Financial Stability 2/2002
6 Financial institutions

6.1 Profits
6.2 Financial strength
6.3 The competitive situation
Box:
- Risk pricing in Norwegian banks
6.1 Profits
Weaker results
Banks’ profits have continued to decline this year. Banks’ pre-tax
profits were 0.77% of average total assets (ATA) in the first three quarters
of this year (Table 6.1). Banks have not recorded weaker results since 1992.
The figure for the same period last year was 1.03%. The decline in profits is
mainly due to lower commission income and income from securities markets. Higher
loan losses have also contributed to the decline. The number of banks recording
weak results has increased (Chart 6.1). At the end of the third quarter, 12
of a total of 144 banks recorded negative pre-tax profits, as against 7 banks
a year earlier.
Table 6.1 Chart
6.1
Banks total net interest income was approximately unchanged compared with the
first three quarters of 2001. In relation to average total assets, total net
interest income now accounts for just below 2.2%. This is close to 1 percentage
point lower than in the mid-1990s (Chart 6.2). On average, net interest income
is highest in the small banks.
Chart 6.2
Negative developments in securities markets have reduced banks’ income
from other activities. Commission income, share dividends and capital gains
on securities were lower during the first three quarters of this year than in
the same period last year, while exchange gains rose.
Banks’ overall operating expenses as a percentage of average total assets
have been marginally reduced over the past year. There has, however, been a
steady decline in operating expenses since the mid-1990s, which indicates that
banks have become more cost-effective.1
1 See the forthcoming article: Gresvik, Olaf
og Grete Øwre, “Banks’ costs and income related to the
payment system”, Economic Bulletin 1/2003, Norges Bank.
The weak developments recorded in parts of the corporate sector in 2002 have
so far had little impact on loan losses. This is because most enterprises were
financially very strong at the beginning of the year (Chapter 3). Banks’
recorded loan losses increased from 0.24% of gross lending in the third quarter
of 2001 to 0.30% in the third quarter of this year. The number of gross non-performing
loans has also risen.
Lower return on equity
Weak results have contributed to a reduction in banks’ return on equity.
Return on equity for the financial groups DnB, Nordea Bank Norway and Fokus
Bank was below 9%, while the Union Bank of Norway recorded a return of over
10% in the first three quarters of this year. This is substantially lower than
in the same period last year, and is also lower than recorded by the largest
Nordic financial groups (Chart 6.3).
Chart 6.3
6.2 Financial strength
Banks still financially strong…
Norwegian banks’ core capital ratio increased overall from 9.3% at the
end of the third quarter last year to 9.5% in the same period this year. The
core capital ratio in the eight largest financial groups varied between 6.8
and 8.9%. At the end of the third quarter, the largest Norwegian financial groups,
with the exception of the Union Bank of Norway, had a relatively high core capital
ratio compared with the other Nordic bank groups (Chart 6.3).
Chart 6.3
Moody’s rating for financial strength and long-term financing for a selection
of Nordic banks is shown in Chart 6.4. The financial strength rating may be
regarded as a measure of the probability of a bank needing assistance from its
owners and/or a third party. The rating for long-term financing is intended
to reflect the bank’s capacity to service its long-term debts as they
fall due.
Chart 6.4
The largest Norwegian banks have a somewhat lower rating than several of the
largest Nordic banks. The ratings nonetheless indicate that they are financially
strong and that their debt servicing capacity is good or very good. The medium-sized
Norwegian banks have a considerably lower rating than the three largest Norwegian
banks with regard to both financial strength and long-term financing. However,
according to the ratings, their financial strength is satisfactory and their
debt servicing capacity is good.
In Norway, 70% of the banks have a rating indicating only satisfactory or moderate
financial strength. This is a far larger share than in Sweden, Denmark or Finland.
The share is also larger than in Germany, France, the UK and the US, where 66%,
60%, 58% and 52% respectively of the rated banks were listed in these groups.
However, Norway has more banks above a certain minimum size than the other Nordic
countries. As a result, more of Norway’s medium-sized banks have been
rated by the international credit rating agencies (Chart 6.2).
Table 6.2
…but reduced financial strength in life insurance companies
Life insurance companies pre-tax result before customer awards showed a deficit
of NOK 10.7bn or -3.6% of ATA for the first three quarters of 2002 compared
with a deficit of NOK 9.5 or -3.4% of ATA for the first three quarters of 2001.
Premium income rose and net income from financial assets was less negative than
at the end of the first three quarters of 2001. This was more than offset by
higher insurance provisions, however, so that the result was somewhat weaker
than for the first three quarters of 2001. Capital adequacy rose from 12.2%
to 15.2% from the end of the third quarter 2001 to the same time a year later.
This is mainly due to a lower measurement base as a result of reallocation from
high-risk equities to lower-risk bonds. The buffer capital has been reduced,
and at the end of the third quarter amounted to only 2% of total assets.
The reduction in shareholdings has reduced their vulnerability to any further
decline in equity markets (see box in Chapter 2). On the other hand, reduced
shareholdings may limit future returns. Life insurance companies’ buffer
capital must be strengthened to enable them to rebuild their shareholdings.
At the end of October, no life insurance company had been granted or had applied
for exemption from the capital adequacy requirement. One company had, however,
applied for an extension of the temporary exemption from the solvency margin
requirement. Earlier this year, three companies were granted exemption from
the capital adequacy requirement for the third quarter.
Low market risk in banks, but higher credit risk
Norwegian banks’ direct exposure to developments in securities markets
is relatively limited. Their shareholdings are very small, while holdings of
bonds and short-term papers are somewhat larger (Table 6.3). Estimated interest
sensitivity for the bond portfolio indicates that interest-rate risk in banks’
trade portfolios is low.
Table 6.3
Banks’ credit risk is considered to have risen in the past half-year
(Chapter 3). Overall household debt burden is now as high as it was in the years
immediately preceding the banking crisis. The corporate debt burden is also
very high. However, banks’ share of loans to industries with the highest
risk is relatively small (Chart 6.5). For some banks, exposure may nonetheless
be high in these industries.
Chart 6.5
Banks able to absorb loan losses
Simplified calculations carried out at Norges Bank indicate that banks’
loan losses can increase markedly for several years before the risk to banks’
financial strength reaches a critical level. According to the projections, all
the banks in the analysis will be able to absorb a single loss of close to 2½%
or more of gross lending before their buffer capital, i.e. the difference between
eligible capital and the capital requirement, is depleted. Banks will also be
able to absorb a loss of 1½% or more of gross lending each year over
a three-year period before the buffer is depleted, assuming that profits are
the same as in 2002. At the end of the third quarter, none of the banks in the
analysis had recorded loan losses of more than 0.6% of gross lending. Average
loan losses for the banks in the analysis were 0.3%.
Chart 6.6
Because of their financial position, banks are well equipped to deal with more
sluggish economic developments. Persistently high credit growth in a situation
with a high debt burden means that both households and enterprises will face
substantial demands in terms of future income growth in order to maintain debt
servicing capacity. The interaction between households and enterprises in terms
of real economic developments is important. Weaker household income growth leading
to lower demand might result in corporate loan losses without any appreciable
rise in housing loan losses. If interest margins and income from other activities
continue to fall, this will exert further pressure on banks’ earnings.
Overall, banks financial position is regarded as sound, although somewhat weaker
than in the previous report.
6.3 The competitive situation
Market continues to be dominated by the largest banks
There has been little change in market shares for small, medium-sized and large
banks over the past five years (Chart 6.7). The three largest banks still account
for almost half of the loans to Norwegian households and non-financial enterprises.
Small and medium-sized banks have marginally reduced their market shares, while
branches of foreign banks have increased their share from 2.9 to 4.5%. The increase
is mainly due to the takeover of Bergensbanken by Handelsbanken in 2001. In
total, foreign-owned branches and subsidiary banks have substantially increased
their share of the Norwegian loan market after Kreditkassen and Fokus Bank became
subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks. At the end of the third quarter, these
banks together accounted for over 21% of the Norwegian loan market.
Chart 6.7
DnB acquired Skandia Asset Management earlier this year. Nordea Bank Norway
has largely sold off its non-traditional banking activities. This means that
this bank, like Fokus Bank, is now more oriented towards traditional banking
operations. In September, the Union Bank of Norway was converted into a limited
company and listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The purpose of the conversion
was to make it easier for the bank to raise new capital.
Little change in interest margins
There has been a marginal reduction in Norwegian banks’ interest margins
over the past year (Chart 6.8). The lending margin is approximately 0.4 percentage
point higher than at the end of the second quarter last year. This may be an
indication that banks are now placing more importance on pricing the risk linked
to their loans (see separate box). The deposit margin is almost 0.5 percentage
point lower than at the same time last year. Some of the smaller Norwegian banks
are perceived as relatively high-risk in the market. This means that money market
financing is relatively costly. The authorities guarantee deposits up to NOK
2 million under the deposit guarantee scheme in Norway. A cheaper financing
option for banks with expensive money market financing may therefore be to increase
their deposit-to-loan ratio by offering higher interest rates on customer deposits.
To the extent this has occurred, it may have contributed to reducing deposit
margins in general.
Chart 6.8
Risk pricing in Norwegian Banks
If a bank’s pricing of loans is on average too low in relation to the
actual risk linked to the loans, the bank’s financial position will
weaken in the long run. This means that banks’ pricing of risk is important
to the stability of the financial system. Pricing can also have implications
for allocation of capital to profitable investment projects.
We have attempted to analyse the degree of risk pricing for loans to Norwegian
limited companies.1 Several of the assumptions
in the analysis are uncertain, and the results must be interpreted with caution.
1 The analysis will be published in
a forthcoming article: Bernhardsen, Eivind and Kai Larsen, “Analysis
of risk pricing in the loan market”, Economic Bulletin 1/03.
A borrowing rate has been estimated for each company for the period 1989-2001.2
The companies were then divided into risk groups according to bankruptcy probability.3
The average estimated borrowing rate for the various groups provides an indication
of whether risk has been taken into account in the pricing of loans. In 2001,
companies with low risk accounted for about 75% of loans outstanding, while
the high-risk group accounted for 7.5%. The figures for 1991 were 44% and
26.5%, respectively.
2 Since we do not have access to companies’
actual borrowing rates, the rates have been estimated using a selection
of annual company accounts, consisting of approximately 500 000 annual accounts
for 85 000 companies.
3 Calculated using Norges Bank’s
bankruptcy prediction model (see Economic Bulletin 3/01). The risk has been
divided into the categories low, medium and high risk on a discretionary
basis.
Chart 1 indicates that there is a relationship between the estimated borrowing
rate and the risk group. A comparable relationship also applies when risk
groups are divided into smaller groups by degree of risk.4
The relationship is weakest during the banking crisis period. The figures
seem to indicate that the degree of risk pricing increased in the mid-1990s,
but has decreased somewhat in recent years.
Chart 1
4 We have looked at a division into
8 and 12 risk groups, respectively, and found that there is a relationship
between the estimated borrowing rate and risk group for all years in the
period 1989-2001.
The analysis above indicates that the degree of risk in the pricing of loans
is differentiated. A difference in borrowing rates of less than 2 percentage
points between companies with high and low risk may seem small, however. Furthermore,
one may ask whether a total margin of about 4-5 percentage points over risk-free
interest for the total loan portfolio is sufficient to cover the risk of loan
losses, administrative costs and the owners’ required return.
We have estimated a reference interest rate to take account of opportunity
cost (i.e. risk-free interest), the probability of the borrower’s going
bankrupt, level of losses given bankruptcy, administrative costs and the owners’
return requirements.
According to the analysis, the reference interest rate was on average about
the same as the estimated borrowing rate up to 1994 (Chart 2). The estimated
borrowing rate was then somewhat lower than the reference rate up to 1997.
During this period, the loan market expanded rapidly and competition intensified,
while the risk in the enterprise sector was generally perceived as low and
falling. This may have contributed to a lesser degree of risk pricing. Between
1999 and 2001, the estimated borrowing rate was higher than the reference
rate. One reason for this may have been growing fears of loan losses as a
result of periodic unrest in financial markets in 1998 and 1999, in addition
to the negative developments observed in the latter half of 2001. Moreover,
greater focus in general on credit risk and the introduction of more advanced
risk management systems may have contributed to a greater degree of risk pricing.
Chart 2
The reference rate for companies with high risk was markedly higher than
the estimated borrowing rate in much of the period up to 1999 (Chart 3). Since
1999, the reference rate for companies with high risk has stood at about the
same level as the estimated borrowing rate, while the borrowing rate for companies
with low and medium risk has been too high in relation to the reference rate.
The reference rate does not take into account that the rate may have a retroactive
effect on bankruptcy probability. When the probability of bankruptcy is strong,
the relevance of the reference rate as a measure of “correct”
pricing is uncertain.
Chart 3
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