UiB : Juridisk Fakultet : Reglementer

JUS297 Complex Business Contracts – 5 sp

Vedtatt av styret ved Det juridiske fakultet 23. januar 2007.

By: Professor Eric Schanze

Content:
The course starts with an introduction to the technology of drafting
agreements. It will show that innovative and successful institutional design
does not only depend on a knowledge of the given legal repertoire and "cook
books" but also on a prior consideration of economic incentive theory. We
will shortly look at the theoretical premises of economic analysis of institutions, specifically at the theory of incentive compatible contracts, e.g. self-enforcing agreements. We will then turn to the structure and individual clauses of important long-term contracts such as concession agreements, joint ventures, turn-key contracts, franchise agreements. The example of a hypothetical contract for seabed mining will inter alia illustrate the close relation between drafting laws and contracts – and the differences. Moreover, we will explore the techniques of “conflict screening” in large business arrangements where the parties use “filters” for sorting out specific foreseeable contingencies by referring them to expert decision-making bodies before redress to a court may be sought. We conclude with an overview on regulation by consensus between the state and firms and the problem of defining a proper relation between requisite institutional innovation and compliance with existing regulation.

Learning outcome:
The students should after the course be able to understand the structure and content of complex business contracts and their relations to economic incentives, and to understand the dispute settlement systems in business contracts.

Literature:
Erich Schanze, ed. “Complex Business Contracts”, English language reader 313pp.

Exam:
Three hours school exam. Course literature and a dictionary is allowed.
Marks: Pass/Fail.