Partnership and Discord

This study analyses Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe from 1991 to 2000. The author examines tensions, contradictions and ambiguities in Russia’s policy that contributed to making both partnership and discord ingredients to Russian–Western security relations. For instance, how can we understand Russia’s intense opposition to NATO enlargement and NATO’s out-of-
area operations in light of Russia’s own formalised cooperation with the Western alliance (i.e., NACC/EAPC; PfP; PJC/the Founding Act)? And how can we conceive of Moscow’s enduring position that theOSCE should be the ‘cornerstone’ of Europe’s security architecture, considering what many observers have interpreted as Russian obstruction of, and non-compliance with, OSCE decisions and norms?
The author seeks to answer these questions by tracing the Russian debate on national identity and foreign policy that emerged in the wake of Soviet dissolution. The theoretical framework draws on some central ideas from the realist and liberal IR traditions, and uses the concept of ‘securitisation’ as a means to show how and under what conditions ‘expectations’ from these two camps about Russia’s behaviour and related institutional outcomes (i.e., Russian–Western security cooperation) may find empirical support. The author also applies a conceptual model for security thinking that incorporates three dimensions: Centre–Periphery, East–West, and Christian–Muslim. The first dimension premises that Russia can be depicted both as periphery to a dominating Western centre and as a centre in its own right. The East–West dimension reflects residuals of Cold War antagonism. The third dimension mirrors an identity component derived from (perceived) Russian–Western cultural and civilisational kinship based on the notion of a Christian civilisation.
Findings from this study largely confirm hypotheses derived from this model: Whereas one identity component (Western/Christian civilisation) fostered shared Russian-Western security interests and the use of the OSCE to promote ‘soft’ security in Europe’s peripheries, the two other dimensions produced incompatible or contradictory security logics as basis for Russia’s behaviour. These security logics can be derived from two different readings (in Russia) of Russia’s ‘identity’ and of its place in the international power structure. A depiction by the government in 1991–92 of Russia as Europe’s periphery dictated westward integration and adaptation to the Western security arrangements. However, from 1992–93, the policy-making elite increasingly came to look upon Russia as an alternative centre of power. This dictated a shielding strategy and Russian policy measures aimed at balancing the institutional weight of the West.
Accordingly, whereas Russia was initially not opposed to a prominent role for NATO and NATO-affiliated structures even inside the post-Soviet space and in areas of former Soviet influence, the security logic from around 1993 dictated Russian attempts to undermine the role of NATO and to increase the relative weight of the OSCE in Europe as a whole, while at the same time limiting the functional scope of the latter (and thereby: Western influence) inside the post-Soviet space, which was regarded as Russia’s ‘exclusive’ periphery. This contributed to making both partnership and discord ingredients to Russian–Western security relations in the late 1990s.