Financial Stability 2/2001
5 Liquidity risk

Box:
Counterparty exposure
Little risk of liquidity problems in the short term,…
A bank is liquid if it succeeds in meeting its commitments as they fall due.
Banks accept short-term deposits and provide long-term loans (see Chart 5.1).
This makes them particularly vulnerable to liquidity problems. In practice,
a large portion of banks' financing has a longer expected residual maturity
than the fixed period or contracts indicate. Customer deposits, in particular,
are normally a stable source of financing, among other things because they are
backed by guarantee schemes. Liquidity problems may arise in connection with
unexpected liquidity shocks. Major changes in the payment pattern or payment
problems experienced by large financial counterparties or others may lead to
liquidity problems.
Chart 5.1
Banks normally have no problems with liquidity under normal market conditions
and where there is no uncertainty regarding their financial soundness. Situations
may arise in which market liquidity deteriorates sharply. On 11 September this
year, there was considerable uncertainty concerning dollar liquidity for a short
period, and the interest rate on dollar loans was high for some banks. However,
the market stabilised rapidly, and caused no major problems for Norwegian banks.
…but money market financing from abroad is increasing
Banks' lending growth has been strong for several years. As customer deposits
have not increased as much as lending, the need to obtain financing from money
and capital markets has also increased (see Chart 5.2). From end-1995 to September,
the difference between lending to households, municipalities and non-financial
enterprises and customer deposits rose from NOK 74 to NOK 319 billion. A falling
deposit-to-loan ratio may reflect the fact that bank deposits are meeting strong
competition from other types of saving, such as securities funds and various
insurance products. It may also to some degree reflect the fact that the deposit-to-loan
ratio, as we measure it, does not take fully into account that customers save
more than previously in indexed bonds, which are a source of long-term financing
for banks.
Chart 5.2
The sharp increase in banks' financing requirements in recent years could scarcely
have been met by domestic money and capital markets without a marked increase
in interest rates. Domestic non-banking sectors have recorded a large outflow
of capital which has not been offset by a corresponding inflow of foreign capital.
In this situation, banks have found it profitable to obtain foreign capital
to finance the sharp increase in lending. From end-1995 to September, 2001 gross
foreign debt increased from NOK 49 billion to a little more than NOK 319 billion
(see Chart 5.3). This has made banks more diversified with regard to financing,
but at the same time makes it easier for turbulence from abroad to spill over
to Norwegian banks. The uncertainty in the global economy has increased the
risk of problems in obtaining refinancing from abroad.
Chart 5.3
Financing in money and capital markets has largely shadowed the cost differential
in recent years (see Chart 5.4). In the past six months, there has been an increase
in bond yields relative to money market rates. It appears that the three largest
banks may have adapted to this tendency by increasing their share of short-term
financing.
Chart 5.4
In the second and third quarters this year, the three largest banks increased
their short-term foreign debt markedly at the expense of their domestic short-term
debt. During the same period, liquid assets increased somewhat, but less than
short-term debt (see Chart 5.5). Liquidity risk may therefore have increased
somewhat in the past six months, but from a relatively low level. The three
largest banks have relatively good buffers in the form of liquid assets. However,
it must be added that the value of securities, and hence the basis for new financing,
may drop sharply in the event of turbulence.
Chart 5.5
In the past six months, small and medium-sized banks have increased their long-term
financing, reduced their short-term foreign debt somewhat and slightly increased
their domestic money market financing. In isolation, this has led to a reduction
in liquidity risk. However, the liquid assets are small in relation to money
market financing, so liquidity risk is probably not smaller than for the three
largest banks. The low level of liquid assets may be due to the fact that small
and medium-sized banks base themselves more on agreements for drawing rights
in other banks or interbank deposits when extra liquidity is needed. In times
of turbulence and uncertainty regarding the financial soundness of banks, drawing
rights may be uncertain, and it may be difficult to raise loans in the interbank
market. Although small and medium-sized banks still have relatively little money
market financing from abroad, there may still be a high level of risk associated
with this financing because these banks may not be very well known in international
markets. Moreover, their rating is relatively low compared with major Nordic
and other foreign banks.
Chart 5.6
Factors influencing liquidity risk in the future
In Report no. 6 from the Banking Law Commission (NOU 2001: 23 Activities of
financial undertakings) it is proposed that banks' liquidity requirements should
be qualitative as a general rule, and that liquidity management and maturity
reporting requirements should be set out for both balance sheet and off-balance
sheet items. Increased use of stress tests is also recommended. These proposals
should induce banks to focus on liquidity risk, and contribute to revealing
vulnerable financial structures in institutions in which this risk exists. The
Commission also proposes giving financial undertakings the right to issue asset-backed
bonds and to securitise parts of the loan portfolio. Such a change could improve
the funding situation of banks and reduce liquidity risk. In addition, it could
contribute to the development of the Norwegian securities and capital market,
so that large Norwegian enterprises could to a greater extent obtain financing
directly in the capital market.
The proposed new Basle rules may lead to higher capital requirements for interbank
deposits for Norwegian banks, if banks' ratings form the basis for the rules.
This may make long-term financing more profitable than short-term financing.
Counterparty exposure
Banks may have large exposures to certain counterparties for short periods.
If an important counterparty has problems with its commitments, this may have
ripple effects which at worst may make the financial system unstable. Such
instability may arise directly if a number of banks are exposed to the same
counterparty, or indirectly if a chain reaction is triggered. This may give
rise to liquidity problems, because an expected incoming payment is late,
or a credit loss, if the claim must be regarded as lost. Both may have major
consequences for banks' financial strength. Foreign counterparties may allow
greater diversification and reduced risk of contagion, but may also be a channel
for the spillover of turbulence from abroad.
Norges Bank and the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission together
investigated the magnitude of unsecured counterparty exposures in financial
positions in some large banks as at 30 June 2001. The survey is also to be
carried out on 31 December 2001 and 30 June 2002. Both balance sheet and off-balance
sheet exposures will be included:
- the positive market value of derivatives
- the value of securities issued by counterparties and
- deposits/lending without security
In addition, banks were requested to report exposures in foreign exchange
settlements to these counterparties. These amounts may be substantial (see
Section 4 for a more detailed analysis).
If market developments for underlying financial instruments have been favourable
for the bank at the time of reporting, the positive market value of a derivative
represents the largest possible loss if the counterparty does not meet its
commitment. Banks are particularly active in the market for interest rate
and currency agreements, but also participate in equity-related contracts.
Commodity-related contracts also occur. The value of securities issued by
the counterparty will depend on developments in the value of the company and
may at worst be completely lost in the event of bankruptcy. If unsecured deposits
cannot be withdrawn from another bank or unsecured loans are not repaid according
to agreement, the bank may have liquidity problems or the exposure may be
lost.
Banks were asked to rank their 15 largest counterparties by aggregate exposures
in the form of derivatives, securities and deposits/loans without collateral.
Chart 1 shows the weighted average exposure for each of the counterparties
as a percentage of the weighted core capital for the banks in the survey.
The results must be interpreted with caution, because there is considerable
uncertainty associated with this first survey.
The chart shows that deposits and loans without collateral dominate for the
majority of large counterparties. Up to now, derivatives exposure has been
of limited scope. Exposures in the form of securities vary considerably. If
the largest counterparty of an average bank cannot meet some of its commitments,
on average 21% of its core capital will be lost. If exposures in foreign exchange
settlement to the largest counterparty are also lost, core capital will be
reduced by 35%. If the next largest counterparty goes bankrupt, the average
loss will be 15% of core capital (17% including exposures in the foreign exchange
settlement). Any disbursements from an estate in bankruptcy may reduce this
loss considerably, however. Although these are extreme effects, stress tests
of this type illustrate that upper limits for counterparties are important.
Chart 1
The largest counterparties are mainly other financial institutions. The financial
strength of financial institutions, represented, for example, by their ratings,
is an important indicator of the risk of the counterparty experiencing problems.
The largest foreign counterparties are very solid. However, the bulk of them
are domestic financial institutions, and some large enterprises. Some counterparties
are common to a number of the banks in the survey. It is important that they
are sound. Counterparty ratings are of great importance in the proposed new
Basle rules. Capital adequacy will then to a greater extent have to reflect
this risk, as expressed in counterparty ratings.
© 2001 Norges Bank webmaster@norges-bank.no