Financial Stability 1/2002
4 Liquidity risk

Box:
- Counterparty exposure - monitoring systemic risk
Relatively stable financing in banks
Banks primarily use three funding sources to finance lending (Chart 4.1). Customer
deposits, which can be looked upon as a stable source of financing, are the
most important source. In March 2002, 64% of lending was covered by these deposits,
which means that the deposit-to-loan ratio has increased slightly over the last
six months. The bond market is another relatively stable funding source for
banks. Bond funding has been rising since the end of 1999, and came to a little
less than 19% of total bank lending in March this year. Money market financing
is a short-term and hence somewhat more unstable funding source. Money market
financing was reduced slightly over the last six months, and covered 23% of
bank lending in March this year.
Chart 4.1
Chart 4.2 shows the size of stable financing sources (here defined as customer
deposits, equity capital and bonds) as a percentage of banks’ illiquid
assets (lending and fixed assets). Less stable financing and more illiquid assets
result in a lower value for the indicator. A low value for this indicator therefore
implies high liquidity risk. In general, a value of 100 implies that banks have
balanced illiquid assets with stable funding sources.
Chart 4.2
Measured by this indicator, liquidity risk in the three largest banks is lower
than in small and medium-sized banks. One reason that small and medium-sized
banks have less stable financing is a lower level of borrowing in the bond market.
For these banks, borrowing in the bond market may be more difficult than for
large banks because such funding often requires a size that exceeds the borrowing
needs of smaller banks. Unless they participate in a joint bond issue, they
will rely more heavily on the short-term paper market, which is not defined
as a stable source of financing in the indicator. However, the indicator is
a better measure for analysing developments in financing strategy over time
for each bank group than for comparing groups. Banks do not appear to have changed
their strategy appreciably in recent years. The indicator has risen somewhat
for both bank groups since September 2001, which in isolation implies lower
liquidity risk than six months ago.
High net capital inflow to banks
Foreign sources account for a substantial portion of banks’ financing.
Gross foreign debt has risen from NOK 67bn in 1993 to a good NOK 333bn in March
2001. The three largest banks in particular account for a high share of foreign
borrowing (Chart 4.3).
Chart 4.3
Banks have recorded a large inflow of capital despite the fact that Norway
as a whole has accumulated considerable foreign assets since 1993 (Chart 4.4).
The securities market (equities, bonds, short-term paper, etc.) accounts for
a fairly small share of capital intermediation in Norway. Enterprises largely
cover their borrowing requirements by raising loans in banks. It is likely that
it is relatively costly and difficult for many enterprises to borrow directly
abroad inasmuch as few small and medium-sized Norwegian enterprises have a rating
from international rating agencies. Moreover, direct foreign borrowing by Norwegian
households is still at a low level as a result of the exchange rate risk and
a lack of familiarity with foreign financial institutions. Domestic banks therefore
play a key role as loan intermediaries in Norway. A large portion of household
investments in financial assets have been channelled to securities funds and
other financial institutions, which in turn have invested some of these funds
abroad. Households and these financial institutions have accounted for a substantial
portion of the net capital outflow since 1993. The central government invests
the government budget surplus in foreign equities and bonds through the Government
Petroleum Fund. The net capital outflow from enterprises, including the reconciliation
sector, has generally varied around zero.
Chart 4.4
Norwegian banks’ gross debt is not particularly high compared with banks
in other countries (Table 4.1). The gross debt of banks in Norway was lower
than in banks in other Nordic countries in 2001. However, banks in other countries
also have a higher share of foreign assets. Among the countries in the table,
only Swedish banks have higher net debt than Norwegian banks. The comparison
indicates that Norwegian and Swedish banks use the international interbank market
to obtain financing to a greater extent than other countries’ banks.
Table 4.1
Slightly higher short-term foreign financing
Short-term (money market) financing from abroad may be a potential source of
liquidity problems. This financing can be more volatile than equivalent domestic
funding because foreigners normally react more quickly and more mechanically
to changes in banks’ ratings. Turbulence in international financial markets
may also induce foreign financial institutions to reduce their loans to Norwegian
banks. The share of short-term foreign debt has been fairly stable in the three
largest banks since 1997 (Chart 4.5). In the last six months, however, short-term
foreign debt has edged up. Small and medium-sized banks have a much smaller
share of foreign money market financing. Reduced uncertainty in financial markets
compared with last autumn implies that the risk of problems in connection with
foreign refinancing may be lower than earlier.
Chart 4.5
All in all, liquidity risk is considered relatively low and somewhat lower
than six months ago.
Counterparty exposure - monitoring systemic risk
Norges Bank, in cooperation with the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission,
has for the second time conducted a survey of banks’ largest counterparty
exposures. The survey applies to ten large Norwegian banks. Banks were requested
to report the magnitude of unsecured exposures in the form of different types
of financial instruments on a specific date distributed by the bank’s
counterparty. Of these, only the 15 largest counterparties were to be reported.
The survey can be used to calculate what at worst may be lost if the largest
counterparties were to default on their obligations or go bankrupt. In the
31 December 2001 survey, some adjustments were made compared with the previous
survey (see Financial Stability 2/2001) The most important change was that
banks were requested to report guarantees and unutilised, approved credit
lines in a separate column. The change means that it is not possible to make
a direct comparison of results. Moreover, it is likely that counterparty exposures
show considerable changes from one survey to another.
The 15 largest counterparty exposures for an average bank are shown in Chart
1. Exposures in the form of unsecured deposits/loans, derivatives, securities
and guarantees form the basis for ranking the counterparties. Exposures in
foreign exchange settlements provide supplementary information. The survey
shows that an average bank can at worst risk losing more than 27% of its core
capital if the largest counterparty should go bankrupt and nearly 38% if exposures
in foreign exchange settlements are included.
Chart 1
The size of exposures varies considerably across banks. Banks’ ability
to absorb losses, measured by the core capital ratio, also varies. It was
only in one case in the survey that a bank risked falling below the minimum
core capital adequacy requirement (4%) if the largest counterparty were to
go bankrupt. Other banks would continue to have a core capital ratio that
is higher than the minimum requirement. In practice, there would also be assets
remaining in the estate that would provide a basis for payment.
Liquidity problems may nevertheless be considerable if an expected incoming
payment is late. How serious this problem is will depend on the scale of alternative
financing possibilities and the bank’s liquidity buffers. If uncertainty
arises concerning the bank’s actual financial strength, financing in
the market may prove difficult. A loss of confidence can at worst be more
extensive and affect several financial institutions, for example if it is
believed that other financial institutions are directly exposed to this bank.
These results show that this is not the case, and the risk of direct contagion
of liquidity and solvency problems in the Norwegian banking system is limited.
This is in accord with the findings from the previous survey.
In many cases, banks in the survey have exposures to the same counterparty.
This may mean that several banks can experience problems at the same time
if an important counterparty does not meet its commitments. Two banks in the
survey have the largest counterparty exposure to one and the same counterparty
(measured in NOK) (Chart 2). A fairly high number of banks are exposed to
counterparty 6 and 7. The risk of a loss of confidence is probably greater
if several banks are exposed to larger losses at the same time.
Chart 2
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