Financial Stability 1/2002

4 Liquidity risk

Rapportforside

Box:
- Counterparty exposure - monitoring systemic risk

Relatively stable financing in banks

Banks primarily use three funding sources to finance lending (Chart 4.1). Customer deposits, which can be looked upon as a stable source of financing, are the most important source. In March 2002, 64% of lending was covered by these deposits, which means that the deposit-to-loan ratio has increased slightly over the last six months. The bond market is another relatively stable funding source for banks. Bond funding has been rising since the end of 1999, and came to a little less than 19% of total bank lending in March this year. Money market financing is a short-term and hence somewhat more unstable funding source. Money market financing was reduced slightly over the last six months, and covered 23% of bank lending in March this year.

Chart 4.1

Chart 4.2 shows the size of stable financing sources (here defined as customer deposits, equity capital and bonds) as a percentage of banks’ illiquid assets (lending and fixed assets). Less stable financing and more illiquid assets result in a lower value for the indicator. A low value for this indicator therefore implies high liquidity risk. In general, a value of 100 implies that banks have balanced illiquid assets with stable funding sources.

Chart 4.2

Measured by this indicator, liquidity risk in the three largest banks is lower than in small and medium-sized banks. One reason that small and medium-sized banks have less stable financing is a lower level of borrowing in the bond market. For these banks, borrowing in the bond market may be more difficult than for large banks because such funding often requires a size that exceeds the borrowing needs of smaller banks. Unless they participate in a joint bond issue, they will rely more heavily on the short-term paper market, which is not defined as a stable source of financing in the indicator. However, the indicator is a better measure for analysing developments in financing strategy over time for each bank group than for comparing groups. Banks do not appear to have changed their strategy appreciably in recent years. The indicator has risen somewhat for both bank groups since September 2001, which in isolation implies lower liquidity risk than six months ago.

High net capital inflow to banks

Foreign sources account for a substantial portion of banks’ financing. Gross foreign debt has risen from NOK 67bn in 1993 to a good NOK 333bn in March 2001. The three largest banks in particular account for a high share of foreign borrowing (Chart 4.3).

Chart 4.3

Banks have recorded a large inflow of capital despite the fact that Norway as a whole has accumulated considerable foreign assets since 1993 (Chart 4.4). The securities market (equities, bonds, short-term paper, etc.) accounts for a fairly small share of capital intermediation in Norway. Enterprises largely cover their borrowing requirements by raising loans in banks. It is likely that it is relatively costly and difficult for many enterprises to borrow directly abroad inasmuch as few small and medium-sized Norwegian enterprises have a rating from international rating agencies. Moreover, direct foreign borrowing by Norwegian households is still at a low level as a result of the exchange rate risk and a lack of familiarity with foreign financial institutions. Domestic banks therefore play a key role as loan intermediaries in Norway. A large portion of household investments in financial assets have been channelled to securities funds and other financial institutions, which in turn have invested some of these funds abroad. Households and these financial institutions have accounted for a substantial portion of the net capital outflow since 1993. The central government invests the government budget surplus in foreign equities and bonds through the Government Petroleum Fund. The net capital outflow from enterprises, including the reconciliation sector, has generally varied around zero.

Chart 4.4

Norwegian banks’ gross debt is not particularly high compared with banks in other countries (Table 4.1). The gross debt of banks in Norway was lower than in banks in other Nordic countries in 2001. However, banks in other countries also have a higher share of foreign assets. Among the countries in the table, only Swedish banks have higher net debt than Norwegian banks. The comparison indicates that Norwegian and Swedish banks use the international interbank market to obtain financing to a greater extent than other countries’ banks.

Table 4.1

Slightly higher short-term foreign financing

Short-term (money market) financing from abroad may be a potential source of liquidity problems. This financing can be more volatile than equivalent domestic funding because foreigners normally react more quickly and more mechanically to changes in banks’ ratings. Turbulence in international financial markets may also induce foreign financial institutions to reduce their loans to Norwegian banks. The share of short-term foreign debt has been fairly stable in the three largest banks since 1997 (Chart 4.5). In the last six months, however, short-term foreign debt has edged up. Small and medium-sized banks have a much smaller share of foreign money market financing. Reduced uncertainty in financial markets compared with last autumn implies that the risk of problems in connection with foreign refinancing may be lower than earlier.

Chart 4.5

All in all, liquidity risk is considered relatively low and somewhat lower than six months ago.

Counterparty exposure - monitoring systemic risk

Norges Bank, in cooperation with the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission, has for the second time conducted a survey of banks’ largest counterparty exposures. The survey applies to ten large Norwegian banks. Banks were requested to report the magnitude of unsecured exposures in the form of different types of financial instruments on a specific date distributed by the bank’s counterparty. Of these, only the 15 largest counterparties were to be reported. The survey can be used to calculate what at worst may be lost if the largest counterparties were to default on their obligations or go bankrupt. In the 31 December 2001 survey, some adjustments were made compared with the previous survey (see Financial Stability 2/2001) The most important change was that banks were requested to report guarantees and unutilised, approved credit lines in a separate column. The change means that it is not possible to make a direct comparison of results. Moreover, it is likely that counterparty exposures show considerable changes from one survey to another.

The 15 largest counterparty exposures for an average bank are shown in Chart 1. Exposures in the form of unsecured deposits/loans, derivatives, securities and guarantees form the basis for ranking the counterparties. Exposures in foreign exchange settlements provide supplementary information. The survey shows that an average bank can at worst risk losing more than 27% of its core capital if the largest counterparty should go bankrupt and nearly 38% if exposures in foreign exchange settlements are included.

Chart 1

The size of exposures varies considerably across banks. Banks’ ability to absorb losses, measured by the core capital ratio, also varies. It was only in one case in the survey that a bank risked falling below the minimum core capital adequacy requirement (4%) if the largest counterparty were to go bankrupt. Other banks would continue to have a core capital ratio that is higher than the minimum requirement. In practice, there would also be assets remaining in the estate that would provide a basis for payment.

Liquidity problems may nevertheless be considerable if an expected incoming payment is late. How serious this problem is will depend on the scale of alternative financing possibilities and the bank’s liquidity buffers. If uncertainty arises concerning the bank’s actual financial strength, financing in the market may prove difficult. A loss of confidence can at worst be more extensive and affect several financial institutions, for example if it is believed that other financial institutions are directly exposed to this bank. These results show that this is not the case, and the risk of direct contagion of liquidity and solvency problems in the Norwegian banking system is limited. This is in accord with the findings from the previous survey.

In many cases, banks in the survey have exposures to the same counterparty. This may mean that several banks can experience problems at the same time if an important counterparty does not meet its commitments. Two banks in the survey have the largest counterparty exposure to one and the same counterparty (measured in NOK) (Chart 2). A fairly high number of banks are exposed to counterparty 6 and 7. The risk of a loss of confidence is probably greater if several banks are exposed to larger losses at the same time.

Chart 2


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Last updated 19.06.2002