UiB : Juridisk Fakultet : Reglementer
JUS297 Complex Business Contracts – 5 sp
agreements. It will show that innovative and successful institutional design
does not only depend on a knowledge of the given legal repertoire and "cook
books" but also on a prior consideration of economic incentive theory.
We
will shortly look at the theoretical premises of economic analysis of institutions,
specifically at the theory of incentive compatible contracts, e.g. self-enforcing
agreements. We will then turn to the structure and individual clauses of important
long-term contracts such as concession agreements, joint ventures, turn-key
contracts, franchise agreements. The example of a hypothetical contract for
seabed mining will inter alia illustrate the close relation between drafting laws
and contracts – and the differences. Moreover, we will explore the techniques
of “conflict screening” in large business arrangements where the parties use “filters” for
sorting out specific foreseeable contingencies by referring them to expert
decision-making bodies before redress to a court may be sought. We conclude
with an overview on regulation by consensus between the state and firms and
the problem of defining a proper relation between requisite institutional innovation
and compliance with existing regulation.
Learning outcome:
The students should after the course be able to understand the structure
and content of complex business contracts and their relations to economic
incentives, and to understand the dispute settlement systems in business
contracts.
Erich Schanze, ed. “Complex Business Contracts”,
English language reader 313pp.
Three hours school exam. Course literature
and a dictionary is allowed.
Marks: Pass/Fail.
|
Sist oppdatert 28.2.2007 av AT Kommentarer til denne siden. |