Date
16.10.2006

Time
14:15

Tårnrommet ved Institutt for filosofi, Breiviklia

Guest lecture -Transcendental Arguments in Doubt

Abstract: A number of objections have been raised against the employment of transcendental arguments against skepticism. Based on a reconstruction of Cartesian skepticism and a looser one of transcendental arguments, three objections will be considered. Concerning the first, the “idealism objection”, it will be argued that the move to weaken the conclusion of transcendental arguments in the face of this objection deprives them of relevance against skepticism. However, counter examples show that the objection fails anyway. These examples reveal underlying assumptions that seemingly trap us in the choice between skepticism and idealism. However, the other two objections, the “uniqueness objection” and the objection that transcendental arguments are too strong, still stand. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from the failure of transcendental arguments in this regard.

Forelesningen tar ca 45 minutter, de siste 45 min er satt av til diskusjon.
Alle interesserte er hjertelig velkommen!

Nettsider
Hjemmesiden til Mikael Janvid: http://www.philosophy.su.se/personal/janvid.htm

Kontaktperson
Mariann Solberg

Epost
msolberg@sv.uit.no