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Journalists do not exist

- a note on some epistemological obstacles when studying professions

Our own interest is ... a marvellous instrument for nicely putting out our eyes.
(Blaise Pascal)

It is by interpreting occupations in terms of preoccupations that we can understand their real, inward meaning.
(Gaston Bachelard)

I. Introduction

This paper is an attempt, although in a very preliminary form, to reflect on some of the problems a sociologist faces when initiating a study of a profession, based on my own experiences in an on-going study of Norwegian journalists¹. Rather than the impossible task to do a scientific version of Flauberts *Dictionnaire des Idées Reçues*, a complete index of scientific folly and mistakes, I will focus on what the French philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard termed epistemological obstacles, and furthermore limit my discussion to what I believe are the first and probably primary obstacles we encounter when studying a profession, namely the concept of *profession* itself and the question of a professions *existence*.

With Bachelard (and later Bourdieu) I will argue that 'journalists' *do not really exist*, at least not in the way we usually think, but are a *construction* (a well-founded fiction) which, even though it thrives in scientific, bureaucratic and professional discourse, is not a *scientific* construction. It is a concept which is loaded with extra-scientific valorisations, which the researcher must make explicit and psychoanalyse (or socioanalyse) if he or she is to have any hope of doing what is the scientist *duty* according to Bachelard, namely to make a scientific construction of the research object.

It is not enough, like in the extreme naïve concept of *tabula rasa* in classical empiricism, to strike a critical pose and instruct the mind to shed all preconceptions. Like Bachelard teaches us: "*When we contemplate reality, what we think we know very well casts it shadow over what we ought to know. Even when it first approaches scientific knowledge, the mind is never young. It is very old, in fact, as old as its prejudices.*"². There is thus no way around a scientific construction of our research object – the alternative is to give up science.

In our view, a general "critical attitude" (as sociologists, like journalists, are often prone to claim) is about as effective in this work as a critical notion of gravity will help make a rocket go to the moon: a scientific feat which requires, contrariwise, a deep understanding of how the forces of gravity *work*. Our doubt in the existence of journalists and "professions" must be a *specific* doubt, and not a general doubt, which are far too easy and ultimately worthless³.

II. The notion of epistemological obstacles⁴

Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) is arguably the most important figure in the French tradition known as *historical epistemology*, a mixture of philosophy and history of science which appeared at Institut d'Histoire des Sciences et Techniques at Sorbonne in the inter-war years. Other important persons in this milieu were Koyré, Cavaillès and Canguilhem. The tradition from historical epistemology was taken up with thinkers like Althusser, Foucault and Bourdieu in the sixties, and all can be seen as attempting to extend the tradition into the realm of sociology.

For Bachelard, scientific facts do not just 'exist', like in the very naïve concept of 'data', which the researcher can 'collect' - a misconception which still appear, thinly veiled, in many current books on sociological methodology: scientific facts must be conquered, constructed and confirmed⁵. Scientific objects can only be achieved by radical breaks (*rupture épistémologique*) with the epistemological obstacles made by poetic and spontaneous thought, where "everyday" knowledge is the first obstacle for the

¹ An short introduction to this project can be found in Hovden 2001.

² Bachelard 2002:25.

³ Ibid.:86.

⁴ Part II of this paper is primarily lifted from an introduction to Gaston Bachelard I have written (Hovden 2004.)

⁵ Bourdieu, Passeron and Chamboredon 1991:11.

researcher: "it is vivid, concrete, natural and easy. You need only describe it and marvel. And then you think you understand it."⁶. Bachelard even goes so far as to say that primary intuition is, when confronted with a scientific explanation, always wrong⁷.

Sometimes we stand in wonder before a chosen object; we build up hypotheses and reveries; in this way we form convictions which have all the appearance of true knowledge. But the initial source is impure; the first impression is not a fundamental truth. In point of fact, scientific objectivity is possible only if one has broken first with the immediate object⁸.

The main problem with everyday knowledge is, according to Bachelard, that we have *poetic* minds. We can not look at an object for long, without falling into daydreams, lead astray with our poetic imagination, weighted down by hidden passions and desires, which hinders a scientific construction of the object, and "replace knowledge by wonderment and ideas by images."⁹.

Thus Bachelard finds for example, when looking at early scientific concepts of electricity, real understanding of it was hindered by conceptualising it as a form of *fire*, and through the scientists unconscious, fire was a sexual force, which led to strange ideas, like that electricity was life-giving for plants, or that eunuchs conducted fire especially well. These ideas were not – as one would believe – quickly dispelled by experiments, because, as Bachelard says: Our dreams are stronger than experience¹⁰.

Although Bachelard most famously was preoccupied with the "hypnotising effect" of the elements – water, air, earth, fire – which he discussed in their own books, inspired by Jungs ideas of archetypes, the problem for science is more general: "The world in which we think is not the world in which we live"¹¹, and when confronted with "this inert world whose life is not ours, which suffers none of our sorrows nor is exalted by any of our joys"¹² we have a tendency to valorise phenomena: we assign to them values and characteristics which are irrelevant for a scientific understanding. Thus, when looking at the history of science, Bachelard gives us many examples of unconscious valorisation which lead science on completely wrong tracks: for example how doctors (and patients) believed emeralds were healthful – an unconscious valorisation based on their economical value¹³, the alchemists preoccupation with essences and distillation / triturating – a valorisation which mixes both the enormous amount of work these operations demanded (the more demanding, the more valuable) and their dreams of (sexual) power¹⁴, or how Keplers theory of the planets elliptic movement met with resistance based on the valorisation of simple geometrical forms (which saw in the ellipse only an imperfect circle)¹⁵.

A particular source for scientific misunderstanding is *language*: Every word contains a petrified philosophy, and Bachelard sees particular danger for scientific thought in metaphors and analogies because they are not always fleeting images, but on the contrary, they function akin to Kantian categories, as mental schemata we use to look at the world, "they encourage an autonomous kind of thought and tend to come to completeness in the realm of images and indeed end there."¹⁶. They bear the stamp of the unconscious, they are "dreams whose occasional cause is an object."¹⁷.

Bachelards main point is that science is historically built on faulty everyday knowledge and metaphorical thinking, and "it takes a good many experiments to dispel the mists of the dream...For primitive man thought is a centralized reverie; for the educated modern man reverie is a loose form of thought."¹⁸. When we do science today, we still dream, even if we believe we are thinking. The scientific mind can only appear by destroying the non-scientific mind, and the scientific unconscious of our minds must be psychoanalysed. Bachelards psychoanalysis is not a Freudian one, but an indirect and secondary psychoanalysis, a kind of *catharsis*, where we are made aware of our poetic and valorising tendencies projected on our scientific objects. Our psychoanalysis is never complete, but is a never-ending fight with the epistemological obstacles that hinder us in the construction of a truly scientific object.

⁶ Bachelard 2002:29.

⁷ Ibid.:86.

⁸ Bachelard 1964:1.

⁹ Bachelard 2002:38.

¹⁰ Bachelard 1964:20.

¹¹ Bachelard 1968:95.

¹² Bachelard 1964:1.

¹³ Bachelard 2002:140.

¹⁴ See for example Bachelard when he says that "The perspective from which alchemy can be understood is that of the psychology of fifty-somethings, the psychology of a man who has just felt his first threat to sexual worth..." (Ibid.:197.) and when he says that the fundamental principle of unconscious sexualization is that "all that is hidden is feminine..." (Bachelard 1964:52.)

¹⁵ Bachelard 2002:230.

¹⁶ Ibid.:88. This is of course a point made by several later authors, see for example Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

¹⁷ Bachelard 2002:195.

¹⁸ Bachelard 1964:22.

III. The concept of 'profession' as an epistemological obstacle.

Just by deciding to study a profession, in our case the journalistic profession, we have stumbled in our first epistemological obstacle. The sociological concept of "profession" and its related concepts (like professionalism) was in deep crisis in the seventies¹⁹, and it has been deeply problematised by authors like Elliott Friedson. In a very Bachelardian critique, Pierre Bourdieu says of the concept:

'Profession' is a folk concept which has been uncritically smuggled into scientific language and which imports into it a whole social unconscious. It is the *social product* of a historical work of construction of a group and of a *representation* of groups that has surreptitiously slipped into the science of this very group ... The category of profession refers to realities that are, in a sense, 'too real' to be true, since it grasps at once a mental category and a social category...²⁰

The quandary that Bourdieu points to is that the *double presence* of the concept of 'profession' - simultaneously being a *sociological concept* used by social scientists and a *folk concept* used by the participants to label and understand their activities - makes us extremely prone to mix naïve beliefs into our scientific construction, as it makes it *far too easy* for us to identify our research object.

If we want to study journalists in Norway, there are grants, research programmes and conferences directed to "research on journalists", we can read histories of the journalistic profession in Norway and academic studies of "journalists", there exist academic degrees in "journalism" at several institutions (including The University of Oslo), and there are of course professional organisations with their own publications for journalists (like NJ and their magazine 'Journalisten'). We have the "Norwegian Institute for Journalism" (IJ), and prizes for the best journalist ("Den store journalistprisen") and for investigating journalism (SKUP). We find "journalism" as a category on most search engines on the web, in publishers lists of books, and even as a dedicated theme on the Norwegian web portal for research (forskning.no). If we want to find statistical data on journalists, they are classified under 3491 in ISCO-88 and 095 in NYK (the older standard for classification of occupations by SSB). There exist laws which regulates the practices of 'journalists' and governmental reports which discusses them.

Given this evidence, it is hard to think that journalists do not exist. *But this is exactly what we must do*. As Durkheim reminds us, widespread use of a term is not a guarantee of its objectivity, it only routine and naturalize it, and such help give an *appearance* of truth²¹. In this case, it is obvious that this mass of pre-constructions which weighs, like Marx said on history, like a mountain upon the living, helps us forget that its widespread use do not make it a *scientific category*.

Another example will help make this clearer. Epistemological problems are very *practical* problems, and appear in the seemingly most mundane of a researcher's chores, like for example making a statistical sample. If we want to do a survey of journalists we need a list of the sample universe, and the "intuitive" thing to do, would be to draw our sample from the press organisations lists of members: *Norwegian Union of Journalists* (NJ) (and possibly also *Norwegian Union of Editors* - NR). Such a demarcation of "journalists" are, however, highly problematic. Historically, NJ have changed its criteria for membership many times, and their definitions a "journalist" has to be seen both as strategies of *Realpolitik* (ex. competition with other professional's organizations for members) and as a part (and result) of internal struggles in the field where different groups fight to exclude whom they think "unworthy" (which was precisely what happened when all who worked in PR were collectively excluded from membership in NJ in 1997)²². NJ's "Journalists"²⁰⁰⁴ are thus not the same as "Journalists"¹⁹⁹⁴.²³

¹⁹ Halvorsen 1993:54.

²⁰ Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:242.

²¹ Durkheim 1964:18.

²² This incident is described in detail by Raaum 1999. There are many other examples which we could cite, from different periods: in the 50s, the debate over sports reporters (were they journalists?), the debates in NJ in the 70s and 80s if it were possible to be a journalist and be political active at the same time, and in 2001, the chairman of NAL (Norwegian Newspapers Publishers' Association) advised NJ to ostracize all of their members who work as "entertainers" (Journalisten, 18.06.01).

²³ A second example could be given by looking at the most "general" (and thus the most prestigious) journalistic prizes. An examination of prize winners of Den Store Journalistprisen, Narvesenprisen and Hirschfeldprisen - the last two which do not exist anymore - for the last 20 years shows that sport journalists, journalists in the "weekly press" or "specialist press" have *never* received this prize, which are given - according to the jury foreman Thor Viksveen in his speech for the 2000 prize candidate - to journalists "*who have done a particularly commendable effort in the field of journalism*". Apparently, these kinds of work are evidently not deemed commendable. Thus we can glimpse a hidden political function of this prize - to mark and uphold the existing symbolic hierarchy of what is defined as a "journalist" and as "journalism".

The academic response to such problems (when not simply ignoring them) is often to search for *definitions*, leaving the real world behind and fleeing to Plato's world of ideas, a long journey given that they usually only turn what commonsensical notions they have into abstract concepts. Two widespread definitions of a journalist are Porter's definition of a journalist as *".... a person whose primary occupation is the gathering, writing and editing of material which consists largely of the reporting or interpreting of current events"*, and Donsbach/Kunczik somewhat "looser" definition: *"... is involved in the shaping of the content of mass-media output, be it gathering, evaluating, sighting, processing or disseminating news, comment or entertainment."*²⁴. Such attempts of definitions unavoidably makes a number of intellectual sins which follows idealism, like identifying "essential" differences which are highly problematic - for example, between symbolic and mechanical manipulation of media content, or that they ignore that the ruling notions about who journalists are, what journalism is and what news is (or not) varies historically and regionally²⁵.

Truly scientific objects can only be achieved through eternal vigilance by the scientist against epistemological obstacles; they must be constructed *"... against experience, against perception, against all everyday technical activity"*²⁶. If we have taken as our task to show that journalists do not simply "exist", it should be obvious by now that this critique, by the same logic, also problematise the many concepts related to the notion of a profession, like the notion of "journalism" and "professionalism". Notice how difficult everything suddenly become, when we no longer can wallow in "happy illusions" and unlike pre-scientific thought, which *"has shut itself into general knowledge and wishes to remain there."*²⁷: we must call everything into question: *"sensation, common sense, usage however constant, even etymology, for words, which are made for singing and enchanting, rarely make contact with thought"*²⁸. But how can we discuss a practice without giving it a name, and how can we give it a name without simultaneously smuggle in a naïve construction and a whole social philosophy?

It should, at this point, also be understandable that the greatest mistake we can do as social scientists is to uncritically transform the professions own categories (in our case: "journalist", "editor", "PR", "news", "entertainment" etc.) into scientific categories. We should rather read them as metaphors, as cosmologies, we must, to quote Bachelard *"take facts as ideas and place them within a system of thought."*²⁹. In this perspective, NJ's rules for membership thus ought to be read as any list of taboos in anthropological literature: like the detailed lists of food-taboos in the Book of Leviticus, they separate the holy and profane, the accepted and the forbidden, clean and unclean.

IV. The concept of social field as an alternative to profession

How then to break away from the problematic notions and epistemological obstacles which lies in the concept of a 'profession'? One way is Weber's method of comparison: by tracing the history of journalistic concepts or regional differences, the concepts can become denaturalised, by denying them their universality and showing that today's situation is only a variation of many possible. This way is also the way of the anthropologist. To paraphrase what Georg Johannesen says about the big yearly (high-brow) music festival in Bergen, *Festspillene*: To understand journalists practices we have to imagine them all wearing skirts of straw. A related strategy is to try to denaturalise our research object by using theories and concepts which runs counter to the dominant emic discourses, like Bourdieu did by bringing in concepts from the world of economy (capital) and religion (ex. Webers concept of charisma) when studying the field of art and intellectuals, two social universes which rests on a belief in disinterestness and charismatic ideals ("the creator" and "the thinker").

Another alternative is of course, to try to replace the concept of profession all together. Several authors has argued for such a course. One is the Swedish sociologist Thomas Brante with his concept of 'modes of production'³⁰, another – the one which I will discuss here – is Pierre Bourdieu with his concept of 'social fields'. They both take as their starting-point that the concept of 'profession' is problematic because internally there are usually bigger differences than similarities, like when Bourdieu says of professional categories that they are *"socially produced only by superseding or obliterating all kinds of economic, social, and ethnic differences and contradictions which make the 'profession' of 'lawyer', for instance, a space of competition and struggle."*³¹. For Bourdieu, the logic of 'professional' practice and discourse must be sought precisely in these internal differences and struggles, in a *social field*.

The relation between the concept of 'social field' and 'profession' is a close but intricate one. Both concepts are attempts to explain the increased division of labour in society. But where for example Parsons saw professions becoming free and autonomous, "outside society" and forming a "professional complex" replacing the state³², Bourdieu sees the nature of modern

²⁴ Both cited in Splichal and Sparks 1994:21-26.

²⁵ This point is very well made by Michael Schudson in his history of the American newspapers (Schudson 1978.).

²⁶ Canguilhem, extract in Bourdieu, Passeron and Chamboredon 1991:82.

²⁷ Bachelard 2002:72.

²⁸ Bachelard 1964:1.

²⁹ Bachelard, cited by Canguilhem in Bourdieu, Passeron and Chamboredon 1991:82.

³⁰ Halvorsen 1993:53.

³¹ Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:242.

³² In Halvorsen 1993:59.

society being characterised with a growth of different social fields, like the field of art, the academic field, the religious field and the economic field³³.

A social field is a complex concept, but can be thought of as a kind of social microcosm, with its own logic, where the participants are more dependent on each other than the "outside world". Fields are products of long historical processes of autonomisation, of social differentiation, which is reversed and re-reversed, fields are born, dies and merges with other fields and later resurrected. A short definition of a social field is given by Broady³⁴: It is a system of relations between positions, where the participants are fighting about something mutual.

To give an better idea of the approach, I will very quickly sketch some ideas – still very preliminary - that I have about the structure of the Norwegian journalistic field³⁵. My initial suggestion for a mutual, *defining* conflict in the Norwegian journalistic field is the question of *nomos*, 1) who are regarded as proper journalists (and not), and 2) what practices which are considered good journalism (or not). In this way, the question of who are participants or not in the journalistic field is – in contrast to that of the concept of 'profession' – a far from simple question, as some of the members in the journalists union will probably not have great interest in these struggles (ex. subtitlers), and other, seemingly "non-journalistic" participants, like many writers for lifestyle magazines, media professors and board members probably do. To make it even worse, we can not select participants based on persons 'occupations', as sharing such a statistical category (ex. 'journalist student' or 'teacher in journalism') do not guarantee that one shares the *illusio* of the field.

The journalistic field has a particular *structure*, dependent on the uneven distribution of basic resources – what Bourdieu terms capital, "a force inscribed into the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible"³⁶. The power to influence the basic struggles in the field, one's 'clout' will not be evenly distributed, but highly dependent on *position*. If you are a professor at a school of journalism, or the leader of NJ (the Norwegian union of journalists), you will have more force, more *weight* in the field than someone without these positions, which rests on internal forms of capital. These resources are not distributed instantly or accidentally, like in a game of roulette, but takes slow work and *time* to accumulate. These resources will be of different kinds. For a Norwegian journalistic field, an educated guess of some of these resources are: 1) *educational capital* (type and level of education), 2) *professional capital* (higher officials in the journalists and editors unions, NJ and NR, and teachers at schools of journalism, who have a large control over the reproduction of the corps), 3) *political capital* (power in different institutions which influences journalism, like the Norwegian Public Broadcasting (NRK) board of advisors (*Kringkastingsrådet*) or PFU (the institution which handles public complaints against journalistic products in Norway), 4) *partypolitical capital* (prominent position in the old "party press" political parties), 5) *scientific capital* (a scientific career in research on journalism/journalists), 6) *economic capital* (control over the economy of a media institution, ex. board members), 7) *editorial capital* (having a high position in the institution, with control over others work), 8) *institutional capital* (the total resources of the institution where one works) and 9) *journalistic capital* (symbolic capital, recognized by other journalists as objectively valuable and related to charismatic beliefs, like different journalistic prizes)³⁷.

The journalistic field is not an *apparatus*, a machine: the practices of journalists – where they work, how they work, what positions they take on important questions in the field, what kind of journalism they prefer to work in (ex. cultural journalism rather than, say, sports journalism) is not dependent on their capital alone, but also on their *habitus*, as made clear in Bourdieu's well-known formula: *practice* = [(*habitus*)(*capital*)]+*field*³⁸. A habitus is, in short, our system of dispositions for acting, thinking and orienting ourselves in the social world. It is a collection of vague mental habits and inclinations which are inscribed in our minds and bodies, according to the objective life conditions in our childhood.

In my view, Bourdieu's concepts of field, capital and habitus are helpful against many epistemological obstacles when studying a (professional) group. They are intrinsically *iconoclastic*: unlike the concept of 'profession', they break with the charismatic and professional discourse, the emic descriptions of journalistic practice as a *purely professional* practice, as constituted by conscious decisions based on professional rather than extraprofessional learning and norms, and uninfluenced by self-interest and the social unconscious. By reducing the dominant participants vision of the field to one point of view among other views (the later ones which often are not easily visible), it links these points of views to participants interests and capital, thus

³³ The concept of field is also related to the concept of 'institution', where Bourdieu feels his concept to be superior, because it emphasises the conflictual nature of social life and can cover practices which are weakly institutionalised. See Swartz 1997:120.

³⁴ Broady 1991:266.

³⁵ The following paragraphs is taken from Hovden 2004.

³⁶ Bourdieu 1986:241.

³⁷ Some journalists will have access to several of these resources in abundance (ex. people in the positions just mentioned), constituting the dominating fraction of the journalistic field, and others will scarcely have access to any, like young un-educated journalists in small district newspapers (constituting the dominated fraction). Furthermore we should expect an internal schism (or, more probable, several) in this structure according to an opposition between different kinds of capital. A guess is for example the existence of a split between journalists high scientific capital on one side, versus journalists with a position dependent on journalistic and editorial capital, opposing journalist-scientists and newspaper editors. How valuable a resource is in the field, and its relative exchange value with other forms of capital (ex. how easy a 2-year journalist education can be translated into a good position in a major newspaper) will vary historically, as this is the result of struggles in the field.

³⁸ Bourdieu 1984:101.

unveiling their interest in a discourse of disinterestness, and problematises the boundaries of the field. It replaces the concept of profession with the focus on how the concept of profession is produced and maintained in a space of struggles and a strategy in the social space. Rather than speak of 'journalists' we should talk about 'participants in the journalistic field'³⁹, which includes and excludes groups which probably would have preferred the old boundaries.

V. Some concluding remarks on epistemological obstacles when studying professions

There are two reasons why professions in general, and journalists in particular, make a particular powerful epistemological obstacle for the scientist.

First, much of the research on a 'profession' is usually done by the profession itself, which helps lend the 'folk concepts' of journalism and journalists' academic credibility. A friend of mine once humorously defined Norwegian "journalism research" as "*journalists writing journalistically on journalistic problems*", which has a lot of truth in it, at least statistically. This goes not only for journalists' own publications, or the many pre-scientific works where journalists reflect on their own practice and history⁴⁰. It is also the case that many of the most prominent researchers of journalistic practice and history have themselves been journalists, are still (primarily) concerned with the question of 'good vs. bad' journalistic practice⁴¹. This preoccupation with the *nomos* of the field leads me to believe that many of these researchers should be regarded as active participants in the journalistic field, fighting its struggles with scientific means. This is of course a suggestion which are bound to be unpopular, because it presents a *double threat* for these researchers: by linking their scientific capital in both fields to an *interest*, it threatens to devalue this capital (and through this, their positions in both fields)⁴²: in the scientific field by raising suspicion that their research is not "proper science" (which is not true 'by definition'⁴³); in the journalistic field it has the potential to undermine the particular efficiency of their discourse by destroying the charisma of 'neutrality' attributed to 'science'.

Second, the study of journalists is probably made more difficult by the fact that journalists and scientists (and also, to some degree, politicians) are participants in social fields, which are in direct competition of trying to say the final truth about the (social) world. Our first impulse, as academics when writing on journalists, if we are not sharing their particular *illusio*, is to denounce journalists for the fact that they are not doing "proper science" (for example, by pointing out that journalists' ideas of objectivity are not scientific, or that the persons interviewed are not a random sample of the population), and thus "putting them in their place". But this impulse is partly result of the ritualistic duty for anyone with ambitions in the academic field (to maintain its borders), but is also related to the social order and the logic of class struggles, struggles which probably are even more acute because news journalists, politicians and social scientists are probably relatively closely situated in the Norwegian social space⁴⁴.

But in the end: The scientist which wants to understand a 'profession' has a struggle against the odds on his hand, but this struggle is an absolute necessity if you want to construct your object and avoid to simply fulfilling a political role in the field of your chosen 'profession': by accepting their own ideas of who is a journalist, you are on the way to consecrating a hegemonic *point of view*, and thus helping maintain the boundaries which keep out unwanted elements and the dominant groups' idealisations of itself. Nobody will stop you from not doing a scientific construction - and you can afterwards bask in the support and encouragement from the dominant groups of the field.

As I have indicated, I see Bourdieu's theory of social fields as helpful because it raises to consciousness many of the epistemological obstacles we face when studying a profession, and help us see that 'journalists' do not simply exist, they are not 'out there' but is a concept which – through force of habit and the mass of preconstructions surrounding practices – is forced upon us and fosters what Bachelard termed conceptual sclerosis⁴⁵: a gradual coagulation and fermentation of our scientific muscles.

In the end, of course, Bourdieu's theory of social fields is, like any theory, another epistemological obstacle we have to face.

³⁹ If I believe it still is meaningful to talk about a "journalistic" field (instead of, say, a "media field"), it is precisely because it appears that the central focus of belief which regulates this particular universe and gives it a specific, internal capital are directed to the constructs of "journalist" and "journalism".

⁴⁰ In particular press history was in Norway for very long time, and to some degree still is, the realm of amateurs of the press which wrote a kind of history which Martin Eide once termed "*the press' family albums*" because, like such albums, unpopular ancestors and unhappy episodes were not represented (Eide 2003.)

⁴¹ Speaking with associate and full professors at the schools of journalism, or researchers of journalists of media studies in Norway, I am often puzzled by the fact that they tell me they are still "journalists", even if they have only worked as a journalist for one year and as a teacher for twenty years – a strong sign of sharing the journalistic *illusio*.

⁴² Scientific capital, like all forms of symbolic capital, needs belief in its value and misrecognition of its function as capital. See for example Bourdieu 1996:201.

⁴³ Doing good quality scientific work and participating in the social struggles of a field – or even several fields – are of course not mutually exclusive activities, although one should expect it to make it harder to construct one's object scientifically.

⁴⁴ See Hjelbrekke and Korsnes 2002. Likewise, the deep uneasiness one feels, when faced with the prospect of having to question (and thus possibly delegitimising) the journalistic professions' justification of their legal rights and privileges through the concept of democracy, by pointing out that in understanding everyday practices of journalists this link is probably relatively arbitrary, is likewise probably not only fear for the wrath of the press, but also rooted in dispositions and concerns shared by journalists and academics (whose rights in Norway are likewise often justified through the concept of democracy).

⁴⁵ Bachelard 2002:70.

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