Financial Stability 2/2002
4 Liquidity risk

Box:
- Norwegian banks' counterparty exposure
The term to maturity on banks’ borrowing in relation to the term to maturity
on their claims is decisive for liquidity risk. A high level of short-term funding
will represent a liquidity risk for banks if their liquid assets are not adequate.
Short-term foreign financing is normally considered more unstable than short-term
domestic financing. Foreign creditors may have a lower threshold for withdrawing
funding in the event of uncertainty about Norwegian banks’ financial strength
or uncertainty about national and international market conditions.
Somewhat higher share of short-term funding
Banks’ funding in the money and capital markets has increased through
the 1990s (Chart 4.1). This is due to a prolonged decline in banks’ deposit-to-loan
ratio (customer deposits as a percentage of lending to the public). The decline
in banks’ deposit-to-loan ratio slowed somewhat in the beginning of 2002,
but in the third quarter, it fell again. At the end of September, the deposit-to-loan
ratio was 66%, a decline of 2 percentage points since March.
Chart 4.1
Banks’ funding in the money and capital markets has decreased somewhat
in the last half year (Chart 4.2). Long-term funding in the bond market in particular
has declined in this period, while money market financing has remained stable.
Chart 4.2
Bank’s choice of short-term or long-term funding will depend in part
on the costs involved in the two types of financing. Chart 4.3 shows how banks’
bond market funding has developed in pace with the difference between short-term
rates and long-term rates. In periods when bond yields are lower relative to
interest rates on money market loans, banks have traditionally increased the
share of bonds. Similarly, they have reduced the share of bonds in periods when
the rate spread narrows. From 2001, this pattern was broken, however, when banks
increased the funding in the bond market even though the spread between short
and long rates narrowed through four quarters. In isolation, this adjustment
contributed to reducing liquidity risk.
Chart 4.3
From March 2002, the rate spread widened sharply. Small and medium-sized banks
have continued to shift to more bond funding, while the largest banks, on the
other hand, have reduced the share of bond funding.
Gross foreign debt is somewhat lower
Banks’ total foreign debt has risen sharply the last few years, but has
decreased somewhat in the last half year (Chart 4.4). At end-September 2002,
this debt was NOK 316bn, corresponding to 27% of gross lending. The largest
banks account for most of the foreign borrowing, but foreign borrowing is also
fairly substantial at some other banks. At end-September, the three largest
banks’ foreign debt corresponded to 42% of gross lending, down from 47%
in March this year. Small- and medium-sized banks’ foreign debt is considerably
lower and has been reduced in the last half year.
Chart 4.4
Short-term money market funding accounts for a large portion of the three largest
banks’ foreign debt (Chart 4.5). At the same time, these banks have a
relatively large share of liquid assets. Liquid assets may be used at short
notice if funding dries up. Such assets may also serve as a guarantee for those
lending to banks so that the risk of losing funding for this reason alone may
be reduced. The share of short-term foreign funding is lower in small- and medium-sized
banks and has been reduced since March.
Chart 4.5
Stable financing as a share of illiquid assets is an indicator of liquidity
risk (Chart 4.6). An increasing value for the indicator reflects a reduction
in liquidity risk. Risk has increased for the three largest banks and for small
banks due to a higher share of money market financing, while it has declined
somewhat for medium-sized banks.
Chart 4.6
Liquidity risk ahead
The three largest Norwegian banks have the best rating for short-term funding,
according to Moody’s. Among the next five banks, measured by size, one
bank has the best short-term rating while the rest have the second best rating.
At some banks, short-term foreign funding accounts for a large share of financing.
This makes them vulnerable if refinancing opportunities abroad should disappear.
The ownership structure in the banking industry has changed compared with earlier.
Even if Norwegian-owned banks experienced funding problems abroad, foreign-owned
banks would not necessarily experience the same. Therefore, the probability
that financial stability will be weakened if foreign financing dries up for
individual banks may be somewhat lower than earlier. On the other hand, the
Norwegian economy may be affected if foreign parent banks encounter financing
problems in their respective countries. Overall, liquidity risk is still considered
to be relatively low, but somewhat higher compared with six months ago.
Norwegian banks' counterparty exposure
On 30 June 2002, Norges Bank, in cooperation with the Banking, Insurance
and Securities Commission, conducted a survey of banks’ counterparty
exposures. This is the third time the survey has been conducted and the same
ten banks participated. Banks report the magnitude of unsecured exposures
spread over their 15 largest counterparties. The sum of the exposures to each
counterparty shows how much a bank can lose if one of the 15 largest counterparties
defaults. This sheds light on the degree to which counterparty risk may be
a source of systemic risk where contagion between banks may threaten financial
stability.
The counterparty exposures reported by the banks are in the form of derivatives,
unsecured deposits/loans, securities and guarantees. The size of these exposures
provides the basis for ranking the counterparties. Exposures in foreign exchange
settlements are reported as additional information. The banks in the survey
have the largest exposures to foreign financial institutions, Norwegian non-financial
corporations and other Norwegian banks and financial institutions. Only two
banks have a foreign non-financial corporation among their 15 largest counterparties.
Several banks in the survey have exposures to the same counterparty. In addition,
the survey shows interbank exposures. A large counterparty’s payment
problems may thus spread in the banking system. However, the most important
foreign counterparties are assessed to be sound by international credit rating
services. Therefore, the probability that the largest foreign counterparties
will not meet their obligations is considered to be small.
The banks in the survey have increased their exposures to the 15 largest
counterparties since the last survey. Foreign exchange settlement exposures
in particular have increased sharply. This probably reflects normal variations
in banks’ foreign exchange transactions. If the average bank’s
largest counterparty had gone bankrupt on the reporting date, the bank would
have lost close to 48% of its Tier 1 capital, assuming no recoveries and including
foreign exchange exposures (Chart 1). The corresponding figures from the survey
as of 31 December 2001 were 38%. However, the results must be interpreted
with caution. Both exposures and counterparties may change considerably within
a short time.
Chart 1
The size of banks’ exposures as a percentage of Tier 1 capital varies.
Thus, their ability to absorb losses varies. The survey illustrates that counterparty
exposures may be considerable, especially when foreign exchange exposures
are included. When the Norwegian krone is included in the new international
settlement system CLS, credit risk connected to foreign exchange settlements
will be substantially reduced, cf. Chapter 5. In practice, payments from a
bankrupt estate will also reduce losses. In a number of cases, however, the
banks in the survey have exposures to the same counterparties and to each
other. This increases the risk of contagion in the Norwegian banking system.
Nevertheless, the risk is considered to be limited since the largest counterparties
are deemed to be financially sound.
© 2002 Norges Bank webmaster@norges-bank.no