Financial Stability 2/2000
2 Financial stability and macroeconomic developments

Norges Bank: Financial stability 2/2000
Box: Cyclical fluctuations and the financial industry's behaviour
There is a close connection between macroeconomic developments and the stability of the
financial system. On the one hand, macroeconomic developments affect the stability of
financial institutions and financial markets. On the other hand, the behaviour of financial
institutions and financial markets may amplify cyclical fluctuations and threaten financial
stability (see separate box).
Slowdown in growth rate
Growth in the Norwegian economy is stronger than previously projected.1) Growth in mainland
GDP this year is projected at 2¼%, an upward adjustment from the previous Financial Stability report
where the projection was 1½%. Projected growth for the next two years is somewhat lower, at
about 1¼% annually.
This year, private consumption and housing investment in particular sustain domestic demand
growth. This reflects several years of sharply rising housing wealth and substantial growth
in credit to households. Growth in household demand is expected to slow next year, due in
part to this year's interest rate increases. Households' real disposable income is expected
to increase by 2¼% this year and 1½% next year. The rise in interest rates is also expected
to contribute to curbing house price inflation and credit growth.
The drop in petroleum investment this year and expectations of a decline next year are
having a negative impact on domestic demand, and at the same time on some manufacturing
sectors. International growth is vigorous, resulting in higher prices for our traditional
export goods. Growth in traditional exports is expected to be about 4½% this year
and 4% in the next two years. Whereas six months ago mainland business investment was
projected to decline in 2000, it is now likely that this investment will increase. This
has probably contributed to the strong credit growth this year.
The macroeconomic outlook does not indicate any disturbances that will increase the
risk of major imbalances in the financial system. Only in the event of an unexpectedly
strong disturbance in economic developments could such a situation arise.
1) Assumptions regarding macroeconomic developments are based on Norges Bank's September 2000 Inflation Report.
Cyclical fluctuations and the financial industry's behaviour
Economic developments are cyclical. Experience shows that banks' loan losses are
greater during economic downturns than during upswings. Therefore, the risk involved
in a project may seem to vary at different times in the business cycle.
One important cause of many financial crises has been that financial institutions
and financial markets underestimate risk during cyclical upswings and
overestimate risk during economic downturns.1)
During upswings, credit growth is often strong, banks' results are
solid (due in part to low loan loss provisions), the rise in the value of assets
such as property and securities is considerable and the risk premium on high-risk
projects as well as spreads in the bond market are low. In general, this will
amplify the period of expansion. At the same time, a strong increase in debt
makes households and enterprises more vulnerable to a rise in interest rates
or a drop in income. When interest rates rise or the economic situation changes,
a high debt burden may therefore amplify an economic downturn and, at worst, trigger
a financial crisis.2) A high debt burden may also prompt
enterprises to take on greater risk than is desirable because owners with limited
liability have less to lose on a high-risk project, but a great deal to gain if
the project succeeds.
Whereas risk in the financial system often builds up over an extended period of high
economic growth, a turnaround in the economy often comes much faster. The turnaround
often results in a decline in earnings, more bankruptcies and increased loan losses.
Financial institutions and financial markets may interpret this as an indication that
risk, also in connection with new projects, has increased, even though the developments
may reflect the surfacing of risk that has built up in the financial system over an
extended period. Furthermore, empirical studies show that the likelihood of downgrading
of credit ratings increases during a downturn and decreases during an upswing. Negative
changes in future prospects often result in a decline in the value of securities and
property, in part because market participants try to sell assets in order to secure
their value. The reduced value of collateral makes it more difficult for enterprises
and households to obtain loans and other financing. When dealing with groups of
enterprises where there is particular uncertainty about future earnings, financial
institutions and securities markets may find it so difficult to distinguish between
low-risk and high-risk projects that the supply of capital to this group dries up.
3) The result may be a credit crunch.
While internal risk systems and external ratings that measure the relative risk
of projects at a given time may be well developed, it is far more difficult to
measure absolute risk over time. This is one important reason why financial
institutions may behave procyclically. Paradoxically, the development of sophisticated
quantitative risk systems may intensify these problems, since data sources may be
influenced by the economic situation at the time a project is evaluated and the
trend extrapolated even though it cannot be maintained in the long term.
In addition, intense competition from new market participants who have little
experience of financial crises and do not take adequate account of this risk may
lead to these participants operating with artificially low risk premia in order
to underbid their competitors. This behaviour may be especially pronounced during
upswings. Such a situation may also arise without competition from new market
participants if existing financial institutions are overoptimistic or behave as
though the probability of financial crises will gradually decline over time.
Moral hazard due to the fact that bank deposits are insured by special
guarantee schemes and that the government may step in with support in the event
of a banking crisis may intensify these problems. The consequence will be that
banks do not build up the capital necessary to cope with periods of economic
contraction.
If the required rate of return or the lending rate to projects reflects the
risk over the entire economic cycle, capital will be built up during economic
upswings when the rate of return and net interest income are high and losses
are low. The most objective risk measurement possible will therefore contribute
to stabilising economic developments and make the financial system more robust.
However, this makes considerable demands on investment decisions in the risk
management systems of financial markets and financial institutions. A cyclical
downturn may, however, be deeper and more prolonged than earlier experience
might indicate. The probability of a financial crisis would then be greater.
An important task for the authorities is to monitor developments in the financial
industry, see them in relation to macroeconomic developments and, if necessary,
consider taking action. A key task for central banks is to ensure monetary
stability. A monetary policy that aims at stabilising economic developments
and ensuring nominal stability will normally contribute to less risk in the
financial sector during economic upswings and will in this way alleviate the
situation during periods of economic decline.
1) See among others, Fisher, I. (1933) "The Debt-Deflation
Theory of the Great Depression",
Econometrica, vol. 1, pp. 337-57;
Kindleberger, C.P. (1978)
"Manias, Panics and Crashes, A History of Financial
Crises", Basic Books, New York; Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1995) "Credit
cycles", Discussion paper no. 205, Financial Market Group, London School of Economics.
2) The fact that considerable financial vulnerability often
precedes and is a contributory cause of financial crises is discussed by, among
others, Davis, E.P. (1995)
Debt, financial fragility and systemic risk, Oxford
University Press; and Knutsen, S. and G.J. Ecklund, (2000),
Vern mot kriser?
Norsk finanstilsyn gjennom 100 år [Protection against crises? Norwegian financial
supervision over 100 years], Fagbokforlaget.
3) An example of the significance of adverse selection, (see
Mishkin, 2000), "Financial stability and the macroeconomy",
Central Bank of
Iceland Working Papers, No. 9).
© 2000 Norges Bank
webmaster@norges-bank.no