Faulty Fighting: Misinterpretations of the gains from conflict
Author(s)
Tarjei Havnes
Date of publication
Oct 8, 2007
Abstract
This paper considers how rational groups may come to misperceive
the gains from conflict. It is shown how experiences of public
policies may differ from actual policies, and at the extreme may
lead to revolts on false premises. The aim is to give a first idea
of how misperceptions and overambitions are formed, and how
rational groups may act upon them. Bayesian updating is employed to
form group perceptions. Increasing transparency may not solve the
problem in the short run.
The framework is applied to show how misperceptions may increase
the likelihood of conflict particularly in poor countries with low
levels of education. Intragroup inequality in wages or education is
shown to increase the probability of revolt.
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