COCA: A Secure Distributed On-Line Certification Authority Certification Authority

20.02.2001

Foredragsholdere
Fred B. Schneider

Abstact:
COCA is a fault-tolerant and secure on-line certification authority that has been built and deployed both in a local area network and in the Internet. Replication is used to achieve availability; proactive recovery with threshold cryptography is used for digitally signing certificates in a way that defends against mobile adversaries which attack, compromise, and control one replica for a limited period of time before moving on to another. Relatively weak assumptions characterize environments in which COCA's protocols will execute correctly. No assumption is made about execution speed and message delivery delays; channels are expected to exhibit only intermittent reliability; and with 3t+1 COCA servers up to t may be faulty or compromised. The result is a system with inherent defenses to certain denial of service attacks because, by their very nature, weak assumptions are difficult for attackers to invalidate. In addition, traditional techniques, including request authorization, resource management based on segregation and scheduling different classes of requests, as well as caching results of expensive cryptographic operations further reduce COCA's vulnerability to denial of service attacks. Results from experiments in a local area network and the Internet allow a quantitative evaluation of the various means COCA employs to resist denial of service attacks.

Professor Fred B. Schneider, University of Cornell, USA



Alle interesserte er hjertelig velkomne til å delta på foredraget. Eventuelle spørsmål i tilknytning til Schneider sitt foredrag ved Institutt for informatikk kan rettes til Dag Johansen, tlf 7764 4047.