we have explicitly personified nations as human characters, in the case of the United States, as "Uncle Sam".  Heider has noted that interper
sonal psychology underlies our perceptions of nations:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"Nations are in some ways like persons, and it is common to apply to them the person-concept which we have developed in the commerce with individuals."(12)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Thus, it might be hypothesized that the norm
al psychological processes of perception and misperception that operate when we think about individual people also operate when we think about nations.  A remembered national history is a socially constructed memory of a nation's "personal" behavior.  Our
 cognitive schemas, whether of persons or of nations, are built from beliefs and are routinely wrong, maybe for similar reasons.
\par 
\par       There is a vast social psychology literature on person perception (13).  Polish psychologist, Gustav Ichheiser, is the pi
oneer on topics of misperception in interpersonal relations, and his phenomenological analyses might have easiest application to cognitive history (14).  Many of his mechanisms of misbelief in interpersonal relations have become standard theories in socia
l psychology, and four of these may help explain misbeliefs in national history: 
\par 
\par       a) We tend to attribute greater reality to visible events than to invisible events.  We have confidence in, and can communicate about, observations open to common, coll
ective perception.  We thus put an epistemological premium on visibility. Ichheiser wrote:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"...the raw material of social perception, that is, the data which serve as a basis of those interpretations and misinterpretations shaping the image of personality
, belong altogether to the collectively perceivable world."(15)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par This tendency, however, readies us to miss or to misinterpret important events because they are not immediately perceptible. Ichheiser noted this to be a problem in history: 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
\par "The point we w
ish to make is that in the world of common sense in which, after all, we are emotionally at home, it is the visible aspects of social relations which impress us as 'social reality.'  Coercion, forinstance, is usually recognized as coercion by those not di
r
ectly involved (by the 'neutral spectators')only when it takes the visible form of outright violence...Historical experience shows it to be possible for a long period of time to conceal, or even to deny, the existence of such social realities... They can 
be concealed, at least from the awareness of neutral observers, as long as these realities can be kept below the threshold of social visibility."(16)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Thus, outright war is historically visible and undoubtedly real.  But preparation for war is much less visible and therefore more easily dismissed as unreal, even though the latter is often more effective as a coercive force in international relations.

\par 
\par   
    b) Our mental images of different people, and of different nations, are cognitive schemas constructed for their helpfulness in organizing perception and memory and in communicating among people who share those schemas.  They are first created from ear
l
y experience and from social norms.  For example, my image of my father as decisive and hardworking comes from my childhood experiences with him and from my mother's and siblings' communicated ideas of what he is like.  My image of the United States is si
m
ilarly constructed.  Once structured, cognitive schemas are like projections from the mind onto the world, or like mental templates.  They feel like reality, but are in fact fabrications.  They ready us for misperception by focusing us on information that
 fits and by causing us to ignore information that does not fit.  Ichheiser argued: 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"[Mechanisms of social perceptions] function so as to transcend in many way and in many directions the pure raw material and to construct out of this material a more or le
ss well-organized and integrated image of the given personality.  This image construction is usually endowed in our minds with only those alleged characteristics which promise to help us explain, as a manifestation of the underlying personality, the behav
ior with which we are confronted.  In other words, we have the tendency to consider a partial structure of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this partial structure were the total personality itself."(17)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par When trying to explain the behavior of people, and perhaps of nations, a little, early evidence goes too far.  Furthermore, these errors of omission subsequently cause, and are compounded by, errors of commission. 
\par 
\par       c) Cognitive schemas ready us for misperception by over-estimating t
he unity and the consistency of the personality across the life-history of the individual.  Schemas are relatively static impositions on dynamic reality and create the appearance of consistency over time (18).  Again, we tend to ignore or to misinterpret 
information that has become dissonant with prior, established schemas.  Ichheiser wrote:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"Once the image of another person, shaped by primary mechanisms of one kind or another, is fixed in our minds, we tend either to overlook all factors in the other pers
on which do not fit into our preconceived scheme; or, else, we misinterpret all unexpectedly emerging factors in order to preserve our preformed misconceptions."(19)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par This was not a new idea.  For example, 40 years earlier, American psychologist and philosopher, William James, wrote:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
"The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older truths...  Their influence is absolutely controlling.  Loyalty to them is the first principle  --in most cases the only principle; for by far th
e most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our preconception is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness to them."(20)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par The dismissal of single items of information because of in
consistency with an overall image is nowadays called "the halo effect", and psychological research shows that our memory is impaired for information that contradicts our constructed preconceptions of a person (21).  Perhaps, by analogy, our history is imp
aired for information that contradicts our constructed preconceptions of a nation. 
\par 
\par       d) We tend to behave "in fact" quite differently from how we think we would behave "in principle".  Our abstract, rational understanding of the cognitive processes behind our beliefs may not describe our actual belief processes.  Ichheiser wrote:

\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"The views, or interpretations, 'in principle' are those we hold, or perform, about social facts and issues in a generalized, so to speak, 'philosophical' way, that is, as lo
ng as we are not faced by any necessity for doing something about those facts and issues...  Our views and interpretations 'in fact,' on the other hand, are those   which actually determine our actions and reactions when confronted by certain situations a
nd issues."(22)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par We misunderstand our own cognitive processes, and these misunderstandings may stand as rationalizations.  Thus, our actual belief behaviors are more telling than are our own explanations of our beliefs.  We may know that historical beliefs 
should be based on careful judgments of evidence, and believe that our own beliefs are, but still be quite unaware that particular beliefs are, in fact, the results of routine cognitive processes that are prone to error.
\par 
\par PURPOSE
\par 
\par       The present study is a first attempt to examine belief behaviors about history, in situ, as the beliefs were expressed in history.  More specifically, this is a study of apparent beliefs in the improbability of hostile behavior by the United States 
t
owards Canada.  The purpose of the study is to document events since 1910 in which public evidence of U.S. behavior hostile to Canada was ignored, ridiculed, or otherwise treated as incompatible with existing historical beliefs, in this instance, the stan
d
ard beliefs in the "undefended border", the "good neighbor", the "trusted ally", and related conceptions of the U.S. having a continuous history since the mid-19th century of peacefulness towards Canada.  The goal of this study is to disrupt these belief 
s
tructures, so that historical beliefs about Canada-U.S. relations might be re-considered.  During a period in which Canada is facing potential, some might say pending, disintegration because of Quebec separatism, it is important to be free to fully consid
er and evaluate U.S. policies towards Canada and the actions of agencies of the U.S. government.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {M E T H O D 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      The method employed here is based on historical texts.  Mentions of events of U.S. hostile behavior were identified in secondary sources such as Richard Preston's book, }{\ul 
The Defence of the Undefended Border}{ (23), or in various journalistic reports found via the }{\ul New York Times Index}{.  Primary sources were then examined where possible and cross-correlations made with other secondary sources in o
rder to document further information on the events and to discover subsequent Canadian reactions.  The hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed is that Canadians have not used these events as opportunities to re-evaluate their beliefs about Canada-U.S. 
relations.
\par 
\par INFERENCE FROM EVIDENCE
\par 
\par       There are two methodological problems with this project.  First, because Canadian newspapers did not begin indexing themselves until the late 1970s, there is no ready way to locate earlier news reports, editorial c
olumns, or letters-to-the-editor.  One must go to the micro-film and search newspapers, day-by-day, page-by-page, or one must rely on secondary sources. Neither of these approaches is a reliable way to make an exhaustive search.
\par 
\par       Second, an exhaustiv
e search is necessary to support a claim that something was not happening, in the present study, that Canadians were not reacting to a reported event of U.S. hostile behavior.  The epistemological problem is that confirming such a claim requires searching
 
all possible places of evidence and finding none.  In practice, this cannot be done.  Such claims must always stand as "not yet rejected".  However, if it is difficult to confirm a claim that nothing happened, it is relatively easy to reject such a claim:
 simply find a few positive instances. 
\par 
\par       For example, J.A.S. Grenville has claimed that by the turn-of-the-century, the U.S. no longer had a policy of holding Canada as a hostage against British military actions: "the 19th century plan of 'hostage' Ca
nada passed away" (24).  This was asserted without reference citations since there is no evidence that can be displayed to prove an absence.  However, in this case, there are several positive instances of contrary evidence.  In 1904, General Tasker Bliss,
 
the founding Director of the U.S. War College, was told by the Joint Board that the preparations of war plans by the Army and Navy War Colleges must be coordinated for approval by the Joint Board and by the Secretaries of War and Navy.  In response, Bliss
 prepared a major policy paper setting out guidelines for future military planning.  Here he referred to hostage-Canada as an important part of U.S. military planning:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"Only in the case of a war with England would we have any chance of reimbursing ourselve
s by more desirable property nearer home to replace that which we should have lost further away."(25)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par       An even more telling rejection of Grenville's claim came 25 years later in }{\ul War Plan RED}{, which was approved by the U.S. Secretary of War and Secret
ary of Navy in 1930.  Here it was declared in three different places that Canada serves as a hostage:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"From the standpoint of BLUE [United States] it would appear to be advantageous for CRIMSON [Canada] to be allied with RED [Great Britain].  In this case
 BLUE would be free to employ her greatly superior man-power in overrunning CRIMSON and holding that Dominion to offset such losses as BLUE might suffer elsewhere.  CRIMSON neutrality would be of little military advantage to BLUE."(26) 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"The conquest of CRIMSON would probably be held by BLUE more than sufficient to offset probable losses elsewhere."(27)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"...the occupation of CRIMSON territory would secure to BLUE a counterbalance against possible territorial losses elsewhere."(28)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Clearly, it is an historical misbelief that the U.S. had ceased to consider Canada a ready hostage to military conquest.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {R E S U L T S
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      The following are brief accounts of publicized events of U.S. behavior evidently hostile to Canada that 
were known to Canadians, or easily could have been known, but were apparently incompatible with Canadian beliefs in the goodwill of the United States.  In such conflicts between beliefs and observations, it seems that the beliefs were retained and the obs
ervations dismissed, as would be predicted by Ichheiser's cognitive theories of misperception.
\par 
\par 1910 MILITARY MANOEUVRES
\par 
\par       One of Preston's methods for discovering evidence of military planning along the "undefended border" was to search the contemporary military trade journals.  In a 1910 issue of the }{\ul United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette}{
, he found a disclaimer that the headline "Canadian Army Crushed," appearing in the New York City newspaper, }{\ul The Sun}{, was just a news reporter's joke, that t
he military manoeuvres it referred to were not directed at Canada (29).  These manoeuvres had taken place at Pine Camp, the present site of Fort Drum, in Upstate New York, near the Canadian border.  In fact, }{\ul The Sun}{
 had been routinely and matter-of-factly reporting that these manoeuvres were practicing for war with Canada (30).  The headline in question was a quotation from the field report of a Capt. Paul M. Malone of the 27th Infantry.  No joke.
\par 
\par       An examination of Montreal and Kingston newspapers for the week immediately following the headline found no mention of the incident.  Preston himself accepted the disclaimer and wrote into history that the }{\ul Gazette}{ had 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"...learned that the word 'Canada' had not appeared in the operational orders for the man
oeuvres and that a newspaper correspondent had been trying to be 'funny' and had 'made a mess of it'."(31)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Preston had accepted this explanation even though he had evidently not even examined the original news reports, as demonstrated by the fact that he had copied the }{\ul Gazette}{'s error of omitting the word "is" from }{\ul The Sun}{'s true headline.

\par 
\par       Preston's readiness to accept the U.S. military's disclaimer of hostile behavior also seems to have prevented him from seeking further evidence about the event an
d from linking it to other discoveries.  He might have wondered, for example, if manoeuvres practicing for war with Canada were at all related to paper plans designing war with Canada.  More specifically, were the same officers involved in both activities
?
  In fact, the first military manoeuvres ever held at Pine Camp were in 1908, and they, too, had been reported in newspapers as practicing for war with Canada (32).  Several of the officers participating in those manoeuvres subsequently prepared plans for
 
the invasion of Canada and do appear in Preston's book (33):  Capt. Alexander Dade of the 13th Cavalry compiled geographic information on Canada, emphasized the strategic importance of the St. Lawrence canals, and recommended that they be quickly seized i
f
 war seemed imminent;  Maj. David Baker, Jr. of the 11th Infantry prepared plans for concentrated attacks on Montreal and Quebec City;  Maj. William Hay of the 10th Cavalry co-authored the most detailed and sophisticated invasion plans to date, calling fo
r
 U.S. forces to cross the St.Lawrence River at Cornwall.  These officers were all listed in the Army's souvenir pamphlet for the 1908 manoeuvres at Pine Camp (34).  Therefore, yes, U.S. military officers planning for war with Canada were also practicing f
or war with Canada, and Preston might have discovered this had he not been predisposed to accept the U.S. Army's dismissal of the news report.
\par 
\par       Confirmation that military manoeuvres and strategic planning were coordinated might have lead Preston to lo
ok for more concrete preparations for war against Canada, for example, base construction.  In fact, the 1908 manoeuvres had been held on leased land, which in 1909 was purchased by the U.S. Army for the creation of a new military base near the Canadian bo
rder, south of Ottawa, despite complaints that the price was too high and that the site was unsuitable for military manoeuvres (35).
\par 
\par 1915 MILITARY MANOEUVRES
\par 
\par       The }{\ul New York Times Index}{ was used to seek for other U.S. military manoeuvres that Preston's
 methods of search might have missed.  This led to the 1915 summer manoeuvres at Plattsburgh, New York, near the border south of Montreal, with further details provided by the local Plattsburgh newspaper (36).  According to the news reports, the war game 
e
nacted a Blue army invading a foreign country defended by Red, causing Red to counter-invade Blue, but with Blue forces prevailing in a final battle fought right on the Canadian border.  Local newspaper reports did not disguise the fact that Red represent
ed military forces defending Canada:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
"The Blue army today won a decisive victory over the Reds after a desperate struggle in which the Reds were driven from their entrenched position and compelled to fall back to the Canadian line."(37)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par       An examination of the }{\ul Montreal Star}{ and the }{\ul Montreal Gazette}{
 found no account of these military manoeuvres a mere 40 miles to the south of the city.  This was another unnoticed public event of U.S. hostile behavior, unnoticed in its day and unnoticed in subsequent his
tory, possibly because it is incompatible with the presumptions of trust and good-will required by the Canada-U.S. partnership as military allies in WWI and WWII.  
\par 
\par       Again, Preston might himself have sought and found evidence of the 1915 manoeuvres or other concrete preparations for war.  But he apparently had a made a prior decision that no inferences follow from the war plans he had discovered.  These include:
  1) a 1913 document entitled, }{\ul Invasion of Canada (Canadian War Plan}{, which proposed a staging area in Moira, New York, a little to the west of the 1915 manoeuvres site;  2) a 1914 }{\ul 
Military Geography of Eastern Canada and a Study of an Invasion Plan by United States Forces}{
;  3) a 1915 invasion plan by Brig.-Gen. M.M. Macomb approved by the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff;  and 4) a 1916 invasion map showing U.S. troops crossing from northern New York to capture Ottawa and Montreal (38).  The discovery that the U.
S. planned war on Canada, even as Canada was fighting for the Allies in Europe in WWI, cannot overcome the set schema or image of the U.S. as an ally with Canada in WWI and WWII.  Rather than new facts causing new hypotheses and a search for further facts
, the science of history falters and is halted.  History seen with a blind-eye is bound by the psychology of beliefs.
\par 
\par       Despite beliefs about how military allies should behave, the United States revived in 1919 its programs of military planning for war
 with Canada.  Care had been taken to keep such preparations from Canadian awareness.  For example, in 1928, the four decade old practice of "Hunting and Fishing Leave" was discontinued as a cover for military espionage in Canada, and in 1929, U.S. office
rs were ordered "not to cross the border during the Quebec reconnaissance" because it might attract unwanted attention (39).  Nevertheless, continuing signs of war preparations were there to be seen, public, obvious.
\par 
\par 1935 BORDER AIR BASE TESTIMONY
\par 
\par       I
n 1935, the U.S. Government Printing Office, by mistake, published the full transcripts of secret testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee by the most senior U.S. officers responsible for strategic planning: Brig.-Gen. C. Kilbourne, Head of t
h
e War Plans Division, Gen. F.M. Andrews, Commander of the Army Air Force, Col. W. Krueger, Assistant Chief of Staff serving the Joint Board, and Capt. H.L. George, from the Air Corps Practice School.  These officers argued that three new air bases were ne
e
ded for surprise attacks against air fields in Canada.  The new bases on the east and west coasts were to be described as coastal defence bases, and the one in the Great Lakes region was to be camouflaged as a civilian airport but "capable of dominating t
he industrial heart of Canada" (40).
\par 
\par       The transcripts were published at the end of April, 1935, and made headline news for several days (41).  U.S. President Roosevelt denied any military planning against Canada and spoke of "permanent peace", "genera
tions of friendship", and the "disarmament of our three thousand miles of common boundary".  Roosevelt claimed that the military officers involved had been presenting personal opinions, not national policy.  Despite the President's denials, however, these
 base recommendations were consistent with }{\ul War Plan RED}{
, which was national military policy at that time, approved by Roosevelt's Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy.  In any case, the greatest force of Roosevelt's reaction was directed at Congress.  He 
threatened Congress that if it could not keep military secrets, then he would forbid military officers to testify in Congress.  Two weeks after Roosevelt's statement, his Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approved amendments to }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 making military offensives against Vancouver and Winnipeg a higher priority, and two months after Roosevelt's statement, he recommended General Kilbourne for promotion (42).
\par 
\par       For the present thesis, Canadian responses were more revealing than were the revelati
ons of the testimony.  Hume Wrong, senior diplomat at the Canadian Legation, asked the U.S. State Department for copies of the transcripts but emphasized to the press "that he had asked for no documents or data considered secret or confidential" (43).  Fr
o
m Ottawa, the official response was that the Canadian government "had been disposed from the first not to take the matter seriously except for its possible effect on Canadian public opinion" (44).  Sir George Perley, acting Prime Minister, affirmed Canadi
an beliefs that the U.S. is a predictable personality with a disposition for good-will: 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"No one in Canada believed the Government of the United States had any intentions of departing from the attitude which has been officially termed 'the policy of good n
eighbors'."(45)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par The }{\ul Toronto Globe}{ headlined its report, "U.S. Disavows Airport Yarn," even though it confirmed for its readers that the appropriations bill would be passed and the air bases built (46).  The }{\ul New York Times}{ quoted one Canadian editorial as 
saying that it was all "foolish publicity given to an irritating topic" and quoted another that "Canadians by and large did not take the episode seriously and were inclined rather to laugh heartily at the absurdity of the whole affair" (47). 
\par 
\par       The Ho
use approved the air base bill on June 6, 1935 (48), and shortly afterwards there appeared reports that the U.S. War Department was examining the prospect of building a new air base in the Lake Champlain region, directly south of Montreal (49).  When the 
C
anadian government was questioned about this in Parliament, the response was that U.S. air bases are a U.S. domestic affair (50).  Given the certified veracity of the sources of information that the U.S. was engaged in hostile preparations, given the cont
inuing evidence of military preparations along the border, it is indeed difficult to interpret the Canadian response as anything other than blind-eye behavior based on an unwillingness to disrupt orthodox beliefs in American goodwill. 
\par 
\par       Further eviden
ce of Canadian blind-eye behavior at this time comes from the first bi-national "Conference on Canadian-American Affairs" held June 17 to 22, 1935, at Canton, N.Y. and sponsored by St.Lawrence University, Queen's University, and the Carnegie Endowment for
 
International Peace.  The two guests of honour were Elihu Root and Sir Robert Borden.  Root had been U.S. Secretary of War when Theodore Roosevelt threatened to use armed force to settle the Alaska boundary dispute, and it was Root who created the War Col
l
ege and the Joint Board and directed them to make war plans, seen so recently in the news.  Borden had made a career of anti-Americanism and was Canada's champion opponent of free trade with the U.S.  Given the topic of the conference, its location near t
h
e border, its guests of honour, and most importantly, its staging right after these widely published accounts of U.S. military preparations against Canada, the most dramatic event of the conference was the complete absence of any comment or query about th
e
 border air bases, not in the published proceedings of the conference and not in archived records of the meetings (51).  There were 145 participants, most of them professors, diplomats, and businessmen, most of them certainly aware of the air base testimo
ny, and not one of them ready to raise the matter for discussion or inquiry.  That is avoidance.
\par 
\par 1935 MILITARY MANOEUVRES
\par 
\par       Fifty days later, fifty miles from the conference site, the United States held the largest peace-time military manoeuvres in it
s history, near the border south of Ottawa (52).  As an historical phenomenon, these manoeuvres have been examined only in my own book, }{\ul Bordering on Aggression}{
 (53).  Five divisions, 36,000 troops, were rushed to the border, some coming in a fleet of New Y
ork City taxi cabs that had raced across the state to pick up soldiers in Buffalo.  Another 15,000 troops were called to a site in Pennsylvania as a back-up reserve force for those at the border (54).  The war game script called for a Blue motorized invas
i
on "across a feigned international boundary defended by a red army", with the Red defenders pushing the invading Blue forces back, until Blue reinforcements arrive and Red loses "out-numbered and out-gunned," this according to the Army's souvenir pamphlet
 (55).  As in 1915, the U.S. military presumed that it was the aggressor and Canada the defender.  After these manoeuvres, the War Department purchased enough land to double the size of Pine Camp (56).
\par 
\par       U.S. military preparations on the Canadian borde
r, well publicized, were there to be seen.  But evidently, they could not be seen, not by Canadians.  If the newspaper in Kingston, the nearest Canadian city to these activities, is a fair indication of Canadian concern, then there was no concern at the t
i
me.  In retrospect, there has, of course, also been no concern, since the very visible alliance and shared victory during WWII served to reinforce perceptions that the U.S. has been, is, and always would be the "trusted ally", the "good neighbor" sharing 
w
ith Canada "the undefended border".  Retrospective judgements of U.S. military preparations in the 1930s would see them as preparations for war with Germany.  Such beliefs, however, do not fit with two historical facts: 1) in the 1930s, the U.S. had done 
"little or no work on }{\ul Army Plan BLACK}{ for war with Germany;" and 2) as late as 1939, the U.S. Army and Navy War Colleges continued working on the plans for }{\ul Overseas Expeditionary Force to Capture Halifax from Red-Crimson Coalition}{
 (57).  Nevertheless, the b
elief in a bond of perpetual goodwill and partnership between Canada and the U.S. was so set by WWII that it would be well into the Cold War before there would be sufficient discrepancies between beliefs and observations for some Canadians to have new opp
ortunities for doubt and disbelief.
\par 
\par WAR PLAN RED
\par 
\par       The 1935 air base incident, the 1935 manoeuvres, and the 1935 border base expansion were unseen 
hints that the U.S. had an active plan for war with Canada.  In fact, during the 1920s, as well documented by Preston, the U.S. military developed extensive and detailed planning for the invasion and conquest of Canada.  A 1924 draft stated:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"Blue intenti
ons are to hold in perpetuity all Crimson and Red territories gained.  The policy will be to prepare the provinces and territories of Crimson and Red to become states and territories of the Blue Union upon the declaration of peace.  The Dominion governmen
t will be abolished..." (58)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par A final draft of these plans was approved by the U.S. Secretaries of War and Navy on May 10, 1930.  }{\ul War Plan RED}{ was ostensibly for war with Great Britain and indeed does have an extended discussion comparing British and U.S. n
aval capabilities.  However, the military operations, especially for the U.S. Army, are very focused on the conquest of Canada.  In the 94 page, single-spaced, legal-size text, only one British city is once mentioned, Portsmouth.  But every Canadian provi
nce and every major Canadian city is present in the text, even communities as small as Sherbrooke, Farnham, Prince Rupert, Trenton, Trois-Riviere, Moosejaw, and Sioux Lookout (59).  The Theatre of Operations for the U.S. Army in }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 was defined to 
be "All CRIMSON territory," and the Army's mission, in bold type, was "ULTIMATELY, TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON" (60).  Curiously, the word "Canada" is never actually used in the document.  Possibly the avoidance of the name "Canada" facilitates wa
r planning by preventing misperceptions of the target nation as a friendly, trusting personality.
\par 
\par       The U.S. invasion plan had two main thrusts: 1) foreclose opportunities for Britain to send reinforcements to Canada, and 2) seize or destroy strategic 
Canadian resources (61).  The first entailed occupying, destroying, or isolating the ports of Halifax, Quebec City, and Montreal, and impeding, if possible, alternate sea and air transport to Canada via Churchill and other Hudson Bay ports.  The second en
tailed the seizure of the Niagara Falls hydro electric generators, the Great Lakes canals, the Sudbury nickel works, and the railroad juncture at Winnipeg.
\par 
\par       }{\ul War Plan RED}{ was not a document in a drawer.  In 1934, amendments to the plan were approved by
 the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy authorizing the destruction of Halifax, Montreal, and Quebec City by "Immediate air operations on as large a scale as practicable" (62) and authorizing the immediate first-use of poison gas against Canadians in 
o
rder to "increase our advantages and hasten the successful ending of the war" (63).  For reasons still unknown, preparations for war with Canada accelerated dramatically in 1935.  Perhaps this was a consequence of a Command Post Exercise (CPX) at Fort Dix
 in September 1934 (64).  In any case, when listed in chronological order, the amount of activity in 1935, especially directed towards Canada, is difficult not to notice:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {* January 19, the War Department announces that Pine Camp on the border south of Ottawa would be doubled in size (65).
\par * February 4, Brig.-Gen. Kilbourne orders a secret reconnaissance mission into the Labrador and Hudson Bay regions to look for hidden Canadian air bases (66).
\par * February 11-13, Congress holds hearings on funding for new air bases, including three directed at Canada (67).
\par * February 20, the War Department announces that it will hold the largest peace-time manoeuvres in U.S history at Pine Camp (68).
\par * March 6, Gen. Douglas MacArthur recommends that }{\ul War Plan RED}{ be amended "to initiate, when the situation permits, offensive operations to secure the Winnipeg and Vancouver Areas" (69).
\par * April 15, the U.S. Army and Navy announce intentions to hold large-scale, coordinated military manoeuvres (70).
\par * April 28, "secret" military testimony from the February Congressional hearings is released by mistake, revealing that the Army Air Force is requesting funds for three new air bases for war on Canada (71). 
\par * April 30, the U.S. Under Secretary of State gives a speech praising the demilitarization of the Canadian border (72).
\par * May 1, President Roosevelt denies that the U.S. has plans for war against Canada, or against any other country (73).
\par * May 9, the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy approve MacArthur's amendments for operations against Winnipeg and Vancouver (74).
\par * June 6, the House approves the bill to build new air bases on the Canadian border (75).
\par * June 9, U.S. Army reports it is examining Maine, New Hampshire, and Northern New York for sites for new air bases (76).
\par * June 17, first bi-annual Conference on Canadian-American Affairs begins at St.Lawrence University, near the border south of Ottawa (77).
\par * June 29, the U.S. Army announces additional soldiers for military bases, including Plattsburgh Barracks and Madison Barracks near the border south of Montreal and Ottawa (78).
\par * July 24, President Roosevelt recommends Gen. Kilbourne for promotion (79).
\par * August 9, equipment and troops begin arriving at Pine Camp near the border south of Ottawa for the largest peace-time mobilization manoeuvres in U.S. history (80).
\par * August 10, President Roosevelt signs into law the air base appropriations bill (81).
\par * August 27, military manoeuvres finish at Pine Camp (82).
\par * October 3 and 5, posted as vice-consuls to Vancouver, respectively, are Douglas MacArthur, Jr. (83) and Carl Walther Strom (84), both of whom continue in careers as espionage agents during WWII and the Cold War.
\par * October 10, William Alexander Mitchell, who in retirement will join the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, is posted to St.Stephen on the Maine-New Brunswick border (85).
\par * November 15, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King work out a plan for tariff reductions designed to achieve free trade (86).
\par * December 1, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Norman Armour, gives a speech praising the demilitarization of the Canadian border (87).
\par * December 18, Major C.H. Jones and Lt.-Col. H.W. Crawford, from the G2 intelligence division of the War College, submit their report on road, rail, and sea routes to target cities in Canada (88).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Two further events, for which exact dates in 1935 are not yet available:
\par * Donald Quested Coster begins work as an advertising sales manager in Montreal and will develop a 40 year career with U.S. intelligence agencies COI, OSS, and CIA (89).
\par 
\par * The Army War College begins a focus on mobilization planning in the North-East Theatre (90).
\par 
\par       This listing raises a number of historical questions.  For example, were the activities of the President, the Army, and the Stat
e Department coordinated or independent?  Where these events registering in the Canadian government or military, and to what effect?  More specifically, did Canadian Prime Minister King feel at all pressured by this military activity during his negotiatio
n
s of the 1935 free trade accord, or in subsequent acceptance of the Ogdensburg agreement placing Canadian defence under U.S. jurisdiction?  Or, might Roosevelt and King have been using trade and defence agreements as a means of reining in U.S. military pl
a
nning?  Was this military activity related to the transfer of Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines in 1935?  What is the history of U.S. intelligence activity during the 1930s?  More specifically, what was the extent and nature of U.S. espi
onage in Canada prior to WWII?  Of course, such questions cannot be answered until they are raised, and they cannot be raised until the phenomena at issue can be seen.  Sight 
\par precedes insight.
\par 
\par REACTIONS TO U.S. WAR PLANS
\par 
\par       In its day, }{\ul War Plan RED}{ wa
s "among the most sensitive and closely held papers on earth", to quote from a former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Army (91).  Thus, it was not possible for Canadians to have had any reactions to it in the 1930s.  }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 was declassified in February, 1974, and this was reported by Richard Preston, then an historian at Canada's Royal Military College, in the summer issue of the }{\ul Canadian Defence Quarterly}{ (92).  This first notice of }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 has never been cited in the }{\ul Social Science Citation Index}{
.  Here we have the only known, detailed, strategic plan to conquer Canada, officially authorized at the Cabinet level, by the only nation capable of conquering Canada, and even Canada's Royal Military College was uninterested: the RMC library did not 
have a copy of }{\ul War Plan RED}{ until the author donated his own microfilm copy in 1991.  It seems that Canadians, even those in the business of thinking about these things, find them unthinkable. 
\par 
\par       In 1975, }{\ul War Plan RED}{ was re-discovered and publicized in a Reuter's news-wire story by Graham Lovell, writing from Washington, DC.  The report was featured by the }{\ul Montreal Star}{ (93) and carried in abridged forms by the }{\ul 
Montreal Gazette}{ (94), the }{\ul Globe and Mail}{ (95), the }{\ul Edmonton Journal Weekender}{ (96), the }{\ul St.John Telegraph-Journal}{ (97), and the }{\ul St.John's Evening Telegraph}{ (98).  Canadian newspapers not reporting the existence of }{\ul 
War Plan RED}{ included the }{\ul Ottawa Citizen}{, the }{\ul Toronto Star}{, the }{\ul Regina Leader-Post}{, the }{\ul Kingston Whig-Standard}{, and the }{\ul Charlottetown Guardian}{, not on Dec. 6 and not in the following issues.  The French-language }
{\ul La Presse}{ in Montreal and }{\ul Le Droit}{ in Ottawa did not report it.  The }{\ul Vancouver Sun}{, the }{\ul Winnipeg Free Press}{, and the }{\ul Halifax Chronicle-Herald}{,
 all from cities named as invasion targets in the Reuters report and shown dramatically on an accompanying invasion map, did not carry the report or even acknowledge it's coverage elsewhere.  On the U.S. side, the }{\ul New York Times}{ and the }{\ul 
Washington Post}{ did not allow their readers to know about the U.S. invasion plans.  Thus, avoidance was the typical journalistic response to }{\ul War Plan RED}{.
\par 
\par       In any case, the news-wire story and subsequent abridgments quite misrepresented }{\ul War Plan RED}{ by linking it to th
e start of the Great Depression in 1929 and by emphasizing U.S. defensiveness, for example, that Canada "was to be invaded by the United States as a defensive measure"(99).  However, according to the Reuter's report, this was to have been a very offensive
 defence:  
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"State Department and Pentagon officials emphasized that the plans were purely defensive --except for what one termed 'that pre-emptive foray into Canada to protect ourselves'."

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par This, even though the "war planners thought that Canada would be neutral".  The report also mentioned a memorandum "suggesting that an officer be sent on a secret mission to the Hudson Bay area" to look for hidden Canadian air bases.  The report lined up 
c
omments from several U.S. military officers that this would have been a silly waste of time and suggested that the whole scheme was something cooked up by Charles Lindbergh.  But despite the news report's readiness to find the idea ridiculous, archived do
cuments show that the mission had in fact been ordered (100).
\par 
\par       In 1977, two years after the news-wire report, Richard Preston published }{\ul The Defence of the Undefended Border}{, again bringing U.S. war planning to public awareness, this time set in histor
ical context with five decades of U.S. military espionage and invasion planning.  Though discovering evidence of continuous U.S. military designs against Canada from 1867 to 1939, and finding no comparable planning on the Canadian side, Preston is very mu
c
h an apologist.  As an historian, he displays his discoveries, but as a member of a military institution, he seems embarrassed by the implications of those discoveries.  Thus, Preston presents excuses for U.S. actions were possible and often looks away fr
om concrete logistical or political extensions of U.S. invasion planning.  The book sold approximately 800 copies and is now out of print.  It its first decade, it appeared in the }{\ul Social Sciences Citation Index}{ only four times. 
\par 
\par       The first citation wa
s 1978, when A.E. Campbell reviewed the book and dismissed its findings as unimportant because military staff "must have something to do" and they "therefore prepare for any eventuality they can foresee, probable or improbable" (101).  Campbell wrote this
 despite the fact that }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 was a policy document approved at the Cabinet level and despite the fact that the U.S. military had not prepared plans for all contingencies.  For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. has no plans for war with its last two bat
tlefield enemies, Spain and Germany, nor with Italy, even though all three nations were increasingly in the news for their military activity and fascism.
\par 
\par       In 1978, Desmond Morton presented another dismissive review of Preston's book, repeating the un
substantiated surmise that the plans were only idle activity "for underemployed staff officers" and "represented the efforts of peacetime armed forces to find meaning for their existence" (102).  Such arguments overlook Cabinet-level authorization for the
 
use of poison gas against Canadians, overlook base construction and large scale manoeuvres, overlook active espionage in Canada.  Morton also surmised that the U.S. military did not take itself seriously and probably thought it "more discreet to plan for 
war with friends rather than with potential enemies."  Finally, Morton made his beliefs clear by declaring that Canada's 1920s }{\ul Defence Plan No. 1}{
, designed to forestall a U.S. invasion, was "proof of the chronic absurdity of the military mind."  This is the standard opinion even though the only study to date to compare }{\ul War Plan RED}{ and }{\ul Defence Plan No. 1}{
 concluded that Col. Sutherland Brown's plan for a quick Canadian strike into the United States within four days of a declaration of war, followed by a destructive retreat, might have worked:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
"Fanciful, maybe, given the relative strengths of the two combatants.  But who is to say that the desperate dash of Buster Brown's 'Flying Columns' in all-out defense of their homeland would not have bought the precious 
days necessary for British reinforcements to reach the scene --especially since the authors of }{\ul Joint Plan Red}{ seem not to have envisaged such aggressive action by the Canadians."(103)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par       N.F. Dreisziger's 1979 review of Preston's book was another that 
tried to dismiss historical facts that did not fit orthodox beliefs (104).  Again, there is the false argument that "American planning for the invasion of Canada was mostly an academic exercise", some unimportant little activity from "the childhood days" 
o
f war planning.  Again, Dreisziger states that it was the very friendship between the U.S. and Canada that caused the U.S. military to plan for war on Canada.  He apparently was willing to write this conclusion into history, without mentioning the poison 
gas authorization, without mentioning the amendment to destroy Halifax, Montreal and Quebec City by strategic bombing, without mentioning the section of }{\ul War Plan RED}{ which reads:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"...large parts of CRIMSON territory will become theaters of military operati
ons with consequent suffering to the population and widespread destruction and devastation of the country..."(105)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par This is not very friendly and certainly not consistent with the usual image of a "good neighbor".
\par 
\par       Dreisziger was explicitly worried t
hat Preston's book about U.S. preparations for war on Canada might lead people to question their beliefs about the United States' attitude towards Canada, as would be reasonable whenever new information becomes available:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"It is a well-crafted piece of sc
holarship researched with great thoroughness.  Nevertheless, its publication in an age of anti-American feelings might have undesirable consequences. The book might be misconstrued, or passages might be taken from it out of context and used to bolster the
 myth that Uncle Sam has, and has always had, designs on Canada."
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Dreisziger's rhetoric here is worth examining: "myth" is used to derogate hypotheses without providing the necessary historical evidence that they are unfounded, and "Uncle Sam" is used to f
urther derogate hypotheses by posing them as cartoons.  Personifying the United States also invokes all of the psychology of person perception, including unified and consistent personality, even though there is no reason to dismiss U.S. military behavior 
because it is inconsistent with U.S. public opinion or with the pronouncements of some U.S. politicians.
\par 
\par       In 1980, R.W. Winks from Yale University prepared a brief review of Preston's book for a military journal, complimenting the research as well don
e (106).  And that is the extent of indexed citations of Preston's book for its first decade.  Not much considering the high compliments it received for its scholarship.  One might say that Preston's work has been ignored.
\par 
\par       }{\ul War Plan RED}{ and }{\ul Defence of the Undefended Border}{
 have also been discussed, or avoided, in monographs which do not enter the citation index.  A sample of books from the FC 240s Library of Congress section shows dismissal to dominate.  For example, Charles Stacey, in his 1981 book, }{\ul 
Canada and the Age of Conflict}{, begins his comments with: 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {
"This is a good point at which to mention a matter that has lately received more attention than it deserves: the obscure existence on both sides of the border of 'war  plans' implying 
the possibility of hostilities between the United States and Canada."(107)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par The use of "obscure" and the use of quotation marks around "war plans" are both rhetorical devices to dismiss without evidence.  Also, the false arguments are again raised that suc
h war plans were idle officers' theoretical exercises, and that plans were made for all contingencies.  In line with this dismissive reasoning, Stacey presents an incorrect supposition as an historical fact when he writes: "Up to twenty 'colour' plans }{
\ul existed}{
 for war with various countries" (underlining added).  Although colour codes may have been defined for that many countries, the records of the Joint Board show approval only of plans for war in Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and in the Pacific with Japan.

\par 
\par       Stacey wrote that "it is amusing" to read the section of the 1924 draft of }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 declaring that the Canadian government will be abolished and the provinces and territories annexed to the United States.  He then wrote into history that "all
 this activity was highly theoretical" even though he knew about but did not mention the 1935 air base appropriations and could have known about the 1935 manoeuvres if historical beliefs had not precluded a search for evidence of concrete military activit
y
.  Air bases are concrete.  Stacey also wrote into history that all this activity was "almost completely divorced from American national policy" even though he knew but did not mention that the plans had been approved at the Cabinet level and that Preside
nt Roosevelt had chosen to lie to protect the plans rather than repudiate them or cause them to be canceled. 
\par 
\par       Stacey concluded his history of U.S. plans for war against Canada by requoting some of Preston's earlier quotation of R.S. Cline, who wrote 
that "in all cases", except for war with Japan, the color coded plans were "simply outlines of missions", "meaningless", merely "abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed military planning, providing useful training for the officers who drew
 
them up" (108).  Thus, three historians -Cline, Preston, and Stacy- all sing the same song.  Add the voices of Campbell, Morton, and Dreisziger, and it becomes hard to hear anything except that it is silly to take these war plans seriously.  But these dis
missals, in every instance, are empty assertions that popped out without any evidence, or rather, despite evidence to the contrary.
\par 
\par       The first of these dismissals was written by Cline in 1951, even though the war plans he was dismissing were not decla
ssified until 1974.  Curious.  Who was Cline?  In 1943, he had been Chief of Current Intelligence for the OSS, and in 1949, joined the CIA to become Chief of the Estimates Staff (109).  In 1951, when he published his much requoted claims, he had just beco
m
e the CIA's liaison officer with British intelligence.  After leaving England, he became the CIA's Chief of the Sino-Soviet Area in the Office of Current Intelligence, and in that position was instrumental in obtaining and publishing Kruchchev's 1956 spee
c
h (110).  He then became the CIA's Chief of Station in Taiwan and after that head of operations in Germany (111).  In 1969, he moved to the U.S. State Department as Deputy Director of Intelligence, the first ever to be routinely informed of covert operati
ons (112).  Clearly, Cline is not the disinterested scholar Canadians should be quoting and requoting to set a dismissive tone re }{\ul War Plan RED}{.
\par 
\par       But the dismissive tone had been set.  Morton, in his 1981 book, }{\ul Canada and War}{, continued the chorus, wri
ting that the 1930s invasion plans "were really little more than staff exercises and a framework for war games and militia exercises" (113).  No mentions of U.S. invasion plans were made in Gwyn's 1985 book, }{\ul The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America
}{ (114), in Bothwell's 1992 book, }{\ul Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership}{ (115), or in Hollmer and Granatstein's 1994 book, }{\ul Empire and Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s}{
 (116).  Thompson and Randall in their 1994 book, }{\ul Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies}{
, quoted the section from the 1924 invasion plan that Stacey had found amusing and then wrote into history, "Not even the soldiers, however, took these plans very seriously" (117).  There is no evidence for that claim, but there 
is abundant evidence that Canadians generally, and Canadian historians especially, have not taken these plans very seriously.
\par 
\par       }{\ul War Plan RED}{ was again re-discovered in 1991 by U.S. journalist Jonathan Salant (118).  Demonstrating again that U.S. invas
ion plans had not entered into Canadian consciousness, at least two Canadian newspapers reported the rediscovery as news (119).  The reactions of two Canadian military officers are also telling.  Maj. Don Marsh, speaking for the Ministry of Defence, told 
the }{\ul Ottawa Citizen}{
 that there is no cause for concern since Canada's relations with the United States "have always been good."  Ichheiser would have identified this as a misbelief based on a criterion of consistent disposition.  Maj.-Gen.(ret.) Ernie Creber
 said that such planning "has no meaning unless there are political orders to go ahead with such schemes."  To the contrary, the obvious meaning is that some agencies of the U.S. government, in some situations, can ready themselves to destroy Canada and k
ill Canadians.  That this is unrealistic, or impossible, given existing beliefs about the United States, means that it is necessary to examine the historical beliefs and the processes by which they are created and maintained.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 { D I S C U S S I O N
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      Th
e conclusion of the history presented thus far is that U.S. behavior hostile to Canada has in large part been ignored.  When it has entered historical discourse, it has been disparaged or dismissed with empty assertions, witticisms, and weak arguments.  T
o
 take U.S. war plans seriously, as the factual historical phenomena they are, does not require a claim that war was imminent, does not require a presumption that all Americans are duplicitous, does not require that alternative explanations be ready.  What
 
is required is that the cognitive mechanisms binding historical beliefs, including here both lay and professional beliefs, must be exhumed and examined.  If Ichheiser's four mechanisms of misperception discussed earlier are indeed operating, then the beli
e
fs are based on an image of the United States shaped by historically visible, salient events, for example, by the absence of war for almost two centuries, by military alliance, by the easy movement of people, news, and commerce across the border, by repea
t
ed pronouncements of "undefended border", "good-neighbor", "permanent peace", "trusted ally" and the like.  No matter how much it is wished, none of these conditions and none of this rhetoric stop agencies of the U.S. government, in some situations, from 
h
aving hostile designs on Canada.  Furthermore, there is a tendency to perceive the United States as having a unity of attitude and behavior toward Canada despite the diversity in U.S. populations, politicians, and government agencies, and as having a cons
i
stency of attitude and behavior across contexts and historical periods.  Historical facts that do not fit these preconditions, are ignored, dismissed, or disparaged.  Finally, even though we may know, in principle, that historical beliefs would be better 
if not biased by processes of misperception, they may, in fact, still be biased by them.
\par 
\par PRESUMPTION PREVENTS EVIDENCE
\par 
\par       The presumption that the U.S. military planned for all conceivable contingencies routinely leads to the inference that therefore n
one of the plans was of any consequence.  This presumption is wrong, and the inference is false.  First, there is simply no evidence in the U.S. military archives that plans were made for all contingencies.  To the contrary, there is specific evidence in 
t
he archived record that only the most likely wars were studied.  As explained by Brig.-Gen.Tasker Bliss, commander of the U.S. War College, to Admiral George Dewey and the Joint Board, concerning the war plans that should be "jointly studied and agreed up
on" by the two services "primarily through the agency of their respective War Colleges":(120)
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"For the specific purposes for which a General Staff is created, the order of relative importance of the war problems which it must study is determined by the ord
er of their relative probability of occurrence in actual experience.  It will have failed in its duty if a little war which occurs tomorrow finds it unprepared although at he same time it has carefully studied the conditions of a great war the probable oc
c
urrence of which is in the remoter future.  If we were guaranteed ample time for study, the question of probability of occurrence need cause us no delay for consideration.  We would take up each possible theatre of war or combination of theatres, study th
e
m under all possible conditions, and thus be prepared for any possible emergency.  As we have no such guarantee of sufficient time for a universal study, we have to endeavor to lift the veil of the future by the exercise of what Napoleon called 'the power
 
of scientific imagination;'  we have to make a scientific guess, --that is to say, a legitimate inference based upon known conditions and tendencies,-- as to what now seems most likely to happen first and in respect to which we need to be first prepared."
(121)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par In other words, if the United States had only four approved war plans, and one of them was for the conquest of Canada, then that is what U.S. military staff predicted to be a good prospect.
\par 
\par       Two more presumptions that encourage dismissal of U.S. war planning are: 1) that the U.S. War Department was a Defense Department, and 2) that war plans were merely practice unrelated to any policies to actually attack a neighbor.  Again, the archiv
ed evidence is contrary to these beliefs.  Brig.-Gen. Bliss, in the same document, explained that U.S. wars would likely be aggression masked as defence: 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"I do not think that when the United States comes to fight it will be for the declared purpose of ext
ension of trade, although that may be the real cause of war and its real object, concealed under an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine."(122)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par After pages of reasoning and inference, Bliss identified Mexico as a country that could be attacked without risk of confronting a major power:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"That the intervention of the United States in Mexico may become necessary, with the least chance of any other foreign complication connected therewith."(123)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par Bliss recommended that the U.S. prepare for five contingencies, the fifth of these was for intervention in Mexico (124). 
\par 
\par       Here is one example of a so-called "abstract, theoretical exercise" written by a purported "idle officer."  But, contrary to the standard song, the exercise would eventually become national policy 
approved at the very highest political level, would develop into concrete operational plans, and would in fact cause a neighbor to suffer a U.S. invasion.  The following information has been available from the U.S. National Archives since 1956 in the same
 set of microfilm as }{\ul War Plan RED}{
.  It could easily have been found by any historians seeking evidence for and against their beliefs that U.S. war plans were benign.  On April 15, 1912, a Joint Board plan for military intervention in Mexico was approved by 
the Secretary of Navy.  On May 3, U.S. President Taft counter-signed the plan (125).  An amended version specifically recommending the "Seizure and temporary occupancy of Vera Cruz and Tampico by the naval forces of the United States" was approved on Febr
uary 13, 1913, by Acting Secretary of the Navy Winthrop, with counter-signature by President Taft (126).
\par 
\par       One year later, in April 1914, as per the plan, U.S. naval forces seized and occupied first Tampico and then Vera Cruz.  Dead in the streets were
 126 Mexicans, and the standard encyclopaedia and textbook versions of these events would have us believe 1) that the Tampico invasion was a response to the failure of Mexican federal forces to apologize sufficiently for detaining some U.S. Marines who ha
d
 landed in Tampico without permission, and 2) that the invasion of Vera Cruz was to prevent a German ship violating the Monroe Doctrine by delivering military supplies purchased by the Mexican government (127).  These explanations are lame and shameful.  
T
he invasions had been pre-planned and pre-authorized.  The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was a prepared lie: the munitions carried by the German ship had been loaded in New York City (128).  There seems to have been no rationale for these invasions ot
her than the mere momentum of military planning: certainly no additional apologies were forthcoming from the Mexicans, the German ship did deliver its cargo, and the Americans did withdraw.
\par 
\par       This planning has been invisible, unseen and unheard in hist
ory.  Nevertheless, this example makes it clear that U.S. military planning for war against its neighbors is not merely defensive and not purely theoretical.  It should be noted that the fourth of Brig.-Gen. Bliss's proposed war plans was "a study of the 
Canadian frontier, assume England as an intervening power under assumption a) alone, b) in coalition" (129).  Given the additional evidence compiled by Preston, the origin of }{\ul War Plan RED}{
 should be credited to Bliss in 1905, quite unrelated to the 1929 onset of the Great Depression or to the 1932 rise of Nazi militarism in Germany.
\par 
\par BAYES' THEOREM
\par 
\par       Some of the cognitive processes underlying blind-eye behavior, and some of the arguments arising from blind-eye behavior, can be explained by Bayes' Theorem
, which is the decomposition of conditional probabilities into their logically necessary components (130).  Presuming that beliefs are subjective probabilities (131), then Bayes' Theorem can present the various components of the question of whether or not
 U.S. preparations for war with Canada imply hostility towards Canada.  That we are unaware of these components and their relationships and that we compute them unconsciously does not detract from their logical or rhetorical force.
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\b\f2                              p(B|A) x p(A)
\par       p(A|B) =    _________________________________________
\par  
\par                    p(B|A) x p(A)   +   p(B|notA) x p(notA)}{
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par       The Bayesian equation would be read as: "The probability of A given B equals the probability of B given A, t
imes the probability of A, all divided by the same expression plus the probability of B given not-A times the probability of not-A."  Probabilities are usually expressed as decimal proportions of 1.00, such that p(A) and its complement p(notA) must add up
 
to 1.00.  For example, if p(A)=.10, then p(notA)=.90.  These two numbers, p(A) and p(notA) are called base-rates, because, as the equation shows, it is not possible to estimate the probability of A given B without some prior estimate of the probability of
 A under all conditions.
\par 
\par      For the present discussion, let "A" stand for "U.S. is hostile to Canada" and "B" stand for "U.S. prepares for war on Canada".  B is not hypothetical; it in fact happened in history.  Thus, p(A|B) stands for "the 
probability that the US is hostile to Canada given the fact that it prepares for war on Canada."  The blind-eye behavior described in this paper is that many people believe, or want to believe, that this probability is very low, and they want no further s
e
arch for evidence or discussion of the topic.  The primary reason for believing p(A|B) to be low would be a prior estimation that the base-rate p(A) is low.  In other words, "The U.S. is not hostile to Canada, even if it does prepare for war on Canada, be
c
ause the U.S. is not hostile to Canada, period."  People believing this might be predicted to point to the lack of war for almost two centuries and to the strong social and economic commerce between the two nations.  They might be predicted to easily thin
k
 of the U.S. as having a consistent disposition or "personality", thus allowing confidence that future behavior will be like past behavior.  They might be predicted to conceive of Canada and the U.S. as having trusted interpersonal relations, like "partne
r
s" or "good-neighbors".  Such people would probably be very shocked by facts to the contrary, for example, Cabinet-level authorization for the use of poison gas and strategic bombing against Canadians.  On the other hand, people believing that the base-ra
t
e for hostility is not low, would seem less likely to exhibit blind-eye behavior and might be predicted to point to the history of U.S. aggression towards other nations in the Americas for their estimation of the base-rate.  The poison gas authorization w
ould confirm their thinking, not shock it.
\par 
\par       The next most important component in the Bayesian equation is p(B|notA), the probability that the U.S. prepares for war on Canada given that it is not hostile to Canada.  This component is in the denominator
 of the equation, so that as it increases, p(A|B) decreases.  Thus, it is very predictable that part of blind-eye behavior will be assertions that the U.S. makes military plans for all contingencies, or that the U.S. plans for war against its friends, or 
t
hat the U.S. military do not take their work seriously.  These assertions are all equivalent to estimating that p(B|notA) is high.  That people make such assertions without factual support shows that it is the desire for p(A|B) to be low that is causing t
h
e estimate of p(B|notA), not visa-versa.  Part of blind-eye behavior will be avoidance of validity checks on these assertions.  Also, part of blind-eye behavior will be a tendency to reconstrue "preparations for war" to mean "theoretical exercises", since
 
military base construction, large scale manoeuvres, Cabinet-level approvals, all make heavy demands on limited financial, logistical, and political resources.  If B is costly, then relatively few war plans can be made, as Gen. Bliss explained and as the a
rchived record demonstrates.  If the base-rate p(B) is low, then p(B|notA) must also be low, not high.  However, "theoretical exercises" are non-threatening, airy, and endless, so they can exist in abundance with no implications.
\par       The one remaining com
ponent of the equation, p(B|A), is the probability that the U.S. prepares for war on Canada given that it is hostile to Canada.  Seemingly, this has to be high and certainly not nice for Canadians to think about.  That p(B|A) is relatively certain and rat
h
er discomforting may explain why it is rarely mentioned by people exhibiting blind-eye behavior.  Furthermore, this component appears in both the denominator and numerator and thus has unclear rhetorical force.  However, one anonymous reviewer of an earli
er draft of this paper, who voted against publication, used the argument:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"Americans have nothing whatsoever to gain by invading Canada, since they are apparently able to buy anything they want anyway, that is, what they don't own already."
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par This is a clai
m that the U.S. can take Canada by other than military means, which in one sense is an estimate that p(B|A) is not high.  This critical comment also illustrates a blind-eye readiness to reconstrue "prepare for war" to mean "make war", which would also ten
d
 to drive down p(B|A), since the base rate, p(B), for making war is much lower than it is for preparing for war.  It is interesting to note that blind-eye beliefs reconstrue "war preparations" sometimes to mean "theoretical exercises" and sometimes to mea
n "making war", depending on what aspect of the Bayesian argument is seen to have most rhetorical force.  It is an empirical question whether or not both reconstruals would be made by the same person.
\par 
\par       The "blindness" of these historical belief patter
ns arises from two related tendencies: 1) The conclusion is controlling the evidence rather than the evidence controlling the conclusion.  The prior determination, probably arising from schema-driven perception that the U.S. is a good-neighbor, requires t
hat p(A) be low and that p(B|notA) be high.  So, these probabilities are decided without reference to factual evidence.  When new information, for example, Preston's book or the declassification of }{\ul War Plan RED}{
, causes an avoidance reaction rather than a re
-assessment, that is proof that the conclusion comes first, evidence and argument follow accordingly.  2) There is a readiness to taboo the entire topic so that these Bayesian components never come up for consideration.  The assertion by some historians t
h
at U.S. war plans are "meaningless" is a claim that preparations for war are categorically unrelated to any qualities of hostility.  In other words, "meaningless" means to say that no implications can be drawn from the fact of war preparations, means to s
a
y that B is unrelated to A, that p(A|B) = p(A).  This is the essence of a taboo, asserting that we are not to think about p(A), p(B|A), or p(B|notA).  Ridicule is a rhetorical method of enforcing a taboo, by excluding or demeaning anyone or any argument r
aising the topic or bringing forward new facts.
\par 
\par       A history of U.S.-Canada relations should not be tabooing topics because they are discomforting and should not be dismissing events because they are incompatible with some standard general image of the 
U.S.  If historical facts feel funny, that is not a comment on the facts but on belief structures evaluating the facts.  Historical explanations of the evidence of U.S. hostility should simultaneously be examining the evidence and the cognitive processes 
b
y which evidence is evaluated.  There should not be a prior requirement that the U.S. military, politicians, and public be consistent with one another, nor that they be consistent over time.  Unity and consistency are empirical questions, not apriori pres
u
mptions.  Historical facts that do not fit fixed images, beliefs, and expectations of consistency should not be dismissed.  Rather, further facts for and against the beliefs should be systematically sought, and the Bayesian base-rates and probabilities sh
o
uld be estimated anew.  This is all very important, for example, if history is ever to understand the sudden acceleration in 1935 of concrete preparations for war with Canada.  This is even more important if more recent signs of U.S. behavior hostile to C
anada are ever to be examined.
\par 
\par AMBASSADOR SPIES
\par 
\par       For example, from 1956 to 1980, almost every U.S. ambassador to Canada had a background in espionage, and apparently no one has noticed.  These are all very high profile men, worthy of routine curiosit
y about their biographies.  Information about their espionage activities has been readily available in standard reference sources, such as the State Department's }{\ul Biographic Register}{, and in books of 
contemporary history.  But no one can think to look for what is unthinkable.  Mike Frost, a professional Canadian espionage officer and author of }{\ul Spyworld}{
, when told first-hand by CIA staff that some U.S. ambassadors are espionage agents, said that he "tri
ed to hide his astonishment at finding out the CIA actually had American ambassadors trained as spies" (132).  If a Canadian spy could not believe it, then how much more disbelieving must ordinary citizens be.
\par 
\par       From 1956 to 1958, and again from 1961 
to 1962, Livingston T. Merchant was U.S. Ambassador to Canada.  A Princeton University graduate, Merchant worked in finance before joining the State Department (133).  In 1948, he was posted to Nanking, China, then in the midst of a communist revolution o
p
posed by U.S. military and espionage operations (134).  In 1950, he was the State Department's liaison to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a covert operations unit comprised of former OSS operatives (135).  In that role, he was instrumental in the
 
United State's first covert counter-insurgency operation, which was in the Philippines.  While Ambassador to Canada, Merchant participated in the U.S. campaign against Prime Minister Diefenbaker, which included subversion of Royal Canadian Air Force offic
e
rs and manipulation of the Canadian press corps (136).  In 1965, Merchant co-authored a report on U.S.-Canada relations that recommended that difficulties and disputes between the two nations be kept from public knowledge (137).  However, Peter Newman's p
opular history of this period, }{\ul Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years}{, presents Merchant as the ideal image of the reasonable, patient, polite, professional diplomat (138).
\par 
\par       In 1962, Willis C. Armstrong was interim Charge d'Affairs for the U.S. in Ottawa.  He quite frankly told Jean-Fran\'e7ois Lis\'e9e that he had been an advisor to the CIA (139).  He also told Lis\'e9
e that as head of the Canada Desk in Washington from 1962 to 1964, he was responsible for naming diplomatic staff in Canada, and that he "alwa
ys made sure to have talented, competent senior officers" in Montreal and Quebec City (140).  At least 6 U.S. diplomats in these two cities during Armstrong's tenure have been identified by the State Department's }{\ul Biographic Register}{ as well as by 
}{\ul Who's Who in CIA}{ to be U.S. intelligence agents (141):
\par 
\par *William Kane, consul in Montreal from 1959 to 1963;
\par *Raymond Senden, visa officer in Montreal from 1960 to 1964;
\par *Robert Yoder, consular officer in Quebec from 1961 to 1965;
\par *Richard Courtenaye, consul general in Quebec from 1962 to 1964;
\par *Joanna Witzel (Martin), vice-consul in Quebec from 1962 to 1964;
\par *Lyman W. Priest, visa officer in Montreal from 1963 to 1966.
\par 
\par       None of these undercover agents were identified as such by Lis\'e9e in his account of U.S. espionage in Quebec.  To the contrary, Lis\'e9
e stated quite confidently that there is no record of there ever being U.S. espionage operations in Quebec (142).  Former CIA assistant director Victor Marchetti told Lis\'e9e that he had hea
rd mention of "the Montreal base" and said that any operations in Canada would have been done outside usual CIA command structure, without the usual authorizations, but Lis\'e9
e dismissed that as unbelievable because it "requires a considerable leap of faith" (143).  In other words, presumption prevents evidence.  Blind-eye history obeys prior beliefs.
\par 
\par       After discussing how George Jaeger, U.S. consul general in Quebec City, arranged to receive secret Cabinet documents via Jacques Parizeau's Ministry of Finance, Lis\'e9e wrote:
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {"With such quantity and quality of information, it was understandable that Washington had no need for CIA agents in Quebec."(144)
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {
\par In fact, Austrian-born Jaeger began working for the U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps in 1944, was listed in }{\ul Who's Who in CIA}{ in 1968, and is identified by his State Department biography to be a career intelligence officer (145).
\par 
\par       From 1962 to 1968, William W. Butterworth was U.S. Ambassador to Canada.  Also a Princeton graduate, he first was posted to 
Canada as a junior diplomat in 1932 (146).  In 1941, he attended the fourth and last bi-annual "Conference on Canadian-American Relations", coming to Queen's University as Chief of the British Empire Unit of the U.S. Department of Commerce (147).  With hi
m
 at the conference were two other men with prominent careers in U.S. espionage: 1) Calvin B. Hoover, who, by his own account, began intelligence work for the U.S. government in 1933, and 2) William P. Maddox, a Princeton University professor who became an
 
OSS colonel in charge of intelligence operations in London (148).  Butterworth served during WWII as an economic warfare specialist in Spain and Portugal and became one of two OSS contacts with Germany's chief of military intelligence, Walter Schellenberg
 
(149).  The other contact was Allen Dulles, eventually to become head of the CIA.  After the war, along with Merchant, Butterworth was posted to Nanking (150).  As U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Butterworth continued the campaign to destabilize the Diefenbake
r government, and at the initial urging of Willis Armstrong, drafted the press release that contradicted the Prime Minister and caused the fall of his government (151). 
\par 
\par       From 1969 to 1973, Adolph W. Schmidt was U.S. Ambassador to Canada.  He was from
 the powerful Pittsburgh Mellon family and was another Princeton graduate (152).  During WWII, Schmidt worked for the OSS in Cairo and London, and in 1945, along with Richard Helms, he took over management of OSS operations in occupied Germany when Willia
m
 Casey had to leave for covert operations in China (153).  When Schmidt became Ambassador to Canada, he brought with him to Ottawa, as his principle political advisor, Vladimir Toumanoff, another career U.S. intelligence agent (154).  During the Schmidt-T
oumanoff tenure in Ottawa, Quebec separatism was re-invigorated by the 1970 October Crisis and by the creation of the Parti Qu\'e9becois.
\par 
\par       From 1974 to 1976, William J. Porter was U.S. Ambassador to Canada.  During WWII, he held various State Department 
postings in the Middle East, including Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus (155), all cities of intense espionage activity (156).  Porter was posted to Algeria from 1961 to 1965, first as consul general and then as ambassador.  His U.S. AID director there was D
o
nald Q. Coster, a career intelligence agent himself also with a record of activity in Canada (157).  On April 22, 1961, four French generals staged a military coup, apparently supported by the CIA (158).  In 1965, Porter went to Vietnam as the single-mana
g
er of the U.S. pacification program, commanding USAID and CIA resources in order to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese peasants (159).  In 1971, he became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and was instrumental in backing the Lon Nol c
oup in Cambodia (160).
\par 
\par       From 1976 to 1979, Thomas O. Enders was U.S. Ambassador to Canada.  He was first employed by the State Department in 1958 as an "intelligence research specialist" (161).  After various positions in Eastern Europe, he became Dep
uty Chief of Mission in Cambodia, where he was responsible for using a local intelligence network to select which villages would be bombed in President Nixon's secret war (162).  Said one colleague, "He was not burdened by much interest in Cambodians."  E
n
ders' next assignment was in Canada, where he is most remembered for his relentless campaign for free trade (163).  After that, President Reagan appointed him Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.  His tenure included the invasion of Gr
enada and the U.S. proxy wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Enders was part of an \'e9
lite inter-agency group that coordinated the war against Nicaragua; others were Lt.-Col. Oliver North, U.S. Army Gen. Paul Gorman, and Duane Clarridge, head of the CIA's covert operations in Latin America (164).  Lis\'e9e quoted Ren\'e9 L\'e9
vesque's belief that Enders "is a damned spy --he must be working for the CIA," but Lis\'e9e dismissed this as mere speculation arising from "the absence of hard information on American activities in Quebec" (165).
\par 
\par       It is not at all clear what should be made of this record of ambassadors with espionage backgrounds.  It is certainly not consistent with "good neighbor" beliefs.  Journalists and historians could have discovered and reported these b
ackgrounds at the time of tenure of each ambassador, and explanations could have been sought and explanations given.  But even in retrospect, it is important to examine the backgrounds of U.S. diplomats if Canadians are to ever understand their modern his
tory, if they are ever to have historical beliefs that allow them to freely observe, seek, and evaluate reported incidents of hostile U.S. behavior in contemporary history.  These are too numerous to dismiss from history sight unseen.
\par 
\par       Reports of vari
ous U.S. agencies engaging in what appears to be surreptitious and hostile activity have yet to be adequately examined and explained.  For example, there is evidence over the past three decades that U.S. agencies have been covertly manipulating Canadian e
l
ections (166), have infiltrated federal political parties (167), have targeted Canadian politicians and institutions for electronic surveillance (168), and have engaged in economic espionage in Canada (169).  During the 1960s, the CIA directed funding to 
Canadian student associations (170), the officers of which may have subsequently moved into positions of political influence in Canada.  U.S. intelligence officers and politicians have advised and assisted the Parti Qu\'e9
becois (171) and perhaps even infiltra
ted and helped fund the FLQ (172).  In 1962, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Research Office initiated "Task Revolt" in Quebec (173), well before FLQ terrorism, well before "Operation Camelot", but surprisingly soon after the CIA's 1961 National Intell
i
gence Estimate predicted "an improved relationship between the major English- and French-speaking communities" (174).  There has been one report from a BBC documentary that the CIA, in 1967, had a training base in Quebec near Trois-Riviere (175).  There i
s
 also the long standing claim that the CIA, prior to the 1970 October Crisis, moved considerable manpower into Montreal (176).  Finally, in the mid-1980s, the United States built a new Army base on the Canadian border, near Ottawa and not far from Montrea
l (177).  The rapid assault division garrisoned at Fort Drum specializes in urban warfare, winter combat, and surprise attacks.  A comparison of Canada's }{\ul Diplomatic Corps}{
 directory with espionage data bases shows that hundreds of U.S. intelligence agents have been posted to Canada under diplomatic cover since 1945 (178).
\par 
\par       Of course, not all such reports are accurate, and a first step in trying to understand the causes and consequences of hostile behavior by agencies of the United States is to seek furt
her empirical evidence to confirm or disconfirm these reports.  For example, in 1971, the }{\ul Kingston Whig-Standard}{
 reprinted an interview with a Mr. Henry Gablinger by a journalist named John Samson.  It had been originally published in a U.S. newspaper called the }{\ul Examiner}{
 (179).  Mr. Gablinger was described as an expert on natural resources and an advisor to President Richard Nixon.  Gablinger stated forthrightly that the U.S. will take Canadian energy and water resources by treaty or by force: "its all very
 simple," and "just look at the figures," and "we have the means to conquer Canada" (180).  Richard Preston wanted a quick dismissal of this report and felt that he had it on the grounds that "no such American periodical had ever existed" (181).  In fact,
 there are numerous U.S. papers called }{\ul Examiner}{
; the most famous one is found in San Francisco (182).  Preston's conclusion was right but not for the right reasons: a) there is no record anywhere of a Henry Gablinger resources expert or advisor to Richard N
ixon, and b) the only U.S. journalist named John Samson was then editor of a sports magazine and only wrote under the pen-name Jack Samson (183).  He has denied authorship.  Although there is still the question of who did write it and why, the document is
 not authentic and can be dismissed, but on the basis of a systematic search for evidence, not on the basis of a cognitive need to turn a blind eye.
\par       In the introduction to this paper, William James was cited for his psychology of beliefs and their con
servative inertia.  He was writing in the context of explaining pragmatism, a philosophy which weighs the merits of competing beliefs by asking, "What difference would it make?"  Canada is a fragile country, despite its size and apparent wealth.  Like the
 
Dutch relentlessly repairing their dikes, Canadians must relentlessly repair their national political structure.  Canada is not robust.  When Canadians refuse to examine evidence of U.S. hostile actions, then they needlessly imperil the nation.  That is a
 difference that weighs against hand-me-down history and quick dismissals of facts.  That is a difference that favours doubt and favours a history that is conscious of its cognitive faults.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\f2 
\par }{\f2 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {E N D N O T E S
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 { 1  For example, the following three discussions on the relationship between history and the social sciences have little of note on the psychology of history:
\par \tab M.M. Krug, }{\ul History and the Social Sciences}{ (Toronto 1967).
\par \tab D. Heater "History and the Social Sciences", in M. Ballard (ed.), }{\ul New Movements in the Study and }{\tab \tab }{\ul Teaching of History}{ (Bloomington, Indiana, 1970), pp. 134-146.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {\tab  W.M. Runyan, "Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between History and Psychology," in W.M. Runyan (ed.), }{\ul Psychologyand Historical Interpretation}{
 (Oxford 1988), pp. 247-285.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {    Some provocative articles on developmental cognitive history can be found in:
\par \tab M. Carretero and J.F. Voss (eds.), }{\ul Cognitive and Instructional Processes in History and the Social }{\tab \tab }{\ul Sciences.}{ (Hillsdale, NJ, 1994).
\par  2  See the following for discussions of history in the "mentalitee" and "social memory" traditions:
\par \tab G.E.R. Lloyd, }{\ul Demystyfying Mentalities}{ (Cambridge 1989).
\par \tab J. Fentress and C. Wickman, }{\ul Social Memory}{ (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
\par \tab Articulation of Memory, a symposium of articles in }{\ul Oceania}{, 66 (Jun 1996), pp. 257-327.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 { Memory and American History, a symposium of articles in }{\ul The Journal of American History}{, 75 (Mar 1989). 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 { 3  See the following for psychohistory and historiometry: 
\par \tab L. de Mause, }{\ul A Bibliography of Psychohistory}{ (New York 1975).
\par \tab E.H. Erikson, }{\ul New Directions in Psychohistory}{ (Lexington, MA, 1980). 
\par \tab E. Stannard, }{\ul Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of}{ }{\ul Psychohistory}{ (Oxford 1980).
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {D.K. Simonton, }{\ul Psychology, Science, and History: An}{ }{\ul Introduction to Historiometry}{ (New Haven, CT, 1990).
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 { 4  F.W. Rudmin, "Cognitive History: Je me souviens," presented at XIII Congress of International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (Montreal, August, 1996).
\par  5  F.W. Rudmin, "Cognitive History: Disbelieving the Unbelievable," presented at XXVI International Congress of Psychology (Montreal, August, 1996).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 { 6  Anon., }{\ul Encyclopedia Britannica}{, Vol. 10 (Chicago 1991), p. 272.
\par  7  I. Deutscher, }{\ul Stalin: A Political Biography}{ (New York 1949), p. 182.
\par      Anon., }{\ul Encyclopedia Britannica}{, Vol. 19 (Chicago 1991), p. 179.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 { 8  }{\ul Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - RED}{, US National Archives, Joint Board, JB 325, serial 435 -641, roll 10, p. 85 (amended draft).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 { 9  For numerous reports of journalistic accounts of the role of historical beliefs in the Bosnian civil war, see:
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {\tab F.W. Rudmin, "Cognitive History of the Bosnian Civil War: A Review of Interview Data," presented at 60th Anniversary  Convention of the Soci
ety for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Ann Arbor, May, 1996).  For example,
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {N.M. Horrock, "A Land Where History Holds Them by the Throat," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 27 May 1993, p. A17.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab P. Koring, "Painful Memories Drive Serb General," }{\ul Globe and Mail}{, 28 Jun 1993, p. A9. 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {10  F.W. Rudmin, "Cognitive History: Proposal for a New Subfield," }{\ul Cross-Cultural Psychology Bulletin}{, 27 (Mar 1993), p. 21.  Also, }{\ul Peace Research}{
, 25 (no. 2, 1993), pp. 99-100.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {11  F. Heider, }{\ul The Notebooks}{, Vol. 3, Book 6 (M. Benesh-Weiner, ed.) (New York 1989), p. 42, note 142. 
\par 12  Ibid., p. 36, note 121. 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {
13  "Person perception" and such related topics as "social cognition", "attribution", and "implicit personality theory" are common topics in most social psychology text books. Further discussion can be found in the following sources:
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab M. Cook, }{\ul Issues in Person Perception}{ (New York 1984).
\par \tab S.T. Fiske, }{\ul Social Cognition}{ (New York 1991).
\par \tab F. Heider, }{\ul The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations}{ (New York 1958). 
\par \tab A.W. Kruglanski, }{\ul Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge}{ (New York 1989).
\par \tab L.L Martin and A. Tesser (eds.), }{\ul The Construction of Social Judgements}{ (Hillsdale, NJ,1992).
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {14  F. Rudmin, M. Trimpop, I.-P. Kryl, and P. Boski, "Gustav Ichheiser in the History of Social Psychology: An Early Phenomenology of Social Attribution," }{\ul 
British Journal }{of Social}{\ul  Psychology}{, 26 (1987), pp. 165-180.
\par G. Ichheiser, "Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study of False Social Perception," }{\ul American }{\tab }{\ul Journal of Sociology}{,  55, (Supplement Part 2, 1949).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab G. Ichheiser, }{\ul Appearances and Realities}{ (San Francisco 1970).
\par 15  Ichheiser, (1949), ibid., p. 14.
\par 16  Ibid., p. 16.
\par 17  Ibid., p. 28.
\par 18  For contemporary accounts of social cognitive schemas, see the following:
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {W.F. Brewer and G.V. Nakamura, "The Nature and Function of Schemas," in R.W. Wyer, Jr. and T.K. Srull (eds.), Handbook of}{\ul  Social Cognition}{
, Vol. 1 (London 1984), pp. 119-160.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab D.E. Rumelhart, "Schemata and the Cognitive System," in R.W. Wyer, Jr. and T.K. Srull (eds.), \tab \tab }{\ul Handbook of Social Cognition}{, Vol. 1 (London 1984), pp. 161-189.

\par 19  Ichheiser, (1949), ibid., p. 28.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {20  W. James, "What Pragmatism Means," in }{\ul Pragmatism, A New Name For Some Old Ways of Thinking}{ (New York 1908), pp. 61-62.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {21  H. Bierhoff, }{\ul Person Perception and Attribution}{ (New York 1989), pp. 35-43.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {
R. Hastie, "Memory for Behavioral Information that Confirms or Contradicts a Personality Impression," in R. Hastie, T.M. Ostrom, E.B. Ebbesen, R.S. Wyer, Jr., D.L. Hamilton, and D.E. Carlston (eds.), }{\ul Person Memory: The Cogntive Basis}{ o}{\ul f
 Social Perception}{ (Hillsdale, NJ, 1980), pp. 155-177.  
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {22  Ichheiser, ibid., pp. 22-23.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {23  R.A. Preston, }{\ul The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939}{ (Montreal 1977). 
\par 24  J.A.S. Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917," in P.M. Kennedy (ed.), }{\ul The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914}{ (London 1979), p. 23.
\par 25  Report from Gen. Tasker Bliss, June 17, 1904, to the Joint Board, att.: Admiral George Dewey and Admiral Taylor.  U.S. National Archives, Joint Board, JB 320-325, serial 415, roll 9 , p. 7.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {26  }{\ul War Plan RED}{, ibid., p. 7
\par 27  Ibid., p. 26.
\par 28  Ibid., p. 57.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-1440\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {2\tab 9  Anon., "Common Sense vs. Peace Fustian", }{\ul United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette}{, 15 Oct 1910, p. 185. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {30  Anon., "Brisk Work at Pine Camp", }{\ul The Sun}{ (New York), 3 Aug 1910, p. 5.
\par       Anon., "War Puzzle Solved Too Soon", }{\ul The Sun}{ (New York), 5 Aug 1910, p.5.
\par       Anon., "Canadian Army is Crushed", }{\ul The Sun}{ (New York), 9 Aug 1910, p. 3.
\par 31  Preston, ibid., p. 196.
\par 32  Anon., "Forces Cross from Kingston to Clayton", }{\ul Watertown Daily Times}{, 19 Jun 1908, p. 5.
\par 33  Preston, ibid., pp. 188, 191.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {34  Anon., }{\ul Encampment of the United States Army and National Guard, Military Department of the East, at Pine Camp, Jefferson County, N.Y., June 15 to July 15}{
, (Watertown, NY,  1908). 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {35  Anon., "50,000 Men May Camp at the Plains," }{\ul Watertown }{Daily Times, 23 Jun 1908, p. 8.
\par       Anon., "Oppose Pine Plains as Manoeuvre Site," }{\ul New York Times}{, 27 Jul 1908, p. 3.
\par       Anon., "Oliver Strongly Urges the Site," }{\ul Watertown Daily Times,}{ 5 Feb 1909, p. 4.
\par 36  Anon., "Plattsburgh Army Begins War Games," }{\ul New York Times}{, 28 Aug 1915, p. 14.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {      Anon., "Recruits Defeat the Red Invasion: Blue Army Wins Battle of Fort Montgomery on the Canadian Border," }{\ul New York}{ }{\ul Times}{, 31 Aug 1915, p. 4.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      Anon., "Brigade on 'Hike'," }{\ul Plattsburgh Daily Press}{, 28 Aug 1915, p. 3.
\par       Anon., "With Blue and Red," }{\ul Plattsburgh Daily Press}{, 30 Aug 1915, p. 3.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {37  Anon., "The Blue Win Signal Victory: Defeat the Reds in Battle Near Rouses Point," }{\ul Plattsburgh Daily Press}{, 31 Aug 1915, p. 3.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {38  Preston, ibid., pp. 191, 192, 271, 272.
\par 39  Preston, ibid., p. 223.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {40  }{\ul 
Air Defense Bases: Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 6621 and H.R. 4130, February 11, 12, 13, 1935}{, (Washington, DC, 1935), p. 61. 
\par 41  Anon., "Air Base Provided Near Canada Line: 'Camouflage'  Clause is Disclosed as Put into Wilcox Bill by War Department," }{\ul New York Times}{, 29 Apr 1935, p. 2.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      Anon., "M'Swain Explains Canada Incident," }{\ul New York Times}{, 2 May 1935, p. 11.
\par       Anon., "Roosevelt Scores House Committee on Border Air Base," }{\ul New York Times}{, 1 May 1935, pp. 1-2.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {42  J. Butler, untitled memo to Secretary of War, 10 May 1935, available from the U.S. National Archvies in documents appended to }{\ul War Plan RED}{.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {      Anon., "Gets Army Promotion," }{\ul New York Times}{, 24 Jul 1935,  p. 3.
\par 43  Anon., "Canada Asks Data on Air Base Proposal," }{\ul New York Times}{, 30 Apr 1935, p. 10.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {44  Anon., "Action Pleases Canada: Roosevelt Stand is Held to Meet Public Opinion," }{\ul New York Times}{, 1 May 1935, p. 8.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {45  "M'Swain Explains Canada Incident," ibid.
\par 46  Anon., "US Disavows Airport Yarn," }{\ul Toronto Globe}{, 1 May 1935, p. 1.
\par 47  J. MacCormac, "Canadians Amused by Air Base Talk," }{\ul New York Times}{, 5 May 1935, sec. IV, p. 7.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {48  Anon., "Air Corps Stations Approved by House: Construction Includes Base Near Border which Caused Canadian Inquiry," }{\ul New York Times}{, 6 Jun 1935, p. 7.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {49  Anon., "Studies Big Air Base in Lake Champlain," }{\ul New York Times}{, 9 Jun 1935, p. 21. 
\par 50  Anon., "Canada Unruffled by Air Base," }{\ul New York Times}{, 13 Jun 1935, p. 3.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {51  W.W. McLaren, A.B. Correy, and R.G. Trotter (eds.), }{\ul Conference on Canadian-American Affairs: Held at}{ }{\ul 
St.Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935}{ (Boston 1936).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab Trotter files, Queen's University Archives, Kingston, Ontario. 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {52  Anon., "Army to Mass 60,000 in Record War Game: Mammouth Manoeuvres Planned for Northern New York, with Nolan in Charge," }{\ul New York Times}{, 20 Mar 1935, p. 22.

\par 53  F.W. Rudmin, }{\ul Bordering on Aggression: Evidence of U.S.}{ }{\ul Military Preparations Against Canada}{ (Hull, Quebec, 1993), pp. 121-123.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {54  H.W. Baldwin, "Troops Mobilize for Big War Games," }{\ul New York Times}{, 18 Aug 1935, pp. 1-2 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {H.W. Baldwin, "Army is Massed in Two-Day Rush: Men and Machines of War Pour into Pine Camp by Train, Truck and Taxi," }{\ul New York Times}{, 19 Aug 1935, pp. 1, 3.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {55  Anon., }{\ul Souvenir of the First Army Manoeuvres: The Greatest Peace Time Event in U.S. Military History at Pine Camp, N.Y., August, 1935}{ (Watertown, NY, 1935), p. 2.

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab H.W. Baldwin, "Motorized Attack Opens Modern 'War'," }{\ul New York Times}{, 22 Aug 1935, pp. 1, 3.
\par \tab J.H. Brior, "Reds Drive Back New Englanders," }{\ul Watertown Daily Times}{, 22 Aug 1935, p. 1.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {56  Anon., "History of Fort Drum", in }{\ul 10th Mountain Division (L.I.) and Fort Drum: An Unofficial Directory and Guide}{ }{\ul Published for Fort Drum Newcomers}{
 (South Boston, Virginia, 1988), p. 34. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {57  Preston, ibid., pp. 219, 226.
\par 58  Ibid., p. 221.
\par 59  }{\ul War Plan RED}{, ibid., pp. 4, 5, 17. 
\par 60  Ibid., pp. 80, 84.
\par 61  Ibid., p. 3. 
\par 62  Ibid., p. 82 (amended draft).
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {63  Commander A.S. Carpender and Colonel W. Krueger, memo to the Joint Board, Oct 17, 1934, available in U.S. National Archives, documents appended to }{\ul War Plan RED}{
. Ibid., p. 85 (amended draft).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {64  Anon., "Army and Navy Plan Huge War Games," }{\ul New York Times}{, 15 Apr 1935, p. 4.
\par 65  Anon., "May Enlarge Pine Camp," }{\ul New York Times}{, 19 Jan 1935, p. 15.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {66  Brig.-Gen. C.E. Kilbourne, memorandum to Assist. Chief of Staff, G-2, "Military reconnaissance", 4 Feb 1935, available in U.S. National Archives, RG 165, War D
epartment General Staff, Red 38-18.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {67  Air Defense Bases, ibid.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {68  Anon., "Plans Army  Manoeuvre: War Department Picks Pine Camp, N.Y., for Drill of 60,000 Men," }{\ul New York Times}{, 20 Feb 1935, p. 2.
\par 69  Gen. D. MacArthur, untitled memo to Joint Board, 6 Mar 1935,  available from the U.S. National Archives in documents appended to }{\ul War Plan RED}{.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {70  Anon., "Army and Navy Plan Huge War Games", ibid.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {71  Anon., "Air Base Provided Near Canada Line: 'Camouflaged' Clause is Disclosed as Part of Wilcox Bill by War  Department," }{\ul New York Times}{, 29 Apr 1935, p. 2. 

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {72  Anon., "Canadian Treaty Held World Ideal," }{\ul New York Times}{, 30 Apr 1935, p. 21.
\par 73  Anon., "President Scores House Committee...", ibid.
\par 74  Butler, 10 May 1935, ibid.
\par 75  Anon., "Air Corps Stations Approved by House...", ibid.
\par 76  Anon., "Studies Big Air Base...", ibid.
\par 77  McLaren et al., ibid.
\par 78  Anon., "299 Men to be Added at Post," }{\ul Watertown Daily Times}{, 29 Jun 1935, p. 6.
\par 79  Anon., "Gets Army Promotion", ibid.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {80  Anon., "Air Unit at Pine Camp for Big Manoeuvres: First Ten Planes Arrive as Washington Lays Plans for Like Events in Next Three Years," }{\ul New York Times}{
, 9 Aug 1935, p. 15.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {81  Anon., "Roosevelt to Sign Army Air Base Bill," }{\ul New York Times}{, 10 Aug 1935, p. 5.
\par 82  J.H. Brior, "War Games End in Sea of Mud,", }{\ul Watertown Daily Times}{, 27 Aug 1935, p. 1.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {83  B. Hersh, }{\ul The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA}{ (New York 1992), pp. 65, 446, 448.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {D. Gibbs, }{\ul The Political Economy of Third World Interventions}{  (Chicago 1991), pp. 118-119, 134-135, 140.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab A. Taheri, }{\ul Nest of Spies: America's Journey to Disaster in Tehran}{ (New York 1988), p. 71.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 136.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 347.
\par 84  W. Blum, }{\ul The CIA, A Forgotten History: U.S. Global Interventions Since WW2}{ (London 1986), p. 149.
\par \tab W. Shawcross, }{\ul Side-Show: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia}{ (New York 1979), pp. 5\tab \tab 3-54.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 209.
\par 
\par 85  Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Membership }{\ul Directory}{ (McLean, Virginia, 1994).
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1944), p. 152.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 392.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {86  W. Baldwin, "1935 Saw First Reciprocity Treaty with US Since 1854", }{\ul Ottawa Citizen}{ (Supplement No. 2), 31 Aug 1954, p. 24.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab L. Martin, }{\ul The Presidents and Prime Ministers. Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of }{\tab \tab }{\ul Bilateral Bliss}{ (Toronto 1982).
\par 87  Anon., "Undefended Frontier is Hailed by Armour," }{\ul New York Times}{, 1 Dec 1935, p. 36.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {88  C.H. Jones and R.W. Crawford, "Critical Areas of Canada and Approaches Thereto," in Current Estimate of Canada and New Foundland, pp. 40-59, available in U.S
. National Archives, RG 165, Army War College, Vol. II, Part 2, Doc. 19, Supplement No. 3, Box 41, 15W3/15/4C.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {89  Anon., [}{\ul 40th year reunion book of the Class of '29}{] (Princeton, NJ, 1969).
\par \tab D.Q. Coster, "Behind the German Lines," }{\ul Readers Digest}{ 37 (Nov), pp. 115-125.
\par \tab J. Mader, }{\ul Who's Who in CIA}{ (Berlin 1968), p. 114.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1944).
\par \tab }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {90  Army War College, 1934-35, War Plans Course, 1935-36, available at United States Military History Collection (Carlisle Barracks, PA).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {91  T. Holt, "Joint Plan RED," }{\ul MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History}{, I (Autumn 1988), p. 48.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {92  R.A. Preston, "Buster Brown was Not Alone --- A Postscript," }{\ul Canadian Defence Quarterly}{, IV (summer 1974), pp. 11-12.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {93  G. Lovell, "The scenario for a U.S. Invasion of Canada", }{\ul The Star}{ (Montreal), 6 Dec 1975, p. A14. 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {94  Anon., "Fearing Trade War with U.K., U.S. Planned Canada Invasion", }{\ul Gazette}{ (Montreal), 6 Dec 1975, p. 13. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {95  Anon., "Files Show U.S. Plan to Invade Canada", }{\ul Globe and Mail}{, 6 Dec 1975, p. 13.
\par 96  Anon., "'Invasion' of Canada in U.S. Plans for 1929," }{\ul Edmonton Journal Weekender}{, 6 Dec 1975, p. 1.
\par 97  Anon., "US Archives Show 1929 Plan to Invade Canada," }{\ul Telegraph-Journal}{, 6 Dec 1975, pp. 1, 13.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {98  G. Lovell, "U.S. Feared War with U.K., Planned Canadian Invasion," }{\ul Evening Telegraph}{, 6 Dec 1975, p. 1. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {99  G. Lovell, }{\ul The Star}{ (Montreal), ibid.
\par 100 Kilbourne, ibid.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {101 A.E. Campbell, [Review of The Defence of the Undefended Border], }{\ul History: The Journal of the Historical}{  }{\ul Association}{, 63 (1978), pp. 398-399.
\par 102 D. Morton, [Review of The Defence of the Undefended Border], }{\ul American Historical Review}{, 83 (1978), pp. 1371-1374.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {103 Holt, ibid., p. 55.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-1440\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {1\tab 04 N.F. Dreisziger, "The Role of War Planning in Canadian- American Relations, 1867-1939," }{\ul Canadian Review of American Studies}{, 10 (Winter 1979), p. 345.

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {105 }{\ul War Plan RED}{, ibid., p. 6.
\par 106 R.W. Winks, [Review of The Defence of the Undefended Border], }{\ul Military Affairs}{, 44 (1980), pp. 50-51.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {107 C.P. Stacey, }{\ul Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of}{ }{\ul Canadian External Policies, Vol. 2: 1921-1948, The}{ }{\ul Mackenzie King Era}{
 (Buffalo 1981), pp. 155-157.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {108 R.S. Cline, }{\ul Washington Command Post: The Operations Division}{ (Washington 1951), pp. 34-35.
\par \tab Preston, ibid., p. 219.
\par \tab Stacey, ibid. 
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {109 L.L. Montague, }{\ul General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of the Central Intelligence}{ (University Park, PA, 1992), p. 138. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab  U.S. State Department, }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1973), p. 68.
\par \tab }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1985), p. 606.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {110 W.R. Corson, }{\ul The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire}{ (New York 1967), p. 367. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab J. Ranelagh, }{\ul The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA}{ (London 1986), pp. 196, 286-287.
\par 111 V. Marchetti and J.D. Marks, }{\ul The CIA and the Cult of}{ }{\ul Intelligence}{ (London 1974), pp. 45, 92.
\par \tab D. Wise and T.B. Ross, }{\ul The Invisible Government}{ (London 1965), pp. 234-235. 
\par 112 U.S. State Department, ibid.
\par \tab Wise and Ross, ibid., p. 238.
\par 113 D. Morton, }{\ul Canada and War}{ (Toronto 1981), p. 94.
\par 114 R. Gwyn, }{\ul The 49th Paradox: Canada in North America}{ (Toronto 1985).
\par 115 R. Bothwell, }{\ul Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership}{ (Toronto 1992).
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {116 N. Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, }{\ul Empire and Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s}{ (Mississauga, Ont., 1994).
\par 117 J.H. Thompson and S.J. Randall, }{\ul Canada and the United States:}{ }{\ul Ambivalent Allies}{ (Buffalo 1994), p. 100.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {118 J.D. Salant, "The War that Never Was," }{\ul Post-Standard}{ (Syracuse), 25 Mar 1991, pp. A1, A4.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {119 P. Peirol, "US Plan to Attack Canada in 1930 Causes Stir," }{\ul Whig-Standard}{ (Kingston), 27 Mar 1991, pp. 1-2.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab D. Pugliese, "Invasion 1930: US Had a Plan to Attack Canada to Win Economic Battle with Britain," \tab \tab }{\ul Ottawa Citizen}{", 27 Mar 1991, pp. A1-A2.
\par 120 Bliss, ibid., p. 1
\par 121 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
\par 122 Ibid., p. 4.
\par 123 Ibid., p. 20.
\par 124 Ibid., p. 21.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {125 Adm. George Dewey, [letter from the Joint Board to the Secretary of Navy] 15 April 1912, approved by the Secretary of Navy on April 2
2, 1912, and by President Taft on May 3, 1912. Declassified May 22, 1956, and available in the records of the Joint Board, U.S. National Archives in microfilm roll 9, JB 320-325, Serial 415.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-1440\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\tx720\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {1\tab 26 Adm. George Dewey, [letter from the Joint Board to the  Secr
etary of Navy] 13 February 1913, approved by the Acting Secretary of Navy and by President Taft. Declassified May 22, 1956, and available in the records of the Joint Board, U.S. National Archives in microfilm roll 9, JB 320-325, Serial 415.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {127 A. Craven and W. Johnson, }{\ul The United States: Experiment in Democracy}{ (2nd ed.) (Boston 1962), p. 403. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab W.C. Gordon, "Mexico" in }{\ul Encyclopedia Britannica}{, Vol. 15 (Chicago 1971), p. 335.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {R. Hofstadter, W. Miller, and D. Aaron, }{\ul The United States: The History of the Republic}{ (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967), p. 641.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab R.C. Wade, H.B. Wilder, and L.C. Wade, }{\ul A History of the}{ U}{\ul nited States}{ (New York 1966), p. 601.
\par 128 K.J. Grieb, }{\ul The United States and Huerta}{ (Lincoln, NB, 1969),  p. 157.
\par 129 Bliss, ibid., p. 20.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {130 Bayes's Theo
rem can be found in most statistical text books. As a mathematical formula, it can be presented in several  different, equivalent forms.  This form comes from: W.L. Hayes, }{\ul Statistics}{ (4th ed.) (Fort Worth 1988), pp.45-47.
\par }{\lang1044\langfe1044\langnp1044 \sect }\sectd \sbknone\linex0\headery1440\footery1440\colsx708\endnhere\sectdefaultcl {\*\pnseclvl1\pndec\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnhang
{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pndec\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl5\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl6\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pndec\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl8
\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnhang{\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnhang}\pard\plain \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 \f1\fs20\langfe1044\cgrid\langfenp1044 {
131 K.H. Teigen, "Variants of Subjective Probabilities: Concepts, Norms, and Biases", in G. Wright and P. Ayton (eds.), }{\ul Subjective Probability}{ (New York 1994), pp. 211-238.
\par 132 M. Frost and M. Gratton, }{\ul Spyworld: How C.S.E. Spies on Canadians and the World}{ (Toronto 1995), p. 212.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {133 }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1964), p. 2157.
\par 134 W. Blum, }{\ul The CIA: A Forgotten History}{ (London 1986), pp. 15-20.
\par 135 Z. Grant, }{\ul Facing the Phoenix}{ (New York 1991), p. 89.
\par 136 L. Martin, }{\ul The Presidents and the Prime Ministers}{ (Toronto 1982), p. 198.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {K. Nash, }{\ul Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border}{ (Toronto 1990), pp. 145-148. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {137 Martin, ibid., p. 230.
\par \tab Nash, ibid., pp. 317-318.
\par 138 P.C. Newman, }{\ul Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years}{ (Toronto 1963), pp. 265-266.
\par 139 J.-F. Lis\'e9e, }{\ul In the Eye of the Eagle}{ (Toronto 1990), p. 175.
\par 140 Ibid., p. 31.
\par 141 J. Mader, }{\ul Who's Who in CIA}{ (Berlin 1968), pp. 115, 272, 420, 471, 564, 570, 
\par \tab U.S. State Department, }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 289.
\par \tab U.S. State Department, }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1971), pp. 83, 336, 459, 377-378, 464.
\par 142 Lis\'e9e, ibid., pp. 324-326.
\par 143 Ibid., pp. 102-105.
\par 144 Ibid., p. 211.
\par 145 Mader, ibid., p. 258.
\par \tab U.S. State Department, }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1974), p.166.
\par 146 U.S. State Department, }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1946), p.163.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {147 R.G. Trotter and A.B. Corey (eds.), }{\ul Conference on Canadian-American Affairs: Held at Queen's University, Kingston,}{ O}{\ul ntario, June 23-26, 1941}{
 (Boston, 1941), pp. 269-274.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {148 C. Hoover, }{\ul Memoirs of Capitalism, Communism, and Nazism}{ (Durham, NC, 1965), pp. 89, 194-255.
\par \tab A.C. Brown, }{\ul The Secret War Report of the OSS}{ (New York 1976),  pp. 6, 303.
\par \tab Mader, ibid., pp. 242, 326.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1946), p. 320.
\par 149 A.C. Brown, }{\ul Body Guard of Lies}{, Vol. 1 (New York 1975), p. 507.
\par \tab  }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1965), p. 300.
\par 150 U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1968), p. 78.
\par 151 Martin, ibid., p. 203.
\par \tab Nash, ibid., pp. 238-241.
\par 152 }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1985), p. 2898.
\par 153 R. Dunlop, }{\ul Donovan: America's Master Spy}{ (Chicago 1982), pp. 391, 393, 465, 466, 480, 483.
\par \tab W. Casey, }{\ul The Secret War Against Hitler}{ (New York 1989), p. 218.
\par 154 Mader, ibid., p. 522.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1971), p. 424.
\par 155 U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1974),  p. 275.
\par \tab  }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1974), p. 2520.
\par 156 A.C. Brown, }{\ul The Secret War Report of the OSS}{ (New York 1976), pp. 177-184.
\par 157 Mader, ibid., p. 114.
\par \tab Dunlop, ibid., p. 344.  
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {R.H. Smith, }{\ul OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency}{ (Berkeley 1972), p. 173. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
\par 158 Blum, ibid., pp. 165-170.
\par 159 Grant, ibid., pp. 280-281.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {R.A. Hunt, }{\ul Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds}{ (Oxford 1995), pp. 71-81.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {160 J. Prados, }{\ul Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush}{. (New York 1991), pp. 231, 290.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {161 U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, DC, 1974), p. 99.
\par 162 W. Shawcross, }{\ul Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia}{ (New York 1979), p. 269.
\par 163 Anon., "Envoy Enders Pushed for Freer Trade," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 23 March 1971, p. A18. 
\par 164 F. Clarkson, "Behind the Supply Lines," }{\ul Covert Action Information Bulletin}{, No. 25 (1986), pp. 56, 50-53. 
\par 165 Lis\'e9e, ibid., pp. 2, 207.
\par 166 Anon., "Yankee Fingerprints," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 7 Jun 1995, p. A20.
\par \tab J. Littleton, }{\ul Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network}{ (Toronto 1986), pp. 82-83.
\par \tab Martin, ibid., pp. 198-199, 206-207.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {G.S. Mount, }{\ul Canada's Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom}{ (Toronto 1993), pp. 108-109.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab Nash, ibid., pp. 166-170, 277-279, 285.
\par \tab L. Pratt, "More on the CIA: Spooks in God's Country?" }{\ul Last Post}{, 5 (Oct. 1975), pp. 9-10. 
\par \tab S.J. Robinson, }{\ul Hansard}{, 25 May 1982, pp. 17772-17773.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {R. Sheppard, "Ottawa Investigated Claims that RCMP Infiltrated by CIA," }{\ul Globe and Mail}{, 20 May 1982, pp. 1-2.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab R. Sheppard, "Kaplan May Convene a Closed Probe on CIA," }{\ul Globe and Mail}{, 21 May 1982, p. 5.
\par \tab R. Speirs, "Straight-Talker Protects U.S. Clout in Ottawa," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 14 Nov 1994, p. A10. 
\par 167 G. Bellett, }{\ul Age of Secrets}{ (Maitland, Ont., 1995), pp. 162, 241.
\par \tab Sheppard, 20 May 1982, ibid.
\par \tab Sheppard, 21 May 1982, ibid.
\par 168 Anon., "U.S. Spied on Canada's Secret Service: Report," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 28 Sep 1982, pp. A1, A4.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {M. Fornataro, "The Prosecution of John Meier," }{\ul Canadian Covert Activity Analyst}{ 1 (Fall/Winter 1984), pp. 3, 9-16.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab Frost and Gratton, ibid., pp. 153 (facing photos), 270.
\par \tab Lis\'e9e, ibid., p. 320.
\par \tab Littleton, ibid., pp. 99-100.
\par \tab D. Sellar, "How Canada Took the Cruise," }{\ul Vancouver Sun}{, 10 Mar 1983, p. 5.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {169 J.L. Granatstein and D. Stafford, }{\ul Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost}{ (Toronto 1990), p. 190.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab  Mount, ibid., p. 117.
\par \tab  Pratt, ibid.
\par \tab }{\ul Who's Who in America}{ (Chicago 1976), p. 665.
\par 170 Blum, ibid., pp. 410-411.
\par \tab Mader, ibid., p. 576.
\par 171 Lis\'e9e, ibid., pp. 33, 66-67, 211, 221, 225-226, 228-229, 231-233, 242, 248, 249-250, 256-260, 274, 344.
\par \tab Mader, ibid., pp. 139, 258-259.
\par \tab Sheppard, 20 May 1982, ibid.
\par \tab U.S. State Dept., }{\ul Biographic Register}{ (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 166.
\par 172 Lis\'e9e, ibid., pp. 102, 103-104.
\par \tab Littleton, ibid., p. 147.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li1440\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0 {R. McKenzie and R. Lebel, "FLQ Men in Cuba Linked to Murder Cell," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 2 Aug 1973, pp. A1, A7.
\par M. Viorst, "An Analysis of American Intervention in the Matter of Quebec," }{\ul Macleans}{ (Nov 1972), pp. 22-23, 74-76. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {173 T. Butson, "U.S. Army Bankrolled Probe into 'Quebec Revolt'," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 26 Feb 1966, pp. 1, 4.
\par \tab B. Macadam and J.R. Dubro, "How the CIA Has Us Spooked," }{\ul Macleans}{, (Jul 1974), p. 46.
\par \tab I.L. Horowitz, }{\ul The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot}{ (Cambridge, MA, 1967).
\par 174 J.-F. Lis\'e9e, ibid., p. 29, quoting from NIE document  available at JFK Library.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {175 J. Edginton (producer) and J. Sergeant (assoc. producer), "Who Killed Martin Luther King?" BBC Television documentary, broadcast in Sep 1989.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\tab J. Edginton and J. Sergeant, "The Murder of Martin Luther King, Jr.," }{\ul Covert Action Information }{\tab \tab }{\ul Bulletin}{, no. 34 (summer 1990), pp. 21-27.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {176 R. Cleroux, }{\ul Official Secrets: The Story Behind the Canadian Security Intelligence Service}{ (Montreal 1990), p. 59.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {T. Hazlitt, "Ex-Spy Claims U.S. Tanks Ready in Quebec Crisis," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 22 Sep 1973, pp. A1, A4.
\par \tab M. Harrison, "Official Denials are Only to Be Expected," }{\ul Toronto Star}{, 29 Sep 1973, p. B2.
\par \tab Lis\'e9e, ibid., pp. 105, 320.
\par 177 Rudmin, }{\ul Bordering on Aggression}{, ibid.
\par }\pard \ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {178 F. Rudmin, "A Brief History of Uns
een Espionage in Canada", April 1997, unpublished, but available from the author upon request.  See page 1.  This paper identifies over 200 U.S. personnel who show evidence of intelligence activity and who were present in Canada between 1945 and 1994. Int
elligence agents can easily be identified by using the Canadian government's quarterly }{\ul Diplomatic Corps}{ directory and cross-checking U.S. diplomats names 1) with the State Department's }{\ul Biographic Register}{
 looking for "intelligence"  classifications, military service with the OSS, or such telltale signs as temporary mid-career transfers to U.S. military services, or 2) with espionage data bases, such as }{\ul NAMEBASE}{
, produced by Public Information Research, PO Box 680635, San Antonio, TX 78268 USA.  }{\ul NAMEBASE}{ is now  available on the World Wide Web.  
\par 179 Samson, "Take Over Canada?  A Friendly Southern Neighbor Looks North," }{\ul Kingston Whig-Standard}{, 7 Jun 1971, p. 6.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {180 Ibid.
\par 181 Preston, ibid., p. 2.
\par 182 }{\ul Gale Directory of Publication and Broadcast Media}{, Vol. 3 (New York 1990), pp. 3334-3335.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {183 Rudmin, }{\ul Bordering on Aggression}{, ibid., pp. 140-142.
\par }}